Justice And Rights Flashcards
How does Mill respond the the moral outrage extreme utilitarianism can inspire?
Our sentiments of justice are not a ‘revelation of some objective reality’ = they are an animal rather than intellectual response
Legal rights as a form of justice
it is unjust to deprive anyone of what they possess by legal right
Moral rights as a form of justice
laws which violate peoples moral rights are unjust - such as freedom from arbitrary arrest (Jean example)
Moral Dessert as a form of justice
violations of the principle that those who do good deserve good and those who do evil deserve evil are seen as an injustice
Contracts as a form of justice
Breaking faith with anyone or disappointing expectations we have voluntarily engendered is regarded as unjust
Impartiality as a form of justice
Allowing one’s judgement to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, such as a person’s race or sex, is, as all will admit, often unjust
Equality as a form of justice
This notion, says Mill, is close to that of impartiality. Some communists, for example, think that goods should be distributed according to need: equal needs give rise to equal claims to goods. The link with impartiality is obvious: the only relevant characteristic to be used when distributing goods is need, while attention to other characteristics will count, for these communists, as partiality and injustice
imperfect obligations
actions that are required, but not at any particular time. So, I have an obligation to be charitable, but not on any specific occasion; when and to whom I am charitable are up to me
perfect obligations
Mill considers it more precise to spell out the distinction between perfect and imperfect with the idea of rights. If I have a perfect obligation, then some other person has a correlative right. In the case of charity, no person has a right to my assistance
Mill’s stance on protecting individuals
no stance other than ‘general utility’ - no protection for the individuals beyond this
most of the more specific principles of justice we find to be merely instrumental to satisfaction of utility - but no principls of justice are absolute - they do not trump utility
Problem with Mill’s definition of perfect obligations (justice)
too broad - any moral obligation i have to a specific person not only gives rise to a crrelative right possessed by another person but also gives an obligation of justice
Example of when a violation of duty does not incur injustice nor give rise to a right
If I nurse you through your old age, it is plausible enough to say that you have some kind of duty to leave me at least something in your will. You’re not doing so will be unjust, but I have no right to any inheritance
Mill, rights and harm
a right rests on the notion of harm to an assignable individual
Homelessness, rights and harm (objection)
a homeless person begging for food from you, will be harmed if refused but has no right to your food
Mill response to homelessness objection
Mill would say it’s indirect harm and thus there is no right because there is no direct harm -> someone else is capable of waiving that harm and there are other means of aquiring food - them going hungry is merely one outcome (but he believes in actual consequences so this doesn’t make sense)