L9 - Climate Change Governance Flashcards
You must be very well aware of the lasting significance of the 1992 UNFCCC
One of the roots of the Paris Agreement
“United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”
UNCED Rio (1992)
Stabilizing GHG concentrations = prevent human-induced climate change (art. 2)
Principles: Core: Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
(CBDR&RC à article 3.1 to the convention: (cf. Rio principles), 27 Rio Principles, number 7 introduces the idea of common but differentiated responsibilities
Focus on equity, support and cooperation
Scientific, technological, and financial support (still main discussions on that) from developed to developing nations
- art. 11 = introduces a financial mechanism to be defined by the COP
Bodies:
Conference of the Parties (COP)
Supreme body of the UNFCCC
Yearly COP’s (Conference of the Parties) since 1995
= Kyoto ’97, Paris ’15, all anchored through the UNFCCC
UNFCCC Secretariat (art. 8)
Facilitate the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies, compile reports, provide technical expertise, …
Initially located in Geneva, since 1995 in Bonn
2 subsidiary bodies:
Scientific and technological advice
Implementation
1997 Kyoto Protocol
Conceived at COP3 in Kyoto (1997)
First addition to the UNFCCC
“Chasing Montreal” (1987 to tackle Ozon problems)
Binding, top-down reduction targets (Average 5% GHG emissions reduction – only for Annex-I= developed nations)
Strict monitoring, facilitation and enforcement
The logic is as follows:
Reduction targets are negotiated on a per-country basis during the COP and once set, legally binding
Strict monitoring, facilitation and enforcement = specific Compliance Committee to oversee the parties
Target:
(Average 5% GHG emissions reduction – only for Annex-I= developed nations, (Annex II developing nations, also China)
Corp criticism: Big developing nations fell out of the agreement, e.g. China & Brazil
Flexibility:
Emissions trading
Joint Implementation
Annex-I countries can support and join projects in other Annex-I countries
Clean Development Mechanism
Developed countries can earn emission reduction credits from supporting projects in developing countries
Participation in it?
Signed in 1997 by 175 countries
Never ratified by the US
Bush retracts in 2001
Entry into force in 2005 (took 8 years to be ratified by 55 states, covering at least 55% of global emissions, climate governance in crisis)
Commitment period: 2005-2012
Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities?
Differentiation: Recognizes that states have varied historical contributions to environmental problems and differing levels of development and capabilities.
Responsibilities: Developed countries bear a greater share of responsibility for environmental degradation due to their historical industrial activities.
Capabilities: Differentiation is based on financial, technological, and institutional capacities of countries to tackle environmental challenges.
Established in international environmental law, particularly in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
UN Paris Climate Agreement
Around voluntary and collective action
Signed in December 2015 at COP21 in Paris
Entered into force November 4th 2016, after EU ratification on October 5th 2016 (30 day waiting period – 55 parties covering 55% of emissions)
Much faster than Kyoto
170 parties had already published their “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions”
Hybrid approach
Falkner: “a more realistic approach” = founded in the domestic realities of the participating countries, allowing them to set targets taking into account their own capabilities, strengths and weaknesses
Universal
Breaks through the Annex-I and non-Annex-I barrier, including developing countries as well as particularly vulnerable countries (e.g. Small-Island states)
Also takes significant steps to bridge the gap between non-state actors and the international climate change regime
E.g. by showcasing the climate commitments of cities, regions, businesses and investors through the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action portal (NAZCA).
Target:
Art. 2.1a: Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C
“so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”
net-zero Approach:
Hybrid, based on transparency and group pressure
3 accountability elements: Enhanced Transparency Framework (CO2 Emmissions reporting), Gobal stocktake (every 5 years, looking at the NDCs>new targets), Implementation and Compliance Committee
2 feedback mechanisms to influence climate action: Naming and shaming (pol. Pressure, domestic and internationally), Investment signal
Reflect on the differences between and the advantages/disadvantages of the Kyoto ‘top down’ (agreed upon emission reduction targets for Annex I-countries) and the Paris ‘bottom up’ (voluntary pledges for all) approach.
Trilemma: ambition, participation, enforcement
Top-down (Kyoto)
Annex I countries obligations to reduce, Annex II not
High participation ( a lot of countries interested in joining the agreements),high ambition( relatively strict enforcement mechanisms, wanted to chase montreal), ☹ low for enforcement
Bottom-up:
Voluntary contributions, no division between Annex I and Annex II, leaves it open, how to ratify
Robert Falkner (2016):
Paris accepts that most major emitters do not want legally binding reduction targets
Paris avoids the distributional conflict of divising the burden
In a bottom-up regime like the Paris Agreement, a lot of importance rests on credibility = that will mainly be strengthened by the international reviews and through peer pressure (domestically and internationally, high ambitious are allowed to hold a speech)
The review system can, however, result in both positive and negative reinforcement (upward when states up their ambition and pull others with them, negative when the implementation lags behind the pledges, damaging the credibility of the pledges)
Is the distinction between industrialised and developing countries under Paris gone as far as emission reductions are concerned?
Yes, Annex I/II turned into universal NDCs, it retains the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC): Developed nations “leadership”
Is the amount of pledges under the Paris agreement sufficient to stop dangerous climate change? If not, what are the mechanisms under the Paris agreement to do something about that? (=important!)
Pledges are insufficient to stay below 1.5/2C,
Mechanisms: Five year global stocktake, Naming and shaming (domestically and internationally), Investment signals, making the profit higher, and lowering the individual costs (m.o.: but what about poor countries which cannot do that ?)
Extra pledges (as in COPs)
Activate sources of Green Climate Fund (GCF)
Ambitions became higher, but questionable whether they are gonna be implemented
What about Biodiversity? Is lacking
Only 1 binding obligation: submitting pledges
Fairly easy to achieve – little regulation on what a pledge needs to look like, what it needs to contain, etc.
= high heterogeneity among NDC’s
In 2015 NDCs > 3degrees warming 2022> just below 2C its working
Emissions gap report 2024 → much more ambition needed to “keep 1.5 alive”
Importance of the ratcheting-up mechanism = pledges are happening, but what about the review?
Challenges according to the concept of climate justice
There is an unfair distribution inherent to all of these dimensions:
Mitigation
Unequal cause for the need for mitigation = historical emissions of industrialised countries
Adaptation
Pre-emptive action to adapt to changing climate is more necessary in many developing countries who are more at risk of climate change…These countries, who also disproportionally had less to do with causing climate change, have less resources to focus on adaptation efforts = need for international adaptation climate finance funds.
Loss and Damage
Many developing countries are already disproportionally feeling the effects of climate change (increased natural disasters, flooding, food shortages, …)
Historical Responsibility:
Developed nations are historically responsible for most emissions but often avoid bearing the full burden of mitigation and adaptation efforts.
Unequal Capacities and Vulnerabilities: Developing countries lack resources to tackle climate change and are more vulnerable, requiring financial and technological support.
Lack of Accountability: Absence of enforceable mechanisms to hold countries accountable for their climate pledges, disproportionately affecting the vulnerable.
Intersectionality and Social Inequalities:
Marginalized groups (e.g., women, Indigenous peoples, low-income communities) face disproportionate impacts and are often excluded from decision-making processes.
Climate Finance and Financial Inequality: Insufficient, inaccessible, or conditional financial support, with developed nations failing to meet climate finance pledges.
Adaptation vs. Mitigation: Tension between prioritizing emission reductions (mitigation) and immediate adaptation needs of vulnerable countries.
Global vs. Local Responsibility: Tension between global agreements and the responsibility of local actors, with local knowledge and solutions often overlooked.
Climate-Induced Migration: Lack of legal frameworks for protecting climate migrants and addressing the displacement caused by climate change impacts
What are the political challenges with regard to climate finance and solidarity between North and South? Where do we stand now with regard to climate finance?
Although some progress has been made in mobilizing finance, the gap between promises and reality remains significant, particularly in ensuring that funds are adequately allocated for both mitigation and adaptation. For a fair and just global climate governance system, the focus must be on ensuring greater financial flows, improving accountability, and prioritizing the needs of vulnerable nations in the global South.
On finance:
COP15 (2009) → $100b annually to help developing countries respond to climate change from 2020-2025 (not even sufficient to some calculations, including L&D)
OECD: 100b finally met in 2022
Goal expires in 2025 → need for a new target → COP29
Especially Loss & damage, mentioned in the Paris agreement and firstly stated in Sharm-El shaik COP27, first L&D fund in COP28
Lack of funding, Framing issues
Ambiguous definition = 2 ‘camps’
Developing states since the early 90’s: L&D is beyond adaptation = calls for liability and compensation
Developed/industrialised countries: L&D is just a part of adaptation
Controversial focus on distributive and corrective justice
COP 29 Azerbaijan:
Core issue: a new climate finance target
“NCQG” → New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
Agreement reached → 300 bn annually by 2035 (voluntarily)
Tripling of current goal, but lower than developing countries asked for
1.3 tn. Of climate finance from “all actors” → not just developed countries
1.3 trillion from “all actors”
300 billion per year by 2035 (why not earlier?)
“from a wide variety of sources” → US fear of legal obligation → would necessitate approval from congress
→ target will be reviewed at COP30
What is the discussion on “loss and damage” about?
Loss and damage = Compensating for climate damage
Distributive or corrective justice through liability and compensation for climate change impacts
Paris has elevated the position of L&D, making it implicitly recognized as a third pillar of the global climate regime, but still not a priority
Lack of funding
Framing issues
Ambiguous definition = 2 ‘camps’
Developing states since the early 90’s: L&D is beyond adaptation = calls for liability and compensation
Developed/industrialised countries: L&D is just a part of adaptation
Controversial focus on distributive and corrective justice
(others: Mitigation & adaptation)
Loss & damage fund first time at COP27 World Bank hosts it, GS was not fan to not make it become another part of development aid
Discuss the catalytic cooperation model.
catalytic model takes into account the change of benefit of individual action over time (e.g. after a while you can invest into renewables and benefit against the cost of contribution)
The classical view of collective action overlooks 3 concepts that are prevailing in climate action/mitigation:
Joint products:
‘private’/domestic action (a) can lead to domestic benefits unrelated to climate change (climate action in these cases provides a public good with additional private benefits for the contributor)
Preference heterogeneity: not all actors prioritise the same type of action. Some will value climate action higher than others.
Increasing returns: actors’ preferences can change over time
Climate action can affect the material costs of future action (technology going down a learning curve, benefitting from network/scale effects)
Early action can affect political preference formation – industries/interest groups can shift, impacting political choices
Prior action can generate learning effects → leader-follower effects
Growing actions may change norms around mitigation → think about the net-zero boom
Discussion:
Catalytic viewpoint: cooperation is no longer wholly dependent on all actors merging their costs and benefits: unilateral action can happen if an actor finds action important (heterogenous preferences) or if their private benefits outweigh the costs (joint products)
Increasing returns make it so the value derived from collective action isn’t just dependent on the action, the factor of impact related to the action can change as well.
This makes it so, over time, cooperation curves can tip and tilt up, reaching tipping points where action becomes preferable and self-reinforcing.
Early movers/leaders create benefits for followers, eventually making action prefereable to inaction.
Paris Agreement: Catalytic institution keeping the ball rolling
Number of actors
Classical model: higher participation → difficult cooperation
Catalytic cooperation: higher participation can kick-start the catalytic cooperation process (what can we do together)
Paris as catalytic model (flexibility, you can be more ambitious if you want to, iterating commitments, stimulating increasing returns)
Criticism: Incantatory governance: Ambitions become just greenwashing if not implemented
