lecture 7 (week 4, myth of a great military revo) Flashcards
the military Revolution thesis in a nutshell
- the argument
recurring great power wars drove military innovation and state-building in Western Europe, which subsequently gave these states a competitive advantage that they used to dominate non-European polities
= intense competition/warfare between Western European powers over 1550-1650 triggered crucial military revolution in Europe
*explanation for the GD
Sharman’s critique
(article we read, was basis for new book: Empires of the weak)
*piece we read was a literature review
makes a powerful critique of the military revolution thesis + forces us to rethink the rise of the West
origins of the western military revolution thesis
- historiography
- European military revolution: Michael Roberts 1955 (the MR stands like a great divide separating medieval society from the modern world)
- How the MR caused the rise of the west (Parker)
*especially interest in this topic after WW1 and WW2 (as these had major changes in tactics etc.)
*earlier historians held the flawed assumption that wars inside Europe were the same kind of wars as outside Europe
4 components of the European military revolution
- tactics and logistics: fortifications, improved supply systems, C16 linear battle formations, C17 bayoneted musketeers, C18 better cannons
- strategy: permanent standing armies and better training
- army size
- socio-political effects (new forms of credit/debt to finance military)
the European military revolution enabled the rise of the West - summary
- dev of modern state based on need to service large armies (Tilly: war made the state and the state made war)
*Tilly’s saying is a famous corollary - result of unmatched military competition in Western Europe
- other Eurasian powers could not keep up because political system was not sovereign state
- military advances in Europe explain European victories elsewhere C16-C18
problematic claims of conventional narrative
large armies
European empires had minuscule forces operating at distances precluding any substantive logistical support, in many cases they were outnumbered (C16-C17 European armies ca. 150000 men, China more than 1 million, Mughal empire multiple millions)
controlled by states
process of early modern European expansion was spearheaded by private groups of adventurers or chartered companies (VOC, British East India Company): were hybrid, non-state, armed, private actors
in Asia no English or Dutch state armies until the late 1700s
same tactics and technologies dev. in Europe used against extra-European opponents
Europeans were forced to adapt tactics to local circumstances, no single superior way of waging war in early modern period (diff regions, populations, imperial arrangements -> diff tactics and technologies)
= European imperial expansion during the early modern period had little to do with military-technological superiority
decisive factor in European military engagement
Americas vs Asia and Africa
- Americas = demographic catastrophe created by ‘old world’ diseases
- Asia and Africa: local rulers combined own tactics with easily acquired Western weapons, Europeans regularly lost
both cases: Europeans adopted tactics of their enemies and vice versa; no clear military advantage
a more accurate historical narrative - Sharman
2 main ingredients of European success : dual strategy of insinuation and deference
- insinuation: cultivation of indigenous allies
- deference: judicious posture of European subservience, especially when faced with more powerful Asian powerful Asian empires
this dual strategy was facilitated by the form of European sea empires: their maritime orientation was perceived as unthreatening by local rulers of land empires
dual strategy - insinuation
cultivation local allies
- divide and rule tactics
- reliance on local rulers for military force, plus credit/financing
- approach temporarily served the interests of both parties
- local rulers played rival European powers against each other
esp. in Asia, less in America (people died a lot there)
dual strategy - judicious posture of European deference
- European coastal ports or trading ports seen as symbol of local rulers’ power and prestige
- Europeans obliged to acknowledge inferior status in exchange for rights to trade (subservience)
*e.g. famous practice of ‘kowtowing’ to Chinese emperor
reflected the hard fact of European military weakness or overextension
!dual strategy was facilitated by the form of European sea empires: their maritime orientation was perceived as unthreatening by local rulers of land empires
(e.g. Macartney embassy of 1793: kowtowing (required ritual to talk to Chinese emperor: had to bow to the ground), edict King George 3 of Great Britain refused to do the ritual, Qianlong refused counter offers)
why were earlier historians so mistaken?
widely held but flawed assumption:
wars inside Europe were the same kind of wars as outside Europe
cases of military confrontations
on land: were rare + Europeans invariable lost
Europeans did win tactical victories at sea, but these hardly mattered to Asian rulers
- one-way European dependence on Asian markets
- asymmetry of land empires and sea empires
The Ottoman exception to the military revolution thesis
Ottoman Empire was an anomaly:
- engaged in sustained, high-intensity warfare with European powers in the early modern period (vs ‘‘infra-European warfare’’: that was supposed to account for military revo.)
*Mainly with Habsburgs
Within Europe, Ottomans were regarded as the ‘‘superpower of the early modern era’’: generally ahead militarily
- maintained large permanent standing armies
- advanced artillery
- modern methods siege warfare (surrounding enemy cities/fortifications) = best military army helped)
fall byzantine empire / christian rule 1453
1683 Relief of Vienna = farthest in Europe the Ottoman empire came, Vienna was saved by Polish king’s christian army
Dracula
European fascination with the Ottoman Turks:
Transylvania was also a big battle ground
Vlad the impaler (‘‘dracula’’) was a real historical figure, had a gruesome reputation
international order in diversity
= puzzle:
co-existence of fundamentally different political forms
why no convergence in political forms
how could sovereign, states, chartered companies, sea empires, land empires interact for centuries without one of the forms winning out?
Phillips and Sharman main findings:
- Europeans (trading rights) and local rulers (territorial control) wanted different things
- both sides recognized idea of territorially non-exclusive forms of organizing authority (no sovereignty)
- for most of the early modern period C15-C18, Europeans got played by local rulers
why it matters:
- our universal system of sovereign states is recent
- western dominance only since C19, could be temporary phase: rise of China and India today could be return to normal
