Managing Companies - Directors and the Board Flashcards

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1
Q

What do the directors do

A
  • manage the company on a day to day basis
  • certain actions can only be taken by the directors
  • owe duties to the company
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2
Q

What do the directors do

A
  • own the company
  • are able to control key decisions through shareholder resolutions e.g. shareholders need to vote to give directors authority to change the articles or name of the company, to vary class rights
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3
Q

MA 3 on directors

A

‘Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company.’

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4
Q

How are shareholders protected from actions of directors?

A

MA 4 reserve power: ‘The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified action.’

Shareholders also have powers under CA 2006, e.g. the power to control amendments to the company’s articles, which require approval by the shareholders by way of special resolution.

Ultimate sanction shareholders can exercise is the removal of a director by ordinary resolution under s 168.

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5
Q

What is a director?

A
  • Directors are the agents of the company, not the agents of the shareholders. They may in fact take decisions against the wishes of the majority of the shareholders (Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum)
  • Term ‘director’ not defined in CA 2006: it states that a ‘director’ is any person occupying the position of director, by whatever name they are called.
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6
Q

Categories of director

A

1) At law: de jure, de facto and shadow directors
2) In practice: executive and non executive directors
The company’s articles also provide for alternate directors.

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7
Q

De jure directors

A
  • A director who has been validly appointed at law.
  • s 154 CA 2006: a private limited company must have at least one director and a public limited company must have at least two directors.
  • every company must have at least one director who is a natural person (s 155(1))
  • the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 requires all company directors to be natural persons and prohibits the appointment of corporate directors subject to certain conditions. However this is not yet in force.
  • CA 2006: no maximum number of directions
  • s 157 CA 2006: directors must be at least 16 years old
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8
Q

De facto directors

A
  • someone who assumes to act as a director but in fact has not been validly appointed
  • no single definitive test
  • must be established whether someone is part of the corporate governance of the company and undertook decisions normally to be undertaken by a director (Re Hydrodam Ltd)
  • considerations: the acts performed and where they were directorial in nature, the cumulative effects of the individual’s acts, and whether the company considered the person to be a director and held them out as such (Smithton Ltd v Naggar)
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9
Q

Shadow directors

A
  • when a person tries to exert influence over the board without being appointed as a director in order to avoid the duties imposed on directors in CA 2006
  • Section 251(1) CA 2006: ‘a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act.’
  • Section 251(2) professional advisers are not to be regarded as shadow directors, although if the conduct of an adviser goes beyond the normal scope of professional capacity and is effectively controlling the company’s affairs, they will be held to be a shadow director (Re Tasbian Ltd)
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10
Q

Case law example for de facto director

A

The Commissioners for Hm Revenue and Customs v Holland:

  • Mr Holland was a de jure director of Company A which was a corporate director of Company B
  • question was whether he should be considered a de facto director of Company B
  • held not to be a de facto director as the acts he undertook were within the scope of his duties and responsibilities as a de jure director of Company A
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11
Q

Case law examples for shadow directors

A
Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd: 
- whether two directors of the parent company could be deemed shadow directors of its subsidiary 
- to establish someone is a shadow director, have to prove: 
(1) The identity of the formally-appointed directors 
(2) that the person in question directed those formally appointed directors as to how to act in relation to the company's affairs 
(3) that those directors acted in accordance 
(4) that the directors were accustomed to act in that manner 
It is a question of fact in every case. 

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Deverell: ‘sufficient to show that in the face of ‘directions or instructions from the alleged shadow director the properly appointed directors or some of them cast themselves in a subservient role’

Ultraframe UK Ltd v Fielding: must be shown that the governing majority of the board are accustomed to act in accordance with the directions of the alleged shadow director.

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12
Q

Distinction between de facto and shadow directors

A

Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd:

  • ‘a de facto director…is held out as a director by the company, and claims and purports to be a director’
  • ‘a shadow director…does not claim to purport or act as a director. On the contrary, he claims not to be a director.’
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13
Q

Executive and non-executive directors

A
  • CA 2006 does not differentiate, but in practice there is a difference.
  • Executive directors: a director who has been appointed to executive office. Will be both an officer and an employee of the company. e.g. Finance Director, Managing Director, Marketing Director
  • Non-executive directors: an officer of the company, but will not be an employee. Do not take part in the day-to-day running of the company.
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14
Q

Alternate directors

A
  • Some companies in their articles provide for alternate directors to take the place of a director where one or more of the directors are absent.
  • The alternate director has the voting powers of the absent director.
  • The MAs do not provide for appointment of alternate directors and the use of them is becoming quite rare (as can now use telephone internet or written resolutions)
  • it is thought that duties of directors will probably apply equally to alternate directors.
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15
Q

Appointment of directors

A
  • CA 2006 does not stipulate a procedure for the appointment of directors, so this is something governed by the Articles of the company.
  • MA Art 17(1); ‘Any person who is willing to act as a director, and is permitted by law to do so, may be appointed to be a director:
    (a) by ordinary resolution (of the shareholders), or
    (b) by a decision of the directors.’
  • The second of these two procedures is easier to implement than the first, so usually the board of directors will appoint a new director.
  • All persons appointed as directors must consent. The consent is required on form AP01, which is required to be sent to Companies House whenever a new director is appointed.
  • A register of directors must be kept at the company’s registered office.
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16
Q

Service contracts

A
  • An executive director is an employee of the company. As an employee, he/she should be given a written contract of employment.
  • There is no automatic duty for directors to be paid - this is something the board can determine, subject to the provisions of the company’s articles.
  • The company must keep a copy of all directors’ service contracts or memoranda of the terms of those contracts (s 228 CA 2006)
  • Shareholders have a right to inspect copies of directors’ service contracts or memoranda (s 229), which must be provided within seven days of a request.
  • MA Art 19: the terms of an individual director’s service contract are for the board to decide. As a general rule, a director’s service contract will only require the approval of a resolution of the board of directors.
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17
Q

Long-term service contracts

A
  • Section 188 CA 2006 applies when a service contract provides for a director’s employment to have a ‘guaranteed term’ which is, or may be, longer than 2 years.
  • Where s 188 applies, the relevant provision requires shareholder approval by ordinary resolution.
  • If shareholder approval is not given, the term incorporated in contravention of s 188 CA 2006 is void under s 189(a) CA 2006.
  • under s 189(b), the service contract will be deemed to contain a term entitling the company to terminate the contract at any time, by the giving of reasonable notice.
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18
Q

Termination of appointment

A

(1) Resignation
(2) Vacation
(3) Removal

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19
Q

Termination of appointment - Resignation

A

Subject to any provision in the articles to the contrary, a director may resign at any time by giving notice (Glossop v Glossop). The resignation of a director does not need to be specifically accepted by the board.

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20
Q

Termination of appointment - Vacation

A

MA 18 provides that a director is automatically deemed to vacate office where that person becomes prohibited from being a director, bankrupt, subject to a composition order made with creditors, or physically or mentally incapable for more than three months.

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21
Q

Termination of appointment - Removal

A

s 168 CA 2006 - a director can be removed by ordinary resolution of the shareholders. Where such a resolution is proposed, the director has the right to be heard at the GM (s 169) and therefore written resolutions cannot be used. Special notice of such a resolution is required to be given (at least 28 clear days before the GM)

Directors who are also shareholders are allowed to vote in their capacity as shareholder on the resolution to remove them.

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22
Q

Bushell v Faith clauses

A
  • Mr Faith held 100 shares, as did each of his sisters. The three siblings were also directors of the company.
  • Company’s articles: ‘In the event of a resolution being proposed at any general meeting of the company for the removal from office of any director, any shares held by that director shall on a poll in respect of such resolution carry the right to three votes per share’
  • Faith was therefore able to defeat a resolution proposed by his sisters to remove him. The court held that the article was valid and effective.
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23
Q

Disqualification

A
  • Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986) allows directors to be disqualified in certain circumstances.
  • Section 1(1) CDDA 1986: where a person is disqualified, that person shall not, without leave of the court, ‘be a director of a company, or a liquidator or administrator of the company…a receiver or manager…or, in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion, formation or management of a company, for a specified period beginning with the date of the order.’
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24
Q

Types of disqualification order

A

1) Discretionary - can last for up to 10/15 years depending on the grounds for disqualification
2) Mandatory- can last between 2 and 15 years

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25
Q

Mandatory disqualification orders

A

Made under s.6(1) CDDA 1986 where the court is satisfied:

(a) that he is or has been a director of a company which has at any time become insolvent (whether while he was a director or subsequently); and
(b) that his conduct as a director of that company…makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company.’
- Section 6 has been taken by the courts to mean that the director has abused the privilege of limited liability in some way, either by gross negligence or deliberate disregard of creditors’ interests.

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26
Q

Discretionary disqualification orders

A

Discretionary grounds on which directors can be disqualified:

  • Conviction of an indictable offence in connection with the management of the company or company property (s 2);
  • Persistent breaches of company legislation requiring returns or notices to be given to the Registrar (s 3);
  • Fraud - either fraudulent trading under s 993 CA 2006, wrongful/fraudulent trading under s 213 and 214 Insolvency Act 1986 or fraud in relation to the company or its property (s 4 CDDA);
  • Disqualification after investigation of the company - where it seems to the Secretary of State that it would be in the public interest for a disqualification to be made (s 8 CDDA). In Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Pawson, the court disqualified a director for 8 years on the basis that he had controlled 9 companies for his own financial benefit by overcharging them for professional services
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27
Q

Criminal penalties

A

It is a criminal offence to act in contravention of a disqualification order and any person doing so is liable for a fine or imprisonment or both (s 13 CDDA), as well as being personally liable for all the debts of the company incurred during the time they were acting in contravention of the disqualification order (s 15 CDDA)

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28
Q

Compensation orders

A

The Secretary of State may apply to the court for a compensation order against a director who has been disqualified where creditors have suffered losses due to the director’s misconduct (s 15 A - s 15 C CDDA)

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29
Q

Disqualification undertakings

A

The Secretary of State may accept a disqualification undertaking by any person that for a specified period, that person will not be a director or be involved in any way with the promotion, formation or management of a company without leave of the court. (s 6(2) CDDA)

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30
Q

Breach of competition law

A

Directors who breach competition law e.g. by operating a cartel may also be disqualified under s 9A-9E CDDA 1986. Disqualification undertakings may also be offered and there is potential immunity for whistleblowers in cartels.

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31
Q

Directors Duties

A
  • developed by the courts of equity but codified in the CA 2006
  • s 170(1) CA - the general duties of directors in ss 171-177 are owed by a director to the company (and not to the shareholders directly)
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32
Q

Breach/remedies of directors duties

A
  • If a director exceeds his powers or breaches his duties, he can be liable to the company for the loss he has caused.
  • Any liability for breach can be avoided if the director’s conduct is capable of subsequent approval, or ratification, by the shareholders (s 239)
  • The remedies for breach were not codified. Section 178 provides that existing common law and equitable remedies still apply.
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33
Q

To whom do the directors owe duties?

A
  • To the company (s 170(1))

- This principle was originally established in Foss v Harbottle

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34
Q

Can the directors ever be found to owe duties to the shareholders?

A
  • In circumstances ‘over and above the usual relationship that any director of a company usually has with its shareholders’ e.g. a special relationship usually arising from a personal relationship and the shareholders place trust and compliance in the directors (Sharp v Blank). This is more typical in family companies.
  • Coleman v Myers: the company was a private company with most shares held by members of one family who had habitually looked to the defendants for business advice, and information regarding the true value of the shares had been withheld from the other family shareholders, so on the facts of this case, the defendant directors were liable to compensate the shareholders.
35
Q

Fiduciary nature of a director

A
  • Directors are agents of the company and therefore subject to fiduciary duties owed by agents. The overriding principle of the equitable fiduciary duties is that fiduciaries must not benefit from their position of trust.
  • Towers v Premier Waste Management on director of a company: ‘it is his duty to promote its success and protect its interests…a duty of loyalty and a duty to avoid conflict between his personal interests and his duty to the company.’
36
Q

Fiduciary duties prior to CA 2006

A
  • Common law duty of skill and care
  • Duties in equity e.g.:
  • act bona fide in the best interests of the company;
  • act within powers and for proper purposes
  • not to misapply company property
  • to account for a secret profit
  • to avoid conflicting interests and duties
  • not to fetter discretion.
37
Q

Directors duties: current position

A
  • The former regime still operates to the extent not expressly provided for in CA 2006.
  • Section 170(3) - general duties are based on the old common law rules and equitable principles
  • Section 170(4) - new duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as the common law and equitable principles
  • the old case law will continue to be relevant in the interpretation of the statutory duties, where it does not conflict with CA 2006
38
Q

General duties of directors under Part 10 CA 2006

A
  • Duty to act within powers (s 171)
  • Duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole (s 172)
  • Duty to exercise independent judgement (s 173)
  • Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence ( s 174)
  • Duty to avoid conflicts of interest (s 175)
  • Duty to not accept benefits from third parties (s 176)
  • Duty to declare any interest in a proposed transaction (s 177)
39
Q

s 171: Duty to act within powers

A

Provides that a director must

(a) act in accordance with the company’s constitution, and
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred

  • The company’s constitution is defined in s 257 and includes everything set out in the articles and decisions taken in accordance with the articles (shareholder resolutions). A director is in breach if he acts without authority, e.g. commits the company to borrow more than the articles allow
  • Proper purpose doctrine = “bona fide in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interests of the company, and not for any collateral purpose.’ (Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd)
40
Q

Interpretation of s 171(b) - the proper purposes doctrine

A

Hogg v Cramphorn: the allotment of shares was held to be for the purpose of destroying the voting control of the majority shareholders, so was held to be void and an improper use of directors’ power

Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum: the new share issue was unlawful as it was not in accordance with the proper purposes doctrine, since the primary purpose of the share issue was not to raise capital but to frustrate Ampol’s takeover offer.

41
Q

Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood: test for determining whether a power has been exercised for an improper purpose

A

(1) Identify the power whose exercise is in question
(2) Identify the proper purpose for which that power was delegated to the directors
(3) Identify the substantial purpose for which the power was exercised
(4) Decide whether that purpose was proper

42
Q

Overlap between s 172 (duty to promote the success of the company) and the proper purposes doctrine in s 171

A

The proper purposes doctrine operates to limit the authority of directors even if their action was carried out in what they believed to be the best interests of the company.

43
Q

s 172: Duty to promote the success of the company

A

Section 172(1) states that a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole, and in doing so have regard to –

(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationship with suppliers, customers, and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation of high standards,
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.

44
Q

Interpretation of s 172

A
  • derives from the long-settled duty of a director to act honestly and in good faith in the interests of the company (Re Smith v Fawcett quote above)
  • the test is subjective, but will involve an element of objectivity
  • “whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions were for the benefit of the company.” (Charterbridge Corpn Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Ltd)
  • ‘success’ is defined as long term increase in value (s 172(1)(a)) and takes into account the effect of the directors’ decision on the members as a whole
  • includes duty to disclose misconduct by the director to the company (Item Software Ltd v Fassihi) and may include disclosure of information other than misconduct and to individuals other than the board e.g. shareholders (GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo)
  • Where a company is insolvent, this duty extends to the directors acting in the best interests of the creditors (Winkworth v Edward Baron)
  • A director that prefers one creditor to another by deliberately paying one over others may be in breach (Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd)
45
Q

s 173: duty to exercise independent judgement

A

(1) A director of a company must exercise independent judgement.
(2) This duty is not infringed by his acting –
(a) in accordance with an agreement duly entered into by the company that restricts the future exercise of discretion by its directors, or
(b) in a way authorised by the company’s constitution.
- Where the board is able to establish that it was in the best interests of the company to enter into an agreement which fetters the discretion of the directions, this will not be in breach of s 173.

Madoff Securities International v Raven: it is legitimate for there to be division and delegation of responsibility but ‘each individual director owes inescapable personal responsibilities.’ ‘It is therefore a breach of duty for a director to allow himself to be dominated, bamboozled or manipulated by a dominant fellow director…’

46
Q

s 174: duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence

A

(1) A director must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with -
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.

47
Q

Interpretation of s 174

A
  • minimum standard is that objectively expected of a director in that position.
  • this may then be subjectively raised if the particular director has any special knowledge, skill and experience.
  • Re D’Jan of London Ltd: directors have:
    (i) a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the company’s business
    (ii) the exercise of the power of delegation does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise
    (iii) it will depend on the facts of each particular case
48
Q

‘Reasonable directors’ - keeping informed and delegating responsibilities

A
  • Re Westmid Packing v Griffiths: ‘Each individual director owes duties to the company to inform himself about its affairs and join with his co-directors in supervising or controlling them.’
  • Re Brian D Pierson Ltd: ‘The office of director has certain minimum responsibilities and functions, which are not simply discharged by leaving all management functions, and consideration of the company’s affairs to another director without question, even in the case of a family company…the function of ‘directing’ on its own requires some consideration of the company’s affairs to be exercised.’
  • Re Barings plc: the power to delegate did not absolve directors from their duty to supervise the way in which delegated functions are carried out.
  • Lexi Holdings plc v Luqman: two sisters who were non-executive directors of a company were liable for failing to exercise oversight of the company’s affairs where their brother, who was managing director, stole almost £60 million that banks had lent the company.
  • Madoff Securities v Raven: directors are, however, able to defer to the views of a fellow director with greater experience where it is reasonable to do so.
49
Q

Sections 175-177

A
  • linked duties which cover the fiduciary duties of loyalty owed by directors to their companies
  • s 175: duty to avoid conflicts of interest
  • s 176: duty not to accept benefits from third parties
  • s 177: duty to declare interest in proposed transactions or arrangements
  • Bray v Ford: ‘it is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position…is not, unless otherwise expressly provided…allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict.’
50
Q

Section 175 - Duty to avoid conflicts of interest

A

(1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company.
(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity)
(3) This duty does not apply to a conflict of interests arising in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company.
(4) This duty is not infringed–
(a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interests; or
(b) if the matter has been authorised by the directors.

51
Q

Section 175(5)(a)

A

For a private company, conflicts may be authorised by independent directors with no interest in the matter unless its constitution otherwise provides.

52
Q

Section 175(5)(b)

A

For a public company, the directors will only be able to authorises such conflicts if its constitution expressly permits.

53
Q

Section 175(6)

A

Board authorisation is effectively only if the conflicted directors have not participated in the taking of the decision or if the decision would have been valid even without the participation of the conflicted directors; the votes of the conflicted directors in favour of the decision will be ignored and the conflicted directors are not counted in the quorum.

54
Q

Explanatory Notes to 175 CA

A

the duty under s 175(4) to (6) is not infringed if (1) the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict; and (2) authorisation (in private/public companies) has been given by independent directors (who have no direct/indirect interest)

55
Q

Interpretation of s 175

A
  • Boardman v Phipps: ‘whether a reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances would think that there is a real and sensible possibility of conflict.’
  • s 175(3) excludes conflicts of interest arising in relation to transactions or arrangements with the company. These conflicts are subject to the duty of disclosure in s 177 for transparency purposes but are not prohibited. Many directors will have interests in other companies, and most companies’ articles permit this, provided such interests are declared.
56
Q

s 175: corporate opportunities

A
  • A corporate opportunity is viewed as an asset of the company which may not therefore be misappropriated by the directors.
  • Cook v Deeks: held that the company was entitled to the benefit of the contract and a shareholders’ resolution which the defendants had passed with their own votes to ratify that the company claimed no interest in the contract was ineffective. They had ‘used their influence and position to exclude the company whose interest it was their first duty to protect.’
  • Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver: the directors obtained shares ‘by reason and only by reason of the fact they were directors of Regal’ and so were ‘accountable for the profits which they made out of them.’
  • Bhullar v Bhullar: ‘the existence of [an] opportunity was information which it was relevant for the company to know, and it follows that the appellants were under a duty to communicate it to the company.’ so conflicts of interest may arise even when the company is not pursuing the opportunity in question.
57
Q

s 175: competing directorships

A
  • The general equitable rule is that a fiduciary cannot enter into a position which gives rise to conflicting fiduciary duties to another person without the consent of both principals (Clark Boyce v Mouat)
  • A conflict will need to be authorised using the process in 175(5) and 175(6).
  • All of the facts need to be considered before it is clear whether a breach of fiduciary duty is committed
  • Plus Group Ltd v Pyke: Plus Group was controlled by Pyke and Plank. The business relationship deteriorated and Pyke was excluded from management and no longer received a salary. He started a new company and entered into a contract with one of Plus’ clients. Held that he was not using any of the claimant’s property for the purpose of that business. Nor was he making any use of confidential information which had come to him as a director, so he was not in breach.
58
Q

s 175: resigning directors

A

Section 170(2)(a): ‘a person who ceases to be a director continues to be subject (a) to the duty in section 175 (duty to avoid conflicts of interest) as regards the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity of which he became aware when he was a director.’

  • relevant to consider all the facts
  • Foster Bryant v Bryant (decided pre-CA 2006): no ulterior purpose to the resignation and he was effectively forced out of the company. Court held that there must be ‘some relevant connection or link between the resignation and the obtaining of the business.’
  • Shepherds Investments v Walters: former directors of Shepherds found liable as they set up rival companies prior to resigning, without disclosing their intentions to the board.
  • CMS Dolphin v Simonet: ‘knowingly had a conflict of interest, and exploited it by resigning’
59
Q

s 176: Duty not to accept benefits from third parties

A

(1) A director must not accept a benefit from a third party conferred by reason of:
(a) his being a director, or
(b) his doing (or not doing) anything as a director.
- Section 176(4): the duty is not infringed if acceptance of the benefit cannot be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.
- “Benefits” covers benefits of any description, including non-financial benefits, e.g. free holidays
- There is no provision for authorisation by the board of directors (unlike s 175). Ratification would need to be sought from shareholders under s 239 CA 2006.

60
Q

s 177: Duty to declare an interest in a proposed transaction

A

(1) If a director is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he must declare the good nature and extent of that interest to the other directors.
- Informal disclosure to the other members of the board will suffice (Lee Panavision v Lee Lighting)
- s 180 - If directors comply with the duty to disclose in s 177, the transaction is not liable to be set aside, although this is subject to any other provisions in the constitution

61
Q

Interpretation of s 177 and s 182

A
  • S 177 places a duty on directors to disclose an interest in a proposed transaction with the company.
  • s 182 applies to cases where a director has an interest in a transaction after it has been entered into by the company and also requires directors to disclose such interests.
  • a major difference is the sanctions for breach: breach of duty under s 177 has civil consequences under s 178, whereas breach of s 182 leads to criminal sanctions under s 183
  • these provisions do not apply to substantial property transactions, loans, quasi-loans and credit transactions which require approval of the company’s members (ss 190-203)
62
Q

Section 179

A

The effect of the duties is cumulative.

63
Q

Transactions with directors requiring the approval of members

A
  • four particular types of transaction between the company and its directors have a real risk of conflict between the interests of the directors and the shareholders
  • if the directors proceeded with such a transaction without shareholder approval, they would be in breach of their general duties under s 171-177, but also in breach of these requirements:
  • (1) Directors’ long-term service contracts (ss 188-189)
  • (2) Substantial property transactions (ss 190-196)
  • (3) Loans, quasi-loans and credit transactions (ss 197-214)
  • (4) Payments for loss of office (ss 215-222)
64
Q

Directors long-term service contracts (s 188-189)

A
  • Section 188 applies where a service contract provides for a director’s employment to have a ‘guaranteed term’ which is or may be longer than 2 years
  • Where s 188 applies, the relevant provision of the service contract requires shareholder approval by ordinary resolution
  • If approval is not given, the term in the service contract is void under s 189(a). The service contract will be deemed to contain a term entitling the company to terminate the contract at any time (s 189(b))
65
Q

Substantial property transactions (s 190-196)

A
  • Substantial property transactions are transactions between a company and its directors or connected persons concerning ‘substantial non-cash assets.’
  • They require shareholder approval by ordinary resolution
  • An asset is a substantial asset in relation to a company if its value-
    (a) exceeds 10% of the company’s asset value and is more than £5,000, or
    (b) exceeds £100,000
  • Shareholder approval must be given either before the transaction is entered into, or after, provided that the transaction is made conditional on approval being obtained.
66
Q

Connected persons (s 252-254)

A

Key categories of connected person:

(1) Members of the director’s family: spouse/civil partner, parents, children or step-children (s 253) Brothers, sisters, grandparents, grandchildren, uncles and aunts are not connected persons under CA 2006.
(2) Companies in which the director holds more than 20% of the shares (s 254)
(3) A business partner of the director or those connected with them (s 252(2)(d))
(4) Trustees of a trust the beneficiaries of which include the director or those connected with them (s 252(2)(c))

67
Q

Substantial property transactions: remedies (s 195)

A

Under s 195(2), the arrangement and any transaction arising from it is voidable at the instance of the company. This is unless:

(a) restitution of any money or other asset that was the subject matter of the arrangement or transaction is no longer possible,
(b) the company has been indemnified by any other person for the loss or damage suffered by it, or
(c) rights acquired in good faith, for value and without actual notice of the contravention by a person who is not a party to the arrangement or transaction would be affected by the avoidance.
- The directors involved are liable to account to the company for any profits made and to indemnify the company for any loss incurred (s 195(3))

68
Q

Loans to directors (s 192-214)

A
  • Company loans to directors and connected persons may also be subject to the requirement of shareholder approval by ordinary resolution.
  • The shareholders must be given info as to the nature of the transaction, the amount and purpose of the loan and the company’s liability (s 197(3))
  • The provisions of s 197 apply to all companies. Further provisions regarding quasi-loans and credit transactions in s 198 and 201 only apply to public companies and associated companies.
  • It is possible for shareholders to approve the transaction after the event (s 214) but this does not absolve the directors of potential liability under s 213.
69
Q

Definition of a “loan”

A

Not defined in CA 2006
Champagne Perrier-Jouet v HH Finch: “a sum of money lent for a period of time, to be returned in money or money’s worth” Whether a payment to a director is a loan or remuneration depends on the facts of the case.
Currencies Direct v Ellis: remuneration is consideration for work done or to be done and may take different forms, not only the direct payment of a regular wage.

70
Q

Loans to directors: exceptions (s 204-209)

A

S 204: Expenditure on company business to a maximum of £50,000
S 205: loans for defending proceedings brought against a director
S 206: loans for defending regulatory actions or investigations
S 207: Minor and business transactions - loans of up to £10,000 do not require shareholder approval
S 208: Intra group transactions
S 209: Money lending companies (where the loan is made in the ordinary business of the company)

71
Q

Loans to directors- remedies

A
  • If approval is not obtained and no exceptions apply, the consequences are set out in s 213.
  • The arrangement is voidable at the instance of the company unless (a) restitution of any money or asset that was the subject matter of the arrangement is no longer possible, (b) the company has been indemnified, (c) rights acquired in good faith, for value and without actual notice of the contravention by a person who is not party to the arrangement would be affected (s 213(2))
  • Directors are liable to account to the company for any profits made and indemnify the company for any loss incurred (s 213(3))
72
Q

Payments for loss of office (s 215-222)

A
  • Any payment for loss of office to a director needs to be approved by the shareholders by way of ordinary resolution (s 217)
  • There are two exceptions:
  • s 220: where the payment is made in good faith (a) in discharge of an existing legal obligation, (b) by way of damages for breach of such an obligation, (c) by way of settlement or compromise of any claim, (d) by way of pension in respect of past services.
  • s 221: no shareholder approval is needed if the payment is less than £200
  • If no shareholder approval is obtained, the director holds the payment on trust for the company and any director who authorised the payment is jointly and severally liable to the company for resulting loss (s 222)
73
Q

Directors duties – how claims would be brought

A
  • Duties are owed to the company and not the shareholders as individuals (s 170)
  • s 260: allows shareholders to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the company where the directors have acted in breach of their duties
74
Q

Directors duties – remedies

A
  • not codified in CA 2006
  • s 178: (1) The consequences of the breach of sections 171 to 177 are the same as would apply if the corresponding common law rule or equitable principle applied, (2) The duties are enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.
  • Breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence under s 174 is a common law rather than fiduciary duty and therefore the only remedy is damages
75
Q

Remedial options for breach of fiduciary duty

A
  • Account for profits
  • Damages
  • Recission
  • Injunction
76
Q

Four ways a director can be relieved of liability for breach of duty under CA 2006

A

(1) Prior consent, approval or authorisation by the directors where that is permitted (s 185, s 177)
(2) Prior consent, approval or authorisation by the shareholders (s 180)
(3) Ratification by the shareholders (s 239)
(4) Relief granted by the court (s 1157)

77
Q

Prior approval by the directors - s 175, s 177

A

Where directors are able to authorise conduct which would otherwise constitute a breach of duty under s 175 or s 177, the effect of this will be that no breach took place and the contract is not liable to be set aside (s 180(1))

  • Potential conflicts under s 175 may be authorised provided there is nothing in the company’s constitution preventing this. The director in question cannot count in the quorum or vote in relation to such authorisation
  • Under s 177, provided directors declare their interest in potential transactions, no breach of duty will take place
78
Q

Prior approval by the shareholders - s 180

A
  • Section 180(4) retains the common law and equitable rules which allow shareholders to authorise in advance conduct which would otherwise be a breach of duty
  • Shareholders can authorise breaches of duty or even negligence but not unlawful acts
  • Authorisation is only effective if there has been full disclosure so the shareholders are properly informed
  • Sharma v Sharma: the director of a company had fully disclosed all material facts to the shareholders and it was held that they had authorised the action and she was not in breach of her duties under s 175. It is not necessary for the shareholders to appreciate that the proposed transaction would be a breach of duty
79
Q

Ratification - s 239

A

Shareholders are able to ratify any conduct by a director amounting to a breach of duty, negligence, default or breach of duty after the breach by ordinary resolution. This has to be passed disregarding the votes of the director involved (s 239(4))

80
Q

Madoff Securities v Raven

A

neither approval under s 180 nor ratification under s 239 will be effective unless the decision is honest, bona fide and in the best interests of the company

81
Q

Relief granted by the court - s 1157

A

(1) If in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against –
(a) an officer of a company, or
(b) a person employed by a company as auditor,
the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him…on such terms as it thinks fit.

82
Q

Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd

A

s 1157 applying is a 3 stage test. The court needs to be satisfied that the director:
(1) acted honestly,
(2) acted reasonably, and
(3) considering all the circumstances of the case, the director ought fairly to be excused.
The burden or proving honesty and reasonableness lies on the director, and it is only if both of these are established that the court needs to consider the third requirement.
- Re D’Jan of London: court granted relief was it was satisfied that non disclosure breach was a minor error which “could have happened to any busy man.”
- Coleman Taymar v Oakes: Honesty is a subjective requirement, whereas reasonableness is objective.

83
Q

Indemnity and insurance (s 232-238)

A

s 232: a company cannot exempt a director to any extent from liability in negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, and that any provision that purports to do so will be void.
Exceptions are allowed in that a company may provide its directors with:
Insurance against liability under s 233;
Qualifiying third party indemnity provisions under s 234,
Qualifying pension scheme indemnity provisions under s 235