Lecture 6 Flashcards
CVD Scenario 1
- Country A subsidizes exports to Country B, causing material injury to domestic producers of product in country B
CVD Scenario 2
Country A subsidizes exports to Country C, squeezes out exports from Country B to Country C’s market
CVD Scenario 3
Country A subsidizes domestic production of products for its own market, having the effect of squeezing out imports from country B into country A’s market
What are the conditions stated in Article VI of Gatt?
- members can impose cvds in domestic markets but not in excess of estimated bounty
- cvd cannot be imposed unless there has been a determination that the effect of the subsidization will cause injury to a domestic product.
What does article XVI of gatt deal with?
export subsidies, subsidies result in the sale of such a product at a price lower than the comparable price for the like product in the domestic market.
What is the process identified in Article XVI GATT
if any contracting parties must notify other contracting parties of the nature/extent of the subsidization and of its likely effects on imports/exports
Subsidies on primary products
should not be applied in a manner which results in the subsidizing party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.
Consultation provisions of Article XVI
ineffectual, additional provisions on export subsidies were not adopted by many member countries, mainly developing countries.
Tokyo Round
- plurilateral negotiations that ended late 1970s, established a more detailed subsidies code that attempted to set out basic disciplines for two tracks of complaints
What were the two tracks of complaints addressed in the Tokyo Round?
- unilateral imposition of cvds by members pursuant to domestic countervailing laws
- subsidies falling into three of the scenarios described could constitute a formal complaint under the dispute settlement provisions of GATT
Uruguay Round
- part of the single undertaking that all members of WTO were required to commit themselves to (multilateral agreement, in contrast to the plurality of the Tokyo Round code)
How are the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds similar?
they both preserve two tracks for objection to other countries’ subsidies policies:
- The unilateral imposition of countervailing duties on subsidized imports
- filing of a formal complaint with the WTO dispute settlement body, with the possibility of retaliatory sanctions
- SCM essentially adopted a red light, yellow light, green light approach.
Article 3 SCM prohibits two classes of subsidies
- subsidies contingent, in law or fact, on export performance
- subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods (red light category)
Article 8 SCM declared certain subsidies non actionable
- subsidies for research development, certain types of assistance for disadvantaged regions, subsidies for compliance with environmental regulations (green light category)
What are the yellow light class of subsidies?
Deemed to be actionable under Part III of the SCM Agreement