LECTURE 9-10: CONSEQUENCES OF LIMITED FISCAL CAPACITY Flashcards

1
Q

problem of

A

organising military service, credible commitment to collect public resources

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2
Q

commitment problem N and W

A

because the actors that will play a significant economic role in 18th did not have incentives to stimulate economic growth due to uncredible commitment by crown, they select the best institutions for them (constitution that protects property rights). societies fail because they select weak institutions

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3
Q

solution

A

good rules and credible commitment: guarantee secure property rights (behave ex-post the same way he promised ex-ante)

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4
Q

mechanisms that guarantee ruler repayment

A
  • reputation: short-run perspective, informal way, didi to work
  • political institutions (constitutions): formalised, select rules that regulate relationships => self-enforcing (imply means to restrict rulers abilities to deviate from agreement
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5
Q

fiscal situation of stuarts

A

1603, fiscal capacity problems due to:
- increasing military expenditures
- institutional and fiscal setting based on the expectation that king had to live on his own
- parliament’s approval was not necessary to impose a new taxation

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6
Q

system of revenues stuarts

A

mixed, because expenses were higher than revenues:
- forced loans, sales of monopoly, sale of crown lands, sale of aristocratic titles, new customary taxes, expropriation of citizens properties

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7
Q

how did crown exercise discretionary power

A
  • royal prerogatives: quasi-legislative power of the crown. exploit to issue bills without parliamentary consent
  • star chamber: took decisions supplementary or going above the ones taken by common courts
  • direct selection and remuneration of judges by crown
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8
Q

consequences of institutional setting beofre

A
  • limited possibility of checking on rulers power
  • high concentration of power
  • bad economic outcomes
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9
Q

civil war changes institutional and fiscal

A
  • abolition of star chamber
  • restriction to sale of monopolies
  • stable role of parliament
    ineffective because the removal of the crown was an insufficient measure to prevent arbitrary use of power + no constraints on crown in case it would come back + no stable solution to fiscal prob
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10
Q

glorious revolution

A
  • parliament had power to check on crown’s decisions and exclusive authority in raising new taxes
  • royal prerogatives subjected to common law
  • judges independent power
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11
Q

effectiveness of revolution

A

those who held wealth had not control over crown activity

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12
Q

self-enforcing framework

A
  • credible threat of removal
  • exchange of power for commitment: wealth holders had incentives to lend resources
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13
Q

why parliament not acting as king

A
  • several actors with veto power: separation of power
  • trade interests: preference for limited government intervention (parliament represents economic powers)
  • independent judiciary system
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14
Q

consequences of new institutional set

A
  • increased control by wealth holders
  • elimination of arbitrary power
  • enhanced credibility of government commitment
  • improved capital market performance
  • long term economic impact
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15
Q

PA problem under Qing china

A

ruler needed to raise resources but prob of credible commitment 19h: social unrest and external threats.

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16
Q

model

A

in administration of tax collection, PA problem due to physical distance between decision maker and admin collecting taxes.

17
Q

agent

A

incentive to extract more resources

18
Q

ruler

A

monitoring costly and complicated, ruler can’t observe if deviation is happening. he wants to avoid revolt: monitor agent and impose fine. monitoring depends on distance, technology and ruler time constraint

19
Q

1st equilibrium. fiscal capacity

A

PA leads to decrease in fiscal capacity: monitoring capacity is low, high change that agent deviates and that pop revolts => ruler has to keep tax low

20
Q

2nd: size of bureaucracy

A

PA => weak fiscal capacity => small bureaucracy. ruler sets number of counties with cost. when monitoring capacity low, since tax rate small, B will be small also

21
Q

3rd equilibrium: impact of economy

A

economic expansion (increase in income) will initially increase the tax revenue (higher tax base) but eventually depress it (more extortion).

22
Q

evdence

A

moving away from capital: lower tax base and same for number of counties