Lecture Unit 6: Dynamic competition across time (3/3) Flashcards

1
Q

What are impediments to coordination?

A
  • The Misread Problem
  • Lumpiness of orders
  • Information availability regarding sales transaction
  • Volatility of demand conditions
  • Asymmetries among firms
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2
Q

What happens when it is possible to misread a rival’s move in a tit-for-tat strategy? (Performance)

A

tit-for-tat may not perform as well as more forgiving strategies

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3
Q

What are two scenarios where misread can happen?

(Impediments to coordination)

A

1. firm mistakenly believes a competitor is changing one price when it is really charging another

  • A firm may be able to observe the rival’s list price but not the effective price;

2. firm misunderstands the reasons for a competitor’s pricing decision or the own change in market share.

  • A drop in the list price may be read as a price cut when effectively it may not be one
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4
Q

What can a single and additional misread lead a firm to do?

(the Misread probelm)

A

will lead the firm to alternate between cooperative and non-cooperative moves.

Additional misreads can make the pattern of moves even worse.

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5
Q

What is the effect of additional misreads?

A

Additional misreads can make the pattern of moves even worse.

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6
Q

Which response might be better when there is a possibility of misreads?

A

Deferred response may be better than immediate response.

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7
Q

When are orders considered “lumpy”?
Name industry examples!!
(2nd impediment to coordination)

A
  • when sales occur relatively infrequently in large batches as opposed to being smoothly distributed over the year

Examples: airframe manufacturing, ship building

  • The lag between orders makes the gain from price cutting more valuable relative to the cost imposed by the rival’s retaliation
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8
Q

What happens to the frequency of competitive interactions when orders are lumpy?

(2nd impediments to coordination)

A

The frequency of competitive interactions is reduced.

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9
Q

How does the lag between orders affect the gain from price cutting?

A

The lag between orders makes the gain from price cutting more valuable relative to the cost imposed by the rival’s retaliation.

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10
Q

When can one easier detect deviations from cooperative pricing? Name example

–>Information availability regarding sales transaction –>(Impediments to coordination)

A

easier to detect when the transactions are public than when they are private

Example: transaction prices for gasoline sales are easily observable while they are not easily observable for automobile sales

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11
Q

–>Information availability regarding sales transaction

When can one harder detect deviations from cooperative pricing? Name example

A

are harder to detect when the products are custom made than when they are standardized

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12
Q

How do complex transactions affect the likelihood of misreading?

(Availability of information about sales transactions ->impediments to coordination)

A

Complex transactions may make misreadings more likely compared with simple transactions

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13
Q

(Volatitiy of demand conditions 3thrd impediments to coodrination)

When is price cutting harder to detect?

A
  • when demand conditions are volatile
  • and the firm can observe only its own volume of sales
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14
Q

(Volatitiy of demand conditions 3thrd impediments to coodrination)

In which situtation may a firm misread an situation to be an effort to steal busssines?

A
  • Suppose one firm cuts its price in response to a decline in demand
  • If other firms see the price cut but cannot detect their rival’s volume reduction, they may misread the situation as an effort to steal business
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15
Q

What might happen if one firm cuts its price in response to a decline in demand?

(Volatility of demand)

A
  • Other firms may see the price cut but cannot detect their rival’s volume reduction,
  • leading them to misread the situation as an effort to steal business.
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16
Q

(Volatitiy of demand conditions 3thrd impediments to coodrination)

What makes the coordination difficult? ( costs]

A

With large fixed costs, the monopoly price fluctuates a lot making coordination difficult

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17
Q

Volatiliy of demand

What impact do large fixed costs have on monopoly pricing?

A

Large fixed costs cause the monopoly price to fluctuate a lot, making coordination difficult.

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18
Q

What can be a focal point when firms are identical?

A

A single monopoly price.

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19
Q

Why is it difficult for firms to coordinate pricing strategies?

(assymmetries among firms, sustianabiltiy of cooperative prices)

A
  • Firms usually differ in costs, capacities, etc., which makes it difficult for them to coordinate pricing strategies to common objectives.
20
Q

Why might small firms have incentives to deviate from an agreement pricing strategy?

A
  • Larger firms often have weak incentives to punish smaller price cutters
  • Small firms might induce customers to buy their products by cutting prices.
21
Q

Coordination in practice

What factors help with coordination among competitors in a market?

A
  • using round number price points
  • maintaining even splits of the market shares
  • Fewer identical products also make coordination easier
  • established conventions and traditions can make rivals’ intentions transparent, aiding in coordination efforts
22
Q

Coordination in practice

When is coordination easier among products? (in terms of products

A

Coordination is easier with fewer products that are identical.

23
Q

Coordination in practice
When is coordination likely to be difficult? (Competitive environment)

A

in a competitive environments that are turbulent and rapidly changing

24
Q

(Coordination problem)

What does the folk theorem suggest about cooperative pricing?

A
  • The folk theorem implies that cooperative pricing behavior is a possible outcome in an oligopolistic industry, even if all firms act unilaterally (self-interest)
25
Q

What is the coordination problem in achieving a desirable equilibrium?

A

Achieving a desirable equilibrium out of many possible equilibria is a coordination problem.

26
Q

What must each firm in an oligopolistic industry do according to the folk theorem?

(Coordination problem)

A
  • Each firm must adopt the tit-for-tat strategy without explicit comm-unication that it intends to do so
  • this must be a focal point — a strategy so compelling that a firm would expect all other firms to adopt it
27
Q

What is necessary for a cooperation-inducing strategy to be effective? (According to the folk theorem)

What is this focal point?

A
  • The strategy must be a focal point
  • a strategy so compelling that a firm would expect all other firms to adopt it
28
Q

What are certain markect structure conditions on which achieving a cooerpative pricing depends upon?

A

cooperative pricing may depend on following conditions

  • concentration
  • conditions that affect reaction speeds and detection lags
  • asymmetries among firms
  • price sensitivity of buyers
29
Q

Where is cooperative pricing more likely to happen? (Terms of market structure ?)

A
  • In concentrated markets
  • here revenue loss from a price cut is larger and the potential gain from new customers is smaller
30
Q

Why is cooperative pricing more likely in concentrated markets?

A
  • Because the revenue loss from a price cut is larger and the potential gain from new customers is smaller.
31
Q

How can firms facilitate cooperative pricing?

A

through a number of practicess, including:

  • Price leadership
  • Advance announcement of price changes
  • Most favored customer clauses
  • Uniform delivered pricing
32
Q

What is price leadership? (A way too)

A

= is a way to overcome the problem of coordinating on a focal equilibrium

33
Q

What happens in price leadership? (What do firms give up)

A
  • Each firm gives up its pricing autonomy and cedes control over industry pricing to a single firm
34
Q

How does the price leader influence the industry?

Name example of a low-price leader

A
  • The price leader in the industry announces price changes ahead of others,
  • and others match the leader’s price.

Example: low-price leader: Walmart

35
Q

When can the system of price leadership break down?

A

The system can break down if the leader does not retaliate if one of the follower firms defects

36
Q

What does advance announcement of price changes do?

A

It reduces the uncertainty that the rival will *undercut the firm

37
Q

What is another benefit of advance announcement of price changes?

A

It allows firms to roll back the changes if the rival deviates from cooperative pricing.

38
Q

hat is a most favored customer clause?

A

= is a provision in a sales contract that promises a buyer the lowest price the seller charges

39
Q

What are the two types of most favored customer policies mentioned?

A
  • contemporaneous most favored customer policy; customer receives same terms and conditions at the same tiime
  • retroactive most favored customer policy; customers receives most favorable deal that were offered to any customer retroactively
40
Q

How can most favored customer clauses inhibit/prevent (hindern) price competition?

A
  • Most of them benefit the buyer ( a price cut to any customer lowers the price for the most favored customer),
  • They discourage firms from cutting prices to other customers who do not have these clauses because a price cut to any customer lowers the price for the most favored customer
41
Q

What is uniform delivered pricing?

A
  • A pricing method where transportation costs are included,
  • facilitating cooperative pricing by making responses to price cutting more effective and deterrent.
42
Q

What are the two types of pricing when transportation costs are significant?

A
  • Uniform FOB pricing
  • uniform delivered pricing.
43
Q

Why is uniform delivered pricing effective in deterring defection from cooperative pricing?

A

Because the response to price cutting can be “surgical” and highly effective (

  • any attempt competitors to undercut prices can be met with a precise and effective response since all customers pay the same price, it is easier for companies to react
44
Q

What affects the sustainability of cooperative pricing?

A
  • market structure affects the sustainability of cooperative pricing
  • thus, high market concentration facilitates cooperative pricing

Market structure: concentration, conditions that affect reaction speed and detection lags, asymmetries among firms, price sensitivity of buyers**

45
Q

What makes pricing cooperation more difficult?

A
  • asymmetries among firms
  • lumpy orders
  • high buyer concentration
  • secret sales transactions
  • volatile demand
46
Q

Which practices facilitate cooperative pricing?

A
  • price leadership
  • advance announcements of price changes
  • most favored customer clauses
  • uniform delivered pricing
47
Q

Is high market concentration good for cooperative pricing?

A

Yes, high market concentration facilitates cooperative pricing