LEIBNIZ/SPINOZA

Question 1

What is Leibniz’s defense to premise (2) of (TOA)?

Answer 1

(1) simple, positive properties are never jointly incompatible
(2) All of God’s divine attributes are simple positive properties
(3) If (1) and (2) then (4)
(4) So the concept of God is internally consistent
(5) if the concept of F is internally consistent, then it is possible that an F exists
(6) So it is possible that God exists

Question 2

What is a cat-annihilator?

Answer 2

‘x is a cat-annihilator’=DF x knows that necessarily, there are no cats

Question 3

What is the cat annihilator objection?

Answer 3

(1) there are cats
(2) if (1), then it is not the case that possibly, necessarily, there are no cats
(3) If it is not the case that possibly, necessarily there are no cats, then it is not the case that it is possible that a cat-annihilator exists
(4) Hence, it is not the case that it is possible that a cat-annihilator exists
(5) the concept of a cat-annhiliator is internally, logically consistent
(6) If (4) and (5), then premise (5) in Leibniz’s argument for (2) in (TOA) is false
(7) So, premise (5) is false

Question 4

What is Spinoza’s defense of premise (2) of (TOA)?

Answer 4

1. if it is possible that God* exists, then it is possible that God exists
2. It is possible that God* exists
3. So it is possible that God exists

Question 5

What is God*?

Answer 5

‘x is god*’=DF

(i) x is god
(ii) x possibly exists

Question 6

Why does Spinoza think we should accept premise (2)?

Answer 6

God* is possible by definition.

If something is God* then it is possible, but we do not know if it is possible that there exists something which is so named God*

Doesn’t mean that premise (2) is false, but the theist just hasn’t defended it yet.