Lecture 8 - recap and controversies Flashcards
how to explain infant ToM
modularity / early competence
theory-theory / late competence / conceptual change
two-systems theory
not ToM: behavioural rules, teleology, submentalizing
replicability of some paradigms
implicit infant FB understanding: there is a wide range of ages at which infants pass various paradigms. what does this mean
there may be a theoretical significance to this
what is the importance of the dissociation between identity and location fals ebelief understanding (and what is the dissociation)
importance: supports two-systems theory
14month - 2.5 year olds can pass identity FB as well as location FB (Scott et al 2009, Buttelmann et al, 2019)
2-3 year olds fail identity FB but pass location FB (low and watts, 2013, Fizke et al 2017)
implicit mechanisms
mentalistic: minimal ToM (registrations, coding relations; Apperly, Butterfill, Low)
non-mentalistic: Behaviour rules (completely non-mentalistic or including only non-representational mental states like seeing; perner)
sub-mentalising (not even behavioural rules; heyes)
explicit mechanisms
(Meta)representational theory of mind (perner)
teleology?
Perner and Roessler (2012) on impliict knowledge in behaviour rule
behaviour rules leave the mind implicit: they capture the causal relations between situations and actions coded by the mind (eg FB situation) without representing the mind
implicit knowledge: a regularity (if x then y) can be implicitly known by inferring y whenever x is known without representing the conditional (false belief) that licenses this inference
explicit knowledge: a regularity (if x then y) is explicitly known if the inference from x to y is informed by a representation of the conditional that licenses it (in contrast to implicit knowledge)
Two systems theory (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013)
-explain the two systems
system 1 (implicit): automatic, fast, efficient, limited mentalising system 2 (explicit): voluntary, slow, inefficient, flexible, not limited mentalising
explain minimal ToM from butterfill and apperly
the implicit system = minimal ToM
registration of situations is a condition and a cause of successful goal directed action - proxy for FB allowing success in location FB (but not identity B). types o computation:
1. goal directedness (agents persue goals)
2. encountering (proxy for perception)
3. registering (where an object last encountered)
4. causal registering (goal directed actions to objects are adressed tonplaces where objects were last registeres - proxy for belief)
evidence in favour of two-systems theory
signature blind spots (no identity FB?) - low, watts and fizke et al
frequent lack of correlation between emplicit and explicit tasks (Grosse-Wiesmann)
evidence against two-systems theory
wang and leslie: inhibition demands affect performance in omplicit visual anticipation FB similarly to explicit FB
ability to pass identity FB tests by infants and toddlers (controversial) Scott & Baillargeon, Buttelmann et al
variability in age for passing different implicit tests
some infant tests may not be so implicit - Buttelmann helping paradigm?
what are the two different two-systems possibilities
two completely independent systems working in parallel and co-existing in adulthood
interdependent systems: explicit developmentally built upon implicit
name the three this is not ToM options
teleology (perner) - debate whether this is mentalistic or not
sub-mentalising (heyes)
behaviour rules (Povinelli and vonk; perner)
explain teleology (priewasser and perner)
by 9-18 months children become teleologists able to derive an agent’s objective reason for an action without concren for the subjective views provided by mental states
teleology = objective facts that provide reason for an action without needing to infer the mental state of another
explain sub-mentalising
Heyes: well documented domain general processes that have empirical support from cognitive sceince, but are not evident to common sense (attention priming, retroactive interference, distraction)
not reasoning, but automatic reactions to colours, shapes and movements. eg automatic attentional orienting, encoding specificity, or retroactive intereference
explain behaviour reading
based on common sense categories (agents, objects, locations)
very difficult to test empirically as one can always imagine a behaviour rules explanation