LABORATORY BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY Flashcards
-Contain Principles, Technologies and practices
implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to
patogens and toxins, or their unintentional release
LABORATORY BIOSAFETY
“PROTECT THE WORKER FROM THE BAD BUGS.”
LABORATORY BIOSAFETY
-PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
VALUABLE BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS WITHIN
LABORATORIES IN ORDER TO PREVENT
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, LOSS, THEFT, MISUSE,
DIVERSION O INTENTIONAL RELEASE
LABORATORY BIOSECURITY
“PROTECT THE BUGS FROM BAD WORKERS”.
LABORATORY BIOSECURITY
INFECTIONS (SYMPTOMATIC /
ASYMPTOMATIC)
LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS (LAI)
▪ ACQUIRED THROUGH LABORATORY RELATED ACTIVITIES AS A RESULT OF WORKING WITH
INFECTIOUS AGENTS
LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS (LAI)▪
Cause of laboratory exposure
20% → EQUIPMENT FAILURE
80% → HUMAN FACTORS
TOP ACCIDENTS RESULTING IN INFECTION
Needle stick injury
- Biohazard spillage
CONSUMPTION OF A SUBSTANCE BY AN ORGANISM
INGESTION
ACT OF INTRODUCTION OF A SUBSTANCE INTO THE BODY
INOCULATION
PRESENCE OF A MINOR AND UNWANTED
SUBSTANCE OR IMPURITY IN THE SKIN OR MUCOUS MEMBRANE
CONTAMINATION
ACT OF DRAWING AIR OR OTHER SUBSTANCES INTO THE LUNGS
inhalation
where laboratory biosafety and biosecurity traces its history
in North America and Western Europe.
when origins of biosafety is rooted in the US
biological weapons program
1943
who origins of biosafety is rooted in the US
biological weapons program
then US President Franklin Roosevelt
and was active during the Cold Baldwin
who terminated the US
biological weapons program
US President Richard Nixon
when is the US
biological weapons program terminated
1969
the first scientific
director of Camp Detrick (which eventually became
Fort Detrick)
Ira L. Baldwin
when did ira baldwin become the first scientific
director of Camp Detrick (which eventually became
Fort Detrick)
1943
ira baldwin task
establish biological weapons
program for defensive purposes to enable
Camp Detrick was
designated a permanent installation for biological
research and development.
After the Second World War,
inherent component of biological
weapons development
Biosafety -
- designed modifications for
biosafety at Camp Derrick.
Newell A. Johnson
developed Class III safety cabinets and
laminar flow hoods
Newell A. Johnson
- U.S. Biological Research Laboratories at Fort
Detrick (1944)
A.G. Wedum, MD (Arnold)
one of the pioneers in developing biosafety
measures after the Second World War
A.G. Wedum, MD (Arnold)
evaluated the risks of handling hazardous
biological agents and developed practices,
ventilated cabinets) equipment, and facility
safeguards for their control
A.G. Wedum, MD (Arnold)
Wedum and microbiologist Morton
Reitman, colleagues at Fort Detrick,
analyzed multiple epidemiological studies
of laboratory-based outbreaks.
1966
general principles for dealing with potential
biohazards
Asilomar Conference in 1975
was suggested that containment should be an
essential consideration in the experimental design
and that the effectiveness of the containment
should match the estimated risk.
Asilomar Conference in 1975
when is the use of mechanical pipettors to
prevent laboratory-acquired infections
1907&1908
when does the pharmaceutical company (Pennsylvania)
developed a ventilated cabinet to prevent infection
from mycobacterium tuberculosis
1909
WHO eradicate smallpox (College of
Physicians of Philadelphia 2014).
1967
designation of 4 levels of biosafety
mid-1970s-
CDC published the Classification of Etiological
Agents on the Basis of Hazard
1976-
(introduced the concept of establishing ascending
levels of containment associated with risks in
handling groups of infectious microorganisms that
present similar characteristics)
the Classification of Etiological
Agents on the Basis of Hazard
(explained in detail the microbiological practices,
equipment, and facility necessarily corresponding to
four ascending levels of physical containment)
First edition of
NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant
DNA Molecules.
Foundation for the introduction of a code for
biosafety practice
WHO’S laboratory safety manual (1983)
* NIH’s Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories (1984)
American Biological Safety Association (ABSA)
1984-
Directive on the protection of workers from
risks related
to exposure to biological agents at work (European
Commission)
1990-
CDC
( Center for disease control and prevention)
-provides oversight of public health and safety,
including the laboratory
CDC ( Center for disease control and prevention)
-Develops and enforces workplace standards to
protect employees’ safety and health.
Recommendations include guidelines addressing
blood-borne pathogens, chemical safety,
phlebotomies, latex gloves, ergonomics, and any
OSHA (occupation safety and health administration)
OSHA
(occupation safety and health administration)
THE PRINCIPLE OF HOLDING OR BE CAPABLE OF
HOLDING OR INCLUDING WITHIN A FIXED LIMIT OR
AREA
CONTAINMENT
PREVENTING THE RELEASE OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
▪ BIOCONTAINMENT:
(control hazard at source)
PRIMARY BARRIERS
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT
□ BSC
□ ANIMAL ENCLOSURES
□ SEALED CENTRIFUGE ROTORS
(structure surrounding
primary barrier)
SECONDARY BARRIERS
SECODARY CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT
HEPA FILTERS
▪ LIQUID EFFLUENT TREATMENT
▪ SEALED LABORATORY WALLS AND floor laminar flow wood
PRINCIPLES OF BIOSAFETY
▪ PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES
CONSIDERATIONS
▪ SAFETY EQUIPMENT
▪ FACILITY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
▪ INCREASING LEVELS OF PROTECTION
STANDARD MICROBIOLOGICAL PRACTICES
▪ MOST IMPORTANT CONCEPT / STRICT ADHERENCE
▪ AWARE OF POTENTIAL HAZARD
▪ TRAINED AND PROFICIENT IN TECHNIQUES
USED TO PROTECT FROM INFECTIOUS FLUIDS
□ DON’T WEAR LAB COATS OUTSIDE OF THE LAB OR
TAKE THEM HOME
□ CUFFED SLEEVES CAN PROTECT THE WRISTS AND
LOWER ARMS
▪ LAB COATS AND GOWNS
□ WEAR DISPOSABLE VINYL, SYNTHETIC OR N-DEX
NITRILE GLOVES WHEN WORKING WITH
BIOHAZARDOUS MATERIALS
□ AVOID LATEX GLOVES (MAY CAUSE ALLERGIES)
□ DO NOT REUSE GLOVES
□ DO NOT WEAR GLOVES OUTSIDE OF THE
LABORATORY
□ WASH HANDS AFTER REMOVING GLOVES
gloves
□ PROTECT MUCOUS MEMBRANES AND PREVENT
INGESTION WHENEVER THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR
SPLASH TO EYES/FACE
▪ EYE AND FACE PROTECTION
OPEN TOED SHOES, SANDALS AND OTHER
OPEN FOOTWEAR SHOULD BE PROHIBITED
□ SHORTS AND OTHER GARMENTS THAT
LEAVE SKIN UNPROTECTED ARE NOT
APPROPRIATE
▪ FOOT/SKIN PROTECTION
□ TWO TYPES: AIR SUPPLYING AND AIR PURIFYING
□ FULL FACE, HALF FACE, PAPR (POWERED AIR
PURIFYING RESPIRATOR)
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION
□ N95 RESPIRATORS
□ N100 RESPIRATORS
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION
BIOSAFETY CABINETS (BSC)
PROVIDE EFFECTIVE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
FOR WORK WITH INFECTIOUS MATERIAL OR TOXINS
WHEN THEY ARE PROPERLY MAINTAINED AND USED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH GOOD LABORATORY
TECHNIQUES
Remove toxic chemicals (ducting/ductless)
- NO HEPA filter = not for biohazard agents
FUME HOODS
Product protection (no personnel
protection)
- Not for biohazard agents or chemical fumes
LAMINAR FLOW CABINETS
CLASS I BSC: personnel and environment
protection
- CLASS II & III BSC: personnel, product and
environment protection
- HEPA filters (not for chemical vapors)
BIOSAFETY CABINETS
personnel and environment
protection
CLASS I BSC:
personnel, product and
environment protection
CLASS II & III BSC:
HEPA
High Efficiency Particulate Air
ULPA :
: Ultra Low Penetration Air
99.99% AT 0.3 MICRONS
HEPA:
99.999% AT 0.12 MICRONS
ULPA:
HEPA & ULPA FILTER CAPABILITIES
Removes a broad range of airborne contaminants:
- Fine dust
- Smoke
- Bacteria (500-0.3mm)
- Soot
Pollen
- Radioactive particles
- Impurity ion= can affect integrated circuit
speed
