Insanity & sane automatism Flashcards
Sullivan [1984] 1 A.C. 156
insanity
=> lord Diplock ‘ “mind” in the M’Naghten Rules is used in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding ‘ [172]
=> epilepsy may constitute insanity
=> My Lords, it is natural to feel reluctant to attach the label of insanity to a sufferer from … epilepsy … even though the expression in the context of a special verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity” is a technical one which includes a purely temporary and intermittent suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding resulting from the occurrence of an epileptic fit. (Lord Diplock at 173)
D had an epileptic fit and attacked his friend
M’Naghten [1843] UKHL J16
insanity - general rule - wrong
M’Nagthen rule : presumption of sanity
=> at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
(1) a defect of reason,
(2)from disease of the mind,
(3) as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.’
we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment.’
[210-211] : ‘If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course therefore has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong… ‘
wrong in (3) used to be read as wrong legally
Daniel M’Naghten attempted to kill the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, but instead shot and killed Edward Drummond, the Prime Minister’s Secretary. M’Naghten was suffering from insane delusions at the time of the killing.
Kopsch (1927) 19 Cr. App. R. 50
insanity - defect of reason
If the defendant knew his actions are illegal, and knew the nature and quality of his acts, the defence of insanity is inapplicable. It does not matter that the defendant was acting under a subconscious or irresistible impulse when carrying them out.
The defendant killed a woman by strangling her with his neck-tie. He told police that she had asked him to strangle her as part of a sex act. He later claimed that this belief, and his actions, were due to a mental condition he was suffering from. This condition was said to have instilled in him an irresistible, subconscious impulse. The defendant was convicted of murder.
R v Clarke [1972] 1 All ER 219
insanity - defect of reason
Short periods of absent-mindedness fell far short of a defect of reason.
‘The evidence fell very far short of showing either that she suffered from a defect of reason or that the consequences of that defect in reason, if any, were that she was unable to know the nature and quality of the act she was doing. The M’Naghten Rules relate to accused persons who by reason of a disease of the mind are deprived of the power of reasoning. They do not apply and never have applied to a momentary failure by someone to concentrate. ‘
Mrs Clarke, a 58 year old woman, absent-mindedly placed a jar of mincemeat, a jar of coffee and some butter into her bag whilst shopping in a supermarket. She had no recollection of placing the items in her bag. Medical evidence was given at her trial which stated that she was suffering from depression and was diabetic.
Burgess [1991] 1 Q.B. 92
insanity - defect of reason
=> sleepwalking is treated as insanity
if one-time thing treated as automatism if it is usual => insanity
The appellant smashed a bottle over a woman’s head and then struck her with a video recorder whilst she was asleep. The appellant had no recollection of the events and claimed he had been sleepwalking.
R v Keal [2022] EWCA Crim 341
insanity - defect of the mind - wrong
=> does not fit within the doctrine of insanity (not a defect of reason in MN rules)
[48] ‘…we conclude that under the M’Naghten Rules, the defence of insanity is not available to a defendant who, although he knew what he was doing was wrong, he believed that he had no choice but to commit the act in question.’
=> per Lord Burnett CJ:
[41] In order to establish the defence of insanity within the M’Naghten Rules on the ground of not knowing the act was “wrong”, the defendant must establish both that (a) he did not know that his act was unlawful (i.e. contrary to law) and (b) he did not know that his act was “morally” wrong (also expressed as wrong “by the standards of ordinary people”) : hard test to satisfy
Changes the law. Has been suffering from addiction, he comes back home tries to kill himself, and then stabs his father, mother and grandmother. While he is doing it, he apologises and claims that the ‘devil made [him] do it’
Quick [1973] Q.B. 910
insanity - disease of the mind
appeal allowed : jury should have been told to consider sane automatism
=> non-insane automatism is caused by an external factor, while disease of the mind is caused by an internal factor
=> strange rules around insulin. Taking insulin and then acting without volition may be automatism (as the insulin is an external cause). Failing to take insulin and then acting under those effects may be insanity (as the reaction to the lack of insulin is an internal cause)
=> at 922 , Lawton LJ:
‘A self-induced incapacity will not excuse… nor will one which could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something, as, for example, taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs’
D was a diabetic and suffered from a hypoglycaemic (low blood sugar) attack at the time of alleged offence due to injection of insulin and not eating afetrwards
R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287
insanity -disease of the mind - insulin cases
=> The appropriate defence was insanity, his mental state was caused by diabetes
=> The question in many cases, and this is one such case, is whether the function of the mind was disturbed on the one hand by disease or on the other hand by some external factor.… stress, anxiety and depression can no doubt be the result of the operation of external factors, but they are not, it seems to us, in themselves separately or together external factors… They constitute a state of mind which is prone to recur. They lack the feature of novelty or accident…’ [14] per Lord Lane
The appellant had stolen a car and was stopped by the police whilst driving it. He was taken to the police station and at first felt well but later taken to hospital because he was unwell. He was a diabetic and was required to take two insulin doses per day. He had not been taking his insulin as he was in an emotional state as his wife had just left him. The appellant had no recollection of taking the car. The appellant raised the defence of automatism, however, the trial judge ruled that the appropriate defence would be insanity. The appellant changed his plea to guilty and then appealed against his conviction.
Codere (1917) 12 Cr. App. R. 21
insanity - nature and quality of the act
[27] per Montagu LCJ:
The Court is of opinion that in using the language “nature and quality” the judges were only dealing with the physical character of the act and were not intending to distinguish between the physical and moral aspects of the act.
“If the accused does know either that his act is morally wrong according to the ordinary standard adopted by reasonable men or that it is legally wrong then it cannot be said that he does not know he was doing what was wrong.” (Lord Reading)
The appellant was convicted of murder. He sought to rely on the defence of insanity, however, at the time of the killing he knew that it was unlawful to kill.
Loake v CPS [2017] EWHC 2855
insanity - nature and quality of the act
further discussion of insanity as a negation of MR :
[39] In virtually every case where the defendant proves that he did not know the nature and quality of his act at the time he performed it, then he will not be criminally responsible irrespective of the first limb of the M’Naghten test, because he will lack the mens rea for the alleged offence’
[40] It is not correct, however, simply to regard insanity reductively, as operating simply on the basis that someone who is suffering from a disease of the mind will always lack mens rea for the offence.
[41] It is possible for someone to have the full mens rea for a criminal offence whilst at the same time, because of a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind, not know what he is doing is wrong. If a man intentionally kills his wife because of his deluded belief that he is under threat from a representative of Satan and has received a divine order to slay, and that it is lawful to comply with divine orders, then he possesses the mens rea for murder but is not guilty of murder because he does not know that what he is doing is unlawful… ‘
[38] Three examples often given where it could be said that the defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act are:
(a) where A kills B under an insane delusion that he is breaking a jar…
(b) where a madman cuts a woman’s throat under the delusion that he is cutting a loaf of bread…
(c) where a drunken nurse puts a baby on the fire thinking it is a log…
+ insanity defence applies to strict liability offences (contrary to what was said in Harper)
harassment bc she kept forgetting that shr had sent the messages
Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725
insanity - self-defence
Where a defendant suffering from an insane delusion that he was being attacked or threatened reacted violently, using force that was reasonable in the circumstances as he perceived them to be, he was not entitled to an acquittal based on self-defence. An insane person could not set the standards of reasonableness as to the degree of force used by reference to his own insanity.
Held: the evidence suggested that although he was suffering delusions, he was not using force to defend himself or that the amount of force used was more than what was reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be
at [36]:
‘But in any event we think that “exempt from punishment” for these particular purposes is to be equated with exemption from conviction. It does not necessarily mean that an accused is also exempt from a special verdict of “Not Guilty by reason of insanity”.’
D believed that police officers were evil spirits who were set on killing him, and attacked them.
Davis (1881) Cox CC 563
insanity - intoxication
= Here distinguish between temporary intoxication (which is not generally insanity) and mental illnesses caused using drugs (which may become insanity)
‘… drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which drunkenness leads are different things; and if a man by drunkenness brings on a state of disease which causes such a degree of madness, even for a time, which would have relieved him from responsibility if it had been caused in any other way, then he would not be criminally responsible.
…If you think there was a distinct disease caused by drinking, but differing from drunkenness, and that by reason thereof he did not know that the act was wrong, you will find a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity. ‘
Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223
insanity - intoxication
Hughes LJ [18] : In order to engage the law of insanity, it is not enough that there is an effect on the mind, or, in the language of the M’Naghten rules, a ‘defect of reason’. There must also be what the law classifies as a disease of the mind. Direct acute effects on the mind of intoxicants, voluntarily taken, are not so classified. That is the distinction drawn by Stephen J in Davis and maintained ever since.
[24]… the defence of automatism is not available to a defendant who has induced an acute state of involuntary behaviour by his own fault… the voluntary consumption of intoxicants leading to an acute condition is the prime example of self-induced behaviour.
stabbed a woman during a psychotic episode induced by voluntary intoxication. Thus he could not rely on insanity.
Bratty [1963] A.C. 386
non-insane automatism - evidential burden
the applicable test of automatism is set out in att gen ref’s no2 of 1992 : total destruction of voluntary self control ( impaired or partial does not suffice)
= directed towards insanity
at 413 per Lord Denning ‘… whilst the ultimate burden rests on the Crown of proving every element essential in the crime, nevertheless in order to prove that the act was a voluntary act, the Crown is entitled to rely on the presumption that every man has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for his crimes: …’
409 per Lord Denning:
‘No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context… means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleep-walking’
“Any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind (p. 412).”
The appellant strangled and killed a young woman whilst giving her a lift. He then dumped her body on the side of the road and drove home. The appellant was a friend of the family of the deceased and had often visited their home and given her lifts. The appellant suffered from psychomotor epilepsy and stated that at the time of the killing a terrible feeling came over him and he was not conscious of his actions. He wished to raise the defence of automatism but the trial judge refused to allow this to be put before the jury and directed the jury with regards to insanity. The jury rejected the insanity defence and convicted him of murder. The appellant appealed contending the judge was wrong not to allow the defence of automatism.
Charlson (1955) 39 Cr. App. R. 37
non-insane automatism - level of destruction of control required
= If he did not know what he was doing, if his actions were purely automatic and his mind had no control over the movement of his limbs, if he was in the same position as a person in an epileptic fit and no responsibility rests on him at all, then the proper verdict is Not Guilty. [43] Barry J
