L1 : Informal Acquisition 2 / Proprietary Estoppel

Question 1

Gillett v Holt (2001) (CA) (MP)

Answer 1

Main point:
* promise need not be irrevocable  what makes it irrevocable = other party’s detrimental reliance on it
* detriment doesn’t have to consist of expenditure of money or quantifiable financial detriment, “so long as it is something substantial”

Question 2

Gillett v Holt (2001) (CA) (summary)

Answer 2

Summary : C spent working life as farm mg for friend D1 = landowner w/ substantial means, D made repeated promises and assurances that C would inherit farming business + farmhouse in which C lived with family – relº broke down, C dismissed and D altered his will

CA held in favour of C: D estopped from going back on promise altogether, should convey promised house to C and pay money in compensation for exclusion from farming business

Question 3

Gillett v Holt (2001) (CA) (Robert Walker LJ) (3)

Answer 3

• “the doctrine of proprietary estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four watertight compartments”
• “where assurances given are intended to be relied on, and re in fact relied on, it is not necessary to look for an irrevocable promise”
  => the other party’s detrimental reliance on the promise is what makes it irrevocable (as in unconscionable to go back on)
• detriment is not ‘a narrow or technical concept’ => ‘need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial’ and causally related to the assurances relied on

Question 4

Thorner v Major (2009) (HL) (MP)

Answer 4

Main points: on representation requirement
* ± obj standard: reasonable person w/ C’s knowledge of D would’ve understood D’s conduct as a rep C was to get an interest in the property
* representation must be ‘clear enough’ and intended to be taken seriously

Question 5

Thorner v Major (2009) (HL) (Summary)

Answer 5

Summary: David (D) worked for 30y on cousin Peter (P)’s land – P = man of few words so never any direct discussion but gave D impression he intended him to inherit the farm + gave D doc abt his life insurance saying ‘that’s for death duties’ – P did make a will in which he left D the farm, but revoked it to change smth else, when he died P claimed the farm based on estoppel

HL held in favour of David :
* representation must be “clear enough” (Lord Walker) – clarity of representation depends on context (less clarity of lgg required in domestic than commercial setting)
* here, P’s assurances, objectively assessed, were intended to be taken seriously and relied upon
* not a pb that extent of farm lb to fluctuate a bit (what D gets = farm at time of death)

Question 6

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management (2008) (HL) (MP)

Answer 6

Main point: mere unconscionable behaviour not enough for a claim in PPE – commercial party willingly taking a risk, knowing that ag was not yet binding ≠ detrimentally relying on a repº

Question 7

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management (2008) (HL) (Summary)

Answer 7

Summary: C & D (commercial partied) orally ag that D would sell C land if C obtained planning permission, when C did so D sought to withdraw from ag and propose a new one with terms much less advantageous for C, C claimed that D estopped from doing that

HL held in favour of D : PPE cannot be founded merely on unconscionable behaviour
=> need for the other requirements to be made out, and commercial party willingly taking a risk, knowing that ag was not yet binding ≠ detrimentally relying on a repº

+ insistence that court should be slow to introduce uncertainty in commercial transactions by introducing equitable concepts (Lord Walker)

Question 8

Davies v Davies (2016) (CA)

Question 9

Wayling v Jones (1993) (CA) (summary)

Answer 9

Summary: C (21) cohabited w/ D (56) for 16y, acting as ‘companion and chauffeur’ + helping run business, in return got ‘pocket money’ + living & clothing expenses + promise he would inherit D’s business – D made a will leaving business to C, but then sold hotel and brought another w/ the proceeds, told C he would alter the will but failed to do so before his death

CA held in favour of C: was entitled to 2nd hotel bcs had detrimentally relied on promises made by D

Question 10

Wayling v Jones (1993) (CA) (Balcombe LJ)

Answer 10

Balcombe LJ:
* The promises relied upon do not have to be the sole inducement for the conduct: it is sufficient if they are an inducement
* Once C has shown there was a representation, burden on D to establish C did not rely on it

Question 11

Jennings v Rice (2003) (CA) (MP)

Answer 11

Main point: there must be proportionality btw expectation and detriment if remedy awarded is to be C’s expectation

=> default remedy = court gives C what he expected (compel performance of the promise) – BUT if C’s expectation “out of all proportion” to the detriment C suffered in reliance, possible for court to satisfy the equity in a more limited way

Question 12

Jennings v Rice (2003) (CA) (Summary)

Answer 12

Summary: J working for R for >25y, at 1st doing gardening & shopping, but gradually R became more dependant on J, helped her wash & dress, stayed overnight – after a while R stopped paying J, telling him ‘this will all be yours one day’ – R died intestate

CA upheld judge’s award of value of full time nursing care for the relevant years – but didn’t allow J to get value of the house and furniture = what J claimed to be his expectation

Question 13

Guest v Guest (2022) (SC)

Answer 13

Main point: approach to ‘satisfying the equity’ in an estoppel claim : hold promisor to his promise unless disproportionate to do so (satisfy expectation rather than compensate for detriment) – if disproportionate (burden on D to show that) court’s chosen remedy must be such that if D were to decide to give that to C in exchange for repudiating the promise, it would not be unconscionable

Summary : C spent life wk (for low wages) on parent’s family farm, promised he would inherit – C fell out w/ his parents, they changed their will

SC (divided) held that C made out claim in PPE but receiving full inheritance early would be excessive
=> reduce amount payable accordingly, or alternatively use trust to allow parents to remain in property for life and give C the farm after their death

Question 14

Spencer v Spencer (2023) (HC)

Answer 14

Main point: C under PPE can get what he was promised, but not ‘unexpected windfall’

Question 15

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management (2008) (HL) (Lord Scott)

Answer 15

Lord Scott at [29] : rejected use of proprietary estoppel as a way of circumventing formality requirement of s2 LP(MP)A 1989

=> “The proposition that an owner of land can be estopped from asserting that an agreement is void for want of compliance with the requirements of section 2 is, in my opinion, unacceptable. The assertion is no more than the statute provides. Equity can surely not contradict the statute”

Question 16

Thorner v Major (2009) (Lord Neuberger)

Answer 16

Lord Neuberger at [99]: s2 LPMPA 1989 not a pb on for “straightforward estoppel claim without any contractual connection” – might be a bit more of a pb w/ claim to enforce an ag which is closer to a contract

Question 17

Farrar v Miller (2018) (CA) (Kitchin LJ)

Answer 17

Kitchin LJ at [57]-[58] :
s2 is only about contracts => other ags can be made enforceable using PPE

• s2 says that ag which doesn’t comply w/ formality not enforceable as a contract to dispose of interest in land – doesn’t say anything abt other causes of action
• exception in s2(5) doesn’t expressly include PPE, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s excluded either => “s2(1) is, on its wording, concerned only with contracts”

Question 18

Stack v Dowden (2007) (HL) (Lord Walker)

Answer 18

not v enthusiastic abt merging CICT and proprietary estoppel

=> bcs PPE involves asserting a ‘mere equity’ against conscience of ‘true’ owner = might sometimes be only monetary awards, not full value of share in property

vs CICT involves identifying ‘true beneficial owners’ and size of their shares

Question 19

Thorner v Major (2009) (Lord Scott)

Answer 19

Lord Scott would also prefer to keep PPE and CICT separate

=> confine PPE to cases where representation on which C has acted is unconditional, and use CICT* for cases where C has been acting on conditional repº as to future interests (eg inheritance cases)

*/!\ in judgement, calling it an RCT (not officially recognised in English law)

Question 20

Matchmove Ltd v Dowding (2017)

Answer 20

[26] LawCom’s reasons for formalities imposed by s2 LPMPA 1989: need for certainty, consumer protection, ‘channeling’ function (creating standard form of transaction), uniqueness of land…
BUT nevertheless explained that not intending to exclude application of equitable doctrines, esp PPE – although ppl not included in s2(5)

=> Arden LJ in Kinane v Mackie Conteh : idea that s2(5) exists to prevent a party from taking advantage of lack of formality when unconscionable for him to do so

eg where other party has relied on informal ag as if it were binding

no CT in Cobbe bcs claimant knew negº were subject to contract, and didn’t expect to obtain an interest other than by contract

Question 21

Hudson v Hathway (2022) (CA)

Answer 21

Main point = about detrimental reliance

[126] Equity won’t intervene without detrimental reliance bcs that is what makes it unconscionable for promisee to go back on his promise

[154] Robert Walker LJ in Gillett v Holt: detriment is not “a narrow or technical concept”
=> “The detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.”