Ethics Flashcards
1
Q
The utility principle
A
The morality of an action depends on its propensity to augment or diminish happiness
2
Q
Mill’s proof- stage 1
A
Attempts to prove that happiness is good
1) The only way to know something is visible is to see it
2) The only way to know something is audible is to hear it
3) The only way to know something is desirable is that we desire it
4) Each person desires happiness
5) Each person’s happiness is desirable
4) General happiness is desirable for the aggregate of all people
3
Q
Hedonic calculus
A
Fecundity Purity Extent Duration Intensity Propinquity Certainty
4
Q
Higher vs lower pleasures
A
Higher pleasures- intellectual, artistic pleasures relating to thought, feeling and imagination- more valuable
Lower pleasures- physical, base pleasures stemming from the body and senses- less valuable
A competent judge (one who is completely acquainted with both) determines that higher pleasures are superior
5
Q
Consequentialism
A
The morality of an action depends only on its consequences.
6
Q
Utilitarianism- 3 key points
A
Consequentialism, value theory (happiness is the only good), equality (all happiness is commensurate).
7
Q
Hedonism
A
The claim that happiness is the only good
8
Q
Act utilitarianism
A
Bentham
Actions should be evaluated on a case by case basis according to the hedonic calculus.
Quantitative analysis of happiness
9
Q
Preference utilitarianism.
A
Peter Singer
Aims to maximise the satisfaction of preferences rather than happiness.
10
Q
Mill’s proof- stage 2
A
Happiness is the ultimate end towards which all actions aim. All other ends are either intermediate ends on the way to happiness, or are constituent in happiness (eg. knowledge).
11
Q
Rule utilitarianism
A
Mill
The utility principle is used to establish secondary principles which generally maximise happiness over time.
These principles form the basis of rules which we must always adhere to, even if they do not maximise happiness.
The rules may only be waived when they conflict with each other
Qualitative analysis of happiness.
12
Q
Problems with calculation- utilitarianism
A
How can we work out how much happiness an action will cause- we cannot predict the future. This is too difficult and time consuming.
13
Q
Individual liberties and rights- utilitarianism
A
Utilitarianism cannot rule out any immoral actions provided they maximise happiness- it can’t protect against the tyranny of the majority.
eg. gang rape scenario
14
Q
The value of motives and character- utilitarianism
A
Utilitarianism places no value of the importance of doing something for the right reasons, due to good character
15
Q
The moral status of relationships- utilitarianism.
A
Utilitarianism does not allow us to prioritise those close to us. This expects too much of people, and overlooks the moral value of partiality towards those we love.
16
Q
Deontology
A
An act based approach (actions have intrinsic value)
We have obligations to carry out moral duties
Intentions matter
17
Q
The good will
A
Good without qualification
To be motivated to act out of duty for duties sake
Aims at no end- intrinsically good
18
Q
Duty
A
Our moral obligations
To act in accordance with universal principles according to categorical imperitives
Dependent on reason
19
Q
Hypothetical vs Categorical imperitives
A
Hypothetical- specify a means to an end, conditional, dependent on our desires
Categorical- intrinsically good, unconditional, independent of our desires towards any end
20
Q
Imperitives
A
Instructions or commands
21
Q
1st categorical imperative
A
Act only on those maxims which you could rationally will to become universal law
22
Q
2nd categorical imperative
A
Treat humans never only as a means to an end, but always also as an end in themselves.
23
Q
Contradictions in conception
A
Maxims which are logically contradictory, or self-refuting.
eg. to universalise queue-jumping would undermine the concept of queues.
24
Q
Contradictions in will
A
Maxims which are self-destructive in nature, and therefore irrational
eg. to universalise never helping others would mean no-one would ever help us
25
Reason in morality- Kant
Reason determines what our duties are via categorical imperatives
Only beings capable of reason are subject to morality
Rationality does not depend on our desires- it is universal
26
Problems with application- Kant
Contradictions in will and conception do not offer necessary and sufficient conditions for morality.
With specific enough maxims, immoral maxims can avoid contradiction, yet some moral maxims are contradictory.
27
The importance of consequences - Kant
What makes an action moral is that it aims at a good end- Kant ignores this.
28
The value of motives and commitments- Kant
Kant does not allow us to act out of love or commitment towards individuals.
By acting only out of duty, we loose the moral value of helping those we love.
It is inhuman to put duty above our feelings.
29
Conflicts between duties.
If our moral duties are absolute, there is no way of resolving situations in which we are obliged to carry out two mutually exclusive duties.
30
The good- aristotle
The good is the ultimate end to which all actions aim
We desire it for its own sake
Good without qualification
31
Eudaimonia
'Flourishing' or 'living well and faring well'
The activity of the soul, exhibiting virtues in accordance with reason.
The ultimate good for human beings
Objective
Refers to life as a whole, not in one transient moment
The only self-sufficient good
32
Ergon
The function or characteristic activity of an object or being.
33
Arete
Qualities or virtues that allow something to carry out its characteristic activity.
34
The function argument
Something is good if it is exercising its virtues in order to perform its characteristic activity well.
The ergon of humans is reason.
Good, for humans, is the activity of living in accordance with reasons, via our virtues, to achieve eudaimonia.
35
The doctrine of the mean
The virtue found between the vices of excess and deficiency.
Specific to individuals in given circumstances- subjective
Found via practical wisdom
36
Psyche
The 'soul'
Divided into the arational and rational parts.
Arational consists of growth and nutrition- we share this with animals
Rational consists of reason- this is unique to humans
Both can contribute to emotions and desires.
37
Virtues
Traits of the soul concerned with choice
| Divided into intellectual virtues (of the rational part) and virtues of character (of the desires and emotions part).
38
Phronesis
Practical wisdom
An intellectual virtue that we use to control our emotions and desires, and apply our virtues by locating the golden mean.
39
Character
A person's dispositions towards certain behaviour.
| Can be developed over a life time
40
Examples of virtues of characters and their respective vices.
Courage, between cowardice and rashness
Truthfulness, between false modesty and boastfulness
Righteous indignation, between spite and envy
41
Acquiring virtue
Acquired via habit
42
Virtuous action
An action is virtuous when the agent knows what they are doing, chooses the action for its own sake, and makes their choice from a position of strong character.
A just action is done in accordance with justice, and 'as the just person does it'.
43
Voluntary vs involuntary actions
blehhhhh
44
Cognitivism
Ethical language has truth value
Aims to describe the world
Expresses a belief
Mind to world direction of fit
45
Non-cognitivism
Ethical language has no truth value
Does not aim to describe the world
Expresses an attitude or emotion
World to mind direction of fit
46
Direction of fit
Whether the mind changes to fit the external reality in the world, or we seek to change the world to fit with the desires in our minds.
47
Arguments for cognitivism
We can make mistakes about morality
We feel obligated to external moral standards
Morality is independent of our feelings
Moral progress is possible
48
Moral realism
Right and wrong are just ordinary properties that can be ascribed to things
Morality is mind independent
It refers to a genuine part of the external world
49
Ethical naturalism
A cognitivist, realist theory
| Moral properties can be reduced to some natural properties - they are identical
50
Utilitarianism as naturalism
Happiness is identical to goodness.
51
The naturalistic fallacy
Moore
Goodness is a simple, unanalysable property
Any attempt to define goodness in terms of something else is fallacious
Goodness cannot be investigated by empirical means
52
The open question argument
An open question is one which can logically have more than one possible answer.
If x is identical to good, then 'Is x good?' is not an open question.
'Is x good?' is always an open question.
Therefore good cannot be equated to a natural property.
53
Intuitionism
A cognitivist, realist, non-naturalist theory
Good is a non-natural property of the world
Moral truth is known via rational intuition, not empirically
Moral truths are a form of synthetic a priori knowledge
54
Rational intuitions
Self-evident statements
Can be known simply via consideration of a statement
Not analytically true, but still accessed a priori
55
Warnock's issues with intuitionism
How is morality linked to natural facts?
How do we resolve moral disagreements if morality is simply 'self evident'?
If morality just provides us with facts, how do these motivate us?
56
Features of an objective claim.
1. Can be known
2. Has truth value
3. Independent of our desires
4. Mind-independent
5. Part of the fabric of the world
57
Error theory
A cognitive anti-realist theory
Ethical statements aim to make objective claims about morality
Moral statements are always false
Moral properties do not exist
58
Epistemological queerness.
Realists can't account for how we come to know about the objective moral properties of things
None of sense perception, introspection and reason can account for this knowledge
Non-naturalists can't explain the relationship between natural and moral properties
59
Metaphysical queerness
Realists can't account for how moral statements motivate us
Objective properties have no relationship to our desires and yet moral truths do
The direction of fit of moral statements is wrong
60
Emotivism
Non-cognitive theory- Ayer and Hume
Moral statements express a feeling of approval or disapproval
Moral statements are like secondary qualities- they are mind dependent
There are no moral truths
61
Hume's arguments against cognitivism
Moral judgements can motivate actions, therefore they are not rational
Moral judgements do not fit onto Hume's fork, therefore they are not rational
62
Hume's argument from motivation
1) Moral judgements can motivate action
2) Reason cannot motivate action
3) Moral judgements are not rational
All rational judgements have a mind to world direction of fit- therefore they do not motivate us.
Moral judgements cannot then be rational
63
Hume's fork against cognitivism
1) All rational judgements are either relations of ideas or matters of fact
2) Moral judgements are neither
3) Moral judgements are not rational
If moral judgements were relations of ideas they would be analytically true by definition, regardless of context.
If moral truths were matters of fact, we should be able to identify the empirical fact they relate to, but we can't
64
The is-ought gap
Hume's argument that statements about what ought to be are entirely different in nature than statements about what is, and therefore one cannot be derived from the other
65
Ayer's argument against non-naturalism
According to the verification principle, any statements that are not either analytic or empirically verifiable are factually meaningless
Intuitions are neither- therefore we have no way of deciding between competing intuitions.
Moral judgements are not meaningful- they express emotion.
66
Punnishment vs revenge
Punishment is administered by someone impartial, who has official/ legal authority.
Revenge is the action of a victim who has no formal authority to harm the wrongdoer.
67
Utilitarians on punnishment
Punishment is only justified if the happiness caused in society is greater than the suffering of the wrongdoer
Deterence, protection, reform, rehabilitation
Forward looking aproach
68
Issues with utilitarianism on punishment
Punishing the innocent could be justified
Preventative punishment could be justified
Disproportionate punishments may maximise happiness
Justice is not necessarily served by the maximisation of happiness.
69
Kant on punishment
Punishment is a matter of justice
Backwards looking aproach
The punishment should fit the crime
Criminals choose to act on certain maxims that should be universalised against them- treat people as they have chosen to be treated
Punishments from deterrence or protection involve using criminals as a means to an end, not as rational beings
Retribution and rectification are used
70
Issues with Kant on punnishment
If no good comes out of the punishment, what's the point of it?
71
Aristotle on punnishment
Justice means that people should get what they are 'due'
Punishment should seek to rebalance an unfair advantage gained by crime
Rectification achieves this
72
Issues with Aristotle on punnishment
It isn't always clear how certain crimes can be rectified
By talking of gain and loss Aristotle doesn't focus on the victim
What good comes from this form of justice?
73
Kant- Justice ad bellum
War must be fought for a 'just cause' - not to seek some political advantage
eg. defending the rights of a nation, resisting agression
War must be declared by a legitimate state
The decision to declare war should be a democratic one- to do so without their consent defies the 2nd CI
74
Utilitarianism - Jus ad bellum
War should only be a last resort- if there is any other way of resolving a conflict it should be taken
There must be a high probability of success in war
The good that can be secured after war must be proportionate to justify the suffering caused
75
Aristotle- Jus ad bellum
War is not desirable, but a necessary response to some evil
The only reason for war is to secure peace
It must be waged for the right reasons, in the right way, at the right time
76
Kant- Jus in bello
It is wrong to intend the deaths of non-combatants
Any force used must be proportional to the end it seeks to achieve
Some methods are ruled out as evil in themselves
77
Utilitarianism- Jus in bello
Only combatants should be targeted
The end must justify the means- excessive cruelty s not justifiable
No method can be definitively ruled out as too harsh
78
Aristotle- Jus in bello
Bravery is commended as a virtue
| Malicious enjoyment of war is a vice
79
Kant- Jus post bellum
War should seek to secure the rights of people once over
The aggressors of war should be punished in an attempt to restore justice and repair the damage caused
The futures of innocent citizens should not be jeopardised by this settlement
80
Utilitarianism- Jus post bellum
The happiness of everyone should be secured
Any form of punishment or reparation only serves to spread further aggression between sides
The only goal should be ensuring peace and happiness in the long run
81
Utilitarianism- treatment of animals
Animals have preferences and can suffer
To ignore the happiness of animals is species-ism
Animals should be treated kindly in life and slaughtered painlessly
The happiness of animals can be equally compared to that of humans when making calculations
82
Kant- treatment of animals
Animals do not have rational will, and can therefore be treated as a means to an end
Harming animals goes against a duty to ourselves and other humans to be virtuous.
Cruelty to animals may lead to cruelty to others
(This suggests that we can used humans who cannot reason as a means to an end?)
83
Regan- treatment of animals
Animals that are subjects of life (have emotions, desires, beliefs, etc) should be valued
We cannot take the life of such an animal for anything less than to save a life
We should not discriminate between more or less valuable lives
84
Aristotle- treatment of animals
Animals have no share in eudaimonia as they are not capable of reason
There is moral significance to our relationship with animals
Not to recognise the importance of animal suffering shows lack of compassion, detrimental to the development of character
Aristotle does not give very clear guidance on this matter
85
Utilitarianism- simulated killing
Simulated killing is wrong only if it actually has a tendency to increase violence in the real world, therefore decreasing happiness
There is little evidence yet to show that this is the case
Pleasure gained from simulated killing may be a 'lower pleasure'
86
Kant- simulated killing
If simulated killing damages our rational will then it violates our duty to others
It could increase our willingness to be violent to others- although there is little evidence for this
It might erode our sense of identity as rational beings
87
Aristotle- simulated killing
Simulated killing is wrong if it prevents the development of virtue and prevents the achievement of eudaimonia
The virtuous person may engage in simulated killing in 'the right way' eg. gains pleasure not from the killing but from success or progression within the game
The morality of simulated killing depends on the person and the way in which we engage with it
88
Utilitarianism- telling lies
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Act- if lying will maximise happiness then it is right
Strong rule- a rule that prevents lying will generally maximise happiness in the long run so we shouldn't lie
Weak rule (Mill)- there are situations in which lying is necessary. Our rule should allow for certain exceptions in which lying is the best course of action
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89
Kant- telling lies
Lying is a contradiction in conception
We should never lie, even to save a life, because we might be mistaken about the consequences of our actions
eg. murderer example
90
Aristotle- telling lies
Truthfulness as a virtue between boastfulness and false modesty focuses on honesty about oneself- in these cases we can find the mean.
More generally, lying is never considered to be virtuous.
There are better and worse motives for lying
The virtuous person might be able to apply practical wisdom to deceive in the right way, at the right time, for the right reasons, etc.
91
Warnock's arguments against emotivism (3)
Ethical language is not unique in being emotive and influencing attitudes- morality must be distinguished from advertising.
Ethical language doesn't always seek to influence anyone
Ethical language isn't necessarily emotive- moral discussion can be dispassionate.
92
Moral argument against emotivism
If ethical language has no truth value and is just emotive, how can we have rational discussion about it, or form formal deductive arguments?
People can rationally change their minds on moral issues
People deliberate over moral issues
This is not consistent with emotivism, where moral reasoning is just emotional manipulation
93
Prescriptivism
Hare
Moral statements intend to prescribe moral imperatives on others, or make value judgements
eg. murder is wrong = do not murder
We are not persuading people with moral statements, we are attempting to instruct them
94
Good for prescriptivists
The word good aims to commend something, not describe it.
Good is not a property, it is a term of praise.
We call something good in relation to a set of standards
We must be consistent with our standards- two identical things must either both be good, or neither be good
A good person is one whom adheres to whichever set of moral standards we have adopted
95
Hare on moral standards.
Our moral standards are subjective- they are adopted rather than being true or false
We must be consistent with our standards- we cannot hold different people to different standards.
We must universalise our moral judgements, otherwise we are being logically contradictory
96
Moral reasoning for prescriptivists
Imperitives can reasonably form parts of a deductive argument
Moral disagreements can be about lack of logical consistency in applying standards
We can discuss someones reasons for their prescriptions
97
Warnock against emotivism
If moral standards are not objectively correct, then we cannot reason with those who hold different standards to us
We cannot rule out people holding very objectionable standards
98
Arguments for non-cognitivism
Moral judgements motivate us and facts do not- thus they must be emotional in some way
Moral decisions seem to be subjective and circumstantial
Morality is not always universal
99
The authority of morality
If there is no objective moral truth, morality has no authority over us.
Acting morally seems to be a matter of taste
Non-cognitivist cannot seem to explain the obligation we feel to act morally
100
Moral progress
If there is no objective moral truth, we cannot make moral progress because we have nothing to aim towards.
