Midterm 2 Study Guide Flashcards

1
Q

externality

A

the uncompensated impact of a person’s actions on the well-being of a bystander

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2
Q

negative externality

A

markets produce a larger quantity than is socially desirable (social cost curve lies above supply curve), so governments internalize the externality by taxing goods

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3
Q

positive externality

A

markets produce a smaller quantity than is socially desirable (social-value curve lies above demand curve), so governments subsidize goods

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4
Q

command-and-control policies

A

regulations that directly seek to influence behavior; however, firms conceal adverse effects, exaggerate costs of regulation, and have no incentive to reduce below regulated levels

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5
Q

market-based policies

A

response to externality that provides incentives so that private decision makers choose to solve the problem on their own, such as corrective taxes and tradable permits

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6
Q

corrective taxes

A

policy designed to tax the right to engage in a negative externality; the higher the tax, the larger the reduction in negative externality – ideally, the tax is equal to the social cost

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7
Q

Canada’s Pigovian tax

A

Canada has increased its tax on carbon emissions from $20 CA / ton in 2019 to $50 CA / ton in 2022; prices on main sources of carbon increase, so fewer consumers buy them

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8
Q

tradable permits

A

form of taxation between firms where firms with lower levels of a negative externality (ex. pollution) have permits to sell to firms with higher levels

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9
Q

Coase theorem

A

if private parties can bargain without cost over the allocation of resources, they can solve the problem of externalities on their own, regardless of the initial distribution of rights; reasons for failure include transaction costs, bargaining breakdowns, and bargaining coordination difficulty

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10
Q

types of goods

A

people can be prevented from using excludable goods; a person’s use of a unit of a rival in consumption good reduces another person’s ability to use it

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11
Q

private goods

A

goods that are excludable and rival in consumption (ex. ice cream cones)

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12
Q

public goods

A

goods that are neither excludable nor rival in consumption (ex. tornado siren)

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13
Q

common resources

A

goods that are rival in consumption but are not excludable (ex. clean air and water, congested roads, wildlife)

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14
Q

club goods

A

goods that are excludable but not rival in consumption (ex. satellite TV)

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15
Q

free-rider problem

A

people receive the benefit of many public goods without paying for them

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16
Q

Tragedy of the Commons

A

a common resource is used more than is desirable from the standpoint of society as a whole; governments tax/regulate usage or turn them into private goods

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17
Q

Tuvalu and climate change

A

due to climate change, Tuvalu is experiencing increasing storms and land mass loss; struck a deal with Australia so that 280 people move to Australia per year (40 years for entire population) and Tuvalu receives assistance after natural disasters, but Australia does not have to restrict fossil fuel exports and must approve defense deals

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18
Q

Prisoner’s Dilemma

A

a situation where individual decision-makers have an incentive to defect as opposed to cooperate and create a less optimal outcome for the entire group

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19
Q

shadow of the future

A

– in a single interaction, both individuals have no incentive to cooperate and defect;
– in finite interactions, both cooperate until the penultimate interaction, then anticipate defection and thus defect;
– in indefinite interactions, cooperation can emerge

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20
Q

costs of signals

A

actions taken in the prisoner’s dilemma must back up verbally sent signals; signals incur costs through actions

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21
Q

Tit-for-Tat

A

strategy for the prisoner’s dilemma in which an individual initially cooperates to prevent unnecessary trouble and then repeats other actors’ decisions – retaliates to discourage defection and forgive to restore cooperation

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22
Q

reputation

A

state reputations for lending are developed via repeat play with incomplete information and political change

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23
Q

lemon

A

debtors who default in both good and bad economic times

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24
Q

fair-weather

A

debtors who repay in good times but not in bad times

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25
Q

stalwarts

A

debtors the are most likely to repay, in both good and bad times

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26
Q

labor market

A

all transaction in which workers exchange their labor for a wage/salary from an employer

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27
Q

national level unions

A

heterogeneous in skills and professions; includes variety of economic sectors; prioritizes universal policies and public goods; difficult to maintain solidarity, which results in less wage coordination

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28
Q

industry level unions

A

prioritize the interests of an industry (ex. auto, steel, agriculture), such as employment protections such as unemployment insurance

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29
Q

enterprise/company level unions

A

bargain at the company level and prioritize job security and wage maximization

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30
Q

skilled vs. unskilled labor

A

skilled and unskilled workers may have competing interests; skilled workers may leave unions, weakening union cohesion and making unions less effective

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31
Q

unions and the social welfare state

A

more collective solidarity within labor results in greater support for government intervention to reduce income inequality, which is vital to building a supportive welfare state; welfare states protect less privileged workers and provide equity for higher earners

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32
Q

benefits of unions

A

unions aim to decrease the wage gap via lobbying and direct contributions; union effects are strongest in bottom half of incomes

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33
Q

decline of unions

A

unions have declined due to
1) electoral losses of Left-wing parties and adoption of neo-liberal policies
2) revisions to historically strong social safety nets, such as the Ghent system, which allowed unions to administer unemployment protections
3) technological innovations have led to the rise of knowledge economies, which demand high-skilled workers but no longer need as much unskilled labor

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34
Q

wage determination institutions

A

– in decentralized settings, institutions “leapfrog” by seeking wage settlements that exceed pay increments in other unions, which often leads to high unemployment; institutions are limited in market power
– in centralized settings, there are more negotiations and institutions focus on internalizing consequences of wage demands, leading to lower unemployment and inflation

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35
Q

labor market policies

A

taxes on labor may increase unemployment, as they affect supply and demand for labor; pay-roll taxes decrease hiring and increase the gap between pre- and post-tax incomes

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36
Q

central bank independence

A

central banks are responsible for setting monetary policy, independent of the government’s policies and goals

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37
Q

presidential executive

A

single, popularly elected chief executive who is independent of legislature (separation of powers) and has a fixed term (difficult to remove)

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38
Q

parliamentary executive

A

prime minister or chancellor (Germany and Austria) who typically comes from the legislative party and continues to hold a legislative seat; checked by legislature through vote of no confidence

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39
Q

perils of presidentialism

A

– legislature and president are independently elected, so there is potential for continuous conflict between branches; the legislature is unlikely to shape executive agenda
– elections are zero-sum, so there is no incentive for a majority; this may polarize the electorate
– chosen cabinet members cannot also be in the legislature, so they are unlikely to offer push back against the president
– fixed terms make it difficult to remove presidents

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40
Q

majority parliamentary government

A

one party wins a majority of the seats in the legislature

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41
Q

majority coalition

A

a coalition of two or more parties that have over 50% of the seats in the lower chamber of the parliamentary legislature

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42
Q

minority coalition

A

a coalition of two or more parties that have less than 50% of the seats in the lower chamber of the parliamentary legislature

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43
Q

single-party minority government

A

parliamentary government formed by largest party despite not having a majority

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44
Q

economic effects of presidential systems

A

public goods are underfunded due to smaller government, separation of powers, lack of legislative cohesion, and limits on public spending and taxes; multiple veto players adversely affect economic growth, unemployment, and inflation

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45
Q

economic effects of parliamentary systems

A

higher GDP per capita and growth, lower inflation, higher taxes to benefit the majority due to larger governments with more centralized power and legislative cohesion

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46
Q

bicameral legislatures

A

– large lower chamber with more power
– small upper chamber that can either only delay, not stop legislation (weak) or introduce and stop legislation (strong/equal)

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47
Q

unicameral legislature

A

contain only a lower chamber and are generally more majoritarian and accountable in decision-making

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48
Q

plurality electoral system

A

winner is whoever receives the most votes

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49
Q

majoritarian electoral system

A

winner must receive over 50% of the votes; includes two-round election systems and alternative vote system

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50
Q

two-round elections

A

– in the first round, all candidates are on the ballot; if a candidate receives 50% of the vote, the election ends
– in the second round, the top two vote getters are on the ballot

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51
Q

alternative vote system

A

voters rank all candidates; until a majority is reached, the last place candidate is eliminated and votes are reassigned to second preference votes

52
Q

proportional representation

A

seats are assigned in proportion to the number of votes a party wins; constituencies are represented by multiple members; there may exist

53
Q

party list proportional representation

A

voters choose parties among a party list of candidates; candidate lists and list orders are determined by parties

54
Q

closed party list

A

in closed party lists, voters can only vote for a party and parties have complete control over lists

55
Q

open party list

A

in open party lists, voters can choose “preference” candidates and influence who gets selected from the list

56
Q

economic effects of PR systems

A

PR systems have higher government spending, revenue, and social spending (transfers and redistribution) due to greater party cohesion and the formation of party coalitions

57
Q

economic effects of plurality/majoritarian systems

A

plurality/majoritarian systems have less social spending and lower inflation rates/inflation volatility due to smaller governments and more specific legislator projects

58
Q

government formation and the Netherlands

A

– Geert Wilders and far-right Party For Freedom (PVV) won most votes (37 of 150 seats) in the recent Dutch parliamentary election
– VVD and Christian Democrats (center-right parties w/ 24 and 20 seats, respectively) do not want to join coalition with PVV
– Stable governmental option would be a four-party coalition of PVV, VVD, Christian Democrats, and BBB (88 of 150 seats)

59
Q

veto player

A

an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a change in policy

60
Q

institutional veto player

A

arise from division of powers and have constitutional means of checks and balances; more institutional veto players results in less public spending

61
Q

partisan veto player

A

political actors whose consent is needed to change policy; more partisan veto players result in more public spending

62
Q

traditional electoral cycle

A

assumes that politicians control fiscal and monetary policies and asserts that vote maximizing politicians manipulate the economy to win re-election

63
Q

traditional electoral model expectations

A

– pre-election, governments pursue policies of economic expansion, including increasing public spending and lowering interest rates and taxes
– post-election, governments pursue restrictive policies

64
Q

cause of electoral cycles

A

voters evaluate politicians retrospectively and expansionary policies have delayed negative externalities, so distant past and future events aren’t as important

65
Q

rational electoral cycle

A

election manipulations occur but are less frequent; incumbents vary in competence; ability to use fiscal and monetary policy is dependent on context

66
Q

competence

A

the ability to solve problems and handle the economy efficiently; competence is private information, so voters view government actions to determine competence

67
Q

monetary policy

A

central banks set monetary policy; independent central banks can offset government policies by setting opposite monetary policy to fiscal policy

68
Q

capital mobility

A

ability of money to move around the world; this can restrict government actions and can signal firms’ intent to leave

69
Q

reverse electoral business cycles

A

businesses and households postpone major investments during elections

70
Q

traditional partisan cycles

A

changes in economic policies are influenced by government partisanship, so change in party control results in a change of economic policy preferences

71
Q

bank debt holders

A

– banks are small in number and have limited mobility
– due to high exposure, more likely to provide financial support to prop up the economy
– economic backing increases the likelihood of political budget cycles

71
Q

bondholder debt holders

A

– bondholders are large in number and have high mobility
– due to low exposure, less likely to provide financial support to prop up the economy
– economic backing decreases the likelihood of political budget cycles

71
Q

political budget cycles

A

cycles in some component of the government budget induced by the electoral cycle; dependent on debt composition (banks vs. bondholders)

72
Q

logic of economic voting

A

if the economy is doing well, the incumbent vote share increases; if the economy is doing poorly, the incumbent vote share decreases

73
Q

central assumptions of economic voting

A

voters are rational and will try to advance individual or collective interests; contextual factors are compounding factors

74
Q

reward-punishment voting

A

voters evaluate politicians based on their handling of the economy and use retrospective decision-making; however, the principal agent-problem (representatives cannot be monitored) persists and politicians do not need to appeal to voters’ wants

75
Q

selection approach

A

voters select the politicians who are most likely to provide good economic performance; they do so by forecasting economic outcomes using rational expectations and macroeconomic conditions

76
Q

institutions and economic voting

A

strong bicameralism, minority coalitions, and/or weak party cohesion hinder reward-punishment since voters do not know who is at fault (limited effect of economic indicators); on the other hand, single-party governments and strong party cohesion have strong effect of economic indicators

77
Q

accountability and economic voting

A

education allows a population to better acknowledge the government’s influence; globalization has caused governments’ control over macroeconomic performance to decline

78
Q

pocketbook voting

A

decisions are based on recent personal economic outcomes (self-interest); for politicians to remain in office, they implemented targeted policies

79
Q

sociotropic voting

A

decisions based on trends in macroeconomic outcomes

80
Q

elite manipulation in economic voting

A

include blame avoidance, gimmickry, and election timing

81
Q

blame avoidance

A

politicians divert responsibility for the domestic economy by using factors such as globalization

82
Q

gimmickry

A

political actors manipulate voters by concealing or spinning factual information

83
Q

election timing

A

political actors strategically time new elections when they are in an advantageous position

84
Q

Duverger’s Law

A

single-member plurality elections tend to produce two-party ystems

85
Q

Duverger’s proposition

A

two-round and proportional representation elections tend to produce multi-party systems

86
Q

vote-seeking parties

A

largest parties in a country, generally Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, or Conservatives

87
Q

office-seeking parties

A

small parties who value coalition formation, such as Germany’s Free Democratic Party

88
Q

policy-seeking party

A

parties that seek to influence policy, such as the Green Party

89
Q

trade policies

A

tariffs and non-tariff barriers (subsidies, quotas) countries utilize to raise revenue, improve terms of trade (price of exports vs. imports), pursue a trade surplus, protect domestic producers and other domestic groups

90
Q

incentives for trade protection

A

trade protection provides monetary benefits to domestic, politically important groups

91
Q

Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act

A

U.S. policy passed in 1930 to raise import duties with the goal of protecting American farmers and other industries from international competition; as a result, U.S. trading partners followed a beggar-thy-neighbor policy of increasing their own tariffs as a response

92
Q

lock-in mechanism

A

explicit rules and informal norms for state actions established by international institutions to make backtracking more difficult and restrict domestic pressures

93
Q

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

A

– international institution designed to interconnect countries via trade by preventing new trade barriers, reducing existing trade barriers, and establishing rules for negotiations and post-negotiations; replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which has more institutional structure
– aspects of the GATT include reciprocity, most-favored nation, national treatment, transparency, flexibility, and accountability

94
Q

reciprocity

A

no unilateral trade liberalization; minimizes free-riding during negotiations and concessions

95
Q

most-favored nation

A

prevents favoritism in liberalizations – tariff concessions must be offered on like products to all members of the GATT/WTO

96
Q

national treatment

A

international goods must receive the same treatment as domestic goods

97
Q

transparency

A

members know private information about other members in the GATT

98
Q

flexibility

A

members can walk-back offers if needed

99
Q

accountability

A

dispute-settlement mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreements

100
Q

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) creation

A

U.S. negotiated rules on transparency, labor, and environment to join the P4 (Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei); Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, Peru, Canada, Mexico, and Japan joined the P4

101
Q

U.S. Domestic Politics and TPP

A

– Congress gave Trade Promotion Authority to TPP (2015)
– U.S. regulatory agencies disapproved because the TPP limited their policy space and were concerned programs would be covered by state-owned enterprises
– Congress never passed and anti-trade sentiment followed after 2016 presidential election

102
Q

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity

A

Designed as 21st century economic framework with four pillars: trade, supply chain resilience, clean economy, fair economy

103
Q

trade pillar

A

strong, enforceable trade standards

104
Q

supply chain resilience

A

more geographic diversification for critical inputs and final products for supply chain resilience

105
Q

clean economy

A

cooperation on research and development and best sharing practices for a clean economy

106
Q

fair economy

A

transparency and cooperation to take on corruption and tax evasion

107
Q

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

A

international financial institution that serves as a lender-of-last resort; works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world

108
Q

World Bank

A

international financial institution originally created after WWII to rebuild the economies of postwar Europe

109
Q

motivations for international financial governance

A

– market failures occur when items are under-supplied by private actors
– availability of global public goods is determined by state or other private actors
– private actors and national governments may be unwilling or unable to provide globally desired outcomes

110
Q

argument for international governance

A

international financial institutions provide financial stability through public goods and lender-of-last resort role, eliminate differences through enforced regulations

111
Q

market-oriented FDI

A

foreign direct investment directed toward production focused within a country

112
Q

export-oriented FDI

A

foreign direct investment directed toward production to be exported

113
Q

FDI restrictions

A

ownership requires partnership with local firms; operation requires local content requirements and representation

114
Q

domestic policies and FDI

A

electoral accountability makes governments more responsive to labor preferences; greater support for FDI occurs during economic downturns

115
Q

preferential trade agreements (PTAs)

A

PTAs reduce trade barriers and include regulatory policies

116
Q

bilateral investment treaties (BITs)

A

international agreements that require binding third-party arbitration, multiple dispute-settlement venues, and arbitration by a standing body

117
Q

FDI in India

A

long-term FDI in India has declined from $40 billion to $13 billion because it lacks the overall economic development and discourages firms because Prime Minister Modi’s government intervenes heavily in the economy and red tape/bureaucracy still exists

118
Q

Laos and Chinese investment

A

– China invested $5 billion across 700+ projects in Laos, including building a high-speed train and constructing hydroelectric dams
– Laos’s total debt is 120% of GDP and is struggling to repay Chinese loans, instead allowing China greater control over the economy and security

119
Q

firms as sponsors

A

act as main sponsors of neo-liberal policies to reduce trade barriers, expand reach of markets, reduce government interference, protect intellectual property, shift policy making from legislative to executive branch (ex. NAFTA expanded access of firms to cheap labor in Mexico)

120
Q

firms set global preferences

A

– group of 30 brings firms together with policy decision-makers to recommend best practices
– harmonize various national or regional rules and regulations
– increase regulations on less regulated competitors

121
Q

firms as inhibitors

A

– firms often oppose rules that limit their autonomy (ex. binding penalties and legal liabilities) through lobbying and threats to leave via mobility under globalization
– firms seek to extend their domestic rules to constrain competitor firms
– firms may oppose extension of domestic rules since they reduce their ability to be mobile and empower local actors

122
Q

firms provide standards

A

firms may set standards without the intervention of domestic governments or international institutions (ex. financial debt reporting, food standards)

123
Q

BP, global shipping, and firms

A

– In response to BP halting shipping through the Red Sea due to attacks by Houthi militants, U.S. formed a coalition to respond to the attacks and ensure shipping through the Red Sea
– alternative route is to circumnavigate around Africa, which incurs 14 additional shipping days and potential supply chain disruptions
– oil and natural gas prices are increasing and insurance costs have doubled to cover the cost of sunken ships

124
Q

U.S. Steel

A

– Nippon Steel has agreed to purchase U.S. Steel, making it the third largest steel manufacture and giving it access to U.S. markets while avoiding high tariffs through domestic plants and manufacturing
– Sale is despite U.S. government attempts to prop-up steel industry via trade protection and quota restrictions
– U.S. Steel continued to struggle due to competition from low-priced, subsidized foreign steel
– Issues with the deal include 1) national security concerns and opposition from domestic political actors, 2) labor union must agree to the sale and prefers a domestic buyer