Lecture Unit 6: Dynamic competition across time (3/3) Flashcards

1
Q

What are impediments to coordination?

A
  • The Misread Problem
  • Lumpiness of orders
  • Information availability regarding sales transaction
  • Volatility of demand conditions
  • Asymmetries among firms
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2
Q

What happens when it is possible to misread a rival’s move in a tit-for-tat strategy? (Performance)

A

tit-for-tat may not perform as well as more forgiving strategies

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3
Q

What are two scenarios where misread can happen?

(Impediments to coordination)

A

1. firm mistakenly believes a competitor is changing one price when it is really charging another

  • A firm may be able to observe the rival’s list price but not the effective price;

2. firm misunderstands the reasons for a competitor’s pricing decision or the own change in market share.

  • A drop in the list price may be read as a price cut when effectively it may not be one
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4
Q

What can a single and additional misread lead a firm to do?

(the Misread probelm)

A

will lead the firm to alternate between cooperative and non-cooperative moves.

Additional misreads can make the pattern of moves even worse.

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5
Q

What is the effect of additional misreads?

A

Additional misreads can make the pattern of moves even worse.

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6
Q

Which response might be better when there is a possibility of misreads?

A

Deferred response may be better than immediate response.

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7
Q

When are orders considered “lumpy”?
Name industry examples!!
(2nd impediment to coordination)

A
  • when sales occur relatively infrequently in large batches as opposed to being smoothly distributed over the year

Examples: airframe manufacturing, ship building

  • The lag between orders makes the gain from price cutting more valuable relative to the cost imposed by the rival’s retaliation
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8
Q

What happens to the frequency of competitive interactions when orders are lumpy?

(2nd impediments to coordination)

A

The frequency of competitive interactions is reduced.

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9
Q

How does the lag between orders affect the gain from price cutting?

A

The lag between orders makes the gain from price cutting more valuable relative to the cost imposed by the rival’s retaliation.

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10
Q

When can one easier detect deviations from cooperative pricing? Name example

–>Information availability regarding sales transaction –>(Impediments to coordination)

A

easier to detect when the transactions are public than when they are private

Example: transaction prices for gasoline sales are easily observable while they are not easily observable for automobile sales

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11
Q

–>Information availability regarding sales transaction

When can one harder detect deviations from cooperative pricing? Name example

A

are harder to detect when the products are custom made than when they are standardized

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12
Q

How do complex transactions affect the likelihood of misreading?

(Availability of information about sales transactions ->impediments to coordination)

A

Complex transactions may make misreadings more likely compared with simple transactions

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13
Q

(Volatitiy of demand conditions 3thrd impediments to coodrination)

When is price cutting harder to detect?

A
  • when demand conditions are volatile
  • and the firm can observe only its own volume of sales
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14
Q

(Volatitiy of demand conditions 3thrd impediments to coodrination)

In which situtation may a firm misread an situation to be an effort to steal busssines?

A
  • Suppose one firm cuts its price in response to a decline in demand
  • If other firms see the price cut but cannot detect their rival’s volume reduction, they may misread the situation as an effort to steal business
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15
Q

What might happen if one firm cuts its price in response to a decline in demand?

(Volatility of demand)

A
  • Other firms may see the price cut but cannot detect their rival’s volume reduction,
  • leading them to misread the situation as an effort to steal business.
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16
Q

(Volatitiy of demand conditions 3thrd impediments to coodrination)

What makes the coordination difficult? ( costs]

A

With large fixed costs, the monopoly price fluctuates a lot making coordination difficult

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17
Q

Volatiliy of demand

What impact do large fixed costs have on monopoly pricing?

A

Large fixed costs cause the monopoly price to fluctuate a lot, making coordination difficult.

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18
Q

What can be a focal point when firms are identical?

A

A single monopoly price.

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19
Q

Why is it difficult for firms to coordinate pricing strategies?

(assymmetries among firms, sustianabiltiy of cooperative prices)

A
  • Firms usually differ in costs, capacities, etc., which makes it difficult for them to coordinate pricing strategies to common objectives.
20
Q

Why might small firms have incentives to deviate from an agreement pricing strategy?

A
  • Larger firms often have weak incentives to punish smaller price cutters
  • Small firms might induce customers to buy their products by cutting prices.
21
Q

Coordination in practice

What factors help with coordination among competitors in a market?

A
  • using round number price points
  • maintaining even splits of the market shares
  • Fewer identical products also make coordination easier
  • established conventions and traditions can make rivals’ intentions transparent, aiding in coordination efforts
22
Q

Coordination in practice

When is coordination easier among products? (in terms of products

A

Coordination is easier with fewer products that are identical.

23
Q

Coordination in practice
When is coordination likely to be difficult? (Competitive environment)

A

in a competitive environments that are turbulent and rapidly changing

24
Q

(Coordination problem)

What does the folk theorem suggest about cooperative pricing?

A
  • The folk theorem implies that cooperative pricing behavior is a possible outcome in an oligopolistic industry, even if all firms act unilaterally (self-interest)
25
What is the **coordination problem** in achieving a **desirable equilibrium**?
**Achieving** a **desirable** equilibrium **out of many possible** **equilibria** is a **coordination** problem.
26
**What must each firm** in an oligopolistic industry **do according to the folk theorem**? (Coordination problem)
- **Each** firm **must adopt** the **tit-for-tat** strategy **without** explicit **comm-unication** that it **intends** to do so - this **must be** a **focal point** — a strategy so **compelling** that a firm would **expect all other firms to adopt it**
27
What is necessary for a **cooperation-inducing strategy** to be **effective**? (According to the **folk theorem**) **What** is this **focal point**?
- The strategy **must** be a **focal point** - a **strategy** so **compelling** that a **firm** would **expect all other firms to adopt it**
28
What are **certain markect structure conditions** on which achieving a **cooerpative** pricing **depends** upon?
**cooperative** pricing may **depend** on following conditions - **concentration** - **conditions** that affect **reaction speeds** and **detection** **lags** - **asymmetries** among firms - price **sensitivity** of buyers
29
Where is cooperative pricing more likely to happen? (Terms of market structure ?)
- In **concentrated** **markets** - here **revenue loss** from a **price cut** is **larger** and the **potential gain** from **new customers** is **smaller**
30
Why is cooperative pricing more likely in concentrated markets?
- **Because** the **revenue loss** from a **price cut** is **larger** and the **potential** **gain** from **new** customers is **smaller**.
31
How can firms **facilitate cooperative pricing**?
through a number of practicess, including: - Price **leadership** - **Advance** **announcement** of price changes - **Most favored** customer clauses - **Uniform** delivered pricing
32
What is price leadership? (A way too)
= is a **way to overcome** the **problem** of **coordinating** on a **focal** equilibrium
33
What happens in price leadership? (What do firms give up)
- **Each** firm **gives up** its pricing **autonomy** and **cedes control** over industry **pricing** to a **single** firm
34
How does the **price leader influence the industry**? Name example of a low-price leader
- The price leader in the industry **announces price changes ahead** of **others**, - and **others match** the leader’s price. **Example:** **low**-price leader: Walmart
35
When can the system of price leadership break down?
The system can **break down if** the leader **does not retaliate** if one of the follower **firms defects**
36
What does **advance announcemen**t of price changes do?
It **reduces** the **uncertainty** that the rival will ***undercut the firm**
37
What is another benefit of advance announcement of price changes?
It **allows** firms to **roll back the changes** if the **rival** **deviates** from **cooperative** pricing.
38
hat is a most favored customer clause?
= is a **provision** in a **sales contract** that **promises** a **buyer** the **lowest** **price** the **seller** charges
39
What are the **two types of most favored customer** policies mentioned?
- **contemporaneous** most favored customer policy; customer receives same terms and conditions **at the same tiime** - **retroactive** most favored customer policy; customers receives most favorable deal that **were offered to any customer retroactively**
40
**How** can most **favored customer** clauses **inhibit/prevent (hindern) price competition?**
- **Most** of them **benefit the buyer** ( a price cut to any customer lowers the price for the most favored customer), - They **discourage** firms **from cutting prices** to other **customers** who **do not** have these **clauses** because a **price cut to any custome**r **lowers** the price for the **most favored** customer
41
What is uniform delivered pricing?
- A **pricing method** where **transportation** **costs** are **included**, - **facilitating** **cooperative** pricing **by** **making** responses to price cutting **more effective** and **deterrent**.
42
What are the two types of pricing when transportation costs are significant?
- Uniform **FOB** pricing - uniform **delivered** pricing.
43
Why is **uniform delivered pricing effective** in deterring defection from **cooperative pricing**?
Because the **response** to price **cutting** can be **"surgical"** and **highly** **effective** ( - any attempt competitors to undercut prices can be met with a **precise and effective response** since all customers **pay the same price, it is easier for companies to react**
44
What affects the **sustainability of cooperative pricing**?
- **market structure** affects the **sustainability** of **cooperative** pricing - thus, **high market concentration** facilitates **cooperative pricing** **Market structure**: concentration, conditions that affect reaction speed and detection lags, asymmetries among firms, price sensitivity of buyers**
45
What makes pricing cooperation more difficult?
- **asymmetries among firms** - **lumpy** orders - **high buyer concentration** - **secret sales transactions** - **volatile** demand
46
Which practices facilitate cooperative pricing?
- price **leadership** - **advance announcements** of price changes - **most favored customer** clauses - **uniform delivered** pricing
47
Is **high** market concentration good for cooperative pricing?
Yes, **high** market **concentration facilitates** cooperative pricing