Military key moments Flashcards
Attack on Fort Sumter, April 11th, 1861
INDECISIVE BATTLE IN LOWER SEABOARD THEATRE
Context:
- Fort Sumter was a key sea fort in Charleston, S. Carolina, defending the bay which gives access to Charleston Town
Lead up:
- Confederate forces surrounding harbour
- Debate in Lincoln’s cabinet as to what to do. Seward/Scott wanted to give up the fort as a goodwill gesture, and the Union didn’t have the 25 000 needed to defend it
–> Decided that, by a plan devised by General Gustavus V. Fox and modified by Lincoln, food would be sent across to troops. If South attacked food boat they would be seen as aggressive
- Notice on April 6th that should the food boat go through, no attempt to furnish troops would happen without notice except if the fort was attacked
—> Davis, cabinet meeting on 9th decides war before boat arrived
Events of Conflict:
- Confederates open fire April 12th, 4:30 am
- Fox’s fleet powerless to intervene due to bad weather
- 33 hours of attack, fort surrenders
Consequences of Conflict:
- Lincoln calls for 75 000 militiamen to tackle insurrection on April 15th
- Caused polarisation:
Stephen Douglas: ‘there can be no neutrals in this war, onlu patriots - or traitors’
- Upper South had to assert its position
Factors affecting outcome:
- Leadership: Seward independently contacted Confederate officials to say the fort would be yielded. Contradicted Lincoln’s inaugural promise to protect and hold federal property
- Resources: Sumter low on supplies before attack, but Lincoln didn’t want to engage to deliver supplies lest he start a war
- Individuals: Lincoln - Backlash from public and inaugural promises ‘hardened Lincoln’s resolve’ to defend it
Battle of First Manassas or Bull Run, July 21st 1861
CONFEDERATE VICTORY IN MAIN EASTERN THEATRE
- Context*:
- Manassas was close to Washington
- Lincoln believed defeating a Confederate force would ‘discredit’ secessionists sufficiently without irreversibly damaging South (and the chance of reconstruction)
- Lead-up*:
- 35 000 Union troops near Washington had formed under General Irvin McDowell
- 20 000 Confederates led by Pierre G. T. Beauregard defending the Manassas junction to the SW of Washington
- Plan dependent on the Gen Pattersons 18 000 stationed to North West preventing Johnston’s 12 000
Events of Conflict:
- Confederate troops positioned along Bull Run
- McDowell attacks first
- northern forces gain ground, Confederates pushed up Henry House Hill
- At this point, McDowell was on the edge of a success
…
- Johnston and Beauregard arrive, rally troops, bring reinforcements on Confederate left
- Thomas J. Jackson becomes ‘stonewall’ Jackson when he halts the Union advances with his Brigade
- Reinforcements arrive, Beauregard orders counter-attack, Union retreats –> Confederate victory
- Consequences of Conflict*:
- ‘Would have important psychological consequences for the North and the South’
- 625 dead on each side
- 1200 Union soldiers captured
- Postponed further attempts to invade Virginia
- Factors affecting outcome*:
- Individuals: Patterson, assuming outnumbered, fails to hold back Johnston’s
- Leadership: ‘lack of experience prevented Northern officers from coordinating simultaneous assaults by different regiments’; McDowell fails to mobilise reserves, Johnston and Beauregard mobilise all their reserves
- Intelligence: Beauregard new McDowell was advancing in advance due to Washington spy
- Speed: McDowell moved so slowly into position that Johnston’s troops could reinforce Beauregard
- Uniforms: Union guns mistook one of Jackson’s units for a friendly, ceased fire and were wiped out
U.S. Grant takes Fort Henry, February 6th 1862
UNION VICTORY IN THE MAIN WESTERN THEATRE
Context:
- Fort Henry was considered to be the achilles heel of Johnston’s Western Military Line
- Positioned low in a valley surrounded by hills and prone to flooding, ill-defended
Events:
- 15 000 troops landed nearby, attacked rear of fort, boats attacked from the river
- Fort’s lower level had flooded, meaning fewer of its guns could fire
- Commander of the fort sends 2 500 to ft Donelson, one company remains to operate cannons
- Company hold for 2 hours, then surrenders to Grant
Consequences:
- Allows Union gunboats to continue 150 miles upstream, capturing nine vessels
Factors affecting outcome:
- Weather
- Leadership: Johnston had not adequately defended the fort, assuming that an attack would come nearby at Columbus or Bowling Green
US Grant takes Fort Donelson, Feb 16th 1862
UNION VICTORY IN MAIN WESTERN THEATRE
Context:
- Fort Henry had been captured, Fort Doneslon was where the men had retreated to
- Bad weather gave Johnston time to consider how to proceed before Grant could come to attack it
- Grant is between Johnston’s two forces, capable of attacking Columbus, Bowling Green or Donelson
- -> Decides to concentrate defence of Donelson
Lead up:
- Council places John Floyd in control of Donelson, whilst Johnston retreats to Nashville with 12 000
- Similar tactics to Fort Henry considered
- Grant orders reinforcements of more boats and 10 000 men (in addition to 15 000)
-
Events:
- Foote attacked from the water but brought boats too close, were destroyed by Confederate short-range guns
- Besieged on all sides, that night a council is called to decide Confederate strategy
- Try to break out the next morning, Union driven back over 1 mile.
- Pillow convinces Floyd that they could break out, but not outrun a Union flank attack
- Grant arrives, orders shell attack to assist ground troops in re-taking lost ground
- Commanders escape, Buckner in command surrenders with 12 000 men
Consequences:
- “the strategic consequences of this campaign were the most important of the war so far”
- 1/3 of Johnston’s forces out of action, remainder were divided between Nashville and Columbus with the enemy dividing them
- Nashville now threatened by Buell’s Ohio army, Columbus by John Pope’s
- -> Both captured, Kentucky and most of Tennessee captured
USS Monitor vs Merrimack
DRAW IN THE MAIN EASTERN THEATRE
Context:
- The mouth of the James River at Hampton Roads was a key defensive position, the river leading up to Richmond )(Confederate Capital)
- This position was held by the Union navy as part of the Anaconda Plan (?)
- Merrimack (Known by Union as the Virginia) was the new Confederate Ironclad vessel
Fight:
- Merrimack sinks two vessels, taking significant but non-disabling flak
- Overnight, Monitor travels to the battleground
- First assumed to be a repair ship for the Minnesota, the Monitor fires on the Virginia
- 2 hours of shelling, attempted ramming
- Union captain wounded by shell, Virginia doesn’t want to be run aground –> retreats
Consequences:
- Hampton Roads fleet was saved
Factors affecting outcome:
- Technology
Battle of Shiloh, April 6th-7th 1862.
UNION VICTORY IN THE MAIN WESTERN THEATRE
CONTEXT
- Grant’s Campaigns had been very successful at Fort Henry and Donelson, so the Union now held Tennessee
- Southern forces were heavily compromised; in retreat, the Confederate Army under Johnston faced a convergence of force from U.S. Grant and General Don Carlos Buell (with another 25 000 troops)
- Faced with this, Johnston seized the initiative and launched an attack before Buell could come and reinforce Grant
BATTLE
- Grant attacked at Shiloh church
- Defensive line, the ‘Hornet’s Nest’, and later further back at Pittsburg’s landing
- Johnston killed early in the fighting –> Replaced by Beauregard
- Beauregard pulls troops back from Pittsburg, things that Buell and his forces are a long way away
- Reinforcements arrive –> Beauregard pushed back
CONSEQUENCES:
- Bloodiest battle to date, set precedent for the size of further battles.
- 13 000 dead for union, 10 000 for Cf
- No longer seemed like the war would end quickly
The Onset of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, May-June 1862
CONFEDERATE VICTORY
Context:
- In May 1862, prospects for the Confederacy’s survival seemed bleak.’
- Loss of Mississippi valley, McClellan’s army was advancing on Richmond
- Jackson now had 17 000 in the Shenandoah Valley
Victories:
- May 8th, over Union force of approx 8,500
- May 23rd, front Royal
- May 25th, Winchester
- June 8th, Cross Keys
- June 9th, Port Republic
- Escape through Strasburg before Union army reaches them
Consequences:
- Lincoln diverts McDowell’s forces away from Richmond, and Fremonts away from the East Tennessee Campaign, to repel Jackson’s advances
Factors affecting outcome:
- Jackson’s leadership
- Intelligence: topographical work of Jedediah Hotchkiss, Jackson’s map maker; Jackson’s spies who knew the county well
- Strategy: Jackson had a sizeable force and consistently overwhelmed Union troops in those areas
Seven Days Campaign under R. E Lee Jule 25th-July 1st
Takes control of the army of Virginia when Joseph E. Johnston is wounded.
-Drives McClellan’s invading army of the Potomac from Virginia
Initiates the Seven Days Battles
Final battle, Malvern Hill, saw disconnected advances with 5 500 killed
Number of fatalities in the Seven Days’ equal to casualties in entire Western Theatre in the first half of that year
‘Lee probably deserves his reputation as the war’s best tactician, but his success came at great cost
Army reshuffle
Two corps under Longstreet and Jackson
Weaker division commanders were transferred
Second Battle of Bull Run/Second Mannasas August 28th-30th 1862
Second Battle of Bull Run/Second Mannasas August 28th-30th 1862
Pope, with the Army of the Potomac, was a few Miles from Jackson’s division. The rest of the Army of Northern Virginia was not far off
Pope, knowing Jackson’s position from a skirmish of the previous evening, assumed Jackson was retreating to meet Longstreet (actually, Longstreet was advancing to him). Forces troops to march through the night to ‘chase’ him on August 28th/29th. Before large force assembled, Pope attacks —>
Jackson’s line holds and counterattacks
Lee’s decision to invade Maryland (Maryland Campaign September 4–20, 1862)
Faced with being chased by McClellan , couldn’t attack Washington, but…
Confed inflitratign Kentucky, Tennessee, not the time to move back
—> Lee moves across Potomac into Maryland with 55 000
Lee’s plan to invade Maryland (Maryland Campaign September 4–20, 1862)
Lee’s plan for the invasion of Maryland
Divide the army, sending 2/3rds of it to attack the garrison a Harper’s Ferry that was preventing Lee from opening a supply line through the Shenandoah Valley
Unfortunately, ‘Special Orders 191’ , detailing that 2/3rds of army was in 3 columns achieving this aim and the fourth was isolated, were found by Union soldiers in a field near Frederick
McClellan made plans to target the group(s) in the Southern Mountain passes 18 hours later on Sep 14th. Lee already knew via a Confed sympathiser that McClellan knew by the 13th!
McClellan ’s units failed to arrive in time to aid those at Harper’s ferry
To retreat or not to retreat after discovery of Special Orders 191?
Lee decides not to retreat to Shenandoah Valley as Jackson would capture Harpers Ferry by 15th
At this point McClellan outnumbered Lee 18 000 to 75 000, but waited. By the next day, Lee had all but 3 of his units
Battle of Antietam, Sep 17th 1862
Maryland Campaign September 4–20, 1862
UNION VICTORY
Antietam
Union: 80 000 Confed: 40 000
Confeds had Potomac behind them
Morning of 70th
Union push against Jacksons men, bolstered from left and right
Union 2nd core, attacked by counter attack in west woods
Union at bloody lane, flank it and push confederates back –> Union capture
Union takes burnside bridge, crosses it, pushes Confederates away ONLY ROUTE OF RETREAT
A.P Hill arrives from Harpers, hits Union flank, Union stall
23 000 killed or wounded
No fighting on 18th
Significance of Sharpsburg and the failure of the Maryland Campaign
- Ended Maryland Campaign
- Lessened chance of Britain recognising Confederacy
- Northern victory –> Helped gather momentum for Emancipation Proclamation
- “The slaughter at Sharpsburg therefore proved to have been one of the war’s greatest turning points”
Comparing R.E Lee and McClellan
Comparing the tactics of Lee and McClellan
Lee: “Are you acquainted with General McClellan ? He is an able general but a very cautious one…”
Lee divided army in three different campaigns up to and including Maryland
Lee risked invasion of Maryland against odds
Lee not risk-averse
McClellan overestimated troop numbers
When hearing of spec orders 191, McClellan estimated Lee had 110 000. Actually number was 50 000, and McClellan had 80 000
McClennan too cautious
Waited 18 hours until 14th Sep to act on finding special orders 191
At Antietam Creek, no ‘probing attacks’ to find out how strong Confederate forces were