Midterm 2 Flashcards

1
Q

Jus ad bellum vs Jus in bello

A
  • Former is defining when it is just to go to war while latter is rules governing how wars are fought
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2
Q

Early conceptions of jus ad bellum

A
  • People like Sun Tzu actually mostly covered how wars are fought, not until writings of Christian Just War Tradition and Sts. Augustine + Aquinas that concept was talked about
  • Augustine synthesized works of early Greek and Roman scholars, suggested that war is legitimate if immediate reasons for going to war are just, if state of war is declared via proper authority such as sovereign, if purpose of war is to obtain peace
  • Aquinas has same three as Augustine but also says that even defensive wars are only just if all three conditions are in place simultaneously, also defensive wars become aggressive wars if more force is used than necessary (concept of proportionality)
  • Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius says needs just cause (self-defense or punishment for injury and cannot be preemptive strike), end does not justify means, wars must be fought with reasonable chance of success, governments must publicly declare wars (shows resoluteness to opponent), declared by sovereign, must be last resort
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3
Q

Problems with Christian just war tradition

A
  • Didn’t actually change much in terms of states going to war (just writers offering guidance)
  • Possible for both sides of conflict to have just war (such as if injuries have occurred on both sides)
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4
Q

19th and early 20th century attempts of jus ad bellum

A
  • Hague peace conferences in 1899 and 1907 which dealt mostly with jus in bello, primary rule that came out of second one was agreement to limit right to use force in collecting foreign debts (only if debtor agreed to arbitration and terms imposed upon it)
  • Covenant of League of Nations where states agree that disputes will be placed before international court, arbitration or League itself before going to war
  • -> Did help to resolve minor conflicts such as Finland-Sweden, Albania-Yugoslavia, Greece-Bulgaria, Columbia-Peru but failed in Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Manchuria-Japan
  • Kellogg-Briand pact that abolished war as legal instrument of foreign policy (however no enforcement, still permission for self-defense, subverted by China and Japan in 1930s by not formally declaring war, did not prevent WW2)
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5
Q

Article 2(4) of UN charter

A
  • Central provision prohibits force (all members shall refrain from threat or use of force against one another)
  • -> Problem is defining force vs war (state practice commonly views it as military force but many countries viewed it also as economic or other sanctions such as 1993 North Korea saying sanctions = act of war)
  • Framers’ intent: record exists of discussion that suggests unlawful military force being of foremost importance
  • Ordinary and apparent meaning: strongly implies military force
  • Etiological approach: favors military force since sanctions and other things are discussed in other parts of UN charter
  • Also refers to force against political independence or territorial integrity, so things like stopping genocides may be allowed (also this interpretation has been contested and was rejected by ICJ in Corfu channel case)
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6
Q

Vienna convention on rules of treaties

A
  • Treaty on treaty interpretation, factors in framers’ intent in creating treaty, apparent meaning, and etiological approach (overall purpose and goal of treaty)
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7
Q

Alternative conceptions of use of force in international law

A
  • Brezhnev doctrine (SU and allies have duty and legal right to use whatever means necessary to prevent fall of existing Communist or socialist regime), used to retroactively justify invasion of Czechslovakia, intervention in Afghanistan
  • Third world claim that colonized peoples should have right to use of force in name of liberation (used by India to justify intervention on behalf of Bangladesh in Pakistan civil war)
  • Humanitarian intervention (also used by India because claimed that West Pakistan was committing atrocities in East Pakistan), often opposed by Third World (imperialism)
  • Passive personality principle (when state national is target of violence, especially if confronted by terrorist group), examples are 1964 Stanleyville raid and 1976 Entebbe raids to rescue hostages which weren’t authorized by Congo and Uganda governments
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8
Q

Obsolete Charter claim to self defense

A
  • Articles 53 and 107 say that if defeated Axis powers renege on surrender, force can be used without getting UNSC permission (was explicitly noted to be a transitional security arrangement so not permanent)
  • SU in 1971 claimed that provision remained operative although out of political dispute and unlikely that people thought would be active
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9
Q

Charter 51 claim to self defense

A
  • Can engage in individual or collective self defense if subject to armed attack
  • Armed attack needs to cross a certain threshold, and if does not reach threshold then need to use alternative means other than use of force
  • Designed to stop states from using things like minor border provocations to escalate into a full scale war
  • Problem is that no precise threshold that triggers right to self defense and aggressors can exploit threshold to continually engage in acts that do not cross it
  • Lack of explicit definition was placed by major powers who did not want to have a forced commitment, opposed by smaller powers who thought might lead to another world war
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10
Q

Russia-Turkey plane

A
  • 2015 Russian-Turkish border dispute where Turkey shoots down Russian jet for flying over its territory, international community says that even if jet flew along route that Turks claimed, the jet would have only flew over Turkey for 17s and therefore no just claim to shoot it down
  • Turkey acknowledges impropriety of action and apologizes to Russia
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11
Q

Attempts to clarify armed attack threshold

A
  • ICJ Corfu Channel case where British ships sail through channel claimed to be Albanian territory, fired on once and hit by mines second time. ICJ finds that Albania was in wrong to place mines in waterway and had to pay reparations to Britain, but efforts by Britain to remove mines violated Albanian sovereignty because minesweeping is not innocent passage so should have used diplomatic response
  • ICJ Nicaragua case where US sells weapons to Contras, places mines on coastline to make it hard for Cuba and SU to supply country in response to Nicaragua arming rebels in El Salvador
  • -> ICJ rules that indirect force via arming El Salvador was not an armed attack, also US decision to place mines was armed attack (controversy because people said US actions same as Nicaraguan actions, also might be incentive to engage in indirect guerilla warfare as long as not directly commanding these activities)
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12
Q

How does UNSC authorize action?

A
  • UNSC considers crisis and determines whether it is threat/breach of peace or act of aggression, decides on response (through Articles 39-42)
  • Crisis only constitutes one of these three if UNSC says that it is in the determination phase, after which it can bring it to vote where UNSC decides whether constitutes it (9/15 with no veto, 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran not declared breach of peace until 1987, prior to which it just called for ceasefire)
  • Types of situations that constitute this have expanded post-Cold War with things like “lack of democracy,” human rights violations, acts of terrorism, etc so technically UNSC can define anything that it agrees upon as one of three
  • Second stage is recommending and decide on response (recommendations technically not binding until decided upon and countries may block latter stage if not happy with action) also with 9/15 and no veto
  • Types of measures can be provisional to start with, very open ended from sanctions to blockades to use of force, could also just do nothing even if determine that situation is threat to peace (or just issue diplomatic statement / watch for further developments)
  • Disagreements are common and sometimes resolutions defied such as where UNSC calls Korean War a violation and China, SU defy and help North
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13
Q

Caroline Test for necessity of self-defense

A
  • 1837 Upper Canada rebellion led by William Mackenzie is routed by British, many survivors flee to Navy Island in Niagara river (goal is Republic of Canada)
  • Sympathetic US citizens supply rebels with cannons and muskets and launch raids, British grow tired and sail to Navy Island and capture the Caroline ship that raids were being launched from, take it from US side of river and set it on fire (rebels flee to US and many arrested)
  • However US unhappy with British killing US citizens, entering territory, sinking US ship so ministers Webster and Ashburton exchange letters with latter saying that UK was engaging in self-defense, former saying that actions were illegitimate
  • Webster lists criteria that would have constituted self-defense that becomes Caroline Test (action must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation) that becomes widely accepted custom in international law
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14
Q

How does proportionality arise?

A
  • Aquinas saying defensive act may become aggressive if employs more violence than necessary
  • Does not mean amount of force employed by defender must be same as amount of illegitimate force employed by attacker (don’t have to stop at 100 troops if aggressor kills 100 troops), rather response must just be appropriate to circumstances and able to address provocation
  • Israel’s cumulative consideration says that considers entire action like rocket attacks as a whole and not the individual rockets in the attacks (Middle Eastern neighbors disagree)
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15
Q

Belligerent reprisal

A
  • Concept that aggressive illegal act can be responded to with own illegal act
  • Accepted limits are cannot harm POWs / shipwrecked sailors / cultural artifacts
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16
Q

Naulilaa Incident

A
  • Incident start of WW1 where misunderstanding in German visit to Portuguese fort leads to killing of German military officers, Germans respond by raiding Portuguese territory and killing 100 people which leads to bigger local uprising
  • Post-war Portugal brings matter to international arbitration and panel rules that Germans acted disproportionately in attacking forts, pay reparations for raid and local raid that attack sparked
17
Q

Oil Platform case on proportionality

A
  • Oil Platform Case 1980s involving naval mines during Iran-Iraq war, US navy ships in response attack oil platforms meant to gather intelligence. Case taken to court and ruling says US has no right to use force vs Iran because mine laying activities not specifically directed towards US and did not constitute armed attack
18
Q

Are anticipatory self-defense actions allowed?

A
  • Generally said to not be allowed under Charter as dangers are too great to be contemplated
  • However under customs, long history of state doctrine where states find it unrealistic to wait until aggressor has struck (esp. in nuclear age)
19
Q

In the article “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law,” Gabriël H. Oosthuizen analyzes the legal limits on the powers of the Security Council. What are Oosthuizen’s main arguments, what is the main evidence used to support these arguments, and what are the strengths and weaknesses, errors, or omissions of this analysis?

A
  • Main argument is that there is no limit to the enforcement powers of UNSC under Chapter 7 of Charter
  • Says that under Article 24, UNSC has primary responsibility for maintaining international security and other chapters
  • Article 1(1) only qualifies that UNSC needs to act in accordance with principles of justice and international law in adjusting or settling international disputes that may lead to breach of peace (clause missing from other things like suppressing acts of aggression), also travaux preparatoires shows that attempts to add this clause to entirety of article were rejected in 1945 (showing that framers intended expediency and UNSC effectiveness to be placed foremost)
  • Article 39 says that UNSC can take any action provided in Article 41 to deal with threat to peace (which can be interpreted broadly) and Article 42 says that if UNSC considers any Article 41 measure inadequate then can take any action necessary to maintain international security
  • Says that Article 25 stating that UN members agree to carry out UNSC decisions that are in accordance with Charter is restrictively interpreted to formal procedure and not to substantive Charter provisions which require value judgements
  • Article 103 says that Charter overrides any other international obligations (referring to treaties, but broad powers under 39-42 also mean international custom) in event of conflict
  • Says that Ius Cogens (VCLT principle) stating that no treaty cannot be in accordance with international custom is not applicable in practical matters like UNSC interventions
  • Says that concepts of good faith and abuse of rights set out in Article 2(2) also not relevant because no agreed upon meaning of concepts in international law, also if states act in accordance with 39-42 in suppressing breach of peace then this is in good faith
  • Problems with argument arise out of lack of scrutiny in decision making dynamics of UNSC, opinions of other UN members in regard to problem UNSC is dealing with, also human rights and humanitarian law that need to be considered
20
Q

In the article “Rwanda in Retrospect,” Alan J. Kuperman analyzes the international community’s reaction to the Rwandan genocide. What are Kuperman’s main arguments, what is the main evidence used to support these arguments, and what are the strengths and weaknesses, errors, or omissions of this analysis?

A
  • Main argument is that despite thorough debate and popular claim that deploying large force of 5k at onset of genocide would have prevented it, such a force would not have been able to save even half of victims
  • US intelligence in region was sparse and Pres. Clinton likely would not have known genocide was occurring until April 20th due to 5 reasons (initial depiction by both gov and rebels was as part of civil war, wide-ranging reports from Dallaire to NYT said violence began to wane a few days in, early death estimates were huge underestimates, evacuation of Western observers from most of country limited reports to being from small capital, prospect of genocide occurring only raised by Hum Rights Watch to UNSC on April 19th)
  • Western military operations were already scaled down following Belgian deaths in initial phase of violence (270 left over)
  • Maximum US force of up to 15,000 troops would have faced problems like transport to small country with few airfields (says ~33 days for whole force to arrive with initial force being able to interposition along war front and police capital in 2 weeks), spurring guilty perpetrators to speed up genocide, still insufficient to fully police entire countryside so overall saved about 125k (25%)
  • Medium force 6k troops would be deployed from neighboring countries and sent to hot zones in southwest, saved up about 100k (20%)
  • Small force 2.5k would be deploying air power from neighboring countries (air patrols, bombardments or air escorts for refugees to neighboring countries) but unlikely to prevent instances of small-scale violence and would not help people unable to reach major roads so saved around 75k (15%)
  • 5 additional claims debunked (diplomatic coercion unlikely to work since army units controlled by extremist Hutu, immediate deployment of 5k UN troops at time requested by Dallaire would still run into logistical issues in early days when violence greatest, weapons cache raid option had flaky informant and raids that were conducted didn’t work as Rwandan police tipped off extremists, jamming radio broadcasts would not have reversed prior polarization, Western evac force of 1k was too small and tied up in other responsibilities like guarding airports)
  • Says only viable option was deploying 5k months prior to genocide since gov still contained moderates that would have welcomed it (prevention is more powerful than intervention – many interventions such as East Timor and Kosovo have been unsuccessful)
21
Q

UNMSC

A
  • UN military staff committee, standing military HQ of the UN that consists of personnel from P5 members
  • Undertakes missions such as directing forces placed by UNSC in a Chapter 7 operation (most important), designs war plans, etc.
  • However, this most important task has never happened so committee is dormant (political deadlock in Cold War, unease with wanting to give up sovereignty over troops to another body, fear of using this force against interests, disputes over size of forces and thus commitment, which countries should contribute forces, etc.)
  • Efforts to revive committee in 1990s particularly over Iraq invasion of Kuwait but didn’t come to pass
  • Committee still has budget and staff, still meets behind closed doors usually only for a few minutes (like scheduling next meeting)
22
Q

Uniting for peace

A
  • UN GA “uniting for peace” mechanism
  • Typically GA can only discuss and recommend issues to UNSC, cannot recommend if UNSC has already taken up issue (Articles 10-12)
  • Mechanism involves 2/3 vote yes that can recommend actions with respect to national security, war
  • First used in Korean War and created the interpositioning missions of 1950s, overall used about a dozen times
  • Supporters say GA powers evolving and despite Articles 10-12, should not be differentiated from UNSC and some say 2/3 vote should even override veto (say endorsed by ICJ indirect ruling)
  • However 12 instances where this has been used have been for very different purposes and there have been no instances where GA has called for use of force
23
Q

Authorizing UN action via regional organizations?

A
  • Articles 52-53 limit regional organizations to peaceful measures and not use of force
  • Exception only arises in the transitional Axis renege measure
  • However supporters say powers of regional organizations are growing and thus not unrealistic to say that they have similar powers to UNSC
  • Also unclear as to which organizations would be authorized to operate under this similar to UNSC capacity
24
Q

How many chapter 7 operations have been authorized by UNSC?

A
  • About 250 (sometimes can be unsure whether operation referring to 6 or 7) resolutions
  • Inflated because conflicts like Iraq and Yugoslavia have generated dozens upon dozens of resolutions (so incorrect to think that UNSC authorizes them all the time)
25
Q

Peace enforcement operations

A
  • Refers to UN sanctioned war, authorized in situation where trying to stop genocide (humanitarian intervention), collective security (Korean War)
  • Designed to use all means necessary to bring end to active conflict (not neutral and do not involve consent, help one side repel force of another)
  • Four missions that fit best are Korean War, Gulf War, UNITAF in Somalia, part of Afghanistan (ISAF)
26
Q

Why have peace enforcement operations been rare?

A
  • Hard to get consensus, more difficult and expensive to carry out (require significant logistics and support investment with Korean War cost to US being $700bn, Gulf War to Canada being $1bn), can be much deadlier than traditional peacekeeping (3.8k vs tens of thousands)
27
Q

Korean War case study

A
  • Was Japanese colony, SU given jurisdiction for North and US given jurisdiction for South under Rhee (border skirmishes between two occupation zones common, 1953 Kim launches attack on South with aim of unifying)
  • Initial attacks by Kim successful and South gov flees and appeals to UNSC with UN authorizing “render every assistance” – not vetoed since Chinese seat held by KMT and SU was boycotting UN when vote happened (somewhat of a mystery but theorized that Stalin allowed UN to intervene to punish NK and China for putting into motion faulty war plan / draw more countries into war)
  • 16 countries enter conflict (mostly Western states but also countries like Thailand, Colombia) vs Communist coalition, lots of dramatic turnaround but border eventually settles at exactly where it started
  • Forces were authorized to wear UN insignia, US spearheaded command since provided most $ and material, UNMSC not used since SU present
28
Q

Gulf War case study

A
  • US leads effort since had most number of troops (different from Cold War since not explicitly given command at beginning but took over naturally)
  • Forces not authorized to wear UN insignia since decided that would be too easy for US to cloak national interests with UN interests, also no UNMSC
  • Few thousand Canadian troops sent but didn’t really see combat
  • Language was “all necessary means”
29
Q

UNITAF case study

A
  • Unified Task Force
  • Conflict had been occurring for some time and chaos was too much for UNOSOM I mission that had been there, UNITAF sent to stabilize situation before turning over to robust mission UNOSOM II
  • Language was “all necessary means”, was somewhat controversial since appeared to authorize international involvement in domestic affairs so extra wording used to emphasize extraordinary nature of Somalia (not interfering since Somalia was failed state and didn’t enjoy rights of sovereign state)
  • No use of UN symbols and UNMSC
  • Wraps up in about 1 year, termed operational success in terms of getting supplies to population but follow-up mission fails and Somalia still failed state