Intoxication/Automatism/Insanity Flashcards
Coley
CA
Non driving Case showing restrictive approach.
Irrational behaviour is not necessarily “wholly involuntary action”.
McNaghten Rules
This is not based on medical definition of insanity.
1) D must suffer from a disease of the mind
2) This must have caused a defect of reason
3) This must have caused a lack of responsibility, either because D did not know the nature or quality of her act, or she did not know it was wrong.
Kemp
Disease of the mind is a legal question not medical.
D attacked wife as he was suffering from arteriosclerosis which caused him to lapse into unconsciousness. CA held: not guilty by reason of insanity. The fact that D’s condition was physical rather than mental does not prevent the insanity rules applying.
Quick
D attacked V causing harm. D said he was diabetic and was suffering hypoglycaemia caused by a lack of food after insulin. Held: D’s hypoglycaemia was externally cause so allowed to raise automatism not insanity.
Hennessey
D took car without consent. He was diabetic who had not taken medication so blood sugar was high. Therefore, prima facia he was insane (internal factor). But he tried to argue that there was other factors which caused this episode, underlying that he was under stress and anxiety. He argued that these were the external factors. CA held no, insanity. As he could not rely on automatism he changed his plea to guilty
Those who change their plea to guilty
Hennessy
Rabey (Canadian case)
The common stresses and disappointments of life do not constitute an external cause.
R v T [1990]
Psychological blows stemming from extreme circumstances can ground a claim of automatism.
D took part in robbery. T was apparently suffering post-traumatic stress disorder at the time as a result of being raped causing her to act in a dissociative state.
Held: this could give rise for potential of automatism rather than insanity, thus accepting the psychological blow as an external cause.
inconsistent with Coley
Heard
A drunken intent is still an intent.
Majewski
HL
He had consumed drugs and alcohol and claimed to have ‘blanked out’.
1) HL acknowledged that sometimes someone performs an action without the mens rea.
Approach in Majewski can be explained by ‘prior fault’. This prior fault in getting drunk is sufficient to provide the blameworthiness.
O’Connor
Austrialian courts ignore the Majewski decision.
Richardson
In the case where D is voluntary intoxicated and has no mens rea and basic intent. If the intoxication was not causative of outcome he will be acquitted.
The question is whether he realised or would have realised had he not been drinking.
Coley
Where D knew of the effects of mixing prescription medication with alcohol, this would constitute voluntary intoxication despite the fact that the drug had been medically prescribed.
Allen
D’s intoxication is voluntary even if he knew he was drinking it but underestimated the strength.
The appellant consumed some home made wine. This had a much greater effect on him than anticipated. He committed sexual assaults and claimed he was so drunk he did not know what he was doing. He argued that he had not voluntarily placed himself in that condition as the wine was much stronger than he realised.
Held:
The intoxication was still voluntary even though he had not realised the strength of it.
Beard
felony murder case where D raping girl suffocated her to death. He was convicted even though he was drunk and because at the time (before constructive malice was abolished by homicide act) you could be guilty of murder if you conducted a felony. Therefore, intention could be proved. Murder can also be committed by intent to kill or do GBH, implied malice. Therefore, when Birkenhead says when a specific intent is an element, all he means is when in murder you have to choose one of these intents evidence of intoxication should be taken into consideration to determine intent. Had case happen now, the specific intent would be to kill/cause GBH and D will be able to say “I did not” because it did not cross my drunken mind that I might be suffocating my victim
Heard
What is specific intent?
a crime was one of specific intent only where the prosecution has to prove a ‘state of mind addressing something beyond the prohibited act itself, namely its consequences’ The trial judge called this a ‘bolted-on’ intent – ‘with intent to …
Gallagher
Lack of Specific Intent and ‘Dutch Courage’
“If a man, whilst sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and makes preparation for it, knowing it is a wrong thing to do, and then gets himself drunk so as to give himself Dutch courage to do the killing, and whilst drunk carries out his intention, he cannot rely on this self-induced drunkenness as a defence to a charge of murder,
Lipman
D can be convicted of assault or any crime normally requiring proof of a subjective mental element, including unlawful act manslaughter
took drugs, hallucinated that he was fighting snakes, actually suffocating girlfriend. UAM basis intent crime, convicted him of that.
Jaggard v Dickinson
Mistaken belief in consent of owner may excuse D charged with basic intent offence of criminal damage where CDA 1971 s.5(3) specifies ‘honest belief’ suffices
divisional court held an intoxication mistake could provide a lawful excuse. D had been told by a friend that she could use his house, she turned up drunk in street where he lived and when she could not get into the house she broke in, causing damage. Unfortunately, it was the wrong house. Nevertheless, the divisional court relying from a phrase in the statute which made it clear that a mistake was enough if It was an honest one, came to conclusion that you can have a lawful excuse if your honest belief was a result of intoxication. A bad decision? CA in Jaggard should have said an honest belief is fine If sober, but does not tell us what happens if drunk so we should look for common law
Magee v CPS
D failed to stop after accident: no defence that because of intoxication D unaware of accident. If a sober person does not realise, then they do have a defence (Harding v Price) but court held this does not apply if reason is due to intoxication
Bailey
Unlikely Intoxicants
D, a diabetic took insulin but then failed to take food in accordance with instructions given, he claimed to be acting involuntarily, hthat he had a black out which led to him injuring a man. This came to CA to see if Majewski (basic intent rule) does not apply. Common knowledge that alcohol and dangerous drunks produces certain consequences, it produces aggression, unpredictable actions but in other kinds of cases there Is no need to apply this strict rule, therefore if D becomes intoxicated through another route (such as misuse of insulin) then another urle can apply. This was a s20 basic intent rule, the test was: was D reckless in the sense that he realised that there was a risk that he would become dangerous/unpredictable? If he did then that priori fault of misusing the drunk knowing this makes him liable for s20 offence, unlike Majewski it is a subjective test
Hardie
D took a large dose of his ex-partner’s Valium tablets (sedditive tablet) after she ordered him out of her flat.He tried to overdose this to get sympathy from ex partner, but what he did not know was that in overdose, Valium can cause aggression, so he set fire to the flat. Although a sedative, in overdose Valium may induce aggression. D set fire to the flat with his girlfriend in it, and was charged with s.1(2) CDA 1971, damaging property being reckless whether life was endangered. D said he lacked mens rea
The CA held that the correct question was whether, if D lacked the mens rea for the offence through intoxication, he was reckless in taking the Valium. The court noted that this had not been established:
Kingston
Involuntary Intoxication
the HL decided that the normal rules of AR+MR-D do apply where the intoxication is involuntary
Hence: (1) If D is innocent of fault in becoming intoxicated (eg his soft drink is ‘laced’) he is not prevented from arguing a lack of mens rea or actus reus or relying on a mistaken belief in defence:
‘once the involuntary nature of the intoxication is added the … theories of Majewski fall away, and the position reverts to what it would have been if Majewski had not been decided, namely that the offence is not made out’ (Lord Mustill)
Sullivan
Insanity
However there is a rationale for imposing some degree of control on those whose condition makes them a danger to others:
“the purpose of the legislation of the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in 1800, has been to protect society against recurrence of dangerous conduct”
