Khrushchev Flashcards
Collective leadership 1953-55
-Five man collective leadership of Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov and Khrushchev, who took over the Party on Stalin’s death, pledged themselves to collective leadership, but there was a fierce power struggle going on behind the scenes. They decided quickly to cut the size of the Presidium down to ten.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Malenkov
- Obvious successor when Stalin dies, ranked second on the eve of Stalin’s death, succeeded Stalin as Prime Minister and Party Secretary. He remained Party Secretary for only a week. It is unclear whether this was his decision, but if a collective leadership was to be viable no one should stand out.
-However, Malenkov may well have believed that being Prime Minister was a more important role than that of Party Secretary. Lenin had been Prime Minister as had Stalin from 1941.
-Member of Politburo from 1941, so couldn’t be blamed for Great terror/ purge but did lead purge of Leningrad with Beria.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Beria
-Had initially replaced Yezhov as head of NKVD after Great Terror 1938, which became the MVD after war, yielding more power.
-He is hated and seen as evil due to power, terror and sex
-Purged Leningrad party and Mingrelian
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Molotov
-Stalin Loyalist - had been in the politburo since 1926, Molotov and Kuganovich only ones in Politburo before and after the Great Terror
-1952 19th Party Congress - Stalin talks about presidium, in a speech attacks Molotov as a problem. Seemed to have fallen out of favour with Stalin and had little chance of emerging as leader.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Khrushchev
-Originally a peasant, very poor, had trained as a metal worker in Brezhnev generation, so was a beneficiary of communist regime.
-When Stalin dies Khrushchev was the only member of the collective leadership who did not have a top government job, Moscow Party Secretary, although was powerful, so not seen as a main contender, but he was also the only person who was in the Secretariat and the Presidium. The Party was now his power base and he was determined to exploit it fully, as Stalin had done in the 1920s.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Beria early actions
Beria rushed from Stalin’s deathbed to ransack Stalin’s office and empty the safe in which he kept evidence of colleagues personal foibles (which Beria himself planned to use) and damning reports on the state’s excessive violence. Beria, ambitious, head of the secret police and personally odious, was feared and disliked by the other leaders. He was quick to grasp the initiative and appeared initially to overwhelm his competitors, adding to their fears. He put forward a reform programme. An amnesty brought the release of about 1 million prisoners, mainly criminals on shorter sentences, and he talked of dismantling the gulags. Beria knew better than anyone how uneconomic they were and how innocent most of the inmates were. He reversed the policies of Russification, in particular in west Ukraine and the Baltic states. He appeared ready to accept a unified, neutral non-communist Germany and imposed reforms on the East German leadership. But when there was a rising in East Berlin, Beria was blamed. This helped Khrushchev to gain support for his removal.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Khrushchev response to Beria
-Beria was hard to move against since he had control of the secret police and he had bugged the Kremlin and the telephones and homes of his rivals. Surprise and the support of the army were essential. Khrushchev took the lead at the Presidium meeting on 26 June; several members were carrying arms in case things got out of hand. Marshall Zhukov and an armed squad were in the next room. Khrushchev, Malenkov and others accused Beria of many crimes and at a given signal Zhukov rushed in and arrested him. Two weeks later his disgrace was endorsed by the Central Committee who, with Khrushchev as the dominant figure, blamed him for the worst excesses of Stalinism. Beria was denounced in Pravda, in the old Stalinist style, as an enemy of the people and an enemy agent. Implausibly he was accused of having been a British agent for 30 years. He was kept in custody for six months and after a secret trial, was executed along with six of his colleagues.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Malenkov reform
-Malenkov, as Prime Minister, was the leading reformist. His rivalry with Khrushchev produced the first open policy debates in the Soviet Union since the 1920s. The economy was a crucial battleground and Malenkov embarked upon a New Course in which the output of consumer goods was to expand even faster than that of heavy industry. He also announced that agricultural taxes would be halved, the prices paid for produce were to be raised and the size of private plots was to be increased - all measures popular with peasants.
However, the harvest in 1953 was poor and Malenkov got the blame. In foreign affairs Malenkov believed that now that the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons war would be disastrous for both communists and capitalists; therefore, peace could be achieved
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Khrushchev response to Malenkov
-Khrushchev counter-attacked. He resented Malenkov taking the initiative on agriculture, which he regarded as his area of expertise. Early in 1954 he launched his Virgin Lands campaign in Kazakhstan and Siberia, promising a quick end to the grain shortage. Khrushchev got the Party behind his campaign and its early success gave him momentum. He saw better than Malenkov the importance of the role of Party organisation. He became known as First Secretary in September. He asserted the clear supremacy of the Party bureaucracy over that of the secret police - the new Committee for State Security (KGB) - and the Council of Ministers.
-Khrushchev had strengthened his own position and weakened that of Malenkov. The military, who wanted to match US defence spending, said Malenkov was unbalancing the economy. The economy was indeed overstrained and Malenkov was not in a strong enough position politically to adjudicate between conflicting claimants on resources. Khrushchev had made allies with heavy industry, planners and the military men, and on this issue he could count on the support in the Presidium of the Stalinist hardliners Molotov and Kaganovich. As a result, Malenkov was forced to resign as Prime Minister in February 1955. Bulganin, who was not a threat, took over with Khrushchev’s support
Khrushchev tactical moves against Malenkov
Malenkov indsutry policy - Raise living standards. His New Course focused on consumer goods at the expense of the military - industrial complex and heavy industry. Khrushchev sided with heavy industry and planners who said Malenkov was unbalancing the economy. After Malenkov defeat favoured raising living standards.
Malenkov Agriculture- Halved taxes on agriculture.
Increased prices paid to collective farms. Increased size of private plots allowed.
More mechanisation and use of chemical fertilisers. Khrushchev attacks Malenkov proposals- as a retreat from the collective principle. Virgin lands campaign began in Kazakhstan and Siberia in 1954, an ideologically pure alternative.
Cold war- Malenkov argued that now the
USSR had the H-bomb a state of deterrence existed between East and West. Resources could be diverted from defence to consumer goods.
Soviet service chiefs
rejected Malenkov’s policies. Khrushchev backed their view to gain their support against Malenkov. Once Malenkov was defeated. Khrushchev adopted this policy.
Why did the ‘secret speech’ happen
-Following Stalin’s death there had been a process of silent de-Stalinisation.
-Reforms had been discussed and prisoners had been released but no public announcement or explanation had been made for this change of policy, such as Beria’s release of 1 million prisoners from Gulags
-Khrushchev wanted to speak openly about Stalin’s crimes
-In Dec 1955 Khrushchev set up a Commission to investigate Stalin’s activities particularly regarding Party officials
-The resulting 70 page report revealed that of almost 2 million arrested 1935-1940 almost 700,000 had been shot and that all alleged plots and conspiracies had been fabricated.
-Khrushchev insisted they reveal the truth but Molotov and Kaganovich strongly disagreed. They had both been members of the Politburo at the time (Molotov since 1926 and Kaganovich since 1930) and would no doubt be held somewhat accountable for Stalin’s crimes.
-De-Stalinisation would allow Khrushchev to undermine them by associating them with the excesses of the terror against the party
-It is also possible Khrushchev wanted to liberate the party from fear of repression so that they party would be more efficient or that he was driven by a moral belief that the truth and condemnation of the truth would save the party from a complete loss of self-belief. He perhaps wanted to restore faith in the Party. Arguably trying to restore faith in Communism which had become unpopular due to repression and lack of free speech/democracy, move away from this and the Stalin image.
Contents of the ‘Secret Speech’
-Distanced Stalin From Lenin - read out Lenin’s testament emphasising the part criticising Stalin and letters about Stalin’s rudeness to Krupskaya to demonstrate Lenin’s doubts about him.
-Depicted Stalin as an enemy of the Party - focused on Stalin’s attack on loyal Party members, notably the delegates to the 1934 Party Congress, projecting an aura of heroism about them and revealing shocking figures, for example, 98 out of the 134 members of the Central Committee had been arrested and shot. This undermined Kaganovich (joins 1930) and Molotov (1926).
-Accused Stalin of mismanaging the War- Held him responsible for the disasters of 1941 and denounced the mass deportations of the punished peoples during the war as contrary not only to Marxism-Leninism but also to common sense.
-Claimed Stalin abused his power - attacked Stalin for what now became a cardinal sin - the ‘cult of the personality - and the way in which Stalin was given unquestioning adulation. He cited how Stalin was guilty of sickening self-glorification while maintaining a front of modesty in his amendments to his 1948 Short Biography. Also criticised role of NKVD in the purges, especially the use of torture to extract confessions for which Stalin was personally responsible, giving instructions to beat, beat and, once again, beat’. And showed that grave abuse of power continued after the war with the purge of Leningrad party and the Doctors Plot (also when Malenkov in party)
What wasnt mentioned in secret speech
-No criticism of the correctness of Marxism-Leninism, the viability of the Soviet system of rule or its superiority to every other form of government. Khrushchev went out of his way to stress that Stalin’s grave abuse of power’ was an aberration.
-There was no criticism of Stalin before 1934 and it accepted that rapid industrialisation and enforced collectivisation were necessary.
-It ignores the sufferings of non-Party members before the war. There was nothing on the repression of the kulaks, ethnic eleansing of the border regions before the war or the notorious NKVD Order 00447 ordering mass executions of former kulaks and criminals.
This final omission was likely due to Khrushchevs involvement in this terror. He over-fulfilled his quota for Moscow and Moscow, arresting 41,500 (35,000 quota) and shooting 8,500 (5000 quota). Only 10 out of 146 Party Secretaries in the Moscow region survived.
When he was moved to the Ukraine in January 1938, Khrushchey was just as active. All members but one of the Ukrainian Party Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat were arrested. Khrushchev could not, or would not, prevent even his closest and most trusted associates from being arrested and shot, and made violent speeches in favour of the purges.
The obvious defence for Khrushchev in retrospect would have been that to oppose Stalin would have been to invite his own death. But Khrushchev was unwilling to invoke this defence. Taubman argues that Khrushchev remained to the very end ‘in denial’ about his own complicity. Guilty of deception and self-deception’, Khrushchev preferred to plead ignorance of what was happening.
The 22nd Party Congress, 1961
Even though Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ was widely discussed, it was not until 1961 that he managed to criticise Stalin the person; prompting a full wave of anti-Stalinism following the Twenty-Second Party Congress. By then, almost 9 million prisoners had been released from the Gulags and special work-camps from across the Soviet Union (the release had accelerated following ‘secret speech’. In 3 years preceding speech 7000 rehabilitated, in ten months after, 617,000 rehabilitated (complete reinstatement of job, apartment, pension, was very rate and less than half of party members granted), and it simply would not do to ignore the ordinary civilians who had suffered under the terror. Thus, it was here that Khrushchev finally acknowledged that the people of Russia, not just the party, had suffered under Stalin. New information about the purges was given and following congress:
* Stalin’s mummified body was removed from the Lenin Mausoleum and reburied in a simpler grave by the Kremlin wall.
* Places named after Stalin were renamed, for example, Stalingrad became Volgograd and Stalino became Donetsk.
* Monuments of Stalin were destroyed
* Khrushchev proposed that a memorial to Stalin’s victims be built in Moscow.
Donald Filtzer (1993) suggests that the renewed attack upon Stalin may have been used by Khrushchev to detract attention away from his own policies which by this time had become very unpopular.
Anti-Party Group
- In his secret speech, Khrushchev attacked Malenkov, Molotov and Kagonovich. Subsequently they form the anti-party group as want Khrushchev to step down as party secretary.
-After 20th party congress, anti-party congress formed. Justification is that they say his foreign and domestic policies are causing problems.
-But main issue is that hes spoken out against Stalin and Desalinisation, feel enough Stalin supporters in party to support.
-They agreed that destalinisation had de-stabilised the party, such as Hungarian uprising following secret speech, gave hope.
-Mau Zedong, communist leader in China looses respect for communist party in Russia due to Khurshchevs reformist approach, increasing freedom
-But main reason for anti-party is personal dislike to Khrushchev
How did Khrushchev deal with the Anti-Party group - Reasons for formation
The unrest in Poland and the Hungarian uprising were used by the hardliners to argue that Khrushchev’s secret speech’ had undermined the credibility. unity and strength of the international communist movement. Khrushchev was too liberal for them. But it was not just the hardliners who had been alienated The Presidium majority were angered by his abolition of the central economic ministries, which weakened their power. They were prepared to challenge Khrushchev whose style of leadership had become increasingly assertive. His unpredictable and ill considered initiatives across foreign and domestic policy were cited as the reason for the need to remove him.
How did Khrushchev deal with the Anti-Party group - Central Committee
In June 1957, Khrushchev was outvoted seven to four, but he appealed to the Central Committee who had elected him First Secretary, arguing only the Central Committee could remove him from his post. He also had the support of the head of the army, Zhukay, and the head of the KGB, and they made sure that members of the Central Commiuce were assembled quickly, flying in members from all over the USSR. Khrushchev had promoted many of them and he prevailed. He referred to his opponents as the Anti-Party group.
A Central Committee resolution expelling them denounced them for opposing Party policy on a whole range of issues over the previous three or four years, and Molotov was castigated for his long years as Stalins Foreign Minister.
They were condemned for factionalism. All this, and the carefully recorded unanimous verdict of the Central Committee, had echoes of the Stalin years Their fate did not. Kaganovich feared for his life and he telephoned Khrushchev This gave Khrishchey the chance to make clear the difference between his regime and Stalin.
Kagonovich and his colleagues were sent a very long way from Moscow and given humiliating jobs. Kaganovich was sent to manage a cement factory in the Erals. Molotov was made ambassador to Mongolia and Malenkov was sent to cok after a hydroelectric plant in Kazakhstan. The fact that Khrushchev had been in a minority in the Presidium was not made public and he did not take over as Prime Minister from Bulganin, who had been one of the Anti-Party group, until 1958
How did Khrushchev deal with the Anti-Party group - Changes to the Presidium
The Presidium was enlarged again to 15 members, bringing in Zhukov, Brezhnev and Kozlov, who had robustly defended their leader during the plenum. In this way, Khrushchev had shifted the balance of power so that those holding party posts now dominated the inner circle. The way in which Khrushchev dealt with his rivals reveals how much things had changed in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death, for under him they would almost certainly have been shot, and they knew it. Kaganovich is reported to have called the leader fearing for his life, but Khrushchev berated him for measuring others by his own vile intentions. None of
Khrushchev’s opponents were expelled from the party, but were simply moved out of Moscow. Bulganin was allowed to stay on as Prime Minister until the following year (1958) , when Khrushchev replaced him. Zhukov too, despite his display of loyalty and being vital support to Khrushchev in removal of Beria and defeat of the Anti-party group had proved too independent and assertive. As Minister of Defence, introducing military reform in 1957 without consulting the party to try and develop a purely professional army, he was seen as a threat to party control and was removed from Presidium and Central Committee (1957). Khrushchev’s rivals were demoted in a most humiliating way: Malenkov became the Minister for Electricity and Molotov was posted to Mongolia (moves far away) . After this, it was clear that all the glamorous posts the party could offer would be Khrushchev’s; however, his refusal to use coercion against his rivals meant that he needed legitimacy to maintain his status.
Khrushchev was determined to make the Party supreme and to strengthen his own position. The years 1957-60 were his best he had more freedom of action than ever before but he also became more authoritarian and arrogant.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform industry - Reorganisation
Khrushchev’s reorganisations had clear political motives, though it was hoped they would avoid waste by streamlining production and bring decision-making nearer the point of production to make planning more realistic and progressive.
The Stalinist command economy concentrated great power in the central governmental ministries and this was where his main Presidium opponents had their power bases. Khrushchev’s devolution of powers to the republics strengthened Party rather than ministry control and increased his power and influence.
* Between 1954 and 1955 about 11,000 enterprises were transferred from central to republican control.
* In 1956 factories run by twelve central governmental ministries were placed under the jurisdiction of republican governments.
Khrushchev also extended his policy of decentralisation into industry by abolishing Moscow-based ministries and replacing them with sovnarkhozy (not to be confused with sovkhozes). A sovnarkhoze was largely independent of central control and was free to regulate industrial activity within an area. Each sovnarkhoze covered an area of one of the administrative divisions of the country. The local sovnarkhoze were, in part, politically controlled since they were intended to allow local Party leaders to have a greater say in the running of Soviet industry (increased interference resented by local managers) . In May 1957, 105 regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) were established to take the place of the central economic ministries. This was one of the factors which stirred up Khrushchev’s Presidium opponents into challenging him.
It also meant that regional councils controlled factories according to their location, not by the type of industry they made goods for, which was disastrous. This policy served to add another layer of bureaucracy as enterprises now had to deal with dozens of sovnarkhozy to coordinate the production of items, creating what Filtzer (1993) calls ‘bureaucratic anarchy. To overcome these problems, a reorganisation of Gosplan occurred 1957, creating State Committees and Central Councils, all of which worked in parallel to the sovnarkhozy, only deepening the chaos. Alec Nove (1977) has pointed out that these reforms tried to solve a problem whilst leaving the basic bureaucratic planning structure in place. Therefore were always likely to fail. In 1962,a national sovnarkhoze was set up to replace the long established Gosplan and become responsible to the management of the Soviet economy.
Khrushchev overcame his opponents but the regional economic councils were abolished soon after Khrushchev was ousted.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform industry - Seven Year Plans
Khrushchev introduced a Seven-Year Plan covering the years 1959-65. He wanted a rapid expansion of the chemical industry to provide more mineral fertilisers for agriculture. There was a large investment in oil and natural gas, and a focus on investment in areas east of the Urals. By 1961 Khrushchev, who was always in a hurry and now buoyed up by Soviet space exploits (see below) announced some upward amendments. Overall industrial progress was impressive and there was a major increase in consumer goods. However, the soaring expenses of the space and missile programme, and increased military expenditure placed a heavy strain on scarce skills and specialist equipment. Growth rates suffered, and in 1963 and 1964 fell to the lowest in peacetime since planning began.
Despite overall growth in industry under Khrushchev, in 1964 the SU remained an economy of imbalances, some areas were successful, others weren’t. Inflation was hidden from records, as was poor labour discipline and the USSR continued to lag behind almost every other developed country in terms of consumer goods. Although the seven year plan focused on light industry and consumer goods, it was once again heavy industry that saw the biggest expansion. Apart from military and space technology, technical innovation was very slow as new equipment caused the disruption of production lines and anything that reduced output, even temporarily, reduced workers pay.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform industry - The space programme
The Soviet Union under Khrushchev took the lead in space research and exploration. In August 1957 the first successful test of an inter-continental ballistic missile was carried out, and two months later that rocket was used to launch the first satellite - the Sputnik - into space to great excitement. There was even more when in 1961 Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. It was a huge boost to Soviet prestige and coupled with Khrushchev’s boasting about its military rocketry, led the outside world to overestimate Soviet progress. There was in fact no ‘missile gap’ with the United States in favour of the Soviet Union.
While there was a clampdown after 1962 on publishing the revelatory works associated with the thaw’, samizdat still grew. The significant numbers of students receiving higher education posed a dilemma for the Soviet state. It needed highly qualified people with inquiring minds in all branches of science and technology, but, in time, such minds might also challenge the whole system.
However, in 1964 the Soviet Union entered upon twenty years of stagnation.
Stalins Legacy - Agriculture
-Remained weaker than industry
-Low productivity- lower than it was under Nicholas II
-Livestock numbers were low - By 1953 fewer cattle than in 1916 and numbers falling
-Low rural incomes and poverty - food shortages issue, Low prices paid for grain led to low income. In 1946 an average days labour earnt less than a ruble (not even enough for 1/3rd loaf of bread)
-Invest in agriculture only to support the industry
-In desperate need of reform
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Virgin Lands Campaign
-Huge operation designed to plough up a vast tract of virgin and fallow land in Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia for grain cultivation. Khurshcehv presented as ideologically pure alternative to Malenkov’s idea of enlarging private plots. He believed could achieve US levels of grain production. Also knew that industrial bosses would never allow the redistribution of resources to favour agriculture, so he sought short-term measures and took huge risks to increase yield levels. Developed as part of seven year plan.
-Leaders of Kazakh communist party had warned of infertile soil and poor climate, although really worried about Russians and Ukrainians working on their land.
-More than 300,000 Komsomol volunteers were mobilised to settle and cultivate this huge area - by 1956, 35.9 million acres, an area equal to the total cultivated area of Canada. They would be joined by even larger contingents of students, soldiers, and truck and combine-drivers who were transported to the virgin lands on a seasonal basis. Conditions were primitive and the climate harsh. Like the Five-Year Plans it was run like a military campaign with an emphasis on speed. There was much publicity and very little listening to advice. Huge propaganda campaign.
-Harvest in 1956 was announced as great victory, largest in soviet history up to that point, over half of the 125 million tons of grain produced came from new regions. -Results never quite reached that level again and by early 1960s, reliance on single crop cultivation had taken its toll on the fertililty of soil and failure to adopt anti-erosion measures led to millions of tons of topsoil simply blowing away, in 1960 this happened to 13,000sq miles of land. By 1963 Grain harvest was disastrous and the Virgin lands produced their smallest crop for years. Specialised chemical fertilisers were needed to cultivate land however chemical industry not able to keep up with demand which was weak due to competition for resources with defence and heavy industry (still second to industry).
-Problems also included: in the first two years over 10 million square hectares of land were taken out of use because the land was indeed unsuitable for growing crops (as the Kazakh leaders had warned). Also, Amenities had not been thoroughly planned before sending the young, inexperienced party members out to these tough lands. Hastily constructed army barracks housed hundreds, not creating the ideal family life many had hoped for; some didn’t even have a canteen, forcing them to travel almost two hours to the nearest barracks to get breakfast. The lack of schools, housing, facilities and assistance in farming the infertile lands meant that many left within the first two years of the scheme to go back to the cities to gain jobs there.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Maize production
-Khrushchev heavily believes in. With the Virgin Lands campaign underway, maize could now be grown in traditional grain-producing areas. It would provide cattle-feed and revive meat and dairy farming which was languishing. He wanted it grown everywhere, claiming, that ‘corn is unequalled by any other crop’.
-K wanted to grow it as US did, ignoring the good reasons why Russian farmers hadn’t before, namely climate and soil. While it is a valuable crop in the Ukraine, it barely ripens elsewhere. Whilst 85 million acres were planted, only about one-sixth was harvested ripe.
-This caused a fall in hay production, which also had the knock-on effect of reducing meat production. Khrushchev’s mistakes were costly.
-His solution was to create new ploughs; he suggested that more ploughing would surely help the crop grow in Soviet soil. The new machines were hastily made and did not tackle weed infestation (as the old ones had), so farmers were forced to leave 20% of their fields fallow. This led to mass soil erosion in the virgin lands, creating vast swathes of dusty, infertile fields. Just as Stalin had, Khrushchev sought advice from the charlatan agronomist Lysenko (see Sections on ‘Political authority and government to 1953’; ‘High Stalinism’; ‘Agriculture’), who suggested early sowing would help cultivation in the virgin lands; however, drought plagued the Soviet Union in 1963 leading to the loss of millions of hectares of fields due to soil erosion.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Move towards Sovkhozes
-Initially wants to expand agricultural output, as peasants had been deprived and persecuted by Stalinist regime. Output and morale was chronically low by 1953. Leaders agrred that collectivisation of agriculture had not solved the problem of food production and supply and major change needed, agrued he had a special knowledge of agriculture.
-After visiting the US, and seeing lowa, the corn capital of US, became convinced of its course.
-Therefore Khrushchev settles for amalgamating the kolkhozy (collective farms) into sovkhozy (state farms) which caused severe social distress in some areas and much upheaval in the countryside.
Although smaller collective farms benefited from this scheme, many peasants did not like change and were suspicious of it. However, Khrushchev raised pay to incentivise peasants to work as hard on the collective plots as their private plots and donated more livestock as compensation.
-Idea was to encourage local decision makingand increase incentives,
-The number of kolkhozy fell from 125000 in 1950 to 69 100 in 1958 as a result of Khrushchev’s policies and output of grain rose dramatically in the state sector - up 75% in 1953-8.
-Workers on sovkhozes enjoying taxes on farming profits were reduced and experts were sent from Moscow to work and advise at local level. The machine tractor stations (MTS) built in Stalin’s time were sold to the farmers.
-Guaranteed, fixed wages and received social benefits, not least the prospect of a pension. Also with produce of the sovkhozes flooding into the industrial towns and cities and those working private plots no longer having to make compulsory deliveries to the State, the living standards of rural workers improved considerably. Between 1952 and 1958 farm-workers’ incomes more than doubled. Although farm wages were still much lower than those of industrial workers, prospects of real economic advancement were greater than at any time since the NEP
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Machine Tractor Stations abolished
-In 1958, owing to a bad harvest the year before, Khrushchev decided that farms needed access to better equipment, which was in part true.
-K sets about decentralising soviet system of agriculture by granting greater autonomy to local Party administrators. By allowing the sovkhozes to purchase their own agricultural machinery, he freed the state farms from their dependence on the Motor Transport Stations.
-In 1958 MTS abolished.
-By January 1959, around 8000 MTS had been abandoned, leaving only 39 remaining.
-Speed of refrom devastating. They had maintained and hired out machinery, now the kolkhozy had to buy the machinery. They had to pay too much and too quickly for machinery and there were not the barns on farms to store it. Mechanics from the former MTS tended to go to the towns where living standards were higher and didnt get same benefits under sovkhozy and so there was not enough expertise to maintain or repair the machinery properly and it was left to rust away, forcing many farmers to return to harvesting crop by hand.
-Artificially too high prices also meant that little money for investment in other projects such as dairy production, which was also desperately needed. The cumulative effect of these policies was to create milk scarcity and force prices up in 1962. This provoked disturbances in Novocherkassk (near the Ukrainian border) so severe that armed garrisons from nearby towns had to be brought in to quell the rioters, killing 22 and injuring 39 of the demonstrators.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Livestock
Khrushchev promised the people in 1961, at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, that by 1980 the Soviet Union would have overtaken the USA in meat production.
This would have meant trebling the figures, which, to anyone who knew anything about agriculture, was impossible. Still, it was characteristic of Khrushchev that he didn’t heed the advice and instructed the local party secretaries to carry out the plan. One particular secretary (by the name of Larionov) was very keen to impress and managed to treble meat supplies in the region of Ryazan within a year. He did this by foolishly slaughtering every animal in sight, even young animals not really ready for slaughter; he even ordered the slaughter of the region’s dairy herds and had to buy meat from other nearby regions to complete his targets. He later committed suicide when his actions were uncovered. The upshot of this was to increase levels of bureaucracy by implementing measures that restricted the number of slaughters that could take place on Sovkhozy. This had the unintended consequence of livestock building up and being wasted, as they became too old to slaughter in the state farms, and animals often became a drain on resources.
The New Party Programme of 1961
Khrushchev eager to associate himself with movement to a new stage in the development of Soviet Society.Khrushchev always remained a ‘true believer’ in communism, which he interpreted as meaning a better life for ordinary people.
Khrushchev wanted to issue an effective summons to action and to revive the mood of the 1920s that there was ‘no fortress a Bolshevik cannot storm’. The New Party Programme of 1961 was Khrushchev’s contribution and was delivered at the 22nd Party Congress. It has been described as a remarkable combination of self-delusion, wishful thinking and utopianism. Below are some parts of it:
-SU already built socialism and was on the way to creating communism
-The Communist Party was now a party of the whole people, it was no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat
-Communist Party was to be the key institution in the march towards communism
-It was to be more accountable to the membership with limits on terms served and rotation of office
-A communist society would be complete by 1980
-By 1970 there will be wo housing shortage and the Soviet Union will have overtaken the United States in per capita production.
-By 1980 the real income per head will have increased by more than 250 per cent.
These claims were made without any proper regard for the views of experts. A classic example of Khrushchev’s bravado
To what extent did Society change under Khrushchev - Class
-Secret envelopes of cash bonuses for party officials who met targets were stopped. Perks such as chauffeurs and private cars for factory directors were also brought to an end.
-Differences between the social classes were reduced, wage differentials were smaller and the differences between town and the countryside, industry and agriculture were being reduced
-‘Rule 25’ limited the number of years any official could stay in office and party membership was increased to include more of the working class.
-Khrushchev wanted education to be available to all and he spoke out against the high proportion of students from wealthy backgrounds attending university.
-Education provision was expanded. The numbers in higher education almost trebled.
-In 1958 the school leaving age was increased from 14 to 15 years. Fees for secondary education were abolished.
To what extent did Society change under Khrushchev - Women
-Women still shouldered the bulk of domestic responsibilities which still including much queuing for scare items. Russia had the highest rate of female unemployment.
-Under the Soviet system, everyone participated in the labor force regardless of gender, says Koenker. In 1967, women made up 41% of engineers there, compared to 2% in the years following the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917.
To what extent did Society change under Khrushchev - Peasants
-In 1964 the improved pension scheme was extended to include collective farmers. They also saw wages increase in this period.
-Women and the elderly still carried out much of the agricultural labour as the young were keen to leave for the urban areas.
To what extent did Society change under Khrushchev -Workers
-In 1956 pensions for elderly, disabled and sick workers were increased from 10 to 30 roubles a month. Particularly important given the impact of the war meant many were left as invalids.
-In 1960 the working day was reduced to seven hours (six on a Saturday). In the same year the minimum wage was increased and holiday pay introduced.
-1957 housing programme launched. The cheap, and simple design of the prefabricated housing meant the annual rate of housing construction almost doubled 1956-65.
-Life in urban areas was still considered better than rural hardship so young people in particular continued to migrate to urban areas
-The new housing meant families previously living in communal apartments now had their own private space. Approx. 108 million people moved into new apartments
-Khrushchev re-established polytechnical education brought in by Lenin. This was vocational training with work experience. It wasn’t very successful.
-More hospitals were built and more doctors trained.More consumer goods wereavailable. Fridges, tvs andwashing machines appeared inSoviet homes for the first time.Fridges grew rapidly, rising from 4% in 1960 to 11% in 1965 and 65% by 1975.
-The fierce labour laws against absenteeism and changing jobs without permission were repealed. TUs were given greater influence in employment negotiations.
To what extent did Society change under Khrushchev - Religion and Minorities
-Atheism was introduced as a school subject. Young people were banned from attending Church services and some were even removed from their parents so they couldn’t be influenced by their religious beliefs.
-The party taught that ethnic distinctions would ultimately disappear and restrictions on Jews were maintained
-There had been an attitude of tolerance to towards the Church after the war but Khrushchev sought a return to militant atheism.
-Anti-religious propaganda and taxes on religious activity were increased. 1959-64 , about three-quarters of all churches and monasteries were closed. Mosques and synagogues were attacked too.
To what extent did Society change under Khrushchev - Culture
-Khrushchev promoted literature which supported his policies. One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovch detailed a prisoners harsh life in the gulags and Khrushchev insisted the Presidium members read it.
-Pravda published a poem attacking Stalin and warning against a resurgence of Stalinism – The Heirs of Stalin, 1962.
-Literature criticising Stalin was now acceptable but criticism of the Party or the present Soviet way of life was not. The Soviet Writers’ Union still controlled what could be published
-Boris Pasternak’s Dr Zhivago was not published as it was felt the novel was against the revolution and depicted the Soviet way of life negatively.
-Restrictions on contact with Western culture were relaxed. Foerign literature and radio broadcasts were permitted.
-There was a partial thaw in cultural life following the ‘secret speech’. Many writers who had been banned under Stalin were able to write again e.g.writer Anna Akhmatova and composerDmitri Shostakovich
-Dr Zhivago was published in Italy and Pasternak received the Nobel Prize for literature. Illegal copies circulated in the USSR. P was expelled from the Writers’ Union and forced to renounce his NP
-In 1957 Moscow hosted a World Festival of Youth hoping to win young people over to the Soviet way of life. Instead the Soviet youth embraced the West’s jeans and jazz.
-In 1961 the KGB confiscated a manuscript written by Vasily Grossman about the Second World War. It was considered even more damaging than Dr Zhivago.
-Manage Affair- Khrushchevs thunderous denouncing of modern art at an exhibition at the Moscow Manage
The Novocherkassk Massacre 1962
-Town in Ukraine, takes place on 1 June 1962. Previous day the price of butter had increased by 25% and meat by 30%. Sharp price increases coincide with the announcement of wage cuts at the large electrical works.
-The insensitivity of works directors when confronting the crowd of workers inflamed the situation, and unrest spread rapidly. A passing train was stopped with a placard hung on it, reading ‘cut up Khrushchev for sausages’
-In response to crowds, troops brought in and opened fire and killed 28 people and wounded over 80.
-Uprising dealt with swiftly with a 7 ring leaders executed and over 200 arrests , the area was given the highest priority for food supplies and local officials blamed for letting the situation get out of hand and placed under strict orders so there would be no repetition.
-Square where shootings take place covered in asphalt overnight to hide blood and bodies buried in existing graves. Unlike under Stalin there were no claims that the unrest was the product of spies and counter revolutionaries. Instead there was a successful news blackout and the full story only came out 30yrs later.
-The Novocherkassk uprising was exceptional only in its number of caulaties. The reasons for it, the fact it was workers involved, was typical. There was not mass dissident movement, but it has been estimated that 500,000 soviet citizens participated in mass disorders, disturbances and demonstrations, protest meetings and strikes between 1953 and 1964.
-After Novocherkassk there was a decline in the frequency and scale of protests largely because the authorities took greater care to prevent unrest occurring in the first place. Working-class grievances were particularly worrying in an era of rising expectations. The workers’ standard of living had to be raised with more consumer goods and above all food prices had to be kept down. From this time on food prices were held down however strong the case for bringing them more closely in line with the costs of production. It was another problem for the command economy:
How was opposition dealt with under Khrushchev
-Although Khrushchev did not use terror to the same extent as Lenin and Stalin the Soviet Union was still a police state under the KGB (set up in 1954)
-Outright opposition from the people remained minimal with Novocherkassk and Tbilisi as the exceptions.
Tbilisi – March 1956, violent nationalist demonstrations were held at Tbilisi, Stalin’s birth place, in protest against K’s ‘secret speech’. Political demands such as the change of the central government in Moscow and calls for the independence of Georgia from theSoviet Unionappeared. The army was sent to crush the riots. Estimates of the number of casualties range from several dozens to several hundred.
-A dense network of informers was maintained: 1957 – ‘Parasite Law’ created armies of citizens to inform on anyone not working - vagrants
-Anti-Soviet views were still not tolerated. Dissenters were arrested and threatened - sometimes physically. Although the no. of political arrests decreased
-Prison camps remained (although no longer known as gulags) and some were forced into psychiatric hospitals (psikhushkas). In the Soviet Union,psychiatric hospitals were often used by the authorities as prisons, in order to isolatepolitical prisonersfrom the rest of society, discredit their ideas, and break them physically and mentally. As such, psikhushkas were considered a form oftorture. The official explanation was that no sane person would be againstsocialism. They were used into the 1980s.
-Large-scale economic crimes received the death penalty e.g. Two currency dealers who had made a personal profit of 2 million roubles were executed
-Yet, following the secret speech the KGB were reformed. Top officials were replaced by Komsomol members who had formed their careers in the party rather than the police. The KGB was also led by the party rather than an individual. The state was still politically authoritarian but far less feared than it had been under Stalin.
How was opposition dealt with under Khrushchev - Cultural Dissidents
-The ‘thaw’ allowed for more artistic and intellectual freedom and a new group of cultural dissidents’ emerged. Most were keen to promote human rights and greater democracy because the Soviet Union was still a highly authoritarian state with a network of spies and informers. The written word, in particular, was a way of expressing political views, either through works published abroad and then smuggled into the country or through samizdat. This practice entailed the rewriting and retyping of articles, poems and books which were then distributed through personal contacts. It became a genuine underground press, spreading information and opinion on Soviet politics and society. Several writers were imprisoned for criticising the regime and thousands more were condemned for their ‘anti-social, parasitic way of life’.
-In the early 1960s, Russian Journal ‘Novy Mir’ changed its political stance from being a Communist propaganda promoter to a more dissident position. In November 1962, the magazine had a circulation of about 150 000 copies per month and became famous for publishing Solzhenitsyn’s novella.
The magazine continued publishing controversial articles and stories about various aspects of Soviet and Russian history despite the fact that its editor-in-chief, Alexander Tvardovsky, who faced significant political pressure, resigned in February 1970. Solzhenitsyn was eventually expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974, but many others, such as the ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev, faced so much harassment they simply defected to the West during the 1960s.
-Poetry readings in Mayakovsky Square in Moscow expanded in scope to include controversial issues. The KGB intervened and broke them up. The young Vladimir Bukovsky was taken to a police station, beaten up, and warned: ‘Don’t ever go to Mayakovsky Square again. Next time we’ll kill you!’. He became a leading dissident, best known for exposing the use of psychiatric hospitals against dissidents; he himself had been so confined between 1963 and
-Cultural dissidents were, by the 1960s, the most articulate opponents of communism and Solzhenitsyn became one of the chief of their number. The Khrushchev era saw the rapid development of samizdat
