Chapter 1 Reading Notes Flashcards

1
Q

define nash equilibrium

A

mutual best response

a mutual strategy for both players that is satisfactory

a law that no one would want to break even in the absence of law or an external police force

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2
Q

define tragedy of the commons

A

a coordination problem in which self-interested individuals act independently and deplete a resource, lowering payoffs for all

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3
Q

who came up with ‘tragedy of the commons’ and when was this?

A

Garret Hardin in 1968

he called this a rebuttal to ‘the invisible hand’

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4
Q

what is ‘the invisible hand’?

A

competitive exchange of good to coordinate the actions of people resulting in people being guided subconsciously via incentives

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5
Q

what are examples of coordination problems?

A

‘how do we sustain the global environment?’

‘how do we move around the city without overcrowding the streets and causing congestion?’

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6
Q

how could coordination problems be solved?

A

through people internalising their actions and its externalities

through changing institutions

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7
Q

define ‘external effects’

A

occurs when someone’s independent action results in suboptimal payoffs for others

externalities

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8
Q

define institutions

A

laws, rules & conventions which regulate how others interact with one another

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9
Q

what are examples of institutions?

A

laws enforced
mutual expectations
social pressures

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10
Q

does game theory focus on strategic interactions?

A

yes

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11
Q

define strategic interactions

A

when participants’ outcomes depend on each others’ actions

mutual dependence, recognised

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12
Q

what is a ‘set’?

A

a collection of things

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13
Q

what are the components of a game

A

players
strategy sets
strategy profiles
order of play
information
payoffs

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14
Q

define players in a game

A

individuals or organisations represented as a single actor choosing a course of action

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15
Q

define strategy sets

A

a list of every possible course of action for each individual

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16
Q

define strategy profile

A

the course of action and its outcome for an individual is their strategy profile

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17
Q

define order of play

A

a game can be simultaneous or sequential

a player may or may not know what their opponent has done

18
Q

define information in a game

A

a game specifies who knows what, when they know it, do others know what they know etc.

19
Q

define payoffs in a game

A

numbers are assigned to each possible outcome for each player

a player chooses a course of action with the highest number

20
Q

define cooperative game

A

a strategic interaction in which the players’ choice of strategy is subject to a binding agreement

21
Q

define solution concept

A

a rule for predicting the outcome of a game

how a game will be played

22
Q

define dominant strategy

A

a strategy is dominant if it yields the highest payoff for a player regardless of others’ actions

23
Q

define dominant strategy equilibrium

A

a strategy profile in which all players play a dominant strategy

24
Q

define equilibrium

A

a situation that is stationary in the absence of external change

a predicted outcome

25
Q

define best response

A

a strategy is a player’s best response to the strategies adopted
by others if no other strategy available would result in higher payoffs

26
Q

pareto efficiency = ?

A

when an economy has its resources and goods allocated to the maximum level of efficiency

no changes can be made without making someone worse off

27
Q

pareto inefficiency = ?

A

an outcome that leaves at least one person better off without making anyone worse off

28
Q

pareto superior = ?

A

when at least one player is better off without anyone being worse off

29
Q

prisoner’s dilemma = ?

A

an interaction that in which there is a unique nash equilibrium, but there’s another outcome that gives a higher payoff to both players

therefore the nash equilibrium isn’t pareto efficient

30
Q

rational agent = ?

A

someone who will choose their best option

31
Q

economic rent = ?

A

the difference between the payoff they’d get if they cooperated and the next best alternative

32
Q

fallback position = ?

A

the payoff a player receives in their next best alternative

(if they don’t cooperate)

33
Q

assymetric information = ?

A

when one person knows information but the other person doesn’t

34
Q

verifiable information = ?

A

information that can be used to enforce a legal contract or other agreement

credible information

35
Q

invisible hand game = ?

A

invisible hand game has a single nash equilibrium that is pareto efficient

36
Q

strategic complementarity = ?

A

when the payoff to playing a particular strategy increases as more people adopt/copy that strategy

incentive to get more people on board

37
Q

assurance game = ?

A

pareto inefficient interaction

a two-player symmetric, strategic interaction with 2 strict nash equilibria, one of which is pareto superior to the other

38
Q

disagreement game = ?

A

a game in which there are two or more pareto-efficient nash equilibria that are ranked differently by the players

this results in two players preferring two different equilibria

39
Q

path dependence = ?

A

a process is path dependent if the most likely state of something depends on its state in recent periods

40
Q

poverty trap = ?

A

when identical people may experience either an adequate living standard or poverty depending on circumstances, not their attributes

41
Q

group inequality = ?

A

economic differences between sets of people distinguished by a common attribute (e.g., gender, age, race)