Intoxication/Automatism/Insanity Flashcards

You may prefer our related Brainscape-certified flashcards:
1
Q

Coley

CA

A

Non driving Case showing restrictive approach.

Irrational behaviour is not necessarily “wholly involuntary action”.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

McNaghten Rules

A

This is not based on medical definition of insanity.

1) D must suffer from a disease of the mind
2) This must have caused a defect of reason
3) This must have caused a lack of responsibility, either because D did not know the nature or quality of her act, or she did not know it was wrong.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Kemp

A

Disease of the mind is a legal question not medical.

D attacked wife as he was suffering from arteriosclerosis which caused him to lapse into unconsciousness. CA held: not guilty by reason of insanity. The fact that D’s condition was physical rather than mental does not prevent the insanity rules applying.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Quick

A

D attacked V causing harm. D said he was diabetic and was suffering hypoglycaemia caused by a lack of food after insulin. Held: D’s hypoglycaemia was externally cause so allowed to raise automatism not insanity.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Hennessey

A

D took car without consent. He was diabetic who had not taken medication so blood sugar was high. Therefore, prima facia he was insane (internal factor). But he tried to argue that there was other factors which caused this episode, underlying that he was under stress and anxiety. He argued that these were the external factors. CA held no, insanity. As he could not rely on automatism he changed his plea to guilty

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Those who change their plea to guilty

A

Hennessy

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Rabey (Canadian case)

A

The common stresses and disappointments of life do not constitute an external cause.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

R v T [1990]

A

Psychological blows stemming from extreme circumstances can ground a claim of automatism.

D took part in robbery. T was apparently suffering post-traumatic stress disorder at the time as a result of being raped causing her to act in a dissociative state.
Held: this could give rise for potential of automatism rather than insanity, thus accepting the psychological blow as an external cause.

inconsistent with Coley

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Heard

A

A drunken intent is still an intent.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Majewski

HL

A

He had consumed drugs and alcohol and claimed to have ‘blanked out’.

1) HL acknowledged that sometimes someone performs an action without the mens rea.

Approach in Majewski can be explained by ‘prior fault’. This prior fault in getting drunk is sufficient to provide the blameworthiness.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

O’Connor

A

Austrialian courts ignore the Majewski decision.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Richardson

A

In the case where D is voluntary intoxicated and has no mens rea and basic intent. If the intoxication was not causative of outcome he will be acquitted.

The question is whether he realised or would have realised had he not been drinking.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Coley

A

Where D knew of the effects of mixing prescription medication with alcohol, this would constitute voluntary intoxication despite the fact that the drug had been medically prescribed.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Allen

A

D’s intoxication is voluntary even if he knew he was drinking it but underestimated the strength.

The appellant consumed some home made wine. This had a much greater effect on him than anticipated. He committed sexual assaults and claimed he was so drunk he did not know what he was doing. He argued that he had not voluntarily placed himself in that condition as the wine was much stronger than he realised.

Held:

The intoxication was still voluntary even though he had not realised the strength of it.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Beard

A

felony murder case where D raping girl suffocated her to death. He was convicted even though he was drunk and because at the time (before constructive malice was abolished by homicide act) you could be guilty of murder if you conducted a felony. Therefore, intention could be proved. Murder can also be committed by intent to kill or do GBH, implied malice. Therefore, when Birkenhead says when a specific intent is an element, all he means is when in murder you have to choose one of these intents evidence of intoxication should be taken into consideration to determine intent. Had case happen now, the specific intent would be to kill/cause GBH and D will be able to say “I did not” because it did not cross my drunken mind that I might be suffocating my victim

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Heard

A

What is specific intent?

a crime was one of specific intent only where the prosecution has to prove a ‘state of mind addressing something beyond the prohibited act itself, namely its consequences’ The trial judge called this a ‘bolted-on’ intent – ‘with intent to …

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Gallagher

A

Lack of Specific Intent and ‘Dutch Courage’
“If a man, whilst sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and makes preparation for it, knowing it is a wrong thing to do, and then gets himself drunk so as to give himself Dutch courage to do the killing, and whilst drunk carries out his intention, he cannot rely on this self-induced drunkenness as a defence to a charge of murder,

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

Lipman

A

D can be convicted of assault or any crime normally requiring proof of a subjective mental element, including unlawful act manslaughter

took drugs, hallucinated that he was fighting snakes, actually suffocating girlfriend. UAM basis intent crime, convicted him of that.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Jaggard v Dickinson

A

Mistaken belief in consent of owner may excuse D charged with basic intent offence of criminal damage where CDA 1971 s.5(3) specifies ‘honest belief’ suffices

divisional court held an intoxication mistake could provide a lawful excuse. D had been told by a friend that she could use his house, she turned up drunk in street where he lived and when she could not get into the house she broke in, causing damage. Unfortunately, it was the wrong house. Nevertheless, the divisional court relying from a phrase in the statute which made it clear that a mistake was enough if It was an honest one, came to conclusion that you can have a lawful excuse if your honest belief was a result of intoxication. A bad decision? CA in Jaggard should have said an honest belief is fine If sober, but does not tell us what happens if drunk so we should look for common law

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

Magee v CPS

A

D failed to stop after accident: no defence that because of intoxication D unaware of accident. If a sober person does not realise, then they do have a defence (Harding v Price) but court held this does not apply if reason is due to intoxication

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

Bailey

A

Unlikely Intoxicants

D, a diabetic took insulin but then failed to take food in accordance with instructions given, he claimed to be acting involuntarily, hthat he had a black out which led to him injuring a man. This came to CA to see if Majewski (basic intent rule) does not apply. Common knowledge that alcohol and dangerous drunks produces certain consequences, it produces aggression, unpredictable actions but in other kinds of cases there Is no need to apply this strict rule, therefore if D becomes intoxicated through another route (such as misuse of insulin) then another urle can apply. This was a s20 basic intent rule, the test was: was D reckless in the sense that he realised that there was a risk that he would become dangerous/unpredictable? If he did then that priori fault of misusing the drunk knowing this makes him liable for s20 offence, unlike Majewski it is a subjective test

22
Q

Hardie

A

D took a large dose of his ex-partner’s Valium tablets (sedditive tablet) after she ordered him out of her flat.He tried to overdose this to get sympathy from ex partner, but what he did not know was that in overdose, Valium can cause aggression, so he set fire to the flat. Although a sedative, in overdose Valium may induce aggression. D set fire to the flat with his girlfriend in it, and was charged with s.1(2) CDA 1971, damaging property being reckless whether life was endangered. D said he lacked mens rea

The CA held that the correct question was whether, if D lacked the mens rea for the offence through intoxication, he was reckless in taking the Valium. The court noted that this had not been established:

23
Q

Kingston

A

Involuntary Intoxication

the HL decided that the normal rules of AR+MR-D do apply where the intoxication is involuntary
Hence: (1) If D is innocent of fault in becoming intoxicated (eg his soft drink is ‘laced’) he is not prevented from arguing a lack of mens rea or actus reus or relying on a mistaken belief in defence:
‘once the involuntary nature of the intoxication is added the … theories of Majewski fall away, and the position reverts to what it would have been if Majewski had not been decided, namely that the offence is not made out’ (Lord Mustill)

24
Q

Sullivan

A

Insanity

However there is a rationale for imposing some degree of control on those whose condition makes them a danger to others:
“the purpose of the legislation of the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in 1800, has been to protect society against recurrence of dangerous conduct”

25
Q

Sims

A

D turned up for trial, unfit through drugs, couldn’t communicate with legal advisor, judge remanded him in custody. D spent evenings in prison where he managed to get hold of more drugs and twice he turned up unfit so could not give evidence in this case. CA said self induced unfitness does not count. In the end the trial went on without his presence.

26
Q

McNaghten

A

To establish a defence of insanity the party must be labouring under a “defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong”.

27
Q

McNaghten Rules

A

1) D must suffer from a disease of the mind
2) This must have caused a defect of reason
3) This must have caused a lack of responsibility, either because D did not know the nature or quality of her act, or she did not know it was wrong.

28
Q

Clarke

A

Disease must affect D in particular way

McNaghten rules applies to those who by reason of a disease of the mind are deprived of their power of reasoning, no those who retain their power of reasoning but who in the moment fail to use their powers.

29
Q

Sullivan

A

Disease of the Mind

D, a man of ‘blameless reputation’, suffered from epilepsy and, during a seizure, kicked V who went to his aid. The HL held that the trial judge had correctly ruled that this was a defence of insanity rather than non-insane automatism.

Trial judge held that D could plead guilty to assault or plead insanity. D chose to plead assault, but he was blameless with what he did and he was not insane with the consent of the word

30
Q

Sullivan

A

Epilepsy and diabetes

Diplock said it was natural to feel reluctant to label D as insane

31
Q

Quick

A

Epilepsy and diabetes

¥ said that though the law regards some diabetic episodes such as insanity, no doctor would send a diabetic to a mental hospital

32
Q

Burgess

A

Sleepwalking

¥ court takes even harder line than in traditional formula in case of one off event, not prone to occur. D attacked a friend while sleep walking, he suffered from a sleep disorder but experts said unlikely to reoccur. Nevertheless, the Court held the proper verdict was one of insanity they said Denning’s dictum (disease prone to reoccur is a disease is one of the mind), they also said that a disease not prone to reoccur can still be a disease of the mind. It is still not determinative.

33
Q

Windle

A

man killed his wife because he suffered symptoms of communicated insanity, he then kills wife but when arrested he said “I suppose they will hang me for it” showing that he supposes that he knew that in law it was wrong. Court held that if he knew that what he did was legally wrong then this excludes from the defense insanity. If they know or have a sense of what the law will say then they cannot rely on this.

34
Q

Stapleton v R (

A

Australia is in favour of a test whether D knows what was done in a moral sense.

35
Q

Oye

A

Insanity and Self-Defence

D wanted to rely on self defense, even though it was an insane delusion, he tried to point ot the criminal justice and immigration act which allows you to use reasonable force in self-defense in reasonable in circumstances as D believed them to be. D suffered from an insane delusion that led to him attacking police officers in the belief that they were evil spirits. When parliament legislates it legislates against background of common law.

36
Q

Bratty v A-G for NI

A

“no act is punishable if it is done involuntarily and an involuntary act in this context…means an act which is done by the muscles without any control of the mind,

37
Q

Bratty

A

D charged with murder of woman he strangled. He claimed to be in a state of automatism, brought on by a form of epilepsy. HL held that where the cause of automatism is one which falls under the rules governing insanity (defect of reason from the mind – McNaughten rules), then the proper outcome is that this is a defence of insanity and D cannot in addition to this put forward a defence of automatism. It is for the court to classify how particular form of involuntariness is perceived by the law.

38
Q

Broome v Perkins

A

D was accused of careless driving, circumstances were that he was a diabetic, he took insulin properly and he ate properly in accordance with medical instructions. However, one day whilst driving, his blood sugar suddenly dropped and he drove erratically, colliding with another vehicle. As he became to realize what happened, he reported the matter to the police. The Magistrates though that he should not be convicted, they thought he had driven on ‘automatic pilot’ and therefore not driving at all. Upon appeal the divisional court disagreed, they said that D was driving because medical evidence suggested that he could still react to stimuli, albeit imperfectly. Therefore, his mind and limbs were not totally disengaged.

39
Q

A-G’s Reference No 2 of 1992

A

Automatism & Loss of Control

driving without awareness’ not automatism

¥ Driver on long journey crashed into car which stopped on hard shoulder on road. Medical evidence suggested that lack of stimulation on long journeys can cause a condition of ‘driving without awareness’, where D might not realize an obstacle. Court held: this was not automatism.

40
Q

Coley, Harris and McGhee

Coley,

A

D during brief psychotic episode, induced by cannabis entered a house and stabbed a neighbor, it seems that Coley acted out a role of a character in a video game. He does not qualify for automatism due to intoxication (Cannibis). But the CA specifically approved A-G reference as to what constitutes automatism. Therefore, cannot confine to driving cases.

41
Q

Coley, Harris and McGhee

McGhee

A

¥ D took prescription drugs for his condition. But to go to sleep he needed alcohol. He went to an off license and caused actual bodily harm to one person and stabbed another. Not automatism, he was at fault in causing the condition. Court noted a degree of control to go to off license and fighting.

42
Q

R v T

A

T was charged with a handbag robbery in the course of which she stabbed another woman. T was apparently suffering post-traumatic stress disorder at the time as a result of being raped: this caused her to act in a dissociative state ‘as though in a dream’

However, this appears inconsistence with what was said in Coley, now it is probably a description of irrational, not involuntary behavior. If the outcome is simply that D is convicted then this cannot be right because this would be to convict without mens rea. Robbery requires mens rea, but it would be right if next question for Jury is “did T have mens rea”, even though condition is not her fault, it would be fair to acquit her on this basis but the law is unclear here.

43
Q

Bingham

A

What is external?

Diabetic was accused of stealing coke and a sandwich, he said he was unaware of his actions because of low blood sugar. Trial judge said that diabetics is a defense of insanity in law. CA overturned this and said it was wrong, instead the court should have distinguished between a diabetic who fails to medicate, thus causing blood sugar to rise and this is classified as insanity because diabetic is in control and this is an internal factor. However, if diabetic takes insulin and blood sugar results from this then this is an external factor, it is the insulin which has caused it.

44
Q

Hennessey

A

A ‘one-off’?

D was arrested in his car at traffic lights, he had taken car without consent, he seemed rational at the time but then appeared that he was diabetic who had not taken medication so blood sugar was high. Therefore, prima facia he was insane (internal factor). But he tried to argue that there was other factors which caused this episode, underlying that he was under stress and anxiety. He argued that these were the external factors. CA held no, insanity was only applicable defense, other matters not capable in law of being external factors being capable.

45
Q

Quick

A

(objective test) – D was a diabetic and he claimed that taking insulin had caused him to loose consciousness and cause injury. CA said this defense was regarded as automatism and should have gone to the Jury. Regarded as your fault if upon an objective test a reasonable person would have foreseen the possible outcome, this extends to taking alcohol with prescribed drugs or having regular meals after taking insulin

46
Q

Coley, McGhee & Harris

Coley

A

he had a brief spell of mental illness, but because it was brough on by cannabis, the dominant defence was intoxication. Same as in McGhee, the court looked at the intoxication rules.

47
Q

Coley, McGhee & Harris

Harris

A

the only one where D was an alcoholic but the only one where the Majewski rules did not apply. D was an alcoholic but stopped his drinking very suddenly, this triggered a withdrawal reaction, he started a fire in his own home after hearing voices. Held: this was not common law arson because it was his own property but charged with criminal damage, being reckless whether his neighbours lives were endangered. Trial judge looked at it as a case of intoxication. But CA said no this was wrong because actual cause was not his drinking, it was his withdrawal effect. Therefore, do not apply Majewski rules. D did not also fall within McNaughten rules (where not insane if you know something is legally wrong, you must know it is not wrong). Therefore, the proper thing to have done was whether Harris had mens rea, judged by ordinary rules.

48
Q

Kingston

A

A drunken mens rea is still mens rea

49
Q

Specific/basic intent

Majewski

A

Offences which can be satisfied by recklessness are basic offences and those satisfied by intention are specific intent.

However, Lord Simon discusses a test based on intention as to consequences. But this is problematic because murder is a specific intent crime and can be committed without intention to kill.

50
Q

Specific/basic intent

Heard

A

Sexual assualt is a basic intent offence, despite mens rea of intentional touching, runs outer intention/reckless distinction in Majewshi.

2) Implies all sexual offences will be classed as basic intent where D’s mens rea relates solely to D’s intentional contact and V’s not consent.
3) provides alternative test based on ulterior mens rea. This is just as problematic as Lord Simons test because this means murder would not be a specific intent crime.

51
Q

Specific/basic intent

O’Conner

A

Austrialian court has rejected Majewski distinction.

52
Q

Gallagher

A

Where intoxicated D lacks mens rea for specific intent offence, this is usually the end, D’s intoxication cannot replace her lack of mens rea, but in dutch courage cases, where D becomes intoxicated at T1 in order to commit the specific intent offence at T2 then D will be guilty.