L1 : Informal Acquisition 1 / Trusts of the Home Flashcards
Goodman v Gallant (1986) (CA)
Main point = an express declaration of trust is conclusive as to how parties’ BI are held, no claim of CICT can be brought to contradict it
Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991) (HL) (MP)
Main point: Lord Bridge drawing sharp distinction btw express and implied ag CICT cases + setting high hurdle for type of contribution required for implied ag (only direct contribº to purchase price)
Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991) (HL) (summary)
Summary : house registered in H’s sole name, W made no financial contribution to acquisition but v involved in practical aspects of renovating it, H moved out and failed to repay mortgage secured on the house, bank sought to evict W, W claimed she had BI under CICT
HL held in favour of the bank :
- CICT claim depended on establishing an agreement as to how BI is to be held (express or implied)
- Lord Bridge drew sharp distinction btw express and implied ag
Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991) (HL) (express vs implied ag)
Lord Briggs:
express ag evidenced by discussion btw parties, look at conduct to see if detrimental reliance
≠ implied ag evidenced by conduct, only direct contribº to acquisition is sufficient and wife’s work too trifling for that
Stack v Dowden (2007) (HL) (MP)
Main point: established presumption of joint tenancy (‘equity follows the law’) in joint names domestic cases (instead of presumption of RT) + factors relevant to intention for CICT include more than direct financial contribution
Stack v Dowden (2007) (HL) (summary)
Summary C and D (unmarried) brought house in joint names, D provided 65% purchase price, remainder provided by mortgage in joint names (D re-paid more of it) , C and D kept all of their finances strictly separate – when separated, C applied for order for sale & equal division of proceeds, D claimed entitled to 65%
HL held in favour of D: unusual case where D successfully rebuted presumption of joint tenancy bcs rigid separation of their finances
- domestic case where house held in joint names = presumption that equity follows the law = JT in equity so each gets half upon severance
- onus on D to show common intention that BI ≠ LI and in what way
/!\ heavy burden, only discharged in unusual cases BUT factors other than financial contribº to acqº are relevant, law has moved on from presumption of RT
Jones v Kernott (2012) (HL) (MP)
Main point : reaffirming Stack v Dowden approach to family home cases
=> starting point = presumption of JT
But possible to rebut that w/ evidence of ≠ common intention (deduced from words & conduct), also possible for common intention to change
Jones v Kernott (2012) (HL) (Summary)
Summary:
- C&D (unmarried couple) brought house in joint names, C provided 1/5 purchase price and rest raised by mortgage (in joint names),
- arrangement = D gave C money for household expenses while C paying for mortgage
- D moved out, C took full resp for house, D got himself another house
- accepted that house held in equal shares at time of sepº BUT C seeking declaration that intention had changed since then and she was entitled to whole BI
SC : held in favour of C, had successfully rebutted presumption of JT w/ evidence that their intention had changed (D moving out and getting another house)
Jones v Kernott (2012) (HL) (additional points) (2)
- where clear that don’t intend joint tenancy but not possible to ascertain what exactly they intended, each party entitled to ‘that share the court considers fair, having regard to the whole course of dealings between them in relation to the property’
- financial contribº are relevant but not the only factor taken into account to establish what was intended / is fair
Jones v Kernott (2012) (HL) (remarks on sole name cases)
o show that it was intended the other party get a BI at all
o establish what that interest is – no presumption of joint BI, common intention to be deduced objectively from conduct – if can’t be established, court decides what is fair w/ regard to whole course of dealing
Hudson v Hathaway (2022) (CA)
Main point = common intention not enough => detrimental reliance (and csq unconscionability) is what makes otherwise unenforceable agreement enforceable under CICT
– bcs otherwise, directly contradicting statutes imposing formality requirements for contracts or DOT to be enforcable (s2 LP(MP)A 1989 and s53(1) LPA 1825)
/!\ obiter bcs case could be decided on grounds that C effectively released BI in the property by email (enough for ‘signed writing’ under s53(1)(c) LPA 1925)
Stack v Dowden (2007) (HL) (RT Point)
unequal participation to purchase price no longer triggers presumption of resulting trust in the domestic context (≠ commercial context) => presumption of JT instead, to be rebutted by evidence of contrary intention and detrimental reliance in order to establish CICT (heavy burden)
Stack v Dowden (2007) (HL) (Lady Hale quotes on intention) (2)
[58] “in the domestic consumer context, a conveyance into joint names indicates both legal and beneficial joint tenancy, unless and until the contrary is proved”
[60] “The search is to ascertain the parties’ shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it.”
Jones v Kernott (2012) (SC) (RT point)
Confirmed that PRT no longer applies in domestic home cases, even where contribution in unequal shares – presumption of JT instead
=> “the search is primarily to ascertain the parties’ actual shared intentions, whether expressed or to be inferred from their conduct”
Lord Neuberger dissenting: supports resulting trust analysis, bcs what equity has always done + more practical
Marr v Collie (2018) (SC)
Main point (lwp): CICT can apply beyond the context of family homes to investment property bought jointly by a cohabiting couple
