Midterm 1 Flashcards

1
Q

Drezner’s definition of smart sanctions

A
  • Sanctions that are structured in a way that hurts the elites or specific sectors of a targeted country and not the masses (arms embargoes, restrictions on luxury goods, asset freezes, limited diplomatic interactions, travel bans, etc.)
  • Used to be either entirely comprehensive or very narrow focus (arms embargo and nothing else)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Drezner on 1990s Iraq sanctions

A
  • Comprehensive economic embargo that drastically decreased Iraq’s oil revenue, caused many magnitudes increase in cost of family food supplies and up to 227k child deaths
  • Did not meet expectations that Hussein would be ousted in coup, did not get weapons inspections concessions from him either
  • Blame placed on US and UN for humanitarian crisis
  • Encouraged black market, organized crime activities in Iraq and bordering countries, monitoring organizations
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Drezner on implications of 1990s sanctions studies

A
  • Called into question ethics and effectiveness of comprehensive sanctions
  • Studies showed sanctions more useful as a threat, against democracy, when endorsed by international institutions, when dispute is of low salience to target, and little chance of future conflict, when potential economic consequences large
  • Most often hurt public and can even enrich key supporters of target regime (incentive for rent-seeking, production of private goods for supporters)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Drezner on historical development of smart sanctions

A
  • Within UN, committees formed to assess effects of authorized comprehensive sanctions
  • International conferences in countries like Switzerland, Sweden, Germany that were tasked with how to better implement sanctions
  • US support for policy due to potential for combating financial abuse (money laundering, etc.)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Drezner on effectiveness of smart sanctions

A
  • Somewhat more humane than comprehensive sanctions (less likely to increase political repression, civilian suffering)
  • Less likely to produce concessions from target government
  • Major successes include Libya (although other factors like threat of invasion and back-channel negotiations aided success) and Angola arms embargoes (although arms embargoes typically actually benefit the largest holder of arms which is usually government in power)
  • Overall mixed bag and further research needed into their long-term impact, relative effect compared to comprehensive sanctions, how they affect behavior in authoritarian countries
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Why do states choose sanctions over other options?

A
  • Sanctions are typically (somewhat inaccurately) considered to be less deadly than military options
  • Can cost less domestic lives
  • Not always alternative to war, can be part of lead-up to military option
  • In absence of any other workable alternative, to boost public opinion and perceptions at home
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

How pervasive have sanctions been in recent history?

A
  • Only two instances in Cold War (Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa)
  • 1990s often referred to as “sanctions decade” where they became widely employed UN-authorized tool
  • Today, about a dozen states and non-state actors (or their leaders) who are sanctioned
  • US is by far most likely to impose sanctions
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

What are secondary sanctions?

A
  • Sanctions applied to institutions or individuals that do business with sanctioned country (US telling banks can either do business with Iran or US)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Canadian sanctions today

A
  • Against Myanmar, Belarus, Russia

- Restricts access on things like military equipment, nuclear reactors, chemical technology to more countries

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Sanctions against Canada

A
  • OPEC in 1970s against Canada and allies to prevent support of Israel in Yom Kippur war
  • Threat of many Arab sanctions in 1979 caused Clark government to back down on decision to move embassy to Jerusalem
  • 2014 Russia imposes retaliatory sanctions and travel bans on 13 individuals (including then-journalist Freeland) in response to Canadian export ban in wake of Ukraine crisis
  • 2018 Saudi sanctions on Canada following criticism
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Changing reasons and administration for sanctions

A
  • Used to be due to threat to international order / “breach of the peace”
  • Nowadays often used to promote better governance, slow development of nuclear weapons, discourage terrorism, etc.
  • Used to be administered by new UN sanctions committee for each imposed sanction with little communication between them, all held behind closed doors
  • Now more sharing of expertise, involvement of NGOS
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

How successful have sanctions been historically?

A
  • IIE study on sanctions between WW1 and end of Cold War argued that effective in producing desired change 34% of time (often criticized for using too broad definition of “success”, many others say only successful about 5% of time)
  • Major success story is South Africa
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Reasons for lack of sanctions success

A
  • “Rally effect”, where people in targeted state rally around government and sanctions increase nationalism (Cuba, India + Pakistan where sanctions produced demonstrations in support of nuclear testing)
  • Naive expectation of change (states targeted tend to be most immune to public opinion
  • Collective action problem (a few non-complying countries like Turkey and Jordan with Iraq sanctions undermined effectiveness) which can be due to refusal to comply with any sanctions not authorized by UN (India), profit from illegal trade (Liberia cut in on Congo diamond trade), countries that decide their own economies/traders will suffer as a result
  • Rebound effect where sanctions hurt imposing country more than target (US prohibition on sale of grain to USSR in response to Afghan intervention doesn’t work, USSR just buys grain from other countries)
  • Target-specific factors like high dependence on particular non-essential export (Saudi not sanctioned due to world oil dependence), size of economy, protective measures against sanctions (Venezuela in 2012 orders repatriation of many tons of gold so couldn’t be seized)
  • Uneven impact that falls heaviest on masses
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Alternatives to comprehensive sanctions

A
  • Smart sanctions

- Trade and investment incentives for good behavior and other forms of constructive engagement

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Background to Iraq conflict

A
  • Saddam invades Kuwait 1990 and names it as an Iraqi province, US and international community condemn it and US puts forces in Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield
  • US then places comprehensive sanctions in place for initial period but assessed to probably not work in getting Iraq to leave Kuwait, so US begins air and then ground war 1991 (Operation Desert Storm)
  • US then reaches ceasefire in return for demands including nuclear and chemical weapons disarmament, end of ballistic missile program, monitoring of disarmament, etc.
  • Comprehensive sanctions for more than decade continued in order to maintain Iraqi compliance with demands
  • War resumes 2003 with US invasion
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Problems with Iraq sanctions

A
  • Some countries circumvented (500 trucks of oil smuggled from Turkey every day which then sold by regime to world market with unclear uses) due to bribes, desire for economic benefit, lack of pressure from US coalition due to fact that countries like Turkey and Jordan were allies
  • Smuggling of goods (nature unknown) every day, approx 199 out of every 200 trucks from Turkey
  • Iraq populations in central and southern provinces particularly suffered greatly with resulting calls to end sanctions, estimates up to 1.7 million deaths (although data hard to verify as mostly from Iraqi regime)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Iraq oil for food program

A
  • Takes 5 years to establish (Iraq adamant that regime itself will be responsible for delivery of food and medical supplies with only 300 UN monitors allowed to observe)
  • Supposed to work by: Iraqi oil production –> sold to world market –> profits go to special UN office (to prevent misuse by regime) –> revenue divided 1/3 to compensation for war victims and 2/3 for food and medicine bought on world market –> distributed by UN in Kurdish north, Iraqi government in central and south
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

Problems with oil for food program

A
  • Iraqi control meant that could selectively choose who to distribute food and medicine to (non-loyal people not helped)
  • Iraqi government imposed many surcharges and fees to complicit food and medicine producers which generated profit for government, costs passed on to UN office
  • Iraqi government smuggled medicines out of country to other countries’ black markets, selling to pharmacies and pocketing profit
  • Iraqi government stockpiled medicines to keep up artificial shortage, selling to domestic black market and pocketing profit
  • Iraqi government chose primarily Russian, French, Chinese firms and individuals to sell oil to at discount rate which then resold to oil companies at full price, either pocketed profit for political favor or gave some profit back to Iraq (prominent examples are South Korean businessman flipping $1 mil contract to UN USG Maurice Strong, program head Benon Sevan who allegedly made millions in exchange for allowing military equipment to enter Iraq, firm owned by SecGen’s son Kojo Annan who may have received money in exchange for influence in lobbying Kofi)
  • Overall profits of all schemes estimated to be in hundreds of millions to billions
19
Q

Why couldn’t problems with oil for food program be fixed?

A
  • Gross mismanagement and corruption

- UNSC could not agree on mechanisms to fix deficiencies (France, China, Russia blocked many moves)

20
Q

Jurisdictions of international courts

A
  • Varies from universal (ICJ) to only regional jurisdictions (European Court of Justice)
21
Q

Function of international courts

A
  • Varies, ICJ exercises broadest jurisdiction (upholds values of UN Charter and international law and only limited to states bringing cases and doesn’t try individuals)
  • Most courts narrower (ICC looks into genocide, OPEC Arab Court handles oil disputes, etc.)
22
Q

Structure of international courts

A
  • Most are permanent but some non-permanent courts and tribunals too (such as war crimes tribunals)
23
Q

Number of international courts and challenges in how they relate to each other

A
  • Currently 17 permanent courts (~40 if including quasi-judicial bodies) and growing
  • Big challenge is which laws to apply and what happens if other courts apply different types of laws that lead to different outcomes (although clashes to date have been rare and most courts typically follow the lead of the ICJ)
  • Suggestions have been made that formal judicial hierarchy should be created but hasn’t happened yet and lack of political will, potential overwork at ICJ, legitimacy of other courts potentially being undermined means unlikely to happen anytime soon
  • Enforcement is other big challenge, as don’t command any police, armies, etc. and rely primarily on voluntary compliance of states (does happen most of the time such as in 1980s Canada-US maritime boundary dispute)
24
Q

Why do/don’t states comply with international court rulings?

A
  • Could be vexing problem where states just want a settlement or face-saving solution where political leaders don’t look like they are conceding to other state / issue is hindering relations between countries
  • Generally in interest of nation to uphold international law obligations
  • Limits on compliance are when dispute is of political and not legal nature (legal disputes typically include technical things like trade while political disputes include things like Cuban Missile Crisis)
  • Complying with decisions may help domestic / international reputation that can help it in future negotiations (although some states may not care as much)
  • In extraordinary cases, other states may step in to enforce rulings (ICJ says Serbia not upholding obligations to uphold genocide perpetrators to justice so EU makes it condition to joining organization), typically happens when states have other agenda to pursue, also only typically stronger state enforcing against weaker state
25
Q

General limits to international law

A
  • Strong nations have much more sway than weaker ones so international courts typically can’t affect them to the same standard that domestic courts can (however even domestic courts are hard pressed to enforce demands – 1/3 of murders in US go unpunished)
  • International politics highly shaped around interests of great powers
  • Some jurisdictions do have high success rates, however (look to quasi-judicial bodies such as fishing committees, World Bank in resolving contract disputes, etc.)
26
Q

Pre-ICJ international court development

A
  • Jay’s Treaty 1795 that established bilateral tribunals between US-UK, helped settle issues like New England, Alaska borders that diplomatic means failed to conclude
  • Aftermath of US Civil War creates tribunals such as Alabama Claims Tribunal (tribunal to decide whether Britain should have allowed construction of easily converted ship sold to South, seated mainly with members from foreign countries so first time countries involved willingly ceded some sovereignty and US awarded damages)
  • Permanent Court of Arbitration created in 1899 after increasing popularity of tribunals in model of Alabama Claims and provided administrative assistance to help countries design their own tribunals
  • Permanent Court of International Justice 1922-1940 served as template for ICJ, had statute, staff, heard cases, offered advisory opinions (hypothetical questions posed by countries)
27
Q

South China Sea arbitration

A
  • Permanent Court of Arbitration case that creates tribunal to resolve China-Philippines dispute over resources
  • China claims most of area as Exclusive Economic Zone and has created lots of artificial islands to boost claim, many militarized clashes over area
  • 2016 Philippines challenge overall claim and Permanent Court deems that almost all Chinese actions violate international law (treaties that say can’t build islands and claim surrounding seas)
28
Q

Prominent PCIJ cases

A
  • 1933 Eastern Greenland case that Denmark did not have to fully occupy territory to claim it and administration was enough
  • 1924 Albania-Yugoslavia border dispute (treaty said border went up until a monastery and didn’t display whether included it), court rules in favor of Albania
29
Q

Creation and structure of ICJ

A
  • Developed post-WW2 to replace moribund state of international law, jurisdiction is entire world assuming parties accept the jurisdiction of court
  • Proposal that ICJ should have compulsory jurisdiction was rejected while statute was being drawn up
  • Non-states actors such as UN can ask ICJ to ask for advisory opinions although cannot bring cases to court
  • Structure is permanent, located in Hague, comprised of 15 elected judges who are elected on staggered basis for 9 year renewable terms, nominated by Permanent Court of Arbitration and confirmed by majority in UNSC
  • Ideological makeup is designed to reflect makeup of UNSC (one judge from each of 5 permanent members, each general region gets 2-3 members each) although countries without judges allowed to appoint one ad hoc judge if they are involved in particular cases
  • No appeal process but states allowed to resubmit cases within 10 years of ruling if there is new information
  • Allowed to decide case on basis of what is fair and just instead of based on international law if parties agree
  • Decisions are not formal precedents although strives to maintain direction of own rulings
30
Q

Optional clause of ICJ

A
  • If both states agree that they accept compulsory jurisdiction of court, they can force the other state to appear before the court
  • 72 states mostly regional, middle, small powers that have accepted compulsory jurisdiction of court
  • States can withdraw from optional clause even during court rulings, however, such as US in aftermath of Nicaragua case
  • States can also provide reservations to signature of optional clause, Canada says accept compulsory jurisdiction of court in all cases except certain cases (mainly maritime matters)
31
Q

Prominent ICJ cases

A
  • 1949 Corfu Channel that helps define concept of international strait, legality of use of force
  • 1984 Gulf of Maine case that settles most of Canada-US maritime boundary
  • 1986 Nicaragua case that helps define concept of legitimate force
32
Q

Origins of ICC

A
  • WW1 and WW2 international tribunals to try war criminals, WW1 not much success but more war criminals tried WW2
  • WW2 effort to create permanent war crimes court floundered (mainly due to Cold War as well as some technical disagreements)
  • Winding down of Cold War in 1990s revives idea, International Law Commission told to start preliminary work
  • Ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia, Rwanda
  • July 1998 signing of Rome Statute creates ICC and 2004 goes into operation
33
Q

Criticism of WW2 war crimes tribunals

A
  • Sometimes trials amounted to victor’s justice and engaged in double standard (same actions undertaken by allies)
  • Some judges had participated in trials under Stalin’s Great Purge and other alleged show trials
34
Q

Relationship between ICC and UN

A
  • Independent body, although treaty exists whereby two sides cooperate and work closely together
  • UN GA authorized to fund ICC if cases are referred to it by UNSC
35
Q

ICC court structure

A
  • Only members are states (although broadening of state definition has let members such as Palestinian authority join), 123 total members today including Palestine (although more than half of world’s population lives in non-member country)
  • Most support in Europe and western hemisphere (esp South America) with less support in Middle East and Asia
  • States allowed to withdraw from ICC although only Burundi has done so, Philippines in process, Gambia + South Africa have announced leaving but reversed
  • Located in Hague, governing body is Assembly of States Parties, non-members may sit as observers, each member gets vote with no vetoes
  • Court has bureaucratic and administrative staff, operations budget about $230 million CAD per year from member dues
  • 18 judges elected on regional basis from member states, 2/3 currently from Europe and Latin America due to member makeup, serve 9 year terms
36
Q

Instances in which ICC can take action

A
  • If state where alleged war crime takes place is a member of ICC
  • If person belonging to member state commits war crime
  • If neither of above are true, UNSC subject to veto can request that ICC takes action (so in theory any war crime could be under ICC jurisdiction)
  • Only UNSC, ICC members, or ICC staff can initiate investigation (non-governmental organizations, etc cannot ask court to investigate, only contribute information)
37
Q

Limits to ICC actions

A
  • Court has limited resources so sometimes turns down investigations into smaller actions in favor of focusing on large scale offenses
  • Court may be unwilling to pursue cases if domestic courts are effective enough (although may step in if domestic courts in shambles or corrupt)
  • Cannot retroactively prosecute crimes that occurred prior to the advent of court (July 1, 2002)
38
Q

What kinds of crime does ICC prosecute?

A
  • Mainly large scale genocide or crimes against humanity
  • Things that have been considered: aggression in general (disagreements on meaning of term led to it being left out), terrorism (although if large scale enough to constitute crime against humanity could step in), large scale drug trafficking (problem so widespread that could overwhelm resources of court)
39
Q

ICC enforcement

A
  • Member states obliged to fully cooperate with court although states like Kenya and South Africa have refused to cooperate with investigations and arrest warrants, etc.
40
Q

US resistance to ICC?

A
  • US opposition arises mostly from fear of loss of sovereignty (subjugation of Constitution), politicized prosecutions (US citizens charged of war crimes)
  • Bush and Obama administrations started to soften stance a little bit with former aiding investigation into Omar al-Bashir, latter tried to get Syrian civil war into ICC via UNSC but vetoed
  • Trump administration less friendly, has not liked fact that ICC has been looking into Afghanistan war
41
Q

Other countries’ resistance to ICC?

A
  • Russia withdrew signature (said didn’t meet expectations as didn’t convict many people despite spending tons of $, although court was also looking into Crimea and South Chechnya)
  • India has cited loss of sovereignty, objects to inclusion of crimes committed in context of domestic conflicts (Kashmir), UNSC ability to refer (doesn’t like current UNSC makeup and veto ability)
  • China mainly cites politicized prosecutions
42
Q

Other general criticisms of ICC

A
  • Possible conflicts between ICC investigations and domestic end-of-conflict tribunals such as truth & reconciliation commissions (threat of ICC persecution may make it harder for countries to cut deals with rebel groups and achieve peace)
  • Maximum penalty that ICC can impose is life sentence which can create conflict in judgement if other courts handling same situation gives harsher sentence
  • Problems with people court decides to pursue (mostly rebel leaders so far with many possible government officials not even charged, most people have so far been from sub-Saharan Africa), although some of this is due to temporal issues since many Asian and European atrocities occurred before ICC established, majority of African cases have been instigated by African governments, many African countries under investigation don’t have adequate domestic courts
  • This has created contentious relationship between Africa and ICC although African Union did end up rejecting motion to mass withdraw from it (so may still be salvageable)
43
Q

In his article “Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent,” Ralph Summy analyzes campaigns of non-violent resistance against violent and oppressive authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. What are Summy’s main arguments, what is the main evidence he uses to support his arguments, and what are the strengths and weaknesses, errors, or omissions of his analysis?

A
  • Critiques the usual assumption that nonviolence is limited by its ability to be successful in face of extremely repressive regimes
  • -> Counters Raymond Aron’s argument that lack of armed resistance led to tragedies like Jews under Hitler by saying that an organized campaign of nonviolence had no occurred in these instances so cannot say that failure to resist violently led to massacres
  • -> Says that conventional view that power is top down is incorrect as refusal by key groups like administrators to do duties can drastically undermine ruler’s power, actions by outcast groups can also mobilize support of these groups
  • -> Says that there are many instances where ruled withdrew their support which led to disintegration of ruler’s power
  • -> Brings up Gene Sharp’s argument that power requires a degree of consent or compliance, is very fragile and requires things like human resources, expertise, authority, etc.
  • -> Nonviolence moreso based on actively denying ruler rather than overpowering him
  • Says that people are also actively shaped by surrounding institutions so attitudes may not immediately be predisposed to united resistance even if oppressed (can be participants in regime, manipulated by media, nationalistic, divided by class or race, etc.)
  • -> Totalitarian states can never exercise 100% control, revolt is can always be possible when costs of operating state control become too high or when regimes begin to suppress for too long the subversive forms of human spirit (music, art, public expression, etc.)
  • Examples:
  • -> Overthrow of Iranian Shah required very little violence, stemmed mainly from more and more people being mobilized by his use of violence against protestors until even many armed forces defected
  • -> Czechslovakia where police beatings against nonviolent protestors galvanized support
  • -> El Salvador where failed violent insurgency against Martinez led to successful nonviolent total civic strike
  • -> Norwegians in WW2 challenged Quisling’s ability to Nazify civic society such as teachers refusing to implement new curriculum
  • -> German attempts to alienate domestic Jewish populations provoked negative reaction and led to carrying out of exterminations outside of Germany
  • In instances where oppressed people don’t have direct dependency relationship with ruler, they can appeal to third parties who do
  • -> Vietnamese people who linked up with anti-war soldiers and draft resisters to erode domestic support in US
  • -> Southern black civil rights advocates who exposed inhumane acts to Northern liberals to pressure governments
  • -> Gestapo released thousands of German Jews married to ethnic Germans after mass protests during their roundup in 1943