mind 3 and 5 markers

Question 1

qualia (3)

Answer 1

intrinsic and non-intentional, phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible.. e.g experiencing the difference between seeing a red rose compared to seeing a yellow rose

Question 2

what is intentionality (3)

Answer 2

the quality of certain mental states which direct themselves beyond themselves and to things in the world.
its what makes mental states such as beliefs, desires, and fears about something. e.g my belief that its raining is about the rain

Question 3

define phenomenal properties (3)

Answer 3

-phenomenal consciousness (involved in perception, sensation, emotion)
-‘what it is like’ -e.g to see a ripe tomato, to smell coffee, to feel sad
not comparative
-subjective qualities of experience

Question 4

define intentional properties

Answer 4

the quality of certain mental states which direct themselves beyond themselves and to things in the world.
its what makes mental states such as beliefs, desires, and fears about something. e.g my belief that its raining is about the rain

Question 5

what is the difference between intentional and phenomenal properties (3)

Answer 5

• qualia: ‘intrinsic and non-intentional, phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’
• intentional m.s: mental states are ‘about’ or ‘directed onto’ something
• qualia are non-intentional mental states (not directed at something) unlike intentional mental states

Question 6

define substance dualism (3)

Answer 6

minds exist and are not identical to bodies or parts of bodies
—-descartes focus on the difference between properties and substance;
material substances - body
mental substances - mind

Question 7

define property dualism (3)

Answer 7

there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties

Question 8

what is a philosophical zombie (3)

Answer 8

a physical, functional duplicate of a minded being but with no qualia, no subjective experience.
— there is no ‘what it is like’ to be a p-zombie

Question 9

define interactionist dualism (3)

Answer 9

the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. the mental and physical can interact in both directions

Question 10

define epiphenomenalism (3)

Answer 10

mental events are caused by physical events. they are a ‘by product’ of physical events. mental events are causally impotent: they are merely epiphenomenon. lastly, mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events

Question 11

what is the difference between interactionist and epiphenomalist dualism (3)

Answer 11

the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. the mental and physical can interact in both directions

mental events are caused by physical events. they are a ‘by product’ of physical events. mental events are causally impotent: they are merely epiphenomenon. lastly, mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events

Question 12

what is physicalism (3)

Answer 12

everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events and any substances that exist)

Question 13

what is supervenience (3)

Answer 13

– a property X supervenes on another property Y if there cannot be a difference in property X without a difference in Y

mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics

Question 14

define hard behaviourism (3)

Answer 14

all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements

Question 15

define soft behaviourism (3)

Answer 15

propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions - ie propositions that use ordinary language

Question 16

define mind brain type identity theory (3)

Answer 16

all mental states are identical to brain states (ontological reduction) although ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (not an analytic reduction)

Question 17

define eliminative materialism (3)

Answer 17

some or all common-sense (folk psychological) mental states/properties do not exist and our common sense understanding is radically mistaken - paul and patricia churchland

Question 18

what is folk psychology (3)

Answer 18

• empirical theory of the mind
• postulates m.s such as beliefs and desires, to explain and predict behaviour
  — explanation requires laws: we use a network of common sense laws

Question 19

define functionalism (3)

Answer 19

all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised

Question 20

what is multiple realisability (3)

Answer 20

• multiple realisability thesis contends that a singular mental kind (property, state, event) can be realised by many distinct physical kinds
  — common example is pain: wide variety of physical properties, states, or events sharing no features in common at that level of description can all realise the same pain

Question 21

what are inverted qualia (3)

Answer 21

Two subjects have different qualitative experiences when confronted with the same stimuli, despite the fact the two subjects are functionally equivalent.
- their different qualitative experiences stand in the same causal relation to the mental states and input and output, but are inverted in relation to each other

Question 22

outline the indivisibility argument (5)

Answer 22

p1: the mind is indivisible by its very nature
p2: the body is divisible by its very nature
p3: two things are identical if, and only if, they share exactly the same properties (leibniz’ law)
c1: my mind has a property that my body doesn’t have, namely, being indivisible
c2: therefore, the mind and body are not identical

Question 23

outline the conceivability argument for substance dualism (5)

Answer 23

p1: I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body existing
p2: anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive if is metaphysically possible.
c1: therefore my mind existing without my extended physical body is metaphysically possible
p3: if it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y, then X is not identical to Y
c: therefore my mind is not identical with my extended physical body

Question 24

explain the argument against substance dualism that the mental is divisible in some sense (5)

Answer 24

• descartes’ claim that we will, think, imagine with the whole of our minds, not a literal part is appealing. however, cases of mental illness, e.g multiple personality syndrome, might be used to suggest that the mind can be divided
• in such cases, it seems that some ‘parts’ of the person’s mind are unable to communicate with other ‘parts’. theories of the unconscious suggest something similar: people may believe or desire one thing consciously and the opposite thing unconsciously. so it makes sense to talk about ‘parts’ of the mind
  example: split brain surgery
• reference to leibniz law: if two things have different properties, that proves they cannot be one and the same thing ; therefore mind and body both divisible, proving substance dualism to be wrong

Question 25

explain the argument against substance dualism, that not everything thought of as physical is divisible (5)

Answer 25

• we may question whether this theory of physical objects is correct. it was a matter of some debate in the 17th and 18th centuries whether physical objects are infinitely divisible. if you cut something up, can you always cut it into smaller pieces
• the question is not whether we can actually do this right now, with the technology we have, but whether there are physical things that cannot be divided even in principle
• e.g if the smallest physical particles are best understood as packets of energy or force fields, then we can’t further divide these - you can’t have half of a force field
• or again, perhaps not only force fields but also processes or waves or something else that can’t be divided spatially form a fundamental part of the physical universe
  — there is a point where you can’t divide matter anymore
• it may not be an essential or defining property o every physical substance that it’s divisible. as shown, there are some indivisible things, such as force fields, that are physical. it could be a form of non-divisible physical thing. so even if descartes is right that the mind isn’t divisible, this doesn’t prove that it isn’t physical

Question 26

explain the argument against substance dualism, mind without body is not conceivable (5)

Answer 26

(questions p1 - logical possibility)
- ghost in the machine
—- key issue is that descartes infers possibility from conceivability
- because it’s conceivable that mind can exist without body then it is possible that mind can exist without body
- however, behaviourists argue that it isn’t conceivable that mind exists without body
- to talk about beliefs, desires, choices etc is to talk about how something behaves
- however, without a body we cannot exhibit behaviour
- and without behaviour, there is no mind
- therefore, it’s not possible that the mind exists without the body (this would be a ‘ghost in the machine’)
- therefore, it’s not conceivable that mind exists without body

Question 27

explain the argument against substance dualism, that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible (5)

Answer 27

masked man fallacy:
- leibniz’s law states that, if one object has a certain property, while another object does not have the same property, the two objects cannot be identical
- so the mind is unextended, the body is extended

• however, while we may acknowledge that it’s logically possible that it’s conceivable that mind and body are distinct, it doesn’t mean that it’s metaphysically possible for water not to be H20 (if it isn’t H20, it isn’t water)
• the same argument applied to mind and body. it’s logically possible that they are distinct, but they could be identical or part of the same substance, even though they have distinct properties.
• in the same way i may think peter parker is not spiderman because peter wears glasses and is meek, while spiderman doesn’t and is heroic, but they are the same person, the distinct properties i ascribe to minds doesn’t mean that that it’s possible for minds to be distinct from bodies,
• this would be committing the masked man fallacy. this shows the conceivability argument doesn’t establish that mind and body and distinct substances

Question 28

explain the argument against substance dualism, what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world (5)

Answer 28

this criticism questions whether the mind does exist as a distinct substance. descartes’ conception of the mind as thinking and unextended, and the body as unthinking and extended could equally be argued against with the idea that there’s just one substance.
- just because it’s metaphysically possible that they’re distinct substances does’t mean that they are.
- modern discoveries within neuroscience: show that the mind is the brain, and that there are only physical substances.
- therefore, whilst it may be logically and metaphysically possible that mind and body are distinct, in the actual world they’re not.
—- libet’s example - proves substance dualism to be incorrect with a real-world example

Question 29

outline the philosophical zombie argument for property dualism (5)

Answer 29

p1:it is conceivable that there are physical zombies: physically identical to conscious human beings but lacking subjective conscious states
p2: if it is conceivable, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies
p3: if it is possible that there could be a world physically like ours but where there are no phenomenal properties of consciousness, then these properties are non-physical
C: therefore, property dualism is true

Question 30

outline the knowledge/mary argument for property dualism (5)

Answer 30

p1: mary knows all the physical facts about colour in the room
p2: mary comes to learn something new when she sees res for the first time
p3: what mary learns is a fact about colour vision
C: therefore, not all facts are physical

Question 31

explain the difference between hard and soft behaviourism (5)

Answer 31

hard behaviourism: all propositions about the mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements
soft behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (using ordinary language)

Question 32

outline dualist arguments against philosophical behaviourism (5)

Answer 32

behaviourism misunderstands the mind. qualia etc cant be analytically reduced to behaviour. cant account for mental causation
introspection: we introspect actual current mental states, events and activities
qualia: phenomenal qualia can’t be analysed in behaviourist terms. e,g to be in pain is not to merely produce appropriate pain behaviour under right circumstances , but is to experience a ‘like-thisness’ of the pain.
e.g a philosophical zombie may engage in pain behaviour yet completely lack whatever is quantitatively distinctive and proper to pain
mental causation: sometimes the effect can be brought about by different causes

Question 33

explain the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including hilary putnam’s ‘super-spartans’ and perfect actors) (5)

Answer 33

-type of conceivability argument
-society of super spartans who feel pain but do not display behaviour - connection between m.s and
behaviour should be necessary, if not, behaviourism =false
-have qualia but behavioural disposition is missing

Question 34

explain issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to (a) circularity and (b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour (5)

Answer 34

issue with defining m.s
multiple realisability
p1: people with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance
c1: therefore, what makes it true that two people have the same mental state is not that they have the same behavioural dispositions
c2 ; behaviourism = false, doesnt give correct account of mental states
circularity how someone behaves in a particular situation depends not on just one mental state, such as being afraid, but on how this interacts with other m.s
- we can’t analyse what behaviour a m.s is a disposition for without referring to other m.s
- e.g i am afraid of dangerous snakes. does this make me want to run when i see one? do i believe the snake is dangerous? am i able to recognize the kind of snake?etc - we cant specidy what set of dispositions my fear is w/o mentioning my beliefs, my knowledge, my desires…

Question 35

explain the assymetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states (5)

Answer 35

• the way i know about my mind is entirely different from the way about others; direct, non-inferential, certain
• behaviourism implies that i can discover the same kind of things about the minds/m.s of others that i can discover about my own mind/mental states - obvious assymetry that exists between our self-knowledge and our knowledge of others

Question 36

explain dualist arguments applied to mind brain identity theory (5)

Question 37

explain issues for identity theory with providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states) (5)

Question 38

explain the issue, for eliminative materialism, that our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations (5)

Answer 38

• el.m says that there is no mind
• one issue is that it’s counter-intuitive. nothing could be more certain to me than the fact that i have mental states, for example, thoughts,desires, beliefs etc.
• descartes supports this criticism through the cogito: i can doubt that my own body exists, however, i cannot doubt that i have thoughts. i have a clear and instinct ideas of my own existence which is a belief derived from intuition and certainty, i therefore cannot doubt i am experiencing beliefs (and thus that beliefs exist)
• this therefore shows we can have certainty about the existence of our mental states, and the instinctive nature that is directly obvious and immediate to us also shows that is takes priority over other considerations
• therefore, el.m is wrong

Question 39

explain the issue that folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis) (5)

Answer 39

• a key aspect of folk psychology is that is isn’t stagnant. it has incorporated many modern ideas from psychology, such as the unconscious and repressed desires, making it an adaptive and flexible theory
• it’s able to incorporate and explain new ideas without collapsing, displaying good explanatory power.
• it is an important part of cognitive psychology, cohering with scientific discipline and modern scientific advances, showing good prediction.
• since it coheres with other scientific discipline, folk psychology id indirectly engaged in answering explanatory failure and cohering with modern scientific advances.
  — since it explains and predicts human action very well, it is therefore the best hypothesis

Question 40

explain why the articulation of eliminative materialism is self refuting (5)

Answer 40

• el.m is the theory that some or all common sense (folk psychological) mental states do not exist and our common sense understanding is radically mistaken.
• it can be argued to be self-refuting in the sense that there is a ‘desire’ of the churchlands to persuade people of the truth of el.m so mate that they have the same ‘belief ‘ about it, despite the fact they’re arguing there are no beliefs.
• in other words, the eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false, which is a belief, however the eliminative materialist also claims that belief is not a genuine m.s
• this involved a contradiction, and it is this logical contradiction that makes el.m self-refuting

Question 41

outline the issue for functionalism, of the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia) (5)

Answer 41

• abby and norma example > functionally speaking, there’s nothing to differentiate the states when they see the coke can. > thus it looks as if functional definitions of mental states leave out the qualitative aspects of mental states
  p1: functionalism about the qualia of seeing a colour is true only if it’s impossible for there to be no two individuals with identical functional roles, but distinct qualitative character
  p2: it’s conceivable that two individuals exist with inverted spectra: when norma sees red, abby sees green
  p3: if it’s conceivable that X, then it is possible that P
  p4: so it’s possible that inverted spectra exists
  p5: so functionalism about the qualitative aspect of seeing a colour is false
  — functionalism cannot capture the qualitative aspect of experience, not giving us a complete account of mind

Question 42

outline the issue for functionalism, of the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (5)

Answer 42

p1: a functional zombie is functionally identical to something that has qualia/phenomenal properties (block’s chinese mind - creation of a mind on a grand scale organised by the whole chinese nation into a functional entity)
p2: a functional zombie is conceivable
p3: if X is conceivable then X is logically possible.
c1: therefore, a functional zombie is logically possible
p4: if a functional zombie is logically possible. then phenomenal properties are not functional properties
c2: therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind

Question 43

outline the issue for functionalism and explain why no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia (5)

Answer 43

p1: if functionalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the functional facts about colour perception would be to have complete knowledge of all the mental facts involved in colour perception
p2: mary knows all the functional facts involved in colour perception
p3: when mary sees colour (e.g a red rose) she learns a new fact ( of what it is like for both herself and other people to see red)
p4: if mary learns a new fact, not all mental facts can be functional facts (since mary already knew all of these)
c1: therefore, not all mental facts are functional facts
c2: therefore, functionalism is false

Question 44

outline the problem of other minds facing dualism (5)

Answer 44

• dualism: the view that minds are not reducible nor identical to bodies or to parts of bodies
• dualists agree that physicalists cannot explain the certainty we have about our own mental life and that phenomenal and intentional m.s cannot be reduced to brain states or brain events
• this means that there is something irreducibly psychical about our minds; the existence of a mind cannot be reverified empirically
• minds cannot be observed
• if i cannot perceive other minds, then there is no way of knowing other people have minds
• i cannot know that they have one as i can never perceive them, and i cannot know the nature of their m.s because i only have knowledge of mine

Question 45

outline the argument from analogy, in response to the problem of other minds (5)

Answer 45

• the problem of other minds is that we can only have knowledge of our own mind (cogito) and therefore can only know our own mental states
• mill’s argument from analogy aims to respond to this:
  p1: i have a mind
  p2: i know from experience that my m.s cause my behaviour
  p3: other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations
  c1: therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause (the mind) as my behaviour
  c2: therefore, other people have minds

Question 46

outline the view that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis in response to the problem of other minds (5)

Answer 46

• can employ a standard form of scientific reasoning: inference to the best explanation
• this asks why do human beings behave as they do, which hypothesis explains people’s behaviours the best
• the claim is that it is the best hypothesis to say that other people have minds and their m.s cause them to behave as they dp
• ms can be taken to be ‘inter’ states that respond to environment and cause behaviour - this is what they are
  -e.g the m.s of pain causes us to respond and prevent further pain, the desire for coffee causes me to go and get coffee
• this is the best explanation for causing behaviour

Question 47

outline the view that dualism makes a category mistake (5) property

Answer 47

• dualism: view that minds are not reducible nor identical to bodies or to parts of bodies
• to make a category mistake is to assign a concept to a logical category to which it doesn’t belong - a category mistake is therefore a logical error
• property dualism thinks of mental or phenomenal properties as part of the same metaphysical framework as physical and functional properties, but they’re not physical
• this thus assigns mental properties to the category of the physical whilst conceiving of it as non-physical
• instead, to talk of mental properties can be reduced to overt behaviour or behavioural dispositions

Question 48

outline the conceptual interaction problem against dualism (5)

Answer 48

• a priori conceptual argument
  p1: causation without pushing/having physical contact is inconceivable
  p2: if causation without X is inconceivable then causation without X is (or is likely to be) impossible
  c1: therefore, causation without X is impossible (likely to be impossible)
  p3: causation between the physical and the non-physical (in either direction) could not possible involve X
  c2: causation between the physical and the non-physical is impossible

Question 49

outline the empirical interaction problem against dualism (5)

Answer 49

• general issue of the incompatibility of interactionist dualism and empirical science, a posteriori/empirical issues as they rule out the dualists interactionist theory on the basis of empirical/scientific facrs, arguments from causal closure

p1: the universe is a closed causal system in which the total amount of energy remains constant (conservation of energy principle)
p2: any non-physical to physical causation would involve an addition of energy to the universe and physical to non-physical would involve a loss of energy
c: therefore, non-physical to physical causation is empirically impossible

the second empirical problem is more specific: science indicates that the movements of the body are caused by physical events in the brain, so if the mind were to move the body it does so by changing what happens in the brain - we have no evidence of this

Question 50

outline the challenge that introspective self-knowledge poses for epiphenomenalism (5)

Answer 50

epiphenomenalism: mental events are caused by physical events. they are a ‘by product’ of physical events. mental events are causally impotent: they are merely epiphenomenon. lastly, mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events

• goes against the common sense opinion that our volition causes our actions– when i decide to reach out for a cup of tea, the conscious decision must be what causes me to reach out (m.s don’t cause anything, so they cannot cause other m.s)
• introspection seems to show that different mental states are causally related to each other
  -e.g the desire to stay dry causes me to wonder where i might find an umbrella, so our introspective awareness of our minds strongly suggests that they represent a stream of causally linked ideas
  -
  appears to be incompatible with being able to form beliefs about, or meaningfully to talk about, our own mental states.
• if m.s cant cause anything physical, then they can’t cause me to talk about them- when im in pain, what am i talking about when i complain about pain?

Question 51

outline the challenge that the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical) poses for epiphenomenalism (5)

Answer 51

The challenge that the phenomenology of our mental life poses is that introspection (direct, non-inferential awareness of our mind) suggests that sensations or qualia cause actions. For example, the mental state of pain when I burn my hand causes me to move it away, run it under cold water and also avoid that in the future. This shows that qualia do have a causal power which epiphenomenalism rejects. Another problem is that epiphenomenalism is in conflict with a central aspect of phenomenology: the sense that our actions are free and we have free will. When I deliberate whether to stay in and study or go out with my friends, and choose to stay, I feel strongly as if I am exercising my free will because the fact, I had another option and chose not that and was not forced shows that it was free. Yet epiphenomenalism argues that everything is caused by the physical and so free will does not exist. This is a crucial problem, for example because it takes away moral responsibility and contradicts the nature of qualia

Question 52

outline the challenge that natural selection/evolution poses for epiphenomenalism (5)

Answer 52

• natural selection: process determined in evolutionary theory to explain the evolution of particular traits in a population of organisms
• organisms with mental states have ultimately evolved from creatures that lack them and this is a result of natural selection
• for natural selection to select a feature, it must be causally potent: ie its presence/absence bestows different causal powers on the organism that has it
• therefore, m.s have causal powers
  -according to epiphenomenalism, m.s have no causal power, therefore its false
  -evolved characteristics should help us to survive and pass on other genes. but, if m.s have no causal role to play, then they cannot have any survival value and, therefore, we would expect them not to have evolved — if we can operate successfully without minds, why would evolution have favoured beings with them??

If we accept that evolution occurs by natural selection, then the traits that humans have developed are in order to help them survive. Therefore, one would assume that we evolved to have consciousness because it would help us to survive. This contradicts epiphenomenalism’s argument that mental states do not cause anything. Yet if this is the case, then there would be no point for them existing as everything that we have benefits us to survive in some way. If epiphenomenalism was correct, a zombie world would be possible but this does not explain that brains in this world seem to produce mental states that are causally impotent and contradicts with evolution.