M5: Joinder & Supplemental Jurisdiction Flashcards

Question

Window Glass Cutters Union sues the employer of its members, claiming that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to assign certain work to its members. The employer's position is that the employees actually perform work covered by a different collective bargaining agreement, with the US Glass and Ceramic Workers. The employer moves to join the US Glass and Ceramics workers under FRCP 19(a). Should the second union be joined? If so, under which subsection of the rule?

Answer 1

Yes. Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) covers the case. If the action proceeds and the court holds that work must be assigned to workers covered by the Window Glass Cutters Union, it will order the employer to do so. Very likely, the employer will then be sued by the US Glass and Ceramic workers, claiming the work should have been assigned to its members instead. The United Glass union would not be bound by that decision (since it was not a party to the first action), so it could litigate the question again in a later action. In that second action, the court might find US Glass workers entitled to the work, so that employer would be stuck between two judgments.

Answer 2

True. Ex: Yost made his motion to dismiss even if he was not particularly concerned about incurring an inconsistent obligation to INA. He may have used Rule 19 as a forum-shopping tool. He may have brought the motion because he and INA preferred state court. Yost was able to show that INA was indispensable, thus the case would be dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction, leaving Torrington to sue in state court instead.

Answer 3

The court should deny the motion because nothing in Rule 19 makes Kelleher a person to be joined if feasible. Rule 19 (a)(1)(A) does not require joinder, b/c Cardena can recover fully from Nashoba for any defects in its work without litigating his claim against Kelleher in the federal suit. Rule 19(a)(1)(B) is not implicated b/c Kelleher won't be affected in any way by this suit between Cardena and Nashoba about Nashoba's unrelated work. Cardena here has two claims based on separate disputes with different contractors on a single job.

Answer 4

The court should not order Kelleher joined under either Rule 19 or Rule 20. Courts uniformly hold that Rule 19 does not require joinder of other tortfeasors in cases like this. The plaintiff has chosen her defendant. If she proves its liability, she will recover. If not, she will lose. But nothing requires that another potentially liable person be joined to effectively litigate the claim against the first tortfeasor.

Answer 5

False. Rule 20(a) addresses when parties may be made parties at the plaintiff's option, not when they should be ordered joined by the court.

Answer 6

Rule 24: Intervening Parties 1) Applicant's interest 2) likely impairment of that interest if the action goes forward without the applicant 3) adequacy of representation by OG parties

Answer 7

No. Although the customers may suffer an indirect economic impact from the case, they had no direct interest in the contract at issue in the case.

Answer 8

Yes. The timber association has a "legally protectable property interest" in the dispute because the members' current and future contracts to harvest timber in the forest would be affected.

Answer 9

Both rules refer to a person who claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situation "that disposing of the action in the person's absence may... as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest." If a person is a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) he is also entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).

Answer 10

Who seeks joinder. Typically defendants move for joinder of a party under Rule 19 while the absentee moves to intervene under Rule 24. Interest --> not the same purpose for one or the other. There are times when a petitioner should be allowed to intervene under Rule 24 that are not necessarily limited to those situations when the trial court should compel them under Rule 19. Some applicants aren't necessary parties.

Answer 11

The application should be denied, since their interest are adequately represented by those already parties to the action. Unless this other group of applicants is somehow distinguishable from the first group, int terms of their interests and arguments in support of the University's affirmative action program, the court is likely to avoid an expansion of the case by denying intervention on the grounds that the later applicants' interests are adequately represented by the original intervenors.

Answer 12

False. Timeliness under Rule 24 is not measure rigidly from commencement of the action. It will be judged practically based on whether the intervenors acted promptly after becoming aware of the action.

Answer 13

False. A party might be allowed to intervene for limited purposes or only on certain claims in the case. + Stringfellow: neighborhood group could intervene on certain claims but not others + Pansy: limited purpose --> efforts of a news organization to obtain info filed in court under a confidentiality order + Public Citizen: limited purpose --> citizen's group sought to seek access to discovery documents produced in litigation + interested non-parties can file amicus briefs (friend of the court) in support of one party's position

Answer 14

False: Denial of an application to intervene as a right is a final decision that is immediately appealable. The intervenor may appeal right away, arguing that she should be allowed to participate.

Answer 15

False. A party who objects to the intervenor's presence (via grant of appeal) must wait until the end of the case to appeal. As a practical matter, if the intervention is granted on appeal, it is effectively unreviewable. If you want to win this battle, you must win it in front of the trial judge.

Answer 16

Statutory interpleader under §1335(a) is proper here: 1) has possession of money or property worth more than $500 - YES 2) There are two or more diverse claimants to the money or property - IA and NV - YES 3) P has deposited the money or property in the court or given a bond for compliance with the court’s eventual order for payment of the money or property - YES Rule 22 interpleader NOT proper here: 1) Claimants must be subject to PJ under traditional analysis, under FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) - minimum contacts? 2) SMJ must be based on traditional rules of diversity under §1332(a) or federal question jurisdiction under §1331 - N/A because it's a contracts claim and parties are from the same state (lack of complete diversity)

Answer 17

Statutory interpleader under §1335(a) not proper: 1) has possession of money or property worth more than $500 - YES 2) There are two or more diverse claimants to the money or property - NO - everyone is from AR 3) P has deposited the money or property in the court or given a bond for compliance with the court’s eventual order for payment of the money or property - YES Rule 22 interpleader NOT proper here: Amount in Controversy does not exceed $75K and this is not a federal question of law under §1331

Answer 18

Statutory interpleader under §1335(a) not proper: 1) has possession of money or property worth more than $500 - YES 2) There are two or more diverse claimants to the money or property - NO - all claimants are from OK 3) P has deposited the money or property in the court or given a bond for compliance with the court’s eventual order for payment of the money or property - YES Rule 22 interpleader proper: 1) Claimants must be subject to PJ under traditional analysis, under FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) 2) SMJ must be based on traditional rules of diversity under §1332(a): P is from IL and D from OK - complete diversity met AND AIC is over $75K

Answer 19

FRCP 13(g) relates to crossclaims against another D to recover for an independent loss. FRCP 14 is a claim to pass on liability from one D to another.

Answer 20

True. These types of claims are only allowed if the law of the forum state allows contributions among joint tortfeasors.

Answer 21

False. FRCP 14 CANNOT be used just to bring in another possible Defendant who may be liable to the Plaintiff. The original Defendant (TPP) must have a claim for reimbursement from TPD.

Answer 22

Under Rule 24: As a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, ***unless existing parties adequately represent that interest *** If someone else in the lawsuit is already protecting the interest of a non-party, then they may not be allowed to intervene.

Answer 23

False. Potential intervenors need not prove res judicata impairment, stare decisis effect is enough.

Answer 24

The federal court has SMJ as to C's federal claims, since they arise under federal law. However, C's battery claims are based on state law against E and R are not within the federal court's SMJ. All three parties are for the same state and there's a lack of complete diversity (no P's can share the same citizenship as any D's). There is no independent basis for SMJ on the battery claim alone and a court would dismiss for lack of SMJ. BUT can C add the state law claims once he's established SMJ on the federal question of law? Supplemental jurisdiction says yes --> Pendent jurisdiction

Answer 25

True. Gibbs holds this to be true. The standard focuses on the facts involved in a dispute, not on legal theories. In Gibbs, both the state and federal claims were based on the same underlying event.

Answer 26

False. A trial court need not always exercise pendent jurisdiction even if they have the power to do so. Reasons can be related to judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.

Answer 27

1) Federal claim drops out early (leaving court with a state claim only) --> however federal court may retain jurisdiction if they so choose if the federal claim is dropped later in the case/significant pre-trial litigation has occurred. 2) State issue is predominate --> "vast majority" is state claims only 3) If the state law claims present novel or complex issues of state law --> "surer footed reading" of state law in state court 4) Likelihood of jury confusion

Answer 28

The judges should dismiss the state law claim, retaining jurisdiction over the federal claim. The court cannot remand the state law claim to Oregon state court, nor can they remand the case to the Oregon state court. The judge can't dismiss the entire case, even if it would be more efficient to dismiss the entire case. If the judge does dismiss the state law claim, P may voluntarily dismiss the federal suit and breing the fed claim and state claim together in state court (that's allowed!). P can also keep her federal claim in federal court and file her state claim in state court.

Answer 29

Cases where the claim arises from a question of federal law §1331

Answer 30

False. Even though the Kroger court concluded that exercising jurisdiction over Kroger's claim was inconsistent with the diversity statute, Gibbs "delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power." Gibbs held that a federal court with original jurisdiction may hear all other claims in the case that arise from the same nucleus of operative fact, federal courts have a constitutional power her Kroger's claim. Then the court turned to §1332 diversity jurisdiction and determined that they could not hear the case.

Answer 31

Yes because the court had original jurisdiction over the claim against the U.S. under §1346(a), which authorizes jurisdiction of tort claims against the US. Under §1367(a), the court has jurisdiction over Adair's claim against Vasquez, which arises from the same airplane crash. The exception to §1367(b) does not apply because the federal court's original jurisdiction is not based on §1332 (but a question of federal law).

Answer 32

Yes, it does. Supplemental jurisdiction is unnecessary here, because it is a claim between an Iowa citizen and a Colorado citizen (complete diversity) for more than $75K (AIC) which is valid under §1332. Picard seeks reimbursement of the entire amount Crawley seeks from her, that's what indemnification means. As long as Crowley's claim is arguably more than $75K, Picard's claim against Banchevsky satisfies the standards of original jurisdiction in federal court. No need to consider whether supplemental jurisdiction applies.

Answer 33

If Banchevsky is from IA, there is no diversity between her and Picard, so we must look for another basis for jurisdiction over Picard's impleader claim. The main suit is based on diversity, not a federal question, but supplemental jurisdiction applies to diversity cases as well as federal question cases. The court has original jurisdiction over Crowley and Picard's case based on diversity. The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the impleader claim if it arises out of the same case or controversy as the main case under §1367(a). Here, it does since since Picard's indemnification claim against Bachevsky arises from the same sale of property as the main claim. B.C. original jurisdiction is based on diversity, we need to consider whether §1367(b) excepts this claim for grant of supplemental jurisdiction. It does not, since the original P is not asserting this claim.

Answer 34

True. In order for a federal court to invoke supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs, it must first have original jurisdiction over at least one claim in the action.

Answer 35

A court must look at ALL parties when analyzing complete diversity requirements, but separately when analyzing AIC. A court may base original jurisdiction on a single claim if the case arises under federal law, but must consider all of the original plaintiff's claims in a diversity case.

Answer 36

False Under FRCP P or D can sue together if they assert claims that “arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences (STOO); ***and*** If their claims involve any question of law or fact common to all P’s” (requires both)

Answer 37

Party asserting counterclaim is seeking their own relief?

Answer 38

YES but 13(b) counterclaims nee their own SMJ analysis.

Answer 39

1) Subject to another pending action 2) Juris over main claim not PJ 3) arises after answer

Answer 40

True, unlike Rule 13(a) Crossclaims are always permissive

Answer 41

False: Rule 14 Allows third-party D to assert defenses that may defeat the main claim ***as well as*** defenses to the third-party claim

Answer 42

False. D's can join parties in counterclaims or crossclaims under Rule 13(h)

Answer 43

Rule 19: Requiring an absentee to be made party to a case Rule 24: Intervention: Who’s allowed? When nonparties ask to participate in a case where they are not named → practical impact on their interests Similarities in language: + Claims an interest relating to the subject of the action + Impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest

Answer 44

Part true, part false §1291 Limits appeal to final decisions, however dismissal of a motion to intervene is immediately appealable

Answer 45

No, it's effectively unappealable harmless error.

Answer 46

Yes, because his right of joinder is unlimited. Here we have a plaintiff asserting two claims against one defendant. The relevant standard is contained in FRCP 18. Under Rule 18, a party can join as many claims as he or she has against that adverse party, regardless of whether the claims are related or unrelated. Keep in mind that the court would still need subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy, but that is not the question at issue. Rule 18 deals only with pleading. A claim properly joined as a matter of pleading need not be proceeded with together with the other claim if fairness or convenience justifies separate treatment. Also, Rule 18 does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdiction or venue which may arise with respect to claims properly joined as a matter of pleading.

Answer 47

Yes, because this claim arises out of the transaction that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant. Defendant has filed a cross-claim against the manager. The rule governing the joinder of cross-claims in federal court is FRCP 13(g). Like the rule regarding joinability of third-party claims, and unlike the rules governing the joinability of counterclaims, the rule governing joinability of cross-claims is limited. Rule 13(g) only permits the joinability of cross-claims that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims or to a counterclaim. Defendant’s cross-claim against the manager for indemnity in connection with any liability it may incur as a result of Plaintiff’s claim against it clearly arises out of the occurrences that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim against Defendant.

Answer 48

Yes, because his claim against the manager arises out of the same occurrences that gave rise to his claim against his employer and both claims contain a common question of fact. Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims against more than one defendant in this suit, which automatically makes this a joinder of parties problem, not a joinder of issues problem. The rule governing joinder of parties in federal court is FRCP 20. Under Rule 20(a)(2), a plaintiff can assert claims against more than one defendant as long as both of two requirements are met. First, these claims must arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Second, the claims against both of the defendants must contain at least one common question of law or fact. Here, the claims against both Defendant and the manager arise out of the latter’s alleged acts of harassment. So the first requirement of Rule 20 is met. Second, both of these claims require resolution of, among other things, the factual question of what the manager did to Plaintiff. Consequently, both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2) have been met.

Answer 49

Yes, because the right of joinder of counterclaims is unlimited. Defendant’s claim against Plaintiff is a counterclaim and the rules governing joinder of counterclaims in federal court are found in FRCP 13(a) and (b). Rule 13(a) defines a compulsory counterclaim and 13(b) defines permissive counterclaims. Whether or not a joinable counterclaim is deemed to be compulsory is determined by assessing whether that counterclaim meets the requirements of 13(a) or (b). But that is not the issue here. The issue here is not whether the defendant was required to assert this counterclaim, but whether he is permitted to do so, i.e., whether the counterclaim is joinable. The combination of these two subsections of Rule 13 clearly means that all counterclaims are joinable. Rule 13 is only a rule of pleading and does not purport to override or eliminate the jurisdictional and venue requirements under the U.S. Code. Thus, the question asks only whether the claim is joinable, not whether the court will ultimately be able to adjudicate the claim based on subject matter jurisdiction.

Answer 50

Yes, as to both claims The manager has filed a third-party complaint against Insurance Co. and this complaint contains two causes of action. The rule governing third-party complaints in federal court is Rule 14. Under Rule 14(a), third-party claims are joinable, but ONLY if they are for indemnity or contribution. Thus, unlike Rule 18 as to multiple claims by one party against one opposing party and Rule 13 as to counterclaims, the rule of joinder of third-party claims is limited. So the indemnity claim is joinable under Rule 14(a). And while it is true that the other non-indemnity claim for breach of contract is not joinable under Rule 14(a), it is joinable under Rule 18 once the indemnity claim is joined because Rule 18 permits unlimited joinder of additional claims to a joinable claim or third-party claim. Thus, but for the indemnity claim (joinable under Rule 14) the insurance company would not be a party to the action at all. While it is true that the other non-indemnity claim is not joinable under Rule 14(a), it is joinable under Rule 18, which permits unlimited joinder of additional claims to a joinable claim or third-party claim.

Answer 51

The court should grant seller’s motion but not grant farmer’s, because Plaintiff’s suit against seller does not fall within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction but Defendant’s suit against farmer does. Pursuant to FRCP 14, seller is a third-party defendant. A defending party is permitted to bring into the lawsuit a nonparty who is or may be liable to the defending party for all or part of the original plaintiff’s claim against the defending party. The additional party is called the third-party defendant and the defending party is called the third-party plaintiff. This impleader action does not need an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction; so long as the original action satisfies the requirements, the courts will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party claims. Since the claim by the original defendant against a third-party defendant falls within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, Defendant’s third-party claim against the farmer will not be dismissed, even though the Defendant and the farmer are both from State V. However, a claim by the original plaintiff against the third-party defendant does not fall within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, so it must have independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Here, Plaintiff and seller are both citizens of State P, so there is no diversity of citizenship. Also, under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the federal court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against persons made parties under Rule 14 when doing so would destroy diversity jurisdiction. The court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against seller.

Answer 52

Yes, because it is an indemnity claim. This is a cross-claim for indemnity. The Rule governing joinder of cross-claims is 13(g). Unlike Rule 18 and Rule 13 governing joinder of multiple claims by a single plaintiff against a single defendant and joinder of counterclaims, respectively, Rule 13(g) does not provide an unlimited right of joinder. It only permits joinder of cross-claims that are transactionally related to the original complaint or counterclaim.

Answer 53

Yes, because there is no limit to joinability of such claims. The plaintiff is seeking to join two claims against one defendant. Under Rule 18, there is no limit to the number of claims a party can join against another party as long as one of the claims is joinable.

Answer 54

Yes, because there is no limit to joinability of this type of claim. Although this is a claim between co-defendants, it is not a cross-claim, but a counterclaim to Books, Inc.’s cross-claim against President. Consequently, the correct Rule governing joinability is Rule 13(a) and (b) and not Rule 13(g). There is no limit on joinability of counterclaims and so this claim is joinable. Whether or not the court has subject matter jurisdiction is another matter, but that is not being tested in this question. Rule 13 is only a rule of pleading and does not purport to override or eliminate the jurisdictional and venue requirements under the U.S. Code. Thus, the question asks only whether the claim is joinable, not whether the court will ultimately be able to adjudicate the claim based on subject matter jurisdiction.

Answer 55

No, because it is a tort claim alleging conduct that lowered the value of his property. This is a third-party claim. Accordingly, joinability is determined by Rule 14(a), which only permits joinder of third-party claims for indemnity or contribution. Since this claim is not an indemnity or contribution claim, (but rather a claim alleging conduct that lowered the value of his property), it is not joinable.

Answer 56

Yes, because this claim is transactionally related to Plaintiff's claim against Books, Inc. and the two claims share a common question of fact. Since Plaintiff filed claims against two defendants, this raises the issue of joinder of parties-defendant. Under Rule 20(a) multiple defendants can be joined if the claim against them arises out of the same transaction and there is at least one question of either law or fact common to the claim against all joined defendants. Both of these requirements are met here as both claims arise out of the decision not to publish Plaintiff’s book and involve the common question of why the book was not published, among others.

Answer 57

The district court must dismiss if Plaintiff fails to deposit the stake into court or refuses to pay a bond. Federal law recognizes two different kinds of interpleader actions: “Rule 22” interpleader and “statutory” interpleader (28 U.S.C. § 1335). Although the procedures serve the same purpose—to enable a party to avoid the risk of multiple and conflicting liability “when several claimants assert rights to a single stake,” Airborne Freight Corp. v. U.S., 195 F.3d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1999)—statutory and rule interpleader differ in their procedural requirements. Statutory interpleader requires that the plaintiff deposit the stake “into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, or has given bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with surety as the court or judge may deem proper.” 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1)(B); see U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Asbestospray, Inc., 182 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A proper deposit or bond is a jurisdictional prerequisite… The stakeholder …must deposit the largest amount for which it may be liable in view of the subject matter of the controversy.”)

Answer 58

No, not over the state law claim because it raises a novel issue of state law. The federal claim falls within the court’s §1331 jurisdiction. The non-diverse state claim is subject to supplemental jurisdiction under §1367 if the two claims form part of the same case, i.e., arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact AND if none of the factors listed in §1367(c) justify declining to exercise such supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the two claims do form part of the same case, but since the damages issue under state law is a question of first impression, this falls within the §1367(c)(1) factor justifying a decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.

Answer 59

A federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over every claim in the lawsuit. The federal claim clearly falls within the court’s §1331 jurisdiction. The second claim, however, is a non-diverse state law claim since both parties are citizens of Indiana. Thus, it does not fall within the court’s original jurisdiction under either §1331 or §1332. This, then, raises the question of whether the claim falls within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. §1367. This is a “pendent claim jurisdiction” first articulated by the Supreme Court in UMW v. Gibbs. It consists of a federal question claim and a non-diverse state claim brought by one plaintiff against one defendant. Congress codified this doctrine in §1367(a), which gives federal courts the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under these circumstances as long as the two claims form part of the same “case” under Article III of the Constitution, i.e., they arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts. If they do not, then the state claim must be dismissed and the federal court retains jurisdiction over the federal claim only. If they do form part of the same “case,” then the court has the discretion to exercise jurisdiction over the (non-diverse state law) claim that did not fall within its original jurisdiction. And §1367(c)(1)-(4) lists the factors that the court should consider in deciding whether or not to decline to exercise this supplemental jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claim. In this question, both claims arise out of the same series of alleged acts of harassment and so the common nucleus test is satisfied. And none of the factors listed in §1367(c) such as predominance of state issues or novelty of state law issues or dismissal of the federal claim is present to justify dismissal of the state law claim. Therefore, the fact that there is no independent subject matter jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claim is not fatal`

Answer 60

No, because the claims do not arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. The federal claim falls within the court’s §1331 jurisdiction. The non-diverse state claim (both parties are citizens of Massachusetts) is subject to supplemental jurisdiction under §1367 only if the two claims form part of the same case, meaning they arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts and if none of the factors listed in §1367(c)(1)-(4) justify declining to exercise such supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the facts giving rise to the price-fixing conspiracy are different from and unrelated to the facts giving rise to the breach of contract claim; the two claims do not form part of the same case. Therefore, there can be no supplemental jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claim.

Answer 61

Yes, because this claim arose out of the car crash. This is a state law counterclaim between diverse parties but as to which the amount in controversy requirement has not been met. So there is no original jurisdiction over this claim. But since original jurisdiction over the civil action is founded solely on §1332, whether or not the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Trucks, Inc.’s counterclaim involves the application of §1367(b). This section prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-based cases, but only over claims by “plaintiffs.” Although Trucks, Inc. is a counter-plaintiff, this does not meet the §1367(b) requirement of being a plaintiff. Trucks, Inc. is a defendant and counter-plaintiff and so the limitation of §1367(b) is inapplicable here. So we must go to §1367(a) and ask if this claim forms part of the same “case” as claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. And it does, since this claim arises out of the accident that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. So the common nucleus of operative fact standard of §1367(a) is met.

Answer 62

Yes, because this claim arose out of the car crash. Driver and Trucks, Inc. are diverse, but since the amount in controversy is only $75,000, it does not exceed $75,000 and therefore does not meet the amount in controversy requirement of §1332. Since this is a state law claim, the court does not have original jurisdiction over this cross-claim. Since original jurisdiction over the civil action is founded solely on §1332, whether or not the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Driver’s claim involves the application of §1367(b). This section prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-based cases, but only over claims by “plaintiffs.” Although Driver is a cross-plaintiff, this does not meet the §1367(b) requirement of being a plaintiff. She is a defendant and cross-plaintiff and so the limitation of §1367(b) is inapplicable here. So we must go to §1367(a) and ask if this claim forms part of the same “case” as claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. And it does, since this claim arises out of the accident that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. So the common nucleus of operative fact standard of §1367(a) is met.

Answer 63

Yes, because this claim arose out of the car crash. This is a state law claim between non-diverse parties so there is no original jurisdiction over this claim. It is a third-party claim in a case where original jurisdiction was founded solely on diversity. Thus, we need to look to §1367(b), but the ban on supplemental jurisdiction in §1367(b) only applies to claims by plaintiffs and this is a third-party claim by a defendant and so the limitation of §1367(b) is inapplicable. We then turn to §1367(a), which would allow supplemental jurisdiction if this claim forms part of the same case as the claims within the court’s original jurisdiction. Since this third-party claim is for indemnity for any loss suffered by Trucks, Inc. in connection with the plaintiff’s claim against it, the common nucleus of operative fact standard of §1367(a) has been met and therefore the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Answer 64

The court should grant the motion, because the two claims do not form part of the same case. Under §1367(a) if the plaintiff asserts a federal question claim against one defendant, the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a non-diverse state law claim against a separate defendant if the two claims form part of the same case, i.e., arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact, and if none of the factors listed in §1367(c) justify declining to exercise such supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the patent claim against the corporation is a federal question claim. The tort claim against the president, however, does not form part of the same case as the patent claim since it is based on acts of sexual harassment and the former claim arose out of the company’s acts of infringement. Thus, supplemental jurisdiction under §1367(a) is not available,

Answer 65

Grant Distributor’s motion against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against Distributor is not within the court's diversity jurisdiction; supplemental jurisdiction cannot be exercised over it; and the facts do not suggest that any other jurisdictional basis is available. When faced with a multi-party and multi-claim action, it helps to diagram the action: Plaintiff (Missouri) v. Defendant (Idaho) v. Distributor (Missouri) Here, Plaintiff is seeking to amend her complaint to sue Distributor, who has been joined in the action as a third-party defendant, under FRCP 14. However, in order to bring a claim against a third-party defendant, the court must be able to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. One form of subject-matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The federal diversity statute permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff and the defendant are "citizens of different States" and "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff (Missouri) and Distributor (Missouri) are citizens of the same state, and so diversity jurisdiction is not present. The second form of subject-matter jurisdiction is supplemental jurisdiction, though this too is unavailable in this situation. Here, Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000, and so diversity jurisdiction is present. When the anchor claim is grounded in diversity jurisdiction, federal law withholds supplemental jurisdiction over any claim "by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Defendant's third-party claim against Distributor requires that Distributor be joined under FRCP Rule 14 which governs third-party practice in federal court. Thus, Distributor is a person made a party under FRCP 14, and Plaintiff is prohibited from joining a claim under § 1367(b); supplemental jurisdiction may not be exercised on Plaintiff's claim against Distributor. The statute codifies the practice that existed before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), which did not permit ancillary jurisdiction when its exercise would violate the rule of complete diversity as articulated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).

Answer 66

The court should deny the motion, and in its discretion exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim against the district manager. Supplemental jurisdiction provides federal court jurisdiction over claims which lack an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction but that arise from the same set of operative facts as the principal claim validly asserted in federal court. Under § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” The exercise of such power is subject to exceptions set out in § 1367(b) when the original claim is based on diversity jurisdiction. Here, the court’s original jurisdiction is based on a claim that arises under federal law; the claim against the district manager is related to that claim because it involves the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and loss of promotion at work, and thus falls under the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Answer 67

The court should grant the motion, because the claim is unrelated to the plaintiffs' claims against Corp. Inc. The claim is a cross-claim brought by one defendant against a co-defendant. It is a state law claim brought by one N citizen against another N citizen. Therefore there is no original jurisdiction over this claim under either federal question (§1331) or diversity (§1332). A cross-claim, such as the one at issue here, may fall under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction (§1367), provided it forms part of the same case as the claim that falls within the court’s original jurisdiction, (here, Plaintiffs’ federal securities claims against Corp. Inc.). This breach of contract claim from Stock Co. against Corp. Inc. is not part of the same case. Thus, it does not fall under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Answer 68

No, because the retailer’s antitrust claim does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s defective-design claim. When one party asserts a claim against another coparty (i.e., another party on the same side of the “v.”), that claim is called a crossclaim. A crossclaim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of either the original action or of a counterclaim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). Here, the manufacturer and the retailer are both defendants and are therefore coparties. The retailer’s claim against the manufacturer is a crossclaim. The district court is unlikely to permit joinder because the retailer’s claim does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s defective-design claim. Besides involving the same product, there is no logical relationship between the plaintiff’s claim that the product was defectively designed and the retailer’s claim that the manufacturer conspired to fix the product’s price. The two claims would likely involve substantially different evidence.

Answer 69

The court will sever the claim, because the claim does not share common factual or legal issues with the existing lawsuit, and the claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 governs the possible permissive joinder of parties to an existing case. Specifically, Rule 20(a)(1) provides that a new party may join in an existing action as a plaintiff if: (1) the new party’s claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the existing case, and (2) there is a commonality in a factual or legal issue that will apply to all the plaintiffs (the existing plaintiffs and the newly joined plaintiff). If a claim fails to comply with the requirements for joinder under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then the court may sever the claim so that it is brought in a separate lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

Answer 70

Yes, because the substantive law provides the retailer a right of indemnification against the manufacturer. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defending party to join a third party who is or may be liable to the defending party for some or all of the claim against the defending party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). This procedure is called impleader, or third-party practice. Here, the substantive law provides the retailer with a right of indemnification against the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s liability to the retailer is derivative: the manufacturer is only liable to the retailer if the retailer is liable to the plaintiff. This is precisely the type of situation for which third-party practice was designed. The retailer’s third-party complaint is therefore properly filed.

Answer 71

The lawyer should check whether, under substantive law, the truck driver has a right of indemnification or contribution from the minivan driver.

Answer 72

Yes, because the plaintiff is a counterclaim-defendant. Impleader may be used by any defending party to join a nonparty who is or may be liable to the defending party for all or part of the claim against it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). A party need not be an original defendant in order to qualify as a defending party under Rule 14. When a claim is asserted against a plaintiff, a plaintiff may use impleader to bring in a third party if Rule 14 would permit a defendant to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(b). Here, the defendant has asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract against the plaintiff. Because a claim has been asserted against the plaintiff, the plaintiff may use impleader to assert a third-party complaint against its supplier

Answer 73

Yes, because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is satisfied and § 1367(b) does not apply to a third-party claim brought by a defendant. Here, the only basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction exists over the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant contractor, because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The third-party claim arises from the same renovation and alleged poor workmanship as the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant contractor. Thus, the defendant contractor’s third-party claim against the subcontractor falls within the general rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which permits the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that forms “part of the same case or controversy” when it shares a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the claim that has an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 1367(b) does not apply because it is not the plaintiff (or a person proposed to be joined, or seeking to intervene, as a plaintiff) who is asserting the claim, but rather the defendant. Remember, defendants are generally considered “defendants” for many jurisdictional statutes (including 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)), even if they become “plaintiff-like” by actively asserting claims against plaintiffs or third parties.

Answer 74

No, because the paint manufacturer is not a necessary party. In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to join a required party, a court must determine whether the omitted party is necessary, and whether it is feasible to join the omitted party. If the omitted party is necessary but it is not feasible to join them, then the court must decide whether to proceed with the lawsuit in the party’s absence or dismiss it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. A party is necessary if the court cannot provide complete relief in the party’s absence, or if the party has an interest in the case and proceeding without the party may either impair the party’s ability to protect that interest, or leave an existing party subject to multiple or inconsistent liabilities. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A), (B). The paint manufacturer is not a necessary party. The homeowner may obtain complete relief from the housepainter. The paint manufacturer has no interest in the lawsuit that requires protecting, nor does proceeding in the absence of the manufacturer subject the housepainter to multiple or inconsistent liabilities. Therefore, the district court is not likely to grant the housepainter’s motion. Rather, the housepainter would be better served here by filing a third-party complaint against the paint manufacturer, provided that the underlying substantive law gives the housepainter a right of indemnification or contribution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1).

Answer 75

The homeowner can reach the beachfront from the homeowner’s lot without traveling over the portion of land the private developer purchased. If it is not feasible to join a necessary party to a lawsuit, a federal district court has two options: (1) proceed with the lawsuit in the party’s absence or (2) dismiss the lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. In general, courts consider four nonexclusive factors to decide whether to proceed or dismiss, including whether: (1) a judgment without the required person would prejudice that person or other parties, (2) a judgment without the required person could be crafted to avoid any prejudice, (3) a judgment without the required person would be adequate to resolve the dispute, and (4) the plaintiff has an adequate remedy if the case were dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(1)-(4). Here, the fact that there are routes between the vacation home and the beachfront that do not cross the private developer’s land indicates that the court may craft an adequate remedy for the homeowner without prejudicing the private developer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(2). This fact best supports a court’s decision to proceed with the lawsuit in the private developer’s absence.

Answer 76

The court should determine whether the patent holder is an indispensable party. After determining that the patent holder is a necessary party whose joinder is not feasible, the court must determine whether the patent holder is an indispensable party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2) and 19(b). That inquiry requires the court to determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Only after making that determination may the court rule on a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party.

Answer 77

The defendant’s delay in bringing the third-party complaint was excessive. In deciding whether to permit or deny impleader, a court will generally balance efficiency against prejudice. Specifically, the court will balance the extent to which impleader will save time, effort, and duplicative litigation on the one hand, against any prejudice or harm that might result to the parties on the other hand. The prejudice or harm might take the form of excessive introduction of issues unrelated to the main claim, unexplained or excessive delay in bringing the third-party complaint, or undue complication of the lawsuit. the district court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion for leave to implead a third-party defendant is best explained by the defendant’s excessive delay in bringing the third-party complaint. Trial on the plaintiff’s claims is set for two weeks. Joining a third-party defendant at this late stage in the litigation would prejudice not only the third-party defendant but also the other parties to the action.

Answer 78

No, because subsequent proceedings can resolve claims of indemnification or contribution. To determine whether a party is necessary under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), courts determine whether the court can accord complete relief among the existing parties to the litigation without joinder of the missing party, or whether proceeding without the missing party would subject the existing parties to multiple or inconsistent obligations because of the missing party’s interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Joint tortfeasors are not considered necessary parties. Here, failure to join the surgeon and hospital would not negatively subject either the manufacturer or the missing parties to multiple obligations. Any claims for indemnification or contribution may be decided in a subsequent proceeding after resolution of the manufacturer's liability.

Answer 79

The court will order joinder of the homeowners’ association, because the association is a necessary party and joinder is feasible. The court must determine whether the homeowners’ association is a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Rule 19(a) requires joinder, if feasible, where (1) the missing party’s absence prevents the court from giving the existing parties complete relief; or where (2) the missing party claims an interest in the litigation, and disposing of the action in the party’s absence may impair its ability to protect that interest or create a substantial risk of inconsistent obligations. Here, the homeowners’ association has an interest in both the interpretation of its bylaws and the validity of its restrictions. If the association is not joined, the court’s judgment could subject the management company to obligations that diverge from its contractual obligations to the association. Thus, the association is necessary and must be joined if feasible. The facts state that venue is proper, the association could be properly served, and the court would have personal jurisdiction over the association without defeating diversity jurisdiction after joinder. Therefore, joinder of the association is feasible. Because it is both necessary and feasible, the court must order joinder of the association.

Answer 80

The district court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim and joinder would not be appropriate. In evaluating whether a potential claim may be added to a particular lawsuit, one should consider whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim and whether joinder of the claim is appropriate. In order for a federal district court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim arising under state law, the requirements for diversity jurisdiction or supplemental jurisdiction must be met. Diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties on opposite sides of the claim be completely diverse (i.e., be citizens of different states) and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are not met, a district court may still exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the state-law claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with another claim that has an independent jurisdictional basis, such that the new claim may be considered part of the same case or controversy as that within the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If the court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the new state-law claim, it must then ensure that the requirements for proper joinder of the claim are met. A claim asserted by one party against a coparty (i.e., a party on the same side of the “v.”) is called a crossclaim. In order for joinder of a crossclaim to be proper, the crossclaim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original claim or of a counterclaim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). Here, the two competitors are both citizens of State B, so the larger competitor’s potential state-law claim for unfair competition against the smaller competitor does not meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, the unfair-competition claim is not related to the plaintiff’s claim against the two competitors. The potential claim is based on different facts and has no logical relationship with the plaintiff’s underlying tortious-interference claim. Therefore, the district court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the unfair-competition claim, either. For these reasons, the district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the larger competitor’s state-law claim. For similar reasons, joinder of the claim is not proper. The larger competitor’s crossclaim against the smaller competitor is based on different facts than the plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference. The crossclaim therefore does not arise out the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim. For this reason, joinder of the unfair-competition claim is not appropriate, either

Answer 81

The district court will be able to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of the former employer’s compulsory counterclaims, even if they otherwise lack an independent jurisdictional basis, but any of the former employer’s permissive counterclaims must have an independent jurisdictional basis. In evaluating whether a potential claim may be added to a particular lawsuit, one should consider whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim and whether joinder of the claim is appropriate. In general, a federal district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim in one of three ways: (1) if the claim presents a federal question, (2) if the claim meets the requirements for diversity jurisdiction (because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000), or (3) if the claim is within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367(a). A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction if a state-law counterclaim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with another claim that has an independent jurisdictional basis, such that the counterclaim may be considered part of the same case or controversy as that within the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A party may join as many counterclaims as it has against an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Counterclaims may be either compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim is compulsory if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s claim and the court has jurisdiction over any parties the claim requires to be added. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1). A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s claim if there is a logical relationship between the claims. In contrast, a permissive counterclaim is entirely unrelated to the opposing party’s claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b). Here, because the former employer’s potential counterclaims are based upon state law, the district court would not have federal-question jurisdiction. The district court could not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the counterclaims either, because both the plaintiff and her former employer are citizens of the same state. Therefore, the only basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is supplemental jurisdiction. A claim within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction must share a common nucleus of operative fact with another claim that has an independent jurisdictional basis. Here, the only other claim in the case is the plaintiff’s federal civil-rights claim for employment discrimination. The plaintiff’s federal claim is also the opposing party’s claim with which any compulsory counterclaims must share a logical relationship in order for joinder to be appropriate. Therefore, by definition, any compulsory counterclaim properly joined against the plaintiff is within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Answer 82

The district court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim but joinder would be appropriate. In evaluating whether a potential claim may be added to a particular lawsuit, one should consider whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim and whether joinder of the claim is appropriate. In general, a federal district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim in one of three ways: (1) if the claim presents a federal question, (2) if the claim meets the requirements for diversity jurisdiction (because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000), or (3) if the claim is within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367(a). A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction if a state-law claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with another claim that has an independent jurisdictional basis, such that the claim may be considered part of the same case or controversy as that within the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A party may join as many counterclaims as it has against an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Counterclaims may be either compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim is compulsory if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s claim and the court has jurisdiction over any parties the claim requires to be added. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1). A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s claim if there is a logical relationship between the claims. In contrast, a permissive counterclaim is entirely unrelated to the opposing party’s claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b). Here, the city’s proposed counterclaim against the organization is for fraud under state law and does not present a federal question. The city and the organization are both citizens of State A, so the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are not met. Nor is supplemental jurisdiction appropriate here because the city’s fraud claim is entirely unrelated to the organization’s claim that the city violated its members’ rights under the First Amendment. The two claims are based on entirely different facts and are not part of the same case or controversy. The district court here could not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the city’s state-law fraud counterclaim.

Answer 83

Yes, because the retailer’s claim against the manufacturer arises out of a common nucleus of operative fact as the plaintiff’s claim. In evaluating whether a potential claim may be added to a particular lawsuit, one should consider whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim and whether joinder of the claim is appropriate. In general, a federal district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim in one of three ways: (1) if the claim presents a federal question, (2) if the claim meets the requirements for diversity jurisdiction (because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000), or (3) if the claim is within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367(a). A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction if a state-law claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with another claim that has an independent jurisdictional basis, such that the state-law claim may be considered part of the same case or controversy as that within the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Rule 14 permits third-party claims against a nonparty who may be liable to a defending party for part or all of the claims against it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). Here, the retailer’s third-party claim against the manufacturer arises under state law and does not present a federal question. Nor is diversity jurisdiction appropriate, because the retailer and the manufacturer are both citizens of State B. As such, the only basis for the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the retailer’s claim for indemnification arises out of a common nucleus of operative fact as the plaintiff’s claim against the retailer. All of the claims are bound up in the plaintiff’s injury from the product the retailer sold and the manufacturer made. Both the retailer’s third-party complaint and the plaintiff’s original complaint would therefore be based on a common nucleus of operative fact, and supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate.

Answer 84

The plaintiff could join claims against all three potential defendants but the district court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over all three claims. plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single action if: (1) any right to relief is asserted against the defendants jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). A federal district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction if a claim: (1) presents a federal question, (2) meets the requirements for diversity jurisdiction (because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000), or (3) is within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367(a). A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction if a claim that lacks an independent jurisdictional basis shares a common nucleus of operative fact with another claim that has an independent jurisdictional basis, such that the two claims may be considered part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, where the district court’s jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, the court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought by plaintiffs, where doing so is inconsistent with the requirements for diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Rule 20 allows the patient to join all three potential defendants, because she is arguing that the hospital, surgeon, and nurse are jointly and severally liable for her injuries. The claims against the three potential defendants all arise out of the same hospital visit. All of the claims are based in negligence, so the claims against each defendant will have at least one common issue of fact or law. Therefore, joinder of the three potential defendants is appropriate. Answer options B and D are necessarily incorrect. Because the potential claims arise under state law, the district court does not have federal-question jurisdiction. The patient and the nurse are citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy of $7,000,000 exceeds the $75,000 threshold, so the district court would have diversity jurisdiction over that claim. However, both the hospital and the surgeon are citizens of State A, like the patient. Therefore, the district court would not have diversity jurisdiction over the patient’s claims against the hospital and the surgeon. Nor could the district court exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Each claim is brought by a plaintiff, in a case where the district court’s sole basis for jurisdiction is diversity. Exercising supplemental jurisdiction would not be consistent with the requirements for diversity (because the patient and each of the defendants are citizens of the same state). Therefore, the district court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over all three claims.