Key concepts Flashcards
What is the main sentiment of mind-brain type identity theory?
Mental states can be ontologically reduced to physiological processes. E.g., when we say we are in ‘pain’ that pain is ‘C-fibres firing,’.
What is an ontological reduction?
One type of entity is shown, in reality, to be another type of entity.
E.g., ‘water’ is really just a collection of molecules of hydrogen and oxygen.
What is the difference between an ontological reduction and an analytic reduction?
Analytic reduction: Two concepts mean the same thing.
Ontological: Two concepts are the same thing.
What does MBIT say about types and tokens?
Mental tokens: These are individual instances of mentl states in a person. E.g., ‘Mark’s pain on Tuesday’ is a differnt token to ‘Mark’s pain on Wednesday,’
Mental types: This is the category of a mental state felt by all people. E.g., ‘pain’.
This theory states that all mental types are identical to brain types. E.g., the ‘type’ of pain is identical to the ‘type of c-fibres firing.
What are the arguments for MBIT?
- Alligns with science.
- Supported by evolution.
- ‘Nomological danglers,’ - Smart.
- Solves the problem of other minds.
- Allows a causal role in behaviour (Not like behaviourism)
What are the dualist arguments against MBIT?
Mary’s room - qualia
Philosophical zombies - qualia
Idivisibility argument - mental and physical states different.
Conceivability argument
What is the issue of spatial location aganst MBIT?
Leibniz law - Cannot be the same if there is just one difference.
- mental states do not appear to have a spatial location, unlike brains.
- Mental states can also not be divided the way the brain can.
What is the argument against the issue of spatial location for MBIT?
- Mental states may occur in different places in the brain. E.g., brain damage leading us to understand where face recognition comes from.
- The mind can be divided: Corpus callosum severing.
- Brain hemisphere experiment.
What is the issue with MBIT concerning intentionality?
- Mental states such as desires, beliefs, and emotions are about things.
- Purely physical things cannot be about anything.
- 3 sticks fall analogy.
What is the issue with MBIT concerning multiple realisability?
- Can different parts of the brain not spark the same mental state? If types are identical, how do we explain recovery after brain damage? The plasticity of the brain seems to sugges that there are multiple ways to realise mental states.
What is the chauvinistic issue with MBIT?
- If pain is identical to processes in the human brain, what about other species?
- Can’t aliens also have thoughts? If pain is c-fibres firing, what if aliens experience pain through b-fibres vibrating? Would we say that they didn’t have pain?
What is the MBIT response to the issue of chauvinistic tendancy?
‘Human pain’ is not ‘dog pain,’
- we’re only mapping human pain by this theory, and we can identify dog pain in dogs another way.
- However, how can we tell what pain is then? Does this not defeat the argument that all brain types are identical to all mental types?
What is a MBIT response to the issue of spatial location?
- Not all physical properties are spatially located. E.g., ‘being wet,’ etc.
