L6: Capital Budgeting - Project Selection & Financial Frictions Flashcards

1
Q

What does Huddart, S., & Lang, M. (2003) suggest about information aggregation (stock options)?

A
  • Examine the information content of employee stock option exercise using detailed employee-level data (rank-and-file workers) for 7 large companies.
  • The aggregation of all employees’ stock option exercise contains as much information about the firm’s stock returns over the next six months as the stock option exercise of executives.
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2
Q

What is an information cascade?

A

Banerjee, A. V. (1992):

An information cascade occurs when external information overrides one’s own information, regardless of the relative correctness of the former.

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3
Q

What does Da, Z., & Huang, X. (2019) suggest about evidence on information cascades?

A

Estimize: open financial estimates platform designed to collect forward looking financial estimates from independent, buy-side, and sell-side analysts, along with those of private investors and academics.

In collaboration with academics, Estimize ran a series of experiments that restricted information available to randomly selected stocks/users.

  • “independent” forecasts resulted in less accurate individual predictions
  • “independent” forecasts resulted in a more accurate consensus
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4
Q

What does Dye, Ronald A. (1985) suggest about disclosure of nonproprietary information?

A
  • If credible disclosure of private information were costless, then information asymmetry vanishes.
  • Best “type” would disclose, then second-best “type” would disclose, and so on.

Famous result. If informed people can credibly convey their private information without cost, then there is no information asymmetry problem.
–> Since they worry about info asymmetry: conveying private info is costly and/or difficult

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5
Q

What does Darrough, M. N., & Stoughton, N. M. (1990) suggest about financial disclosure?

A
  • Additional information may not be valuable
  • Revealing positive information results in better financing terms
  • Revealing positive information may encourage competitors to enter your market

Not disclosing allows you to innovate more. You can learn from those who disclose and improve (freeride). It is a tradeoff between tipping off competitors and getting better financing terms (less information asymmetry).

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6
Q

What does Philip G. Berger, Jung Ho Choi, and Sorabh Tomar suggest about cost disclosures?

A
  • Exploit a 2004 rule in South Korea that allowed firms to not disclose the Cost of Sales Schedule (CSS).
  • Companies that stopped disclosing the CSS innovated more and recorded productivity gains of 6-7% relative to companies that continued to report.
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7
Q

What does Bae, B., Han, E., Choi, C., Noh, Y., Shin, J., & Li, L. (2013) suggest about the effect of voluntary cost disclosure on cost of debt?

A

Firms that disclose the schedule of manufacturing costs have lower cost of capital.

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8
Q

What does Oh, H., Park, S., & Jeon, H. (2017) suggest about voluntary cost disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecasts?

A

Firms that disclose have more precise analyst estimates.

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9
Q

What is the wisdom of the crowd?

A
  • Information that analysts receive are conditionally independent
  • Putting together all analysts’ diverse signals generates a more precise signal.
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10
Q

What lessons can we learn from the analyst game example?

A

The decision based on many pieces of less-precise information may be better than a decision based on one piece of more-precise information (wisdom of the crowd).

Moral hazard problems may prevent individual forecasters in a big group from diligently collecting information.
- But incentivizing the accuracy of individual forecasts may cause the aggregate forecast to be less accurate.

Managing forecasts requires an understanding of this trade-off.

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11
Q

In what way is risk management linked to information asymmetry?

A
  • Risk management inherently involves the collection of information.
  • Collection of information focused on those parameters that are most payoff relevant.
  • The collected information makes management better informed than potential investors (equity market, banks, etc).
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