Lecture 6 Topic 6 Flashcards
what do firms want to maximise?
profits
what choices do firm owners make to maximise profits?
how much to produce
at what price to sell
how much to pay employees
what impacts do firm owners choices have?
macro and micro impacts
macro = indirect
micro = direct
what is the structure of the lower discipline model?
- employer (principal) is the first mover and announces wage w
- worker responds to w by selecting a level of effort e
- the principal then chooses total hours h to give to employee
- termination probability with probability t(e), contract renewed with probability 1-t(e)
- if terminated, employee receives fallback (0) & the game ends
- if not terminated, the game is repeated
does the no shirking game connect micro and macroeconomics?
yes
because macroeconomy affects the fallback option of workers
workers’ fallback option depends on the level of employment in the economy and the unemployment benefit
how does the no shirking game work?
employer (first mover) sets a no-shirking level of effort and announces the contract will be terminated if underperformance is detected
workers’ willingness to work is B+u(e) (line underneath u)
this is the minimal price the employer could offer the worker if contract is incomplete
the least the employer could pay, leading to the worker being no worse off is…?
w > B + u(e)
wage is larger in expected payoff than employment benefit + low effort
line underneath u
why can’t effort be purchased under a complete contract?
because workers may be able to exert minimal effort and still get paid, so employers must incentivise workers by providing a high enough wage w to get desired effort e
what is the minimal wage to incentive workers called?
no shirking wage
what are the steps of the no shirking game?
- employer announces no shirking level of effort and termination probability t
- the worker decides to povide e (no shirking level of effort) or e=0 (doesn’t work)
- if the worker provides e (doesn’t shirk), they’ll receive w, wont be terminated and experience disutility u(e)
- if the worker provides e<e (shirks), they may be detected and terminated (t) or undetected and paid w (1-t)
- if terminated, they’ll find another job with probability 1-j or remain jobless with probability j
- if they remain jobless, they’ll receive B (unemployment benefit)
- if they get a new job, they’ll get w-u (same as if they didn’t shirk)
what does the employer need to consider to find the no shirking wage?
- the workers payoff if they don’t shirk: wage - disutility of effort w-u
- the workers payoff if they do shirk: depends on the probability they get fired (t), if fired, the probability they remain jobless and their unemployment benefit if they remain jobless
to motivate workers to have desired level of effort employers must…
offer wage with higher expected payoff than if they shirked
e=e > e=0
no shirking level of effort payoff > shirking level of effort payoff
ICC = ?
w-u > (1-t)w + t(1-j)(w-u) + tjB
- w-u = payoff for not shirking
- 1-t(w) = not terminated
- t(1-j)(w-u) = terminated, immediately finds another job
- tjB = terminated, remains jobless with unemployment benefit
national accounts = ?
system used to measure overall output and expenditure in a country
what are the 3 equivalent ways to measure GDP?
- total spending on domestic products
- total domestic production
- total domestic income