Midterm 2 Flashcards
Contingent contracts create…
Value - align incentives and share risk
External negotiations are rough without…
Internal alignment - less time on strategy & more on interests
Owner-Manager incentive conflicts (5)
- Choice of effort
- Perquisite taking
- Differential risk exposure
- Differential horizons
- Over investment
Hierarchy in a firm
Shareholder CEO Divisional manager Plant manager Workers
Sources of conflict
- Differences in preferences for perquisites and effort
- Differences in decision horizon
- Differences in risk preferences
- Differences in investment incentives
Elements of organizational architecture
Delegated decision authority
Performance measurement
Reward system
Contracts designate…
Actions, rules, payments, expectations
Can be explicit and implicit
Contract parties voluntarily agree to….
Modify behavior for mutual benefit.
Organizational architecture
Decision rights
Reward system
Performance measurement
Benefits of decentralization
Effective use of knowledge
Conservation of management time
Training and motivation for local managers
Costs of decentralization
Potential agency problems
Coordination costs and failures (duplicate efforts)
Less effective use of central information
Revenue center
PxQ
Take derivative
Solve for Q
Optimal level of decentralization
Solve for D
Assigning decision rights to teams
Benefits: better use of member knowledge, contribution by each member, increase employee support and involvement, enhance employee buy in
Costs: slower than individual decisions, collective action problem (politics), free riders (moral hazard)
Decision process
Initiation - generate proposals
Ratification - select initiatives to be implemented
Implementation- execution of decisions
Monitoring - measurement of performance of decision makers
Why do we measure performance?
- To provide feedback on employee activities
2. To determine rewards and compensation
What determines performance?
Ability
Effort
Noise (random stuff)
Agency cost =
Monitoring costs + bonding costs + residual loss
Who pays for monitoring costs?
Principal
Who spends bonding costs?
Agent
Ex: audit fee
Residual loss represents…
Opportunity loss remaining when contracts are imperfectly enforced
Incentive contracts can improve performance because they …
Motivate employees
Attract high performers
Stretch performance
Belief that aggressive targets will motivate managers to perform at their highest levels
Minimum performance standard (MPS)
To judge managers first on if they hit an MPS
MPS should be realistic and achievable
Problem with MPS
It can be subjective
Owner incentives:
To maximize profits and have diligent employees
Employee incentives:
Maximize utility and take breaks from working
Incentive problems
Firm cannot observe employee performance costlessly
Output can be difficult to measure
If employee and owner interests align :
Incentive problem does not exist
Contracts can solve incentive problem if :
Workers actions and output are observable
Constraints for contracts
Contract must balance fixed income and performance incentives