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MH-65 > MH-65D Chapter 3 > Flashcards

MH-65D Chapter 3 Flashcards

1
Q

Land Ditch Immediately

A

Executing a landing or ditching without delay due to the seriousness of the malfunction. Primary consideration is to assure survival of the occupants of the aircraft.

W: Potential loss of airframe after aircrew egress is not sufficient cause to continue flight.

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2
Q

Land As Soon As Possible

A

Executing a landing at the first site at which a safe landing can be made. Primary consideration is the urgency of the emergency.

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3
Q

Land As Soon As Practicable

A

Extended flight is not recommended. Landing site and duration of flight is at the discretion of the PIC.

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4
Q

Abort Mission

A

Aircraft shall not proceed on its assigned mission and should return to the desired recovery base.

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5
Q

Continue Flight As Appropriate

A

Acknowledges the aircraft is performing in a degraded mode. Consider mission urgency and impact of malfunction on safe aircraft operation when determining whether to proceed on an assigned mission.

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6
Q

MGB Failure Imminent

A
  1. 200’ CHECKLIST - COMPLETE
  2. LAND/DITCH IMMEDIATELY

W: Potential loss of airframe after aircrew egress is not sufficient cause to continue flight.

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7
Q

MGB Overtorque

A
  1. REDUCE TORQUE WITHIN LIMITS WHEN ABLE
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8
Q

MGB Fire

A
  1. ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM PRESENCE OF FIRE
  2. 200’ CHECKLIST - COMPLETE
    If fire confirmed:
  3. LAND/DITCH IMMEDIATELY
    If fire NOT confirmed:
  4. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

W: Due to potential for fire damage to flight control servos and/or hydraulics, may result in complete loss of aircraft control.
W: Potential loss of airframe after aircrew egress is not sufficient cause to continue flight.
W: Illumination of MGB FIRE light may indicate a fire, overheat, or short circuit in the detection system.
W: Since no extinguisher is provided in the MGB compartment, immediate action should be taken to confirm presence of fire.

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9
Q

Engine Compartment Fire Inflight

A
  1. ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM PRESENCE OF FIRE
  2. SINGLE-ENGINE FLIGHT PROFILE - ESTABLISH
    If fire confirmed:
  3. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM; IDLE, CONFIRM; OFF
  4. EFSL (affected engine) - CONFIRM; OFF
  5. BOOST PUMPS (affected engine) - OFF
  6. PRI FIRE EXTINGUISHER BUTTON (affected engine) - CONFIRM; PUSH
  7. SECONDARY FIRE EXTINGUISHER BUTTON (affected engine) - PUSH
  8. 200’ CHECKLIST - COMPLETE
    If fire still persists:
  9. LAND/DITCH IMMEDIATELY
    If fire no longer evident:
  10. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

W: Potential loss of airframe after aircrew egress is not sufficient cause to continue flight.
N: Confirming may be difficult; it may be necessary to open the cabin sliding door and/or turn the aircraft to look for smoke.

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10
Q

Engine Compartment Fire Ondeck

A
  1. ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM PRESENCE OF FIRE
  2. FCSs - BOTH OFF
  3. EFSLs - BOTH OFF
  4. BOOST PUMPS - ALL OFF
    If fire confirmed:
  5. PRI FIRE EXTINGUISHER BUTTON (affected engine) - CONFIRM; PUSH
  6. SECONDARY FIRE EXTINGUISHER BUTTON (affected engine) - PUSH
  7. EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CUTOFF - OFF
  8. ROTOR BRAKE - ON
  9. EVACUATE AIRCRAFT
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11
Q

Internal Fire (Cabin, Electrical, and/or Avionics)

A
  1. DESIGNATE CREWMEMEBER TO FIGHT FIRE
  2. AFFECTED EQUIPMENT - OFF
  3. CIRCUIT BREAKERS - PULL (for affected circuits)
  4. RACK BLOWER CIRCUIT BREAKER - PULL (for avionics rack fire only - avionics rack panel R5#4)
  5. HEAT/COOL - OFF
  6. RAM AIR, DOORS, AND CP WINDOW - CLOSED
  7. 200’ CHECKLIST - COMPLETE
    If electrical or avionics fire persists:
  8. EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CUTOFF - OFF
    If electrical or avionics fire persists:
  9. LAND/DITCH IMMEDIATELY
    If fire goes out:
  10. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

W: Severity of fire and actual flight conditions (night, IMC, etc) will dictate immediate procedures to be followed. May not be advisable to secure all electrical power prior to achieving VMC.
W: With Emergency Cutoff - Off the float system will not be available. Consideration should be given to float activation prior to securing power if ditching is anticipated.
W: All comms, internal and external, will be lost with Emergency Cutoff.
W: Emergency Cutoff - Off removes power from the tail rotor hydraulic isolation valve and may result in considerable feedback in the pedals.
W: Potential loss of airframe after aircrew egress is not sufficient cause to continue flight.
N: Avrack fires will be fought by disconnecting enough camlocks for fire extinguisher access; short blasts advised to preserve agent in case of reflash.

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12
Q

Smoke And Fume Elimination

A
  1. HEAT/COOL SWITCHES - OFF
  2. RAM AIR, CABIN SLIDING DOOR, AND CP WINDOW - OPEN

W: If fuel fumes present, minimize radio transmissions. Due to antenna location, COMM1 radio is best choice.
N: SEAS bottle in crew vests may be a good source of clean air.
N: Normally, no toxic quantities of CO or other gases are present in engine exhaust. Objectionable odors from ECS sometimes occur due to internal oil leaks and should be noted in ALMIS.

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13
Q

Engine Post-Shutdown Fire

A
  1. FCS - CHECK OFF
  2. BOOST PUMPS - CHECK OFF
  3. EFSL (affected engine) - OFF
    If high TOT still evident after 10 secs:
  4. CRANK BUTTON - DEPRESS UNTIL TOT DECREASES
    If TOT continues to rise or does not decrease:
  5. EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CUTOFF - OFF
  6. ROTOR BRAKE - ON
  7. EVACUATE AIRCRAFT

C: Operation of the crank button w/ the EFSL pulled will cause severe damage to the engine fuel pump.
N: If the engine does not stop immediately (solenoid valve failure), FADEC will shutdown the engine 5-6 secs later.
N: After engine shutdown is complete and N1 rotation has ceased, TOT may increase slowly due to temperature soak-back.

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14
Q

Known Or Suspected Aircraft Damage/Abnormal Vibrations

A 
1. 200' CHECKLIST - COMPLETE
If Severe vibrations and/or drastically altered flight characteristics:
2. LAND/DITCH IMMEDIATELY
If Moderate vibrations:
2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

W: Potential loss of airframe after aircrew egress is not sufficient cause to continue flight.
W: Known or suspected damage that appears minor on the surface may involve structural or flight control components. It’s imperative damage be thoroughly investigated prior to continuing flight.
N: Reductions in airspeed below 75-100 KIAS may reduce vibrations and improve flight characteristics.

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15
Q

NR Overspeed

A
  1. REDUCE NR TO WITHIN LIMITS, WHEN ABLE.
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16
Q

Uncommanded Left Yaw (ULY)

A
  1. IMMEDIATE FULL RIGHT PEDAL.
  2. ALTITUDE/OBSTACLES PERMITTING, SMOOTHLY APPLY FORWARD CYCLIC TO INCREASE FORWARD AIRPSEED.
  3. ALTITUDE PERMITTING, REDUCE COLLECTIVE.
  4. NR SWITCH - HI.

W: If a large decent rate develops close to the ground/water, the subsequent large collective increase to arrest decent may aggravate or reinitiate ULY.
N: Consideration should be given to having the PM switch the NR to HI while the PF executes the initial corrective action.

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17
Q

TGB Chip Detected

A
  1. ESTABLISH A SAFE AIRSPEED AND ALTITUDE FOR POSSIBLE LOSS OF TAIL ROTOR THRUST.
  2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

N: If accompanied by strong medium frequency vibrations or abnormal noise from the tail section, plan your approach for the possible loss of tail rotor thrust.

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18
Q

Loss Of Tail Rotor Thrust In Forward Flight Or Fixed Tail Rotor Pitch

A
  1. DIRECTIONAL CONTROL MAINTAIN USING CYCLIC AND COLLECTIVE.

W: If no suitable surface, an autorotative landing to the best available area may be required.
C: Changing the NR switch from its current setting may exacerbate a tail rotor malfunction based on a high or low fixed pitch setting and is not recommended.

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19
Q

Loss Of Tail Rotor Thrust While Hovering

A
  1. EFSLs - BOTH OFF
  2. MAINTAIN LANDING ATTITUDE.
  3. CUSHION LANDING WITH COLLECTIVE.
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20
Q

Big 4

A
  1. NR
  2. AIRSPEED/ALTITUDE
  3. WHEELS/FLOATS
  4. ANALYZE
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21
Q

Single-Engine Failure Inflight To Include: Low Hover, High Hover, and Takeoff/Landing Transition

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4
    If suitable landing area is immediately available:
  2. ASSUME LANDING ATTITUDE, ELIMINATE YAW AND DRIFT PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN
    If suitable landing area is not immediately available:
  3. COLLECTIVE - ADJUST TO MAXIMUM POWER, MAINTAIN NR ABOVE 345RPM.
  4. AIRPSEED - CLIMB @ Vx OR Vy
  5. NR/OEI - SET AS NECESSARY
  6. ANALYZE

N: Procedures depend on hovering height, gross weight, indicated airspeed/wind, and other environmental factors.
N: Ability of the aircraft to fly out from a hover should be predetermined. The ASE Aircraft Performance page shall be used inflight to verify fly out capabilities.

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22
Q

Flameout

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.

N: Boost pumps on the failed engine side must be on to drive the transfer ejectors.
N: ECS may still be recovered by resetting the COOL switch.

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23
Q

Engine Gearbox/Output Shaft Failure

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.

N: When N2 reaches 429 +/-4 RPM the FADEC will operate the stop electro-valve via the BIM and shutdown the engine.
N: Boost pumps on the failed engine side must be on to drive the transfer ejectors.

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24
Q

Engine Lubrication System Failure

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.
  2. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM, IDLE; CONFIRM, OFF.

N: Oil pump failure resulting in symptoms may be preceeded by an initial rise in pressure above 100psi, accompanied by CHECK CDU.
N: Boost pumps on the failed engine side must be on to drive the transfer ejectors.

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25
Q

Engine Chip Detected

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.
  2. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM, IDLE.
    If ABNORMAL IDLE indications:
  3. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM, OFF.

N: Boost pumps on the failed engine side must be on to drive the transfer ejectors.
N If additional power is required for landing, affected FCS may be switched to FLT.

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26
Q

Engine Surge Or Compressor Stall Inflight

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.
    If ABNORMAL ENGINE indications and affected engine can be ID’d:
  2. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM, IDLE.
    If ABNORMAL IDLE indications:
  3. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM, OFF.

N: Boost pumps on the failed engine side must be on to drive the transfer ejectors.
N If additional power is required for landing, affected FCS may be switched to FLT.

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27
Q

Engine Surge Or Compressor Stall Ondeck

A
  1. FCS (affected engine) - OFF.
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28
Q

N1 Divergence/Partial Power Loss

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.

N: N1 of the malfunctioning engine determines what FLI page will be displayed: N1>40% - OEI GOV; N1

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29
Q

Major FADEC/Governor Failure (Level 3)

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.
  2. TRNG SWITCH - FLT
  3. FADEC BACKUP SWITCH (affected engine) - CONFIRM, BACKUP.

W: FADEC Backup switch shall not be in BACKUP when an engine is at TRNG IDLE as N1 matching will occur without regard to the opposite engine’s current N1 setting.
C: Reduction of collective before selection of the FADEC Backup switch could result in an overspeed and possible engine shutdown by the BIM.
N: While FADEC N1 matching is assured, there will be some acceleration delay on the engine in BACKUP mode.
N: EBCAU operation, if selected while in Training Mode, will conflict with FADEC logic and operation will be unpredictable. FADEC logic is designed to cancel Training Mode in the event of a Level 2 or 3 failure.

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30
Q

Minor FADEC/Governor Failure (Level 2)

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.

W: A BALAN.A failure may result in NR stabilizing below continuous operating range (

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31
Q

Engine Shutdown Procedure Inflight

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.
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32
Q

Emergency Shutdown Procedure Ondeck

A
  1. EFSLs - BOTH OFF.
  2. EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CUTOFF - OFF.
  3. ROTOR BRAKE - ON.
  4. EVACUATE AIRCRAFT.

W: Application of the rotor brake above 170 RPM may result in a fire.

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33
Q

Engine Start Emergencies

A
  1. FCS - OFF.

C: If engine start fails and OAT is at or below 0C with TOT >120C crank engine for 20 secs prior to subsequent start.
N: The FADEC will automatically shut the engine down during start if TOT exceeds 840C. The pilot shall initiate shutdown if it appears TOT will exceed 750C.
N: Before attempting another start, investigate and analyze conditions requiring abort.

34
Q

Dual Engine Failure Inflight (Autorotation Procedure)

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4 (airspeed 75-105 KIAS)
  2. TURN TOWARD DESIRED LANDING AREA AND/OR INTO THE WIND
  3. AT 200’ RADALT - WHEELS RECHECK.
  4. AT 125’ RADALT - INITIATE FLARE, CONTROL RATE TO ARRIVE @ 20 DEGREES NOSE UP @ 75’ RADALT; INFLATE FLOATS SA REQUIRED.
  5. MAINTAIN FLARE UNTIL DESIRED AIRSPEED IS REACHED - 30 KTS PLUS HALF THE WIND SPEED.
  6. ASSUME 5 DEGREE NOSE UP, WINGS LEVEL LANDING ATITUDE.
  7. AT 25’ RADALT - COLLECTIVE (cushion the landing)
35
Q

Primary Hydraulic (HYD2) System Malfunction

A
  1. CRUISE AIRSPEED - 75 TO 100 KIAS.
36
Q

Secondary Hydraulic (HYD1) System Malfunction

A
  1. CRUISE AIRSPEED - 75 TO 100 KIAS.

W: Electric pump should only be used to charge the wheel brake accumulator if brake pressure is absolutely necessary, only after the gear is down and locked. Secure pump immediately after pressure levels off to prevent overheat and electric pump failure, which could lead to fire.
C: SEC HYD C/B secures power to the 2000psi isolation valve and returns it to the open position which may result in additional fluid loss.
N: TAIL HYD ISOLATE to CUTOFF serves several functions: prevents further fluid loss in other the straight and level flight, prevents low fluid probe from opening valves should residual fluid from blowdown activation rise above 1 gallon in sump, prevents accidental gear retraction during emergency extension procedure.
N: In addition to hydraulic isolation of gear, wheel brakes, TALON, and left body of tail rotor servo normal electrical power to the rescue hoist will be isolated.
N: Gear blowdown is accompanied by an electrical burning smell and should not be confused with a possible malfunction or fire.
N: TALON manifold block incorporates a check valve that prevents the accumulator from pressurizing the gear and brake circuits, and should not lose pressure when lowering the gear in an isolate condition.

37
Q

Secondary Hydraulic (HYD1) Pressure High/Low

A
  1. LANDING GEAR HANDLE - DOWN (wheels confirm down).

N: Rescue hoist response will be decreased w/ a reduction in system pressure. Pressure available for braking will be indicated on the wheel brake accumulator gauge.

38
Q

Dual AC Bus Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

W: Resetting AC system C/Bs carries significant risk of igniting an electrical fire and should not be attempted.
N: If the two AC systems did not fail concurrently, begin by attempting to recover the last one to fail, then the first one. If unknown, numerically.
N: TACAN and EGIs are 28VDC powered, but use 26VAC reference power. EGIs will still work normally and TACAN will provide distance only on BDI, with valid direction and distance on MFD needles.

39
Q

AC System Failure (Main AC Bus Short, Alternator, Alternator Control Unit (ACU), Or 115/26VAC System Failure)

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
  2. 26VAC XFER SWITCH - MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ILLUMINATED FAIL LIGHT
  3. AFCS - REENGAGE

W: Resetting AC system C/Bs carries significant risk of igniting an electrical fire and should not be attempted.
N: BTC CLOSED light does not indicate bus transfer, but merely switch position. System isolation is effected by open bus tie C/Bs on cabin overhead.
N: 115VAC components may be recovered except No.1 system - ECS, Inst lights; No.2 system - Radar, Inst lights.
N: TACAN and EGIs are 28VDC powered, but use 26VAC reference power. EGIs will still work normally and TACAN will provide distance only on BDI, with valid direction and distance on MFD needles.

40
Q

Main DC Bus Short

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
  2. AFFECTED AUDIO CONTROL PANEL(S) - ALTN (FM audio control panel to ALTN for No.1 Copilot DC Bus Short).
  3. AFCS GYRO SELECTOR SWITCH - MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE OPERABLE EGI.
  4. AFCS - REENGAGE.

W: Loss of No.1 CP DC Bus will cause an unrecoverable loss of the transponder.
N: Loss of No.1 CP DC Bus will cause loss of COMM1 antenna relay limiting capabilities of COMM1 radio.
N: Loss of No.2 P DC Bus will result in considerable feedback in the pedals due to TAIL HYD ISOLATE condition.
N: If P and CP master volume settings differ significantly, the MSTR VOL on the unaffected audio control panel may have to be adjusted to ensure effective comms.
N: AFCS computer requires input from both EGIs for YAW operation.

41
Q

Battery Over Temperature/Thermal Runaway

A
  1. BATT RELAY SWITCHES - BOTH OFF.

W: Securing the BATT RELAY switches WILL NOT stop or reverse a thermal runaway.
W: CO2 should never be directed into the battery compartment, static discharge could cause explosion.
C: If BATT TEMP warning light goes out switches should be left off unless absolutely needed.
N: In the even to a dual DC generator failure, the T/R cannot power either main DC bus with the battery switches secured.
N: A No.2 DC generator failure with the No.2 BATT RELAY switch in OFF position will result in considerable feedback in the pedals due to TAIL HYD ISOLATE condition.

42
Q

Engine Fuel Pressure Low

A
  1. COMPLETE BIG 4.
    If ABNORMAL ENGINE indications:
  2. FCS (affected engine) - CONFIRM, IDLE; CONFIRM, OFF.

N: Boost pumps on the failed engine side must be on to drive the transfer ejectors.

43
Q

Fuel Filter Contamination

A

If both FUEL FILTER caution lights illuminated:
1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

C: With possible fuel contamination in one system, DO NOT XFER FUEL UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.
C: The FUEL FILT light indicates a pressure differential the fuel filter and may extinguish at reduced power levels. This DOES NOT indicate that the problem has cleared.

44
Q

Boost Pump/Ejector/Indicator Failure

A
  1. BOOST PUMPS (affected system) - BOTH ON

W: Due to potenial for fire, do not reset boost pump circuit breakers.
C: If operating abive 8000’ MSL both boost pumps shall be on to prevent feed tank failure.
N: Left system unusable fuel: 280lbs (13-14%); Right system unusuable fuel: 60lbs (3-4%)
N: At or below unusable level, illumination of FEED TANK light may mean as little as 5 minutes to engine flameout.
N: FEED TANK lights may not illuminate at high fuel levels.
N: FEED TANK lights during a crosswind hover may only be leaking feed tank lids, and flight may be continued if leveling the aircraft extinguishes the light.
N: Pounds of fuel in each system may be observed on the VEMD Caution/Fuel page by moving the test switch to the desired side, or on the CDU fuel page.

45
Q

HIFR Emergency Breakaway

A
  1. CREW - ALERTED “BREAKAWAY, BREAKAWAY, BREAKAWAY.”
  2. EMERGENCY QUICK DISCONNECT HANDLE - PULL.

C: To prevent damage and fuel spill, hoist cable should not be sheared while HIFR nozzle is connected.

46
Q

EGI Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
  2. GYRO SELECTOR SWITCH - MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE OPERABLE EGI.
  3. AFCS PITCH AND ROLL - REENGAGE.

C: Pulling the wrong EGI C/B may induce a Dual EGI Failure.
N: AFCS computer requires input from both EGIs for YAW operation.
N: Conditions permitting, establish straight and level flight for ~2 mins before IN-AIR alignment and until complete (~10 mins).

47
Q

Dual EGI Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
  2. AFCS PITCH AND ROLL - DISENGAGE.

C: Pulling the wrong EGI C/B may induce a Dual EGI Failure.
N: Conditions permitting, establish straight and level flight for ~2 mins before IN-AIR alignment and until complete (~10 mins).
N: Hardover protection is not possible during reversionary EGI operations. Should an EGI failure occur uncommanded movement about the pitch and roll axes without cyclic inputs can be expected.

48
Q

Detected FD Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: Other components may fail in conjunction with an FD failure because they are powered by, and provide valid signals to, the flight director computer. Additionally, a FD failure could cause a loss of any or all three accelerometers.

49
Q

Undetected FD Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: If FD command bar/pointer is directing the proper correction, it is likely that the AFCS is unable to follow the command. If the bar/pointer remains centered a FD malfunction should be sustpected.

50
Q

AFCS Computer Or Series Actuator Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
  2. DISENGAGED CHANNELS - ATTEMPT TO REENGAGE.

N: Pitch and Roll channels redundantly powered through P and CP DC buses. Yaw and Collective through P bus only, and may be lost while attempting to cycle C/Bs.
N: Illumination of P, R, or Y TRIM lights indicates respective series actuator is not centered and associated control may have reduced authority. AFCS is unable to execute FD commands in disabled channels.

51
Q

AFCS Series Actuator Hardover (Undetected)/Parallel Servo ardover

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

2. AFFECTED CHANNEL - DISENGAGE.

52
Q

Collective Parallel Servo Hardover Or Failure

A
  1. COLLECTIVE - C-SYNC DEPRESS AND STABILIZE.

W: Depending on extent of failure, collecive may require significant force to move, or movement may not be possible.

53
Q

Cyclic Artificial Feel (Feel/Trim) Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

C: Without EM clutches engaged the AFCS and FD are ineffective in pitch and roll.

54
Q

Radar Altimeter (Radalt) Cycle Or Failure

A
  1. COLLECTIVE - C-SYNC DEPRESS AND STABILIZE.

W: During FD hover mode operation a RADALT cycle will be sensed as a climb with reduction in collective and loss of altitude followed by downward cycle and increase in collective with possible overtorque.
N: Above 8000’ AGL many of the failure symptoms manifest, this is not a failure but a trip point between indicator and encoder. Actual failure will include RALT on the Stat Page fail line.

55
Q

Dual Data Bus Lockup

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

W: Securing either AVIONICS will secure power to the respective EGI.
W: Turning CPLT AVIONICS to OFF will secure power to the transponder.
N: COMM1, COMM2, and HF will remain tuned to the last frequency with a blank or scrambled RRU. FM transmit capability is lost.

56
Q

Single Avionics (Electrical) Bus Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
  2. AFCS GYRO SELECTOR SWITCH - MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE OPERABLE EGI.
  3. AFCS PITCH AND ROLL - REENGAGE.

W: Turning CPLT AVIONICS to OFF will secure power to the transponder.
N: AFCS computer requires input from both EGIs for YAW operation.
N: Conditions permitting, establish straight and level flight for ~2 mins before IN-AIR alignment and until complete (~10 mins).

57
Q

Control Display Unit (CDU) Failures

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: NAVAIDS and comm radios will remain tuned to last frequency.
N: If power is regained after dual CDU failure IFF defaults to STBY.
N: Radar scan-to-scan integration will be lost with a CDU 1 failure.
N: Failure of CDU with bus control (BC) may cause erroneous nav pt generation.
N: If CDU in BC mode fails on side with NAV CTRL, FMS guidance and FD modes may be lost, but can be reengaged when other CDU assumes BC.

58
Q

SCC Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: Depending on type of failure other components interfaced through the SCC may or may not be lost.

59
Q

Steering Guidance (STR) Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: NAV and APPCH will function normally with VOR, ILS, and TCN as nav source. HDG SEL is unaffected.

60
Q

Display Control Panel (DCP) Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.
61
Q

MFD Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: HDG SEL can be reengaged when NAV CTL is on same side of cockpit as operating MFD.

62
Q

Dual MFD Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

N: Dual MFD failure will result in loss of RADALT low altitude warning tones and visual indications (40’ and 200’)

63
Q

Altitude Controller Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT.

C: Barometric altitude info will not be made available to the FD. FD affected in APPR, ALT, IAS-ALT, IAS-VS, VS, and GA modes.
N: FMS navigtion will be degraded & CATCH is not available.
N: LOW ALT light is inoperative.

64
Q

Mode 4 Failure

A
  1. CHECK IFF: NORM
  2. CHECK ANT: BOTH
  3. CHECK REPLY: TONE
  4. SELECT M-4A/M-4B AS APPROPRIATE
    If in high threat area & IFF/M4 WCA light remains illuminated or cycles, M4 fails, or IFF fails:
  5. EXIT AREA IMMEDIATELY.

N: IFF MON light on IFF/COMM panel will also illuminate when the IFF/M4 light illuminates and LIGHT is selected on the CDU page.

65
Q

Mode 4 Audio Tone

A
  1. SELECT M-4A/M-4B AS APPROPRIATE
    If in high threat area & tone remians:
  2. IMMEDIATELY EXIT AREA

N: A VALID but not COMPATIBLE code will cause an audio tone in the pilot and copilot headset when aircraft is interrogated (e.g. A code selected during B crypto period).

66
Q

Audio System Failure

A
  1. PILOT AND COPILOT AUDIO BYPASS SWITCHES - BYPASS

N: For the pilot, copilot, and FM to communicate over ICS both switches shall be in the BYPASS position. All audio warnings are inoperative.
N: During BYPASS operation the pilot can only transmit/receive on COMM1, the copilot on COMM2, and the FM will not have radio transmit capability.

67
Q

Node Wheel Shimmy Damper Failure

A
  1. LIFT AIRCRAFT OFF GROUND IMMEDIATELY OR REDUCE TAXI SPEED

C: Excessive and/or abrupt aft cyclic application may result in tail skid-to-ground contact.

68
Q

Heater Overheat

A
  1. HEAT SWITCH - OFF

C: Illumination of the HEATER O/HEAT warning light may indicate a fire hazard.
C: Do not turn HEAT on again until cause of overheat has been determined. Closed heater nozzles may cause an overheat condition.
N: A bleed air leak could also cause a warning light due to excessive temperature in the aft cabin overhead or near the FADEC computer. Placing the HEAT selector switch to OFF will close the bleed air shut-off valve.

69
Q

Copilot Static System Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT
    If flight director is degraded:
  2. AFFECTED FLIGHT DIRECTOR MODES - DESELECT

N: Static port blockage could be an indication of airframe icing.

70
Q

Copilot Pitot System Failure

A
  1. FLIGHT CONTROLS - STABILIZE AIRCRAFT
    If flight director is degraded:
  2. AFFECTED FLIGHT DIRECTOR MODES - DESELECT
71
Q

Hoist Cable Fouled/Damaged

A

If injury or damage is imminent:
1. ANNOUNCE “CABLE FOULED”
2. ACTIVATE HOIST SHEAR SWITCH WHILE ANNOUNCING “SHEAR, SHEAR, SHEAR” (PF/PM/FM)
3. ONCE CABLE IS CLEAR, ANNOUNCE “CABLE IS AWAY” (FM)
If conditions permit:
1. PAY OUT SLACK IN CABLE
2. ADVICE PF
3. DIRECT THE VESSEL’S CREW TO FREE THE CABLE
4. IF UNABLE TO FREE THE CABLE OR THE CABLE IS DAMAGED, AND SITUATION PERMITS, CUT THE CABLE UTILIZING CABLE CUTTERS AND ANNOUNCE “CABLE IS AWAY”(FM)
5. IF MISSION URGENCY DICTATES A CONTINUED HOIST, ASSEMBLE THE QUICK SPLICE AND COMPLETE THE HOIST WITH REMAINING CABLE LENGTH

W: If the hoist cable is damaged (e.g. kinked, bird-caged, strands broken, or deformed), the cable shall not be used for hoisting, nor shall the damaged portion be retrieved into the hoist assembly. Use of the quick splice should be considered.
C: With the quick splice installed there is no spring buffering and it is unlikely the UP-LIMIT switch will actuate.
C: Severe damage to the hoist or cable may result if the quick splice is run to the UP-LIMIT switch.

72
Q

Hoist Failure

A
  1. ANNOUNCE “HOIST FAILURE” AND ADVISE THE PF “COMMITTED” OR “NOT COMMITTED”
    If committed:
  2. CHECK THE CABLE AND DRUM FOR FOULING
  3. ACTIVATE EMERGENCY HOIST POWER AND CONTINUE THE HOIST
    If hoist power is not restored:
  4. ACTIVATE MANUAL OVERRIDE AND CONTINUE THE HOIST
    If hoist fails to respond to manual override with no personnel in rescue device:
  5. RETRIEVE THE RESCUE DEVICE IF PRACTICABLE
    If unable to retrieve the rescue device:
  6. CUT CABLE WITH CABLE CUTTER OR SHEAR
  7. ONCE CABLE IS CLEAR, ANNOUNCE “CABLE IS AWAY”
    If not committed:
  8. ABORT THE HOIST

W: During manual override (step 1 valve) operations the UP-LIMIT switch will be inoperative. Do not run the hoist hook to the UP-LIMIT switch.
C: The manual override (step 1 valve) shall be closed when the rescue device/RS is in the cabin to prevent hoist creep.
N: Any secondary hydraulic isolate condition (e.g. secondary hydraulic low fluid level, No. 2 DC Bus Short, etc.), will cause normal electrical power to be removed from the hoist.
N: When a survivor or rescue swimmer is attached to the hoist, on scene conditions will dictate possible courses of action. Refer to rescue swimmer emergencies in this section.

73
Q

Hoist Boom Failure

A
  1. ANNOUNCE “BOOM FAILURE”
  2. HOIST MASTER SWITCH - CHECK CREW POSITION
  3. HOIST ACT CONTROL AND HOIST ACT POWER CIRCUIT BREAKERS (2) - CYCLE (cabin overhead R1 No. 1 and R2 No. 1)
    If boom is not in the fully stowed position and does not respond to electrical control inputs:
  4. HOIST ACT CIRCUIT BREAKERS (2) - PULL
  5. HOIST OPERATOR PENDANT - DISCONNECT
  6. MANUAL CRANK - INSTALL
  7. MANUALLY CRANK BOOM TO STOWED POSITION
  8. MANUAL CRANK - REMOVE

N: The BOOM STOW and BOOM IN-OUT switches work independently of each other. The BOOM STOW switch will operate regardless of MASTER or EMERGENCY switch positions, as long as the No. 1 MAIN DC BUS is powered.

74
Q

Hoist Electrical Runaway

A
  1. SECURE HOIST POWER AT THE HOIST CONTROL PANEL ONLY
  2. ANNOUNCE “HOIST RUNAWAY” AND ADVICE PF “COMMITTED” OR “NOT COMMITTED”
    If committed to the hoist or mission urgency dictates:
  3. ACTIVATE MANUAL OVERRIDE AND CONTINUE THE HOIST
    If not committed to the hoist:
  4. ABORT THE HOIST

W: DO NOT SECURE the cockpit hoist master switch as all shear capabilities will be lost.
W: During manual override (step 1 valve) operations the UP-LIMIT switch will be inoperative. Do not run the hoist hook to the UP-LIMIT switch.

75
Q

Lost Communications During Hoisting Operations

A
  1. FM - TAP PF AND GIVE HOLD SIGNAL (closed fist)
  2. ANNOUNCE “ICS FAILURE” AND ADVISE PF “COMMITTED” OR “NOT COMMITTED”
    If committed:
  3. COMMUNICATE BY VOCAL COMMANDS AND CONTINUE HOIST
    Once hoist is completed:
  4. FM - ENSURE HOT MIC IS SELECTED, HELMETS PROPERLY CONNECTED; ATTEMPT HOT MIC ICS COMMS
    If communications are not restored:
  5. PRESS PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH - ATTEMPT NORMAL COMMS
    If communications are still not restored:
  6. AUDIO CONTROL PANEL - SELECT ALTN AND ATTEMPT COMMS (ALL CALL and HOT MIC are inoperative in ALTN)
    If communications are still not restored:
  7. ABORT MISSION
    If not committed:
  8. ABORT MISSION
76
Q

Lost RS

A 
Corrective action DAY:
1. MARK AND RECORD POSITION
2. TRANSITION AND ESTABLISH RIGHT ORBIT
3. LOOK AND LISTEN FOR RS SIGNAL
4. WHEN VISUAL - RESUME HOVER POSITION
If these procedures fail to relocate RS:
5. COMPLETE LEAVING RS ON SCENE PROCEDURE
Corrective action NIGHT:
1. MARK AND RECORD POSITION
2. FLASH LANDING/HOVER LIGHT
3. LOOK AND LISTEN FOR RS SIGNAL
4. WHEN VISUAL - CEASE FLASHING LIGHT
If these procedures fail to relocate RS:
5. COMPLETE LEAVING RS ON SCENE PROCEDURE
77
Q

Emergency Recovery of RS

A
  1. RESCUE BASKET - IF RIGGED AND EMPTY
  2. BARE HOIST HOOK - BASKET NOT READILY AVAILABLE
  3. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FM, THE RS SHALL ENTER THE CABIN BACKWARDS

W: If the aircrew observes a hazard to the RS in the water, hoisting of the RS should be initiated by placing the rescue device or bare hook between the RS and the hazard.
N: The RESCUE BRIEF is not required if the IN TROUBLE, NEED ASSISTANCE signal is observed.
N: If two or more RSs are in the water and the rescue basket is sent down, the RSs may disconnect the rescue basket and connect to the hoist hook utilizing the lifting V-ring on the RS harness.

78
Q

RS Falls Through Ice

A

Hoist cable attached:
1. RS - EXTRACT OUT OF THE ICE HOLE BY ROLLING OUT, OR PULLING OUT WITH THE ICE AWLS OR HOIST CABLE
2. ESTABLISH A HOVER, FM CONNS HELO INTO POSITION SO THAT THE RS MAY BE HOISTED OUT OF THE HOLE
Hoist cable NOT attached:
1. RS - EXTRACT OUT OF THE ICE HOLE BY ROLLING OUT, OR PULLING OUT WITH THE ICE AWLS
If the RS is unable to extract:
2. COMPLETE EMERGENCY RECOVERY OF THE RS

79
Q

Emergency Breakaway of Disembarked RS on Ice

A
  1. ON PRE-BRIEFED FREQUENCY PF ANNOUNCE “BREAKAWAY, BREAKAWAY, BREAKAWAY”.
  2. ACTIVATE HOIST SHEAR SWITCH WHILE ANNOUNCING “SHEAR, SHEAR, SHEAR” ON PRE-BRIEFED FREQUENCY
  3. ONCE CABLE IS CLEAR, ANNOUNCE “CABLE AWAY”
  4. COMPLETE LEAVING RS ON SCENE PROCEDURES
80
Q

Leaving RS On Scene

A
  1. MARK AND RECORD POSITION
  2. DEPLOY LIGHTED RAFT
  3. DEPLOY DMB

N: The abandoned RS ans survivor’s survivability is enhanced by providing any extra equipment possible (e.g. LR-1 raft, hypthermia bags, EMT kit, etc.) on scene prior to aircraft departing.

MH-65 (4 decks)

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