epistemology 3 markers

Question 1

gettier case

Answer 1

an example that shows the 3 conditions not to be jointly sufficient (JTB)

Question 2

(false) lemma

Answer 2

a (false) proposition that you rely on as part of your justification of another proposition

Question 3

ability knowledge

Answer 3

knowing how to perform an action

Question 4

acquaintance knowledge

Answer 4

knowing X by experience of X

Question 5

propositional knowledge

Answer 5

knowing that a proposition is true or false

Question 6

virtue epistemology

Answer 6

the view that S knows P if and only if; S is justified in believing it, its true and it is truth apt

Question 7

infalibilism

Answer 7

belief must be infallibly justified (without doubt)

Question 8

no false lemmas theory

Answer 8

knowledge is justified if an only if; its justified, true, you believe it and the justification doesn’t involve a false belief

Question 9

reliabilism

Answer 9

belief must be caused by a reliable cognitive process, must be true and have belief

Question 10

tripartite view of knowledge

Answer 10

the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge are; JTB

Question 11

global scepticism

Answer 11

the view that we can extend doubt without limit; that none of our usual forms of justification for our beliefs are adequate

Question 12

local scepticism

Answer 12

the view that we can extend doubt to all beliefs of a specific type (e.g. those about the past); none of our usual forms of justification for certain kinds of beliefs are adequate.

Question 13

philosophical scepticism

Answer 13

something that’s generated by philosophers as a tool to uncover what we can know

Question 14

normal incredulity

Answer 14

your normal, natural everyday doubts

Question 15

impressions

Answer 15

experiences - they are “forceful and vivid”.

Question 16

ideas

Answer 16

caused by impressions and are “copies of impressions” that we can recall later - they are (normally) less forceful and duller than impressions.

Question 17

berkley’s idealism

Answer 17

The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects.

Question 18

direct realism

Answer 18

The view that (a) mind-independent material/physical objects and their properties exist and (b) we perceive them immediatel;y (i.e. without any intermediaries/sense data)

Question 19

hallucination

Answer 19

It seems to you as if there is an object that has some properties. But there is NO suitable mind-independent object with these properties

Question 20

illusion

Answer 20

A mind-independent object exists. It seems to you as if an object has a particular property. But the mind-independent object does not have this property

Question 21

indirect realism

Answer 21

The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects

Question 22

perceptual variation

Answer 22

A mind-independent object exists. The mind-independent object’s properties do not change in a certain respect. But, it seems to you as if the properties do change in that respect. The changes occur because of changes in the perceiver or in the relationship between the perceiver’s body and the object.

Question 23

primary quality

Answer 23

powers of mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which resemble the actual inherent properties of the object eg number, extension, motion, shape, solidity.

Question 24

secondary qualities

Answer 24

powers in the mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which do not resemble the the actual inherent properties of the object eg colour, taste, smell, sound, texture.

Question 25

solipsism

Answer 25

the view that the only mind that exists is your own

Question 26

time-tag

Answer 26

the view that the process of perception always requires more than zero time to take place.

Question 27

a priori deduction/argument

Answer 27

An argument in which a conclusion is inferred validly from a priori knowledge

Question 28

a priori intuition

Answer 28

Belief which is (1) non-inferentially justified (you do not infer an intuition FROM something else that you believe; you just believe it immediately without needing to argue for it) and (2) a priori / ‘rational’ (i.e. justified without the need for experience/s)

Question 29

clear and distinct idea

Answer 29

It is CLEAR = the truth of the belief is immediately accessible through thought (it is “clear” to me). It is DISTINCT = I can distinguish it from other truths (I won’t confuse it with other things).

Question 30

empiricism

Answer 30

The view that (a) all of our concepts are ultimately derived from sense experience (so there are no innate concepts) and (b) all of synthetic knowledge is ultimately derived from sense experience (i.e. it is a posteriori) (so there is no innate knowledge, and no synthetic a priori knowledge).

Question 31

hume’s fork

Answer 31

All knowledge is either (a) knowledge of matters of fact (which are a posteriori, contingent and synthetic) or (b) knowledge of relations of ideas (which are a priori, necessary and analytic).

Question 32

innatism

Answer 32

The claim that (at least some) concepts/truths exist within the mind at the moment that it exists - they are not caused to be there by experience. Minds are not “tabula rasas”/blank slates.

Question 33

intuition and deduction thesis

Answer 33

All knowledge is either: (a) justified non-inferentially by a priori intuition or (b) justified inferentially through a priori deduction from these a priori intuitions using sound arguments

Question 34

meno’s paradox

Answer 34

Either you know what you’re looking for or you don’t know what you’re looking for.
If you know what you’re looking for, inquiry is unnecessary.
If you don’t know what you’re looking for, inquiry is impossible.
Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.

Question 35

innate knowledge thesis

Answer 35

We have knowledge of at least some truths as part of our rational nature which (a) are “discovered”/”uncovered”/”recollected”, (b) are not “intuited”/”deduced” and (c) are not, and could not be, justified by experience and so are a priori (though experience might ‘trigger’ our discovery of them)

Question 36

innate concepts thesis

Answer 36

We have at least some concepts as part of our rational nature which (a) are “discovered”/”uncovered”/”recollected” and (b) are not, and could not be, based (directly or indirectly) on experience and so are a priori (though experience might ‘trigger’ our discovery of them)

Question 37

simple concepts

Answer 37

(a) are phenomenally simple/ ‘uncompounded’ so cannot be analysed in terms of other concepts and (b) are the effects or copies of impressions (Hume) or of reality (Locke).

Question 38

complex concepts

Answer 38

(a) can be analysed in terms of other concepts and (b) need not be a copy of anything that exists.

Question 39

tabula rasa

Answer 39

The claim that the mind is a ‘tabula rasa’ is the claim that no concepts/truths exist within the mind at the moment that it exists.

Question 40

cogito

Answer 40

“I exist” - an indubitable, non-inferentialy justified a priori intuition which (according to Descartes) is the foundation of one’s other knowledge and survives sceptical doubt.

Question 41

epistemology

Answer 41

The area of philosophy that examines the source, the limits and the nature of our concepts/knowledge

Question 42

external world

Answer 42

The sum total of all mind-independent objects and their properties.