behaviourism 25 mark

Question 1

intro

Answer 1

• physicalist theory
• *all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movement
  solves interactionsim + problem of other minds
  theory fails due to crucial issue: assymmety

Question 2

argument 1: hempel and verification principle

Answer 2

• the verification principle argues that a statement is meaningful only if its analytic or if it can be verified empirically
• mental states are private: cant be verified by other people - talk of mental statements is meaningless
  talk of behaviour is empirically verifiable and therefore meaningful as behaviour is publicly observable
  analytic reduction: everything that can be said in the familiar vocabulary of sensations, beliefs, thoughts consciousness can be better described in other mental terms, namely behavioural descriptions
• paul and his toothache

strong bc: logical positivsim origins - here the mind is not a metaphysical substance inaccessible to science

Question 3

issue 1: multiple realisability and circularity

Answer 3

issue with defining m.s
multiple realisability
p1: people with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance
c1: therefore, what makes it true that two people have the same mental state is not that they have the same behavioural dispositions
c2 ; behaviourism = false, doesnt give correct account of mental states
circularity how someone behaves in a particular situation depends not on just one mental state, such as being afraid, but on how this interacts with other m.s
- we can’t analyse what behaviour a m.s is a disposition for without referring to other m.s
- e.g i am afraid of dangerous snakes. does this make me want to run when i see one? do i believe the snake is dangerous? am i able to recognize the kind of snake?etc - we cant specidy what set of dispositions my fear is w/o mentioning my beliefs, my knowledge, my desires…

Question 4

response to circularity: soft behaviourism

Answer 4

multiple realisability and circularity aren’t objections - they misunderstand the theory
- we cant reduce mental concepts to a set of behavioural dispositions
- m.s are still concepts of behavioural dispositions, jus at ahigher level of generality
- dispositions are hypothetical propositions, so behaviour refers to actual and potential behaviour
- —-easily resolved.

Question 5

issue 2: qualia and introspection

Answer 5

qualia - intrinsic and non-intentional, phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible
-qualia by very nature are private but behaviour is public.
introspection - inescapable that there are inner mental episodes that we know from the inside - not constituted by any actual behaviour or mere hypotheticals
qualia - phenomenal qualia can’t be analysed in behaviourist terms
- some features of mentality have characteristic ‘qualia’. e.g, to be in pain is not merely to produce appropriate pain behaviour under the right environmental circumstances, but is to experience a ‘like-thisness’
- —– unable to account for causal efficiency of mental states

Question 6

response to qualia:

Answer 6

hempel: statements cannot be about private or inaccesible states of the person
- there are no such things as qualia (unless what we mean by qualia are behavioural descriptions) so when paul says ‘this is what its like’ he is observing and describing hus behaviour

Question 7

issue to response: mental causation

Answer 7

mental causation: m.s are understood with reference to/are dependent on other m.s - links to circularity
-e.g a desire to stay dry, will dispose you to carry an umbrella only on the condition that you believe it might rain.
mental states cause behaviour, they cannot be reduced to purely behavioural prorpositions - doesnt give correct account of m.s

Question 8

response to the issue to response: ryle - category mistake

Answer 8

ryle: category mistake.
dualists make a logical error, the mind is not a substance, oxford example
- m.s can be reduced to propositions of behaviour bv mind is immaterial

Question 9

issue 3: super spartans

Answer 9

• type of conceivanility argument
• society of super spartans who feel pain but do not display behaviour - connection between m.s and behaviour should be necessary, if not, behaviourism =false
• have qualia but behavioural disposition is missing

Question 10

response to super spartans:

Answer 10

they have behavioural dispositions
- pain reporting is behaviour

Question 11

issue to response: X worlders

Answer 11

x-worlders:
- they have been super-spartans for so long they even suppress talk of pain: dont even have the disposition
- we can imagine scenarios where there is no pain but no pain behaviour = contingent rather than necessary = behaviourism is faaaaalse

Question 12

ISSUE 4: assymetry

Answer 12

• the way i know about my mind is entirely different from the way about others; direct, non-inferential, certain
• behaviourism implies that i can discover the same kind of things about the minds/m.s of others that i can discover about my own mind/mental states - obvious assymetry that exists between our self-knowledge and our knowledge of others