metaphysics of the mind 3 markers Flashcards
category mistake (ryle)
When someone represents certain facts/terms/concepts as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another.
epiphenomenalist dualism
(1) Dualism (of some form) is true, so minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (i.e. substance dualism) or some mental properties are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. property dualism); (2) The mental is caused by the physical - it is a “by-product” of the physical; (3) The mental, however, is causally impotent: the mental consists of epiphenomena - the mental has no effects.
interactionist dualism
(1) Dualism (of some form) is true, so minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (i.e. substance dualism) or some mental properties are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. property dualism); (2) What happens mentally causally affects what happens physically; (3) What happens physically causally affects what happens mentally.
philosophical zombie
A being that: (1) is physically identical (or duplicate of) a (normal/conscious) human being (ie has all and only the same physical properties as a normal/conscious human being) but (2) lacks any consciousness/qualia/phenomenal properties.
property dualism
There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
qualia
These are (1) phenomenal properties of mental states which are (2) intrinsic and non-intentional and are (3) introspectively accessible
substance dualism
Minds (mental substances) exist and are not identical to (and can exist independently from) bodies or to parts of bodies (physical substances).
functionalism
All mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised
eliminative materialism
At least some of those mental states (phenomena, properties, processes) that are supposed to exist according to the common-sense folk-psychological theory of the mind do not exist.
folk psychology
(1) The ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of
others) which (2) involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states/events with certain features and (3) is used by people to explain and predict human behaviour.
hard philosophical behaviourism
All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (i.e. analytically reduced) to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states / movements
mind brain type identity theory
All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although the concepts/terms ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction).
physicalism
Everything (including the mental) is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).
self refuting
If a claim/theory is _____________ then something about theory/claim means that the theory/claim itself is undermined/contradicted (e.g. the verification principle and eliminative materialism)
soft philosophical behaviourism
(At least some) propositions about mental states are (at least in part) propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language)
super spartan
Beings that (1) feels pain-qualia but (2) has the ability to successfully suppress all voluntary pain behavior (and, if a SSS, (3) does not even talk about pain)
intentional properties
A mental state has _____________ if is is about something, if it has an “intentional object”
multiple realisability of mental states (vs MBTIT, for functionalism)
Many different types of thing (which need not be humans) can have exactly the same type of mental state. A single mental kind (property, state, event) can be realised / instantiated in many (perhaps even infinite) ways.
multiple realisability of mental states (vs philosophical behaviourism)
A single mental kind (property, state, event) can be identified with multiple (perhaps infinite) behaviours.
principle of identity
everything is identical to itself
principle of sufficient reason
Everything that happens/exists must have a sufficient cause/basis/explanation
a priori knowledge
knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that is justifiable independently of experience (ie justified without needing any experience).
a posterior knowledge
knowledge gained through experience
a priori argument
arguments in which all of the premises are a priori
a posteriori arguments
arguments in which at least one premise is a posteriori.
analytic proposition (truth)
A proposition whose truth or falsity depends ONLY upon the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts (and how they’re combined).
synthetic proposition (truth)
A proposition whose truth or falsity depends upon how reality is (and not only on the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts (and how they’re combined))
argument from analogy
A particular type of inductive argument, whereby known/perceived similarities are used as a basis to infer some further similarity that has not been observed.
assertion/claim
An utterence / kind of speech act, typically carried out by the utterance of a declarative sentence in which a proposition is presented as true.
a circular definition
When the term being defined/explained is part of the (ultimate) definition/explanation of the term.
consistent
Propositions (fully specified) are consistent if there is at least one possible world in which they are all true;
inconsistent
propositions are inconsistent if there is no possible world in which they are all true
dilema
A situation/argument in which all options are, in some sense, unsatisfactory.
deductive argument/deduction
An argument which the proponent intends to be valid - i.e. for the conclusion to follow from the premises with logical necessity
inductive argument
An argument which the proponent intends to be strong - i.e. they intend for the premises to give us good reasons to accept the conclusion as probably true.
introspection
The process by which one is directly aware of one’s own mind now and one’s current mental states.
necessary truth
a proposition that is true in all logically possible worlds (i.e. it could not (possibly) have been false)
contingent truth
a proposition that is true in the actual world (and maybe in other possible worlds) but false in at least one possible world (i.e. it could (possibly have been false)
paradox
Where sound (or apparently sound) reasoning from what seem to be true premises, leads to a conclusion that seems logically unacceptable or self-contradictory.
phenomenology
The study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view / how things seem from the first-person point of view
sound argument
A sound argument is an argument that (a) is valid (i.e. the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion) and (b) has premises that are all in fact true.
unsound argument
An unsound argument is an argument that either (a) is not valid (i.e. the truth of the premises does NOT logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion) or (b) has at least one false premise or (c) both.
tautology
An analytic truth: A true proposition whose truth depends ONLY upon the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts (and how they’re combined).
valid argument
An argument in which the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion; if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true; it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false
invalid argument
An argument in which the truth of the premises does NOT logically guarantee the truth of the conclusion; it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false.
verification principle
A proposition is meaningful if and only if either: (1) it is analytically true/false
or (2a) (Strong version) its truth can be conclusively empirically verified in practice; or at least (2a) (Weak version) its probable truth could be empirically verified in principle.
