judicial review Flashcards
what are the three grounds of review
- illegality (decision maker misapplies statutory power)
- irrationality/unreasonableness (no reasonable decision maker could have arrived at it without something going horribly wrong)
- procedural impropriety (duty to act fairly - audi alteram partem and rule against bias)
what case shows the relevance of judicial review and why
Borrowdale v Director-General of Health - one can challenge an action or decision in judicial review if they allege that a decision has been handled wrongly. The rationale of judicial review is to promote and uphold the rule of law
what happened in Borrowdale v Director-general of Health
- given: lockdown did restrict protected rights under NZBORA
- Bloomfield issued paragraph M order under s 70(1) to forbid congregation in outdoor places of amusement and recreation and close all premises - Borrowdale won challenge on first 9 days - no legal obligation to comply
- 9 days later he issued a second notice under paragraph f requiring all persons to isolate or quarantine at home
- in media briefings Ardern directed people to isolate, stay in their bubbles, stay home and cease interactions with people outside their bubble - these statements lacked lawful authority
- argument that the PM has no authority to suspend the protected NZBORA rights by statements, court didn’t let it succeed because they somehow construed that Ardern’s statements had suspended s 5
- the argument that para f might only apply to individuals was rejected - they read it up because the Health Act was dealing with a big public problem
- rejected Crown’s argument that Ardern’s statements merely counselled voluntary compliance
what is the jurisdictional journey as to hearing judicial review cases
- the courts don’t exercise a statutory jurisdiction, the HC exercises inherent jurisdiction which can be traced back to the origins of the common law courts - the court of king’s bench which branched off the king’s council in the 12-13th centuries in particular. that jurisdiction was established here by our colonial supreme court and carried over through successive statutes - now the Senior Courts Act 2016.
how did the courts cling to the doctrine of ultra vires for judicial review
one could only succeed in bringing an action for judicial review if the applicant could establish the decision maker had committed a jurisdictional error. If they had, they had acted ultra vires. The court asked: did the decision maker have the authority to enter upon this matter and decide it, if no, there was a reviewable jurisdictional error. if they were acting within their jurisdiction at the outset there was nothing to review
what did Anisminic do the change how judicial review was heard in regards to jurisdictional errors being abolished
the HOL said it doesn’t matter at what stage of the process the error is committed, if it is material (that is, if it influences the outcome of the decision making) then it is reviewable - the distinction between a jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error was abolished. this greatly expanded the scope of the courts powers of judicial review and review as a weapon
what does Peters v Davison say the intention of judicial review
it is intended to uphold the rule of law - government according to law (Dicey’s first meaning)
what two sided questions did the old way of the binary judicial review method ask
jurisdictional vs non-jurisdictional error - the answer the court gave determined the outcome, non-jurisdictional = you lose
legal rights v non-legal interests - you had to establish the decision making adversely affected your legally recognised rights, otherwise you lost
statutory power v royal prerogative power - if the public power exercised is conferred by statute it was reviewable
ministerial decision-making v other public decision-making - Ministers are individually and collectively responsible to Parliament rather than the courts so we shouldn’t intervene - that is the proper forum for accountability
void v voidable - if void, it was void ad initio (from the outside) and decision handed down was a nullity, if only voidable the decision is deemed at law to be legally effective and in force up until the point where it is set aside by a successful challenge in judicial review, which may never come
mandatory v directory - a statute may lay down certain requirements of people - mandatory requirements enjoined strict compliance, but not so if the requirement was seen to be directory only
judicial review is what three things
- inherently discretionary
- fully contextual - Robin Cooke: ingredients of the problem at hand dominate
- judicial review involves overall evaluation
what were the great prorogative writs
certiorari - order of the court quashing a decision that has been handed down in excess of powers granted to the decision maker
prohibition - anticipatory order, where if the decision maker enters upon a matter it will be beyond their jurisdiction
mandanus - to seek an order of the court compelling a statutory body/decision maker to perform a public statutory duty
In Martin v Ryan, how did Fisher J describe judicial review
“inherently discretionary”
there are no hard and fast rules in judicial review - it comes down to?
overall evaluation
Robin Cooke said: the ingredients of the problem at hand …?
dominate
What did Lord Steyn say in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department about judicial review being fully contextual
“in law, context is everything”
what was said about judicial review involving “overall evaluation” in A.J. Burr Ltd v Blenheim Borough Council by Cooke J
“The determination by the court whether to set the decision aside or not is acknowledged to depend less on clear and absolute rules than on overall evaluation; the discretionary nature of judicial remedies is taken into account”
judicial review involving overall evaluation is inherently what?
discretionary
What dicta did Robin Cooke say in the foreword of Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective “captured the essence of judicial review”
R v Take-over Panel; Ex parte Guinness plc - “The ultimate question would, as always, be whether something had gone wrong of a nature and degree which required the intervention of the Court, and, if so, what form that intervention should take”
what statement of Cooke P about judicial review had the 3 defining characteristics implicit in it
“most cases turn on an analysis of the particular facts and an application of the particular provisions, usually but not always statutory, which are the source of the administrative power in question. Typically the result of the case flows from the facts and the statute or rule .. the ingredients of the problem at hand dominate”
what inference can be taken from Cooke P’s statements about judicial review as to the application of the doctrine of precedence
the doctrine of precedence has less application in this area of the law because every case is unique and must be decided on its own particular facts in its own particular legal context
how does Cooke P shun over-sophisticated analyses of judicial review principles or doctrines
“refinements in the way in which fairly simple and broad background doctrines are expressed are less important than the specific and interpretive issues”
these broad background doctrines reduce to simple “the decision maker must act in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably”
how was the distinction between appeal and review put in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans
- JR concerned with the decision making process - concerned not with the merits of the decision challenged, but rather with the manner in which the decision was made, whether the decision should be allowed to stand, has the decision been reached properly in accordance with the law and the requirements of fairness - if not, it will be reviewable no matter the merits of the decision
- appeal concerned with the correctness of the decision itself - here if the court finds the appeal is good, the court will substitute its own decision for that of the decision maker
what did Justice Hardy Boys in R v Sloan say about the proper concern on review, accepting the idea in NZ
concern on review was “with the decision making process, not the decision itself”
what happened in Fraser v State Services Commission
a public servant had been dismissed for certain alleged disciplinary offences. the decision to dismiss was based on a departmental report that was highly critical of Miss Fraser, which she had not been shown in advance of the hearing.
court held the decision was in breach of principles in natural justice. the judicial review was successful and it was quashed.
the case illustrates the duty of disclosure in administrative law and judicial review. all decision makers have a duty to disclose all relevant information to all interested parties.
Richardson J: concern was the manner in which the decision was reached - was it fair and in accordance with the requirements of judicial review - no (even though she had been involved in misconduct, that merit of the decision was not the courts concern)
how does the distinction between appeal and review serve as discipline
the courts powers are limited when they sit in review
what are the 2 basic limitations to what the courts can do in judicial review
democratic - 95% of public decision making powers are statutory. statutory powers are enacted by the parliament who we the people elect. if Parliament mandates X as the decision maker it must be X and not the courts.
constitutional - derives from the separation of powers - the courts exercise the judicial power on the state, not executive and the decisions are handed down by executive
the distinction between appeal and review has incidental relevance when
when the pleaded ground of challenge is procedural impropriety - this ground of review is focussed entirely on procedures of decision making and a challenge may be that the decision maker was biased, audi alterum partum (hear the other side) etc.
vs illegality and unreasonableness which are less focussed on the procedures of law making - more to do with application of the law and merit based respectively
what are 5 ways the distinction between appeal and review is unhelpful
- does not identify which decisions are reviewable and which aren’t e.g. in Curtis v Minister of Defence the decision challenged was beyond judicial scrutiny because of the subject matter of the decision itself - national defence and resource allocation beyond judicial scrutiny (removing air force combat wing)
- does not help courts fix the scope of discretionary powers (that involves statutory interpretation)
- does not identify the intensity of review in any particular case - different decisions will invite different intensities depending on the interests at issue e.g. a matter of human rights like immigration with have intensive scrutiny by the courts but an economic decision the courts will back of.
- distinction does not identify or indicate which decisions warrant judicial deference and which do not
- distinction does not assist courts in the exercise of public law discretions - judicial review is inherently discretionary and the distinction does not assist courts in any navigational sense in exercising the discretionary element of judicial review
what did Lord Donaldson in ex parte Guinness was the true motivation and catalyst in judicial review
“has something gone wrong of a nature and degree that requires the intervention of this court? If so, how should the court intervene?”
if something has gone wrong in decision making, what must the judge do
judge must translate the instinctual impulse or response into real language that can explain and justify the courts intervention, they must identify a recognised ground of judicial review - illegality, procedural impropriety or unreasonableness or maybe even breach of some generic statute relating to public administration e.g. NZBORA
why do more judicial review actions fail than succeed
they fail to trigger the required instinctual response to establish that something has gone terribly wrong with the decision making. should this occur, no amount of persuasive advocacy will get the applicant home and convince the judge
how can the judge in judicial review explain why the application can not succeed (because they didn’t have the something has gone wrong reaction) - give cases
Curtis v Minister of Defence - decision was non-justiciable
Wellington City Council v Woolworths (NZ) - given the nature of the decision, the decision maker may be accorded deference and the court will back off, in this case Wellington City Council was a democratically elected decision making body so the court would not intervene unless something was demonstrably wrong
Air New Zealand Ltd v Wellington International Airport Ltd - applicant was in the wrong forum, the right forum was the Commerce Commission because it was a purely commercial decision by the airport in this case
what happened in Curtis v Minister of Defence
The Clarke Labour government made a decision to disband the combat wing of the RNZAF. The court held the decision was non-justicable because it was a matter for the executive and not the courts. there was no legal yard stick to assess the impugned decision to disband because it was a decision to do with national defence and armament of armed forces
what happened in Wellington City Council v Woolworths (NZ)
a wellington rate payer challenged the WCC decision. the application failed because the WCC was a democratically elected decision making body so the court would not intervene - they would only intervene is something was demonstrably wrong and shown to have occurred. so deference was accorded due to the democratic nature of the decision maker
what happened in Air New Zealand v Wellington International Airport
the applicant challenged an airport pricing decision, but failed because the court said the applicant was in the wrong forum - the right forum would be the Commerce Commission - set up under the Commerce Act to investigate such decision making as the purely commercial decision in this case
is there such thing as unfettered discretion
no - every discretionary power has legal limits. unfettered discretion cannot coexist with the rule of law and constitutional government - a body with this would have absolute power, unamicable to the concept of limited government that underpins the system.
even if parliament seemingly conferred an unfettered discretion, the courts will read down that discretion and import legal limits into it as per the statutory purpose. courts assume parliament confers power for particular statutory purposes
what happened in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Padfield established: a decision maker may enjoy a wide discretion, yet be under a legal duty to exercise it in certain circumstances.
this case concerned a statutory scheme to regulate a particular trade. to ensure the integrity of the scheme, parliament introduced a complaints process. a committee was established to to investigate such complaints but only had the power to hear complaints “if the Minister in any case so directs.”
A legitimate complaint was made but the Minister declined to refer it on to the committee for investigation because if he did it would expose his own failings and cause him significant political embarrassment.
this was successfully challenged - the Minister had abused the statutory power on two grounds:
1. Minister had acted on a legally irrelevant consideration
- Minister violated the statutory purpose for which the power had been given
despite the ostensibly unfettered nature of the power itself, the court had no difficulty in reading in those limitations
what dicta came out of Padfield
“The use of that adjective [unfettered], even in an Act of Parliament, can do nothing to unfetter the control which the judiciary have over the executive. “
“Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a whole and construction is always a matter if law for the court”
what is the significance of Padfield
when parliament confers a statutory power, it will confer it and then subject the exercise of that power to internal statutory controls.
A statute may say that X may reach a decision on X, Y, Z and any other matter that the decision maker considers relevant - this catch-all will be restrictively construed in the light of the statutory purpose and the reason why that statutory power was conferred
powers can also be restricted in other ways: by reference to the context of the decision making, context might invite limitations on the exercise of discretions e.g. the decision maker would have to have regard to the effect of decision making on sectional interests disproportionately affected in the context
what happened in the Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority case
The High Court imported Maori spiritual values into the decision making of the Planning Tribunal (now Environment Court under the RMA).
An application had been made under the relevant act at the time for a water consent - the Tribunal upheld the application and granted the water consent.
Local Maori opposed, it would adversely effect their spiritual relationship with the waters of the region. The Planning Tribunal placed to one side what they were saying - the values were legally irrelevant.
Maori successfully reviewed the tribunal decision. The High Court ruled that in appropriate cases, Maori spiritual values may be a mandatory relevant consideration and the decision maker must be shown to have proper regard to the consideration. Extrinsic aids may be needed to ascertain what those spiritual values might be - further, maybe the court should look at Waitangi Tribunal interpretations in ascertaining values
what happened in Attorney-general v New Zealand Maori Council (radio frequencies)
this case was about the 4th Labour government’s (Lange) decision to privatise the radio frequencies.
The Maori Council intervened, under the Treaty of Waitangi Maori were entitled to be gifted some of those frequencies, particularly in Auckland and Wellington where there were large concentrations of young Maori (to protect the language - state obligation).
The promotion of the maori language and culture was a mandatory relevant consideration, hedging the exercise of the discretionary power.
The High Court granted an interim injunction to pause the sale process, which continued until the Waitangi Tribunal decision. The Waitangi Tribunal held that they should be made available to Auckland and Wellington.
The Minister had regard to the WT report and elected to go ahead and sell as he had intended to do.
Maori Council game back and challenged but the Minister had done all that he was required to do and the Court is only concerned with the decision making process not the merits of the decision itself
what did the CCSU case say about illegality as a ground of review
“A public authority must understand correctly the law that regulates its decision making power and must give effect to it”
illegality encompasses which three situations
- an abuse of discretionary power under the Wednesbury principle e.g. exercising a power for an improper purpose or failing to have regard to a mandatory relevant consideration or if the decision maker relies upon a legally irrelevant consideration
- abdicating a statutory discretionary power e.g. adopting a rigid rule of policy (negating the exercise of discretion - a decision maker cannot fall back on a blanket rule instead of deciding) or acting under dictation of another person or body
- committing a jurisdictional error in making findings of law or fact
what amounts to a clear abuse of discretionary power and what may be more nuanced
a decision maker that acts in bad faith/fraud/malice clearly amounts to an abuse of discretionary power.
a decision maker may set out in good faith and yet still abuse his/her discretionary power if the power is exercised for an improper purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant grounds which must be factored in to the exercise of discretion
what happened in Municipal Council of Sydney v Campbell
the local council had power to compulsorily acquire land under statute, which said it was to be done “for carrying out improvements.”
Clearly the Council exceeded its power because it compulsorily acquired land, but not for the purpose of carrying out improvements but rather for making a profit arising from a future increase in the land value.
Held to be an abuse of power.
what happened in Rowling v Takaro Properties
this illustrates the problematic nature of this interpretive exercise in ascertaining parliament’s purpose when not clearly set out in statute.
In 1975 a judicial review action was brought and in 1988 an action in tort for damages. they both concerned the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964. Both courts had to ascertain purposes for which it was enacted by construing the statute and each came to an opposite conclusion as to what the statutory purposes where.
where decision makers are given two separate powers, they must not?
merge those separately granted - the decision maker must chose the power under which it wishes to act and cannot act under two separate powers at the same time unless they are identical
what happened in James Aviation Ltd v Air Services Licensing Appeal Authority
the decision maker erred by merging two separate powers which had been granted separately. the Appeal Authority had two separate jurisdictions:
- to confirm, modify or reverse a decision of the licensing authority
- the power to direct the authority to reconsider the matter
they ordered the rehearing of an application but subject to that application in principle being granted, so had erred
what happened in the retirement villages association case
the legislation gave the responsible minister two options:
- if the industry came up with a draft code of practice, the Minister had the power to approve it
- or he could promulgate his own code of practice
the minister erred by approving a draft industry code but materially altering its terms, placing the cost of refurbishment on the retirement village.
the court held the minister had improperly merged two discrete powers - he could do either, not accept or rewrite
ulterior statutory purposes pursued by a decision maker _____ invalidate the exercise of a statutory power
may or may not
what happened in Attorney-General v Ireland
the court held that a statutory power may be exercised for a concurrent ulterior purpose, in addition to the lawful/authorised statutory purpose. ulterior purposes do not necessarily invalidate the decision making.
a court must identify the character or quality of the ulterior purpose and ask if it runs counter to or circumvents or undermines the mandated purpose. the court emphasised the fulfilment of the statutory purpose is paramount
DOC was authorised to set aside a parcel of land within the reserve in order to erect a building needed for administration of the reserve - but they set up buildings to administer all the reserves in the greater Auckland region. Ireland brought challenge saying DOC exceeded its lawful powers, but the CA said it was permissible - they had met the purpose so pursuing ulterior purposes was okay
decision makers will often develop policies to guide them in the exercise of their discretions, what do the courts think of this
courts often encourage - it is seen to promote the consistency of decision making, particularly where the decision maker has broad discretionary power. the caution is that any policy or guideline adopted must itself further the statutory purposes or at least be consonant with it
what happened in Pub Charity v Attorney-general
the decision maker adopted a policy rule which the HC held sought to substitute for the statutory criteria laid down. the policy was seen to trump what the statute provided, exposing the decision to challenge
what happened in Attorney-General v Unitec Institute of Technology
an application was made by Unitec to be accredited as a university and the Minister put it on indefinite hold because of a government policy not to create any new universities pending a tertiary education review.
the court upheld the deferring because the Minister was not handing down a binding decision, rather it was a decision whether or not to initiate a certain process.
how must a decision maker consider relevant and irrelevant considerations
a decision maker must not be influenced by legally irrelevant considerations and must fairly have regard to all legally relevant considerations (at lease where they are mandatory consideration)
what happened in Fiordland Venison v Minister of Agriculture
- statutory regulations which required the Minister to grant a deer processing/export licence once the Minister was satisfied as to certain matters
- Minister declined application made by having regard to potential adverse economic effect it would have on other stakeholders in the industry (existing licence holders)
- but this was not a listed criteria and this exposed the decision to challenge
- where an applicant succeeds on judicial review, they will usually quash the decision and remit it back to the decision maker to reconsider. Here the regulation imposed a duty on the Minister to give a licence if satisfied and all other listed criteria were satisfied so the CA declared the applicant was entitled to a licence
what happened in Wahrliche v Bate
- an application to the DC judge for a grant of legal aid, declined owing to the limited pool of legal aid monies available
- on review, this was an irrelevant consideration to the stated statutory test, whether a grant was “desirable in the interests of justice”
- The DC judge was acting in public interest, but that consideration is not relevant and won’t provide a defence
why is a decision maker not always bound by relevant considerations
because there are two classes - mandatory and permissive
what comments did Cooke J make in CREEDNZ about the distinction between mandatory and permissive relevant considerations
“it is only when a statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken into account by the authority as a matter of legal obligation that the court holds a decision invalid on the ground now invoked. It is not enough that a consideration is one that may properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people, including the Court itself, would have taken into account if they had to make the decision”
“[The more] general and the more obviously important the consideration, the readier the court must be to hold that Parliament must have meant it to be taken into account”
only if parliament mandates a relevant consideration will?
a successful judicial review be found
does the decision maker have to take permissive relevant considerations
no - decision maker may or may not take into account depending on their inclination and judgment