L7: Efficiency of punishment and Third party punishment games: part 2

Question 1

Explain how the SP vs TP Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) game is set up? (PD)

Answer 1

Prisoners Dilemma, 2 players, 2 stages:
1st stage) normal PD (see before)
2nd stage) 20 point endowment given to each player for punishing:
SP: punish player in own game
TP: can only punish player in a different game

Question 2

Method for eliciting decision in SP vs TP Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)? (PD)

Answer 2

Strategy method again

Question 3

Main findings of SP vs TP Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) PD? (3)

Answer 3

1) 2nd and 3rd parties strongly punished defectors, co-operators didn’t get punished much at all
2) SP always stronger than TP punishment
3) Defectors punished more often than co-operators

Question 4

Main conclusions (2) of BOTH PD and DG Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)’s comparing of TP and SP? and what can we infer from these conclusions?

Answer 4

1) Large % of subjects willing to enforce distribution and co-operation norms, despite costs and despite not being harmed directly by the norm violation (TP)
2) SP punishment stronger than TP punishment

Therefore Altruistic third party punishment is likely to be a POWERFUL ENFORCER OF SOCIAL NORMS