Judicial Review Grounds Flashcards

1
Q

Three heads of judicial review (grounds)

A

Illegality (formerly ultra vires)
Irrationality (formerly unreasonableness)
Procedural impropriety

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2
Q

Illegality definition

A

An ultra vires use of powers can be found if the authority
- Exceeds the limits of a public function
- Unauthorised delegations of a public function
- Commits errors in law and fact
A decision maker can also abuse their power, which will happen if
- They exercise their function on the basis of irrelevant considerations
- They attempt to further improper purposes
- The decision maker has fettered their discretion

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3
Q

Acting in excess of powers

A

There are two subdivisions:

  • express limitations upon a public function must be respected, which include statute prohibiting an action (White&Collins and Fulham Corporation).
  • implicit requirements upon public functions, i.e. running a scheme according to proper business principles or economic soundness (Bromley BC v GLC [1983] and ex p WDM).
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4
Q

Unauthorised delegation of a public function

A

Public functions cannot be delegated further (Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953]) unless they are ministers delegating work to civil servants (the Carltona Principle). This is subject to the fact that some functions cannot be delegated at all and delegation must be to a suitable candidate (Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2002]).

Fits in with GREEN LIGHT vision of jud review as it expands the functions of government rather than restricts.

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5
Q

Errors of law and fact

A

Law: as in Anisminic, the courts can correct errors of law and declare decisions null as they are the ultimate arbitrators of statute.
Fact: E [2004] established that for a mistake of fact to declare a decision a nullity, it must be a mistake of fact, it must have been established (objective verification), C must NOT have been responsible for the mistake and the mistake must have been material in the decision maker’s reasoning.

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6
Q

Abuse of powers

A

This takes into account if the decision maker

  • They exercise their function on the basis of irrelevant considerations
  • They attempt to further improper purposes
  • The decision maker has fettered their discretion

It is to prevent use of powers against the spirit of a statute (Padfield [1968]).

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7
Q

Relevance of a decision maker’s considerations

A

A decision maker cannot make a decision based on considerations not provided for, however benevolent (Wheeler v Leicester CC [1985]).
Likewise a single intention, despite being ‘good’ cannot be the only consideration in a decision (ex p Fewings [1995]).
Actions could still be ultra vires despite being democratically approved (Bromley v GLC [1983]).
Public support or disapproval is an irrelevant consideration to legal redress (ex p Venables [1998]).
Thus, while politically motivated decisions can be made, statutory powers cannot be used for purely political endeavours (Porter v Magill [2001]).

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8
Q

Exercising a power for improper purposes

A

The dominant purpose for making a decision is sought by the courts (Porter v Magill, Fewings).
The test is what is the purpose of the action? In ex p Westminster Council [1986] (using advertisement budget to influence public opinion against govt education cuts) it was found to influence public opinion and not ‘provide information’ which was what the power was conferred for.

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9
Q

Fettering of discretion

A

This can be done by overly rigid rules (British Oxygen [1971]). In this case the rules had not been so rigidly applied anyway.
Likewise in ex p Hindley stating a definitive statement (which would fetter discretion) can be rebutted by the fact that the decision maker (the home sec) will actually review parole in light of pertinent factors in the future.

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10
Q

Irrationality definition

A

Irrationality applies to arbitrary as opposed to illegal exercises of power. The Wednesbury test will be applied in three scenarios:

  • Where a decision falls within a particular expertise of a decision maker the court will be more reluctant to intervene (the super Wednesbury test).
  • Where a decision involves particular interests of an individual the courts will more likely intervene (the sub Wednesbury test).
  • The normal Wednesbury test
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11
Q

Wednesbury unreasonableness (irrationality) formulation of the test

A

The modern test was formulated in the Wednesbury case. In this case, a town council sought to restrict the use of the town’s cinema on Sundays by using their licencing power to not allow children to attend the cinema on Sunday’s unsupervised by an adult. The cinema sought to have this arbitrary use of power quashed. The test was formulated that the courts would intervene if it involved ‘something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.’ This case itself failed the test.

The test was reformulated by Diplock in GCHQ to requiring ‘a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.’

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12
Q

Use of Wednesbury

A
  • Few cases are successful
  • In ex p Croydon LBC a court found that the Croydon Council education Committee’s decision to not allow a child to join an already full school was not unreasonable. Even though the classes should have had 30 students and already had 36, drawing the line at this child was not unreasonable or arbitrary.
  • An example of a case finding irrationality is in Re Duffy [2008]. In this case, it was found that the Sec of State’s decision to appoint two members of the Orange Order to the Parades Commission of Northern Ireland was irrational. This is because the commission was set up to quell violence in parades in northern Ireland and two members of a particularly violent group had been appointed to the detriment of peace in the country. therefore no reasonable minister would have come to the same decision as this one.
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13
Q

Wednesbury variations

A
  • In cases of special expertise decision making, Wednesbury is more strictly applied (i.e. the decision must be MORE irrational). Public financial administration is stringently looked at by the courts (ex p Nottinghamshire CC [1986]).
  • In cases of grave personal impacts, reasonableness is considered to a greater degree. Thus in ex p Smith [1998] in which homosexuals were being discriminated a greater degree of reasonableness was required but the court eventually did not strike down the rule as it had been considered and approved by Parliament.
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14
Q

What happens where serious fundamental rights questions are made by expertise decision makers? (sub v super Wednesbury)

A
In R (Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust (PCT) [2006] a breast cancer patient was denied a special drug as it was not approved by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). She challenged this decision for irrationality, and PCT countered saying that there were still safety concerns around the drug. 
The court found that while her life was at stake, this alone could not overcome concerns regarding the allocation of scarce resources. Nevertheless in this case the court could disregard these concerns as there were instances where the PCT would permit the drug to be prescribed by the NHS. This was key in finding the decision of the PCT irrational. It was therefore found that rejecting applications without considering the clinical need was irrational.
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15
Q

Proportionality?

A

It is applied in EU and ECHR law.

It was mentioned in GCHQ as a potential to be a head of review one day. It would be a much lower bar for claimants to clear than in irrationality as it requires that the courts look at how a decision is reached, and the decision maker’s efforts to balance the claimant’s interest against the public interest.

Ex p Brind [1991] closed off the possibility of proportionality as no other law lords agreed with Diplock. This case concerned the ban on the broadcast of proscribed terrorist organisations. The claimant contended that this was a disproportionate interference with the reporter’s ability to present balanced news report, but it was outright rejected for extending the judicial role too far. It was found that a wednesbury approach would be much preferred.

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16
Q

Procedural Impropriety

A

Express rules on the exercise of statutory power must be adhered to. Exercises of power must be done in a fair manner.

17
Q

Two rules which underlie procedural impropriety

A

a. Nemo judex in causa sua (no one may judge in his own cause): it imposes the rule against bias
b. Audi alterem partem (the requirement to hear the other side)

18
Q

What does procedural impropriety mean

A
  • A breach of ‘natural justice’
  • Much legislation provides no express procedural rules. The courts remedied this by applying their own implied guidelines into the exercise of public power in a fair manner.
  • It was not until the late 80’s in Lloyd v McMahon [1987] that procedural impropriety was recognised as well estasblished in the UK courts. They now fall into two established categories: The rule against bias and the right to a fair hearing (and the emergent category of duty to give reasons).
19
Q

The rule against bias

A

This can be broken up into
- Bias (or the appearance of) which breaks down into:

  • Financial interest in a decision
  • Predetermination of an issue
20
Q

Bias (or the appearance of bias)

A

ex p McCarthy [1924] set out the original test. After a solicitor was involved in the litigation of a criminal case against an individual then as a clerk in civil proceedings of the same incident, a judicial review was brought. It was held that ‘justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ This is broken into the two further sub-categories seen above.

21
Q

Financial interest in a decision

A

Long established - Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852).
Gough [1993] forumlated a test stating that “the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue…”
In ex p Pinochet (No 2) [2000] Hoffman was expelled for being a director on Amnesty International which was bringing litigation against Pinochet Ugarte in his extradition to Spain for trial for war crimes.
Locabail [2000] added conditions which might suggest an appearance of bias, i.e. friendship/animosity with the judge, and those which won’t suggest bias, i.e. religion, origin, gender etc.

22
Q

Pre-judgment/determination of an issue

A

The only succesful Locabail case was one where a judge had a documented personal view on personal injury, and thus his judgment was so unbalanced and extreme to throw doubt on his ability to be independent on the issue.

These principles apply to all decision-makers.

It also applies to politicians, i.e. Condron v National Assembly for Wales [2006] where judicial review was brought against a committee in the Wales Assembly for prejudging a decision based on one report. However it was held that in the process of creating the report all reasoned decisions had been considered and there was no evidence of bias as a result.

23
Q

Porter v Magill reformulation of the test for bias

A

The reformulation was made to better give effect to the Art 6 requirement of a fair trial. It reformulated the Gough test to now ask (better inline with ECHR jurisprudence) ‘Whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts,would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.’

Olowofoyeku argues that the fair minded observer has become a mere channel for the reasoned view of the judges.

24
Q

The right to a fair hearing

A

The requirements of a fair trial depend on the importance of the rights at issue (Lloyd v McMahon [1987]). The requirements can be split into two types:

  • core requirements which are required for every case
  • Optional extra requirements which are used only in cases of considerable importance
25
Q

The core requirements

A

Refound in Ridge v Baldwin [1964], these includes such requirements as

  • Notice of the measure where the defendant must know of the measure being brought against them in order to form a defence (R (Shoesmith) v OFSTED [2011]).
  • Opportunity to make a case where they must be able to make a defence under all circumstances (Ridge v Baldwin [1964]).
26
Q

Optional extra requirements of fairness

A

Recognised in ex p Doody [1994] that the principles of fairness would not be applied to same to every case. These include the right to an oral hearing where livelihood is at stake (ex p Hook [1976]) but not where it is not at stake (i.e. applying for a licence, as in McInnes v Onslow-Fane [1978]). It is needed when personal liberty is at stake as in R (on the application of West) v Parole Board [2002].
It also includes the right to witnesses and cross examination where liberty is at stake (ex p Germain (No 2) [1979]).

27
Q

Further requirements for fair trial

A
  • Legal representation as safeguards are weak without it so it is required when serious rights are at stake (Roose v Parole Board [2010]).
  • The facility to appeal is important and if it is absent then procedural impropriety is more likely to be found (Porter v Magill [2001]).
28
Q

Duty to give reasons under common law

A

There is no general common law duty (ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994]). Many public bodies are required to under sch 1 of the Tribunals and Inquires Act 1992.

The duty to give reasons only applies in issues of sufficient importance (ex p Doody [1994]).

The details of reasons need only be ‘briefly stated’ (South Bucks DC v Porter [2004]). In Asha Foundation [2003] the words ‘other applications were preferred’ was sufficient reasons.

29
Q

Statutory exceptions to requirements of a fair trial

A

Statute can change the requirements of a fair trial as the courts only implement natural justice because there is no statutory procedures set out (Wiseman v Borneman [1971]).

The courts are reluctant to exclude elements of a fair trial (ex p Fayed [1998] and require express wording. It was successfully done in Bank Mellat [2011] as the words were sufficiently clear and it concerned national security.

30
Q

Legitimate expectations

A

It is a new type of judicial review and was not mentioned in GCHQ. There are two types:

  • Procedural legitimate expectations: where a body can conclude that another will carry out a certain course of action due to previous policy without consulting individuals as to the change in policy
  • Substantive legitimate expectations: where, due to a promise, a public body cannot change its policy
31
Q

Procedural legitimate expectations meaning

A

Where a procedure is normally abided by but is departed from without reason or notification. In ex p Schmidt [1969] it could not be invoked regarding applications, but if a visa was revoked before the leave date had elapsed then that would be a breach of legitimate expectations.

If a procedure is set out for citizens to follow in regard to an application and the citizen follows it and the application is denied, then that is a breach of legitimate expectations (ex p Asif Mahmood Khan [1985]). There must be an ‘overriding public interest’ to change policy.

32
Q

Substantive legitimate expectations meaning

A

When a promise has been made and cannot be departed from. The courts are reluctant to apply this (ex p US Tobacco international [1992]). There must be an abuse of process to ground a claim.

Ex p Hamble FIsheries [1995] recognised that legitimate expectations may outweigh a policy choice through fairness. This was dicta and was condemned in ex p Hargreaves [1997].

ex p Coughlan [2001] however recgonised substantive legitimate expectations and prevented a substantive decision being made to move a group of disabled patients away from a nurrsing home after promising them that they would be there ‘for life’. It requires an overriding public interest to go back on a promise.

33
Q

How to create a legitimate expectation

A
  • Make an official representation (Coughlan) or engage in a specific conduct for years without a notification to the change of conduct (GCHQ).
  • Make sure the representation/conduct is sufficiently clear (Association of British Internees [2003]). This includes no conditional promises: an unconditional, express promise is required (Bancoult No 2 [2008]).
  • The party need not rely on it to their detriment, but it would substantially help a claim, especially where the policy change is a big one (Begbie).
  • The smaller the group, the better (Bhatt Murphy [2008]).
34
Q

How to counter a legitimate expectation claim

A
  • Fulfill the expectation (i.e. a transitional phase is sufficient as in ex p Hamble Fisheries, or prior warning as in Bhatt Murphy).
  • The overriding factor against not frustrating the legitimate expectation is taken into account (Coughlan) and it must be sufficient (GCHQ). Indeed the need for freedom of action may override it (Begbie).