Lecture 10 Flashcards
Access consciousness
• the contents of your mental states are access consciousness when they
are available for:
a) the control of behavior
b) input for your speech
c) input for further thoughts
• example: [The Eiffel tower is in Paris]
• contrast this with your:
1) knowledge of grammar
2) ability to ride a bike (‘know how’)
A double dissociation?
• mental states can be poised for action control, speech and further
thoughts without having a ‘what it is like’ quality
• phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness: you become
aware of the ticking of the clock after it stops
Chalmers (1995): the ‘hard problem of consciousness”
• ‘easy problems’ can be explained by using the standard
methods of cognitive science, i.e. in terms of
computational or neural mechanisms
Functional explanation
• the easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation
of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need
only specify a mechanism that can perform the function
neurophenomenology
we cannot understand conscious experience from a 3rd person
theoretical perspective
• the (neuro)phenomenological method focuses on 1st person experiences
• this is not just introspection…
Lutz et al. (2002) Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using
first-person data
• in neuroimaging research a lot of brain activity is seen as ‘noise’, i.e.
deviations from the ‘neutral’ baseline
• a baseline is needed to measure the effect of the stimulus on the brain
• subjective reports are ignored, except when they are triggered by
external stimuli
Dennett’s heterophenomenology:
a) ‘conscious experiences themselves’
b) beliefs about these experiences
c) ‘verbal judgments’ expressing those beliefs
d) utterances of one sort or another
Only b) is accessible to scientitic research, a) is just not interesting…
Consciousness as a ‘mongrel’ concept (Block 2002)
• consciousness is used in describing a variety of concepts to identify
different phenomena.
• the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness doesn’t
cover other interesting forms of consciousness
Conscious awareness of self-organizing autonomous systems
Narrative self-consciousness
• awareness of oneself as an organizer and regulator of experience
epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs.
Wegner’s main argument (from double-dissociation)
• ‘automatisms’: agents appear to perform voluntary actions without
being consciously aware of this (without conscious intention)
• ‘illusions of control’: agents have a conscious awareness of both willing
and doing, but they actually fail to perform the action
Dennett’s heterophenomenology:
a) ‘conscious experiences themselves’
b) beliefs about these experiences
c) ‘verbal judgments’ expressing those beliefs
d) utterances of one sort or another
Only b) is accessible to scientitic research, a) is just not interesting
Wegner suggest that this occurs if three conditions are met: a) priority, b)
consistency, and c) exclusivity
the ‘apparent mental causation’ model: “unconscious mental processes give rise to conscious thought about the
action (e.g., intention, belief), and other unconscious mental processes give
rise to the voluntary action. There may or may not be links between these
underlying systems (as designated by the bidirectional unconscious
potential path), but this is irrelevant to the perception of the apparent path
from conscious thought to action” (p. 67)
confabulation
Nisbett en Wilson (1977)
• subjects had to choose from four identical pair of pantyhoses
• “Why did you choose this pair?” Subjects referred to certain
characteristics of the pantyhoses, but no one mentioned the relative
position
• conclusion: people don’t know the real cause of their actions
choice blindness
Johansson, Hall, Sikström en Olsson (2006)
• male subjects had to choose between two photos of different women
(blond and brunette)
• subsequently they were given the other photo. “Why do you find this
woman the most attractive?”
• only 13% of the subjects knew something was wrong, the others started
to explain their preference. They were just as confident and fast as the
others…
Descartes
• the ‘vertical’ problem:
the relation between mind and body
