Lecture 14 The Reagan Reversal, Neo-conservatism, and the End of the Cold War Flashcards
Basic Assumptions of the neoconservative turn
♣ Strategic superiority Matters
♣ USSR still dangerous and expansionist
♣ Détente = new appeasement
♣ International Institutions and Allies (i.e.: Europe) cannot be trusted: unilateralism
♣ Moral and strategic imperative of defending Israel
What qualified the nationalism/exceptionalism of the neocons?
♣ Vs. strategic interdependence/détente
♣ Vs. moral equivalence/realism
♣ Vs. multilateral internationalism: UN, allies
What were the main elements of Reagan’s “New Cold War”?
♣ Ideological confrontation, bombastic rhetoric eg. USSR as «Evil Empire», 1983
♣ New Arms Race: Increase Defense budget eg. SDI
♣ Supply-side, trickle down policies (Reaganomics)
What were the main elements of Reagan’s Cold War ideological offensive?
♣ Optimism (vs. pessimism of predecessors)
♣ Rejection idea of US decline
♣ Exceptionalist Nationalism
♣ Communism = Totalitarianism (and different from authoritarianism)
Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships & Double Standards”, 1979
fact that traditional authoritarian gov are less oppressive than revolutionary autocracies and that they are more compatible with US interests –> staple of early CW discourse (something Kissinger would never have said)
Why was a high defense budget so central in Reagan’s new approach?
♣ Superiority matters, symbolically and strategically
♣ SDI & moral rejection of strategic interdependence
♣ Sales of arms to friendly regimes
What were the main elements of Reagan’s diplomacy?
♣ Special relationship with Margaret Thatcher
♣ Very pragmatic policy in the Middle East (alliance with Saudi Arabia vs. neocons)
♣ Reagan Doctrine: «roll back» in the global South (support to anti-communist regimes and groups)
What were the main contradictions of Reagan’s foreign policy?
♣ Fiscal irresponsibility
♣ Geopolitical limitations and necessities (neocon critique)
♣ Simplistic and binary: Iran contra
♣ Genuine horror re “nuclear peace”
Iran-contra scandal
1985-87
- Secret illegal deal
- Arms to Iran, help with hostages, covered funds for contras
- Sum of illegalities
- Morality?
Why did 1983-84 represent a crucial turning point?
- Risk of accidental war/rejection of nuclear terror
- Fear of US decline
- Changes in the SU
Main results of the second detente
♣ Summits: 1985 1986 (Geneva Reykjavik): Psychological importance
♣ 12.1987: INF Treaty (elimination intermediate range missiles)
♣ Drastic reductions of size of Soviet army + first withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe
♣ USSR Withdrawal from Afghanistan (ended in 2.1989)
The End of the Cold War: Winners?
- US: triumphalist/Reaganesque vision
BUT USSR unable to keep up with US – in-built failure of economic system that was unable to keep up with the pace of technological innovation R’s build-up was inconsequential - EU: European model as a magnet (euro-exceptionalism)
engaging the East, esp Poland & Czechoslovakia - Germany and Japan: economy
model built on high levels of consumption but also welfare, social security a different model to the US which ended up being seductive in Eastern European public opinion - No winners: human costs, financial costs, risks & proxy wars
Why in the second half of the 1980s there was a second, and somehow final, détente?
♣ Bipolar
♣ Centrality of nuclear weapons
♣ Importance of leaders
Doug Rossinow, The Reagan Age. A History of the 1980s, 2015, ch.12 and ch.14
On the one hand there are US engagements in conflicts that involved the SU. On the other, there are US engagements in the countries where right-wing dictators were overthrown. When speaking about US policy towards the Third World there is no simple explanation for the actions and a lot of contradictions - divide and rule (Nicaragua & El Salvador)
Why didn’t the SU respond to Regan’s aggressiveness like it did to previous presidents?
For 40 years there have not been any actual wars between the two powers. Only proxy wars happened. People started to feel that the rhetoric of a Cold War is empty. It was a lot easier in the 80’s to move to this let it go attitude. (Rossinow)
Reykjavik Summit
11–12 October 1986 Both leaders (Regan and Gorbachev) didn’t think that the weapons were the problem, rather it was TRUST. If they could trust each other they would move to the armaments question and then build trust – a virtuous circle.
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
1987 The treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges, defined as between 500–5,500 km (300–3,400 miles). The treaty did not cover sea launched missiles.
Beth Fischer, US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush in Melvin Leffler e Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. III: Endings, 2010
She argues that Regan thought about detente even before Gorbachev coming to power?
Regan recognized that Gorbachev presented him with an opportunity that he should take. Fisher makes a point that other leaders might not have realized that opportunity. Regan could have continued the tough talk etc.
Regan Doctrine
♠In January 1977 - “My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic,” he said. “It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?
♠ he Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided overt and covert aid to anti-communist guerrillas and resistance movements in an effort to “roll back” Soviet-backed communist governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The doctrine was designed to diminish Soviet influence in these regions as part of the administration’s overall Cold War strategy.
♠ One perceived benefit of the Reagan Doctrine was the relatively low cost of supporting guerrilla forces compared to the Soviet Union’s expenses in propping up client states. Another benefit was the lack of direct involvement of American troops, which allowed the United States to confront Soviet allies without sustaining casualties.
