metaphysics of the mind 3 markers

Question 1

category mistake (ryle)

Answer 1

When someone represents certain facts/terms/concepts as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another.

Question 2

epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 2

(1) Dualism (of some form) is true, so minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (i.e. substance dualism) or some mental properties are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. property dualism); (2) The mental is caused by the physical - it is a “by-product” of the physical; (3) The mental, however, is causally impotent: the mental consists of epiphenomena - the mental has no effects.

Question 3

interactionist dualism

Answer 3

(1) Dualism (of some form) is true, so minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (i.e. substance dualism) or some mental properties are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. property dualism); (2) What happens mentally causally affects what happens physically; (3) What happens physically causally affects what happens mentally.

Question 4

philosophical zombie

Answer 4

A being that: (1) is physically identical (or duplicate of) a (normal/conscious) human being (ie has all and only the same physical properties as a normal/conscious human being) but (2) lacks any consciousness/qualia/phenomenal properties.

Question 5

property dualism

Answer 5

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.

Question 6

qualia

Answer 6

These are (1) phenomenal properties of mental states which are (2) intrinsic and non-intentional and are (3) introspectively accessible

Question 7

substance dualism

Answer 7

Minds (mental substances) exist and are not identical to (and can exist independently from) bodies or to parts of bodies (physical substances).

Question 8

functionalism

Answer 8

All mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised

Question 9

eliminative materialism

Answer 9

At least some of those mental states (phenomena, properties, processes) that are supposed to exist according to the common-sense folk-psychological theory of the mind do not exist.

Question 10

folk psychology

Answer 10

(1) The ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of
others) which (2) involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states/events with certain features and (3) is used by people to explain and predict human behaviour.

Question 11

hard philosophical behaviourism

Answer 11

All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (i.e. analytically reduced) to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states / movements

Question 12

mind brain type identity theory

Answer 12

All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although the concepts/terms ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction).

Question 13

physicalism

Answer 13

Everything (including the mental) is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).

Question 14

self refuting

Answer 14

If a claim/theory is _____________ then something about theory/claim means that the theory/claim itself is undermined/contradicted (e.g. the verification principle and eliminative materialism)

Question 15

soft philosophical behaviourism

Answer 15

(At least some) propositions about mental states are (at least in part) propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language)

Question 16

super spartan

Answer 16

Beings that (1) feels pain-qualia but (2) has the ability to successfully suppress all voluntary pain behavior (and, if a SSS, (3) does not even talk about pain)

Question 17

intentional properties

Answer 17

A mental state has _____________ if is is about something, if it has an “intentional object”

Question 18

multiple realisability of mental states (vs MBTIT, for functionalism)

Answer 18

Many different types of thing (which need not be humans) can have exactly the same type of mental state. A single mental kind (property, state, event) can be realised / instantiated in many (perhaps even infinite) ways.

Question 19

multiple realisability of mental states (vs philosophical behaviourism)

Answer 19

A single mental kind (property, state, event) can be identified with multiple (perhaps infinite) behaviours.

Question 20

principle of identity

Answer 20

everything is identical to itself

Question 21

principle of sufficient reason

Answer 21

Everything that happens/exists must have a sufficient cause/basis/explanation

Question 22

a priori knowledge

Answer 22

knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that is justifiable independently of experience (ie justified without needing any experience).

Question 23

a posterior knowledge

Answer 23

knowledge gained through experience

Question 24

a priori argument

Answer 24

arguments in which all of the premises are a priori

Question 25

a posteriori arguments

Answer 25

arguments in which at least one premise is a posteriori.

Question 26

analytic proposition (truth)

Answer 26

A proposition whose truth or falsity depends ONLY upon the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts (and how they’re combined).

Question 27

synthetic proposition (truth)

Answer 27

A proposition whose truth or falsity depends upon how reality is (and not only on the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts (and how they’re combined))

Question 28

argument from analogy

Answer 28

A particular type of inductive argument, whereby known/perceived similarities are used as a basis to infer some further similarity that has not been observed.

Question 29

assertion/claim

Answer 29

An utterence / kind of speech act, typically carried out by the utterance of a declarative sentence in which a proposition is presented as true.

Question 30

a circular definition

Answer 30

When the term being defined/explained is part of the (ultimate) definition/explanation of the term.

Question 31

consistent

Answer 31

Propositions (fully specified) are consistent if there is at least one possible world in which they are all true;

Question 32

inconsistent

Answer 32

propositions are inconsistent if there is no possible world in which they are all true

Question 33

dilema

Answer 33

A situation/argument in which all options are, in some sense, unsatisfactory.

Question 34

deductive argument/deduction

Answer 34

An argument which the proponent intends to be valid - i.e. for the conclusion to follow from the premises with logical necessity

Question 35

inductive argument

Answer 35

An argument which the proponent intends to be strong - i.e. they intend for the premises to give us good reasons to accept the conclusion as probably true.

Question 36

introspection

Answer 36

The process by which one is directly aware of one’s own mind now and one’s current mental states.

Question 37

necessary truth

Answer 37

a proposition that is true in all logically possible worlds (i.e. it could not (possibly) have been false)

Question 38

contingent truth

Answer 38

a proposition that is true in the actual world (and maybe in other possible worlds) but false in at least one possible world (i.e. it could (possibly have been false)

Question 39

paradox

Answer 39

Where sound (or apparently sound) reasoning from what seem to be true premises, leads to a conclusion that seems logically unacceptable or self-contradictory.

Question 40

phenomenology

Answer 40

The study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view / how things seem from the first-person point of view

Question 41

sound argument

Answer 41

A sound argument is an argument that (a) is valid (i.e. the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion) and (b) has premises that are all in fact true.

Question 42

unsound argument

Answer 42

An unsound argument is an argument that either (a) is not valid (i.e. the truth of the premises does NOT logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion) or (b) has at least one false premise or (c) both.

Question 43

tautology

Answer 43

An analytic truth: A true proposition whose truth depends ONLY upon the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts (and how they’re combined).

Question 44

valid argument

Answer 44

An argument in which the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion; if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true; it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false

Question 45

invalid argument

Answer 45

An argument in which the truth of the premises does NOT logically guarantee the truth of the conclusion; it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false.

Question 46

verification principle

Answer 46

A proposition is meaningful if and only if either: (1) it is analytically true/false
or (2a) (Strong version) its truth can be conclusively empirically verified in practice; or at least (2a) (Weak version) its probable truth could be empirically verified in principle.