LECTURE 7-8: FISCAL CAPACITY Flashcards

1
Q

Fiscal capacity

A

measure of the capability of a political entity to raise and spend public resources

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2
Q

Expansion of islam world based on 2 skills

A
  • ability to absorb rather than impose administrative structure and knowledge of conquered place
  • unification of all territories under a common language
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3
Q

11th crisis

A

political crisis and instability with internal and external pressure (demise of caliphate into small regions, rise of Western Europe)

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4
Q

explanation for decline

A

-geography
- religion
- fiscal capacity

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5
Q

geography

A
  • location and long distance routes: Arabs had lot of trade power but cities were landlocked, rise of competitive European trade, far from where trade happens
  • worsening climatic conditions reduced potential for agri
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6
Q

religion: renan, kuran, greif

A
  • renan: religious assumptions and set of beliefs blocked innovation and technological change
  • kuran: islam supports the creation of laws that led to institutional divergence, diff between christian and Arabs
  • greif: islam as the foundation of culture which led to divergence (Genoese vs maghribi)
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7
Q

greif Genoa magrhibi

A

very similar but diverged: genoese develop formal institutions: individualist, strong and generalised morality, impersonal ties
maghribi: informal partnership and trade only between them. collectivist, strong intra group ties

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8
Q

fiscal capacity

A

classical equilibrium

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9
Q

classical equilibrium

A
  • influential monotheistic clergy
  • ruler with monopoly over coercive fore
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10
Q

CE Europe

A

process of fragmentation from external military pressures. from CE to 3 competing powers: sovereign, clergy and landed aristocracy, emergence of effective checks on the ruler power

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11
Q

CE Middle East

A

ruler relies on slave armies as an alternative to the landed aristocracy, region remained in the CE (no third power, no fragmentation, centralisation)

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12
Q

blades

A

fiscal capacity (stronger in califate where sovereign kept his central powers and weaker in Europe where monarchs had to negotiate with local barons) influenced the type of military system (employ aristocracy and give them land and power vs mercenary power) which led to different political outcomes (checks on the king vs absolute power and emergence of alternative opposition).

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13
Q

feudalism

A

codified land grants as forms of compensation for military support of domestic elites, which led to creation of landed aristocracy
- more stable: longer ruler duration and lower chance of revolt by elite
- fracture of power created a vacuum and competition among the 3 emerged
- increase in institutional innovation
- multiple and more equitable legal systems
- more power decentralisation to guarantee stability to ruler
- consequence of weak fiscal capacity

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14
Q

mamluk

A

Buying military service from soldiers recruited as slaves. temporary land grants, isolated.
- stronger fiscal and administrative capacity: no need of landed aristocracy, don’t need to decentralise
- dual legal system

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15
Q

collusion

A

collusion between the 2 powers vs competition among 3 limited institutional innovation and development of a more equitable legal system

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16
Q

diff ruler stability Europe

A
  • decrease rents of sovereign
  • increase rents of potential rivals
  • decrease payoffs from successful revolt
  • lower likelihood of revolt
  • increase in ruler duration
17
Q

ruler stability middle eats

A
  • high diff between ruler and rival rents
  • high payoff from successful revolt
  • lower ruler duration
18
Q

two models of public credit

A
  • territorial monarchies: contracting loans from bankers and merchants
  • city-states: loans with residents (forced loans and indirect taxes)
19
Q

two sided of fiscal capacity

A

political representation and public credit

20
Q

political representation

A

assemblies to extract taxes and regulate debt

21
Q

model

A

executive needs to raise resources for war with citizens possessing liquid wealth to be invested.

22
Q

contracting problem

A

willing to lend only if policy actions will be coherent with initial need
executive needs power to alter policies in case of unexpected drop of revenues

23
Q

solutions

A
  • full specification of future course of action
  • executive grants lenders a degree of autnomony and control over future policies =>emergence of representative assemblies
24
Q

intensive political participation

A

intensive political participation (assemblies, monitoring and modifying) = facilitating access to credit

25
Q

2 conditions to be fulfilled

A
  • presence of small-scale polities
  • assembly’s composition: - Assemblies were more likely to take actions consistent with the interests of state creditors in polities where the same merchants who invested in government debt were also predominant among the political elite (elite of creditors).
26
Q

Conditions for the development of public credit:

A

city-state or geographically-limited state in which an oligarchy (merchnats) that represents creditors rules and controls the flow of finances.

27
Q

representation within city-states took on a much more intensive form than was the case in territorial states

A

Representative bodies in city-states met frequently, and they played an active role in monitoring not only taxation but also public spending and borrowing. If a representative body is to exert a degree of control over public finances to this extent, then it seems plausible to suggest that the assembly will need to meet frequently. In larger territorial states it was rare to see assemblies meet even annually.