Lecture 7

Question 1

What does it mean to say that the mind is physical?

Hempel’s dilemma:

Answer 1

a) if we define the physical in terms of the principles of current
microphysics, then the claim is probably incorrect;
b) if we take microphysics to be some future unspecified theory,
then the claim that the mind is physical is extremely vague

Question 2

Jerry Fodor on mental causation

Answer 2

“If it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my
reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my
believing is causally responsible for my saying […] if none of that is
literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false
and it’s the end of the world.”

Question 3

• causal closure

Answer 3

every physical state is causally determined by

physical laws and prior physical states

Question 4

• supervenience:

Answer 4

mental states are dependent on, but not
identical with, physical states

• supervenience is not a causal relation(!)

Question 5

Important ingredients of the problem of mental causation

Answer 5

• no overdetermination: each effect has not more than
one sufficient and distinct cause
• causal efficaciousness: mental states have their causal
effect in virtue of being mental

Question 6

what are Three accounts of causation?

Answer 6

1) fundamentalist
2) Humean
3) Interventionist

Question 7

1) Fundamentalism about causation

Answer 7

• causation is an intrinsic property of physical objects; it is ‘out
there’ in reality
• consider the relation between the variable ‘worrying’ and the
variable ‘sleeping problems’: the fundamentalist thinks that
the common cause of both variables can be found in the brain
• there is no direct causal relation between cognitive processes
(worrying) and behavior (sleeping problems)
• mental causation is derived from physical causation

Question 8

2) The Humean view

Answer 8

• causation is just a projection; it only exists in our mind
• e.g., colliding billiard balls A and B
• we know from experience that colliding billiard balls always
behave in much the same way. There is a constant conjunction
between A and B
• we observe that A precedes B and that they are contiguous
(i.e., right next to each other), but we don’t observe the causal
relation itself

Question 9

3) Interventionism

Answer 9

• X causes Y means that there is a possible intervention I on X
that changes the value of Y (all else being equal)
• James Woodward (2003) ‘Making Things Happen’
• causation involves manipulation (and is thus related to our
agential capacities)
• ‘surgical’ rather than ‘fat-handed’ interventions

Question 10

Problems for interventionism

Answer 10

• interventions on mental states are not ‘surgical’
• supervenience implies that changes in mental states are
accompanied by changes in brain states
• but this means that we cannot keep the other variables fixed