Causation

Question 1

R v White [1910] 2 KB 124

Causation (but for)

Answer 1

Not convicted of murder bc it can’t be proved that he caused her death. She would’ve died anyways => only attempted murder.

Son killed his mother by poisoning her (cyanide). Charged with murder. But post-mortem: mom died from a heart-attack not poison.

Question 2

Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273

Causation (legal cause)

see also Cato (1976): the conduct has to be more than de minimis, need not be the sole cause, need not be direct

Answer 2

It is not a culpable cause so Dalloway was not convicted (his behaviour ought to be salient)

a man rides a cart driven by a horse. He is not holding on to the reins. A little boy gets crushed by the horse and die. Charged with homicide. There’s eveidence tht if even if held the reins, no time to avoid the boy.

Question 3

Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552

Causation (legal cause)

Answer 3

=>Appeal dismissed. His conviction was upheld.

The offence was one of strict liability and therefore fault in causing death was not required. It was sufficient that his driving was a cause of death it need not be a substantial cause.

This dismissed the Dalloway authority

The appellant was driving on a dual carriageway when a man stepped into the road right in front of him. He was unable to stop and the man was killed. The appellant was not speeding and had not in anyway been driving recklessly or without care. Two witnesses gave evidence that it would have been impossible to avoid hitting the man given the closeness to the car when he stepped out. However, at the time of incident, the appellant had no driving licence or insurance. He was convicted of causing death by driving without a licence under s.3ZB Road Traffic Act 1988. He appealed on two grounds:

Question 4

Hughes [2013] UKSC 56

Causation (legal cause)

Answer 4

supreme court overturned the decision (there was nothing wrong with his driving). He should be punished for driving w/o license but no causation of death.

defendant driving w/o driving license (nothing wrong with his driving). Car opposite side of the road. Crashes into the defendant’s car and dies. The defendant is charged with 3zb.

Question 5

Wilson (James) [2018] EWCA Crim 1184:

Causation (legal cause)

Answer 5

Jay J rejected this argument. The driving under section 3ZB does not need to be so bad that it constitutes another offence, for instance driving with undue care, just that the driving materially increased the risk of death. The cause of death needs to be more than de minimis.

This n ew reading would convict Dalloway

D was speeding, had cannabis in his system and was driving without insurance. D argued that the prosecution needed to prove that V would not have died if D had been driving at the speed limit, or else it was merely a but for cause.

Question 6

Environmental Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Company (Abertillery) Ltd [1998] 1 ALL ER 481. (HL)

Novus actus (human intervention/ natural event)

Answer 6

Lord Hoffman disagrees with this argument: he contends that if this is reasonably foreseeable (ECC was negligent (no system oof protection))then it doesn’t not break the CoC = the intervention of a human is a “normal fact of life” so CoC not broken. This decision was criticized.

departing from the orthodox test in environmental offenses

pollution offence, the defendant is a company. ECC is a firm in Wales. Charged with having caused pollution which damaged the river A trespasser broke into the premises and caused a diesel discharge. Applying the orthodox test, ECC would not be liable.

Question 7

Kennedy no 2 [2007] UKHL 38

Novus actus (V’s intervention)

Answer 7

Lord Bingham: The old orthodox position is restored the buyer made a free, deliberate and informed decision. The seller cannot be convicted of manslaughter.

=> it doesn’t overrule the previous ECC decision but restricts it to environmental offences.

Orthodox approach comes back

omeone supplies a prohibited drug (heroin), and the buyer (self-injection) dies of overdose. The drug dealer claims that he should be acquitted on the grounds of the orthodox test. The defendant is charged with manslaughter. On the basis of ECC case, the lower courts convicted him.

Question 8

Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279

Novus actus (human intervention

Answer 8

Appeal dismissed; D was rightly convicted +using the girl as a shield caudsed her death.
The police sniper’s shot did not constitute a novus actus interviens

D kidnapped his girlfriend, she was killed when police sniper fired upon D
D was convicted for manslaughter

Question 9

Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104

Question 10

(R v Williams and Davies [1992] 1 WLR 380)

novus actus (V’s intervention)

Answer 10

If D’s conduct prompts the response from V, D is still liable if V’s acts are within the range of expected responses in that situation => not voluntary act.

NB : V’s reaction must ‘be proportionate to the threat’ and NOT ‘so daft as to make it his own voluntary act which amounted to a novus actus interveniens and consequently broke the chain of causation’.

V is a hitchhiker picked up by D. V jumps out of the moving car and dies. Initially D convicted of manslaughter and robbery. Jury accepted that robbery and threatened violence were pre-planned

Question 11

Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R CA

Novus actus (V’s intervention)

Answer 11

Convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm => V’s response must be reasonably foreseeable (does not need to have been foreseen by D). The jury should bear in mind ‘any particular characteristic of V and the fact that in the agony of the moment he may act without thought and deliberation.’

similar to Williams

A young woman accepted a lift from D to a party
D drove to a deserted location and made sexual advances but was rejected
Later, when D was driving he made sexual advances
The woman jumped out of car and sustained injury

Question 12

Martin (1832) 5 C & P 128.

novus actus (thin skull rule)

Answer 12

=> D must take V as he finds them

Question 13

Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411 (CA)

novus actus (thin skull rule)

Answer 13

The thin skull includes religious beliefs (as fundamental rights)

heavily criticized

After having been stabbed by D, V refused consent to a blood transfusion (it was assumed the blood transfusion would have saved V’s life). She did so in accordance with her faith as a Jehovah’s Witness.

D appealed conviction for manslaughter, claiming V’s refusal was unreasonable and broke the chain of causation.

Question 14

Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690:

novus actus (V’s intervention)

Answer 14

Appeal allowed; causation could be found by a jury, and a new trial was therefore ordered

NB: Ultimately W was acquitted

Threw sulfuric acid over V. The latter is paralysed and in a state of constant pain. He travels to Belgium to carry out his euthanasia. D is charged with murder and applying a corrosive substance and convicted under both charges. She appealed on the murder charge: argued on behalf of D that V’s choice to die together with the Belgian doctors ‘conduct broke the chain of causation. In teh crown court the murder charge was removed => appeal

Court of Appeal: It is open to a jury to find on these facts that V’s request for euthanasia, and the doctors’ subsequent conduct in granting his wish were not independent of D’s conduct were not voluntary.

Question 15

Field [2021] EWCA Crim 380

causation (V’s intervention)

Answer 15

Court of Appeal: Rejected D’s argument that V was taking a free, voluntary and informed decision by drinking the alcohol, knowing its strength. V had been deliberately led into a dangerous situation by someone purporting to be deeply concerned about his wellbeing and safety. V thought the whisky was from such a person, not one who wished him dead. D’s undisclosed purpose altered the nature of his conduct**. D’s conviction for murder is upheld. **

Question: is it consistent with the ruling in Kennedy n°2? => was V any less significantly ‘informed’ than V in Kennedy (no 2)?

The Court drew an analogy: two friends going swimming (one is unconfident with his swimming skills a,nd counts on the other friend – claiming to be a good swim

D (Benjamin Field) begins a ‘loving’ relationship with V (Peter Farquhar). Having persuaded V to alter his will in D’s favour, there was evidence that D planned to bring about the end of V’s life in a way that made it appear self-inflicted, left a bottle of strong whisky for V, knowing V had given up alcohol for medical reasons and that it would react badly with his prescription medicine. V drank the alcohol and died from acute alcohol toxicity. D claimed not to be present when V drank the whisky or when V died but the jury rejected that.

Question 16

Morby (1882) 8 QBD 571

Actus Novus (omission)

Answer 16

Lord Coleridge overturned the conviction. Appears to require proof that the medical treatment would have saved the child, not might have. = demanding standard to establish causation in omission.

a boy died of smallpox. His father (in conformity with religious view did not summon a doctor for help. The medical evidence at trial had been that proper medical attention might have saved or prolonged the child’s life, and would have increased his chance of recovery, but might have been of no avail.

Question 17

Broughton [2020] EWCA Crim 1093:

Actus novus (omission)

Answer 17

Conviction for manslaughter overturned

Lord Burnett CJ in Broughton [2020] EWCA Crim 1093:

‘In order to establish a breach of duty was a substantial cause of death, it must be established to the criminal standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the person concerned would have lived.

The test is not (as the prosecution had argued): are members of the jury sure that the negligence deprived V of a significant or substantial chance of survival?

The expert witness unable to rule out that death would have occurred even if V had had had medical assistance. Would need proof beyond reasonable doubt that V would have lived with the assistance.’

V, the deceased, had taken a controlled Class A drug, as well as ketamine and ecstasy supplied that D, her boyfriend and “bumped” it up either by giving her an increased dose or mixing it with ecstasy or ketamine. D didn’t call the ambulance because he was afraid of judicial repercussions.
Prosecution argued that D, having supplied the drugs and remained with V, owed V a duty of care to secure medical assistance as her condition deteriorated to the point where her life was obviously in danger. He was grossly negligent in failing to obtain timely medical assistance, which failure was a substantial cause of her death. V pronounced dead in the early hours of Monday morning.

D convicted of manslaughter and supplying class A drugs. D appealed his manslaughter conviction on the ground that the jury were misdirected on causation, based, as it was in his case, on omission. Expert evidence: V would have been ‘seriously unwell and in need of urgent medical care’, four hours after taking the drugs. She would have stood a 90% chance of survival with medical intervention had it been available after 4.5 hours.

Question 18

Stone and Dobinson[1977] 2 W.L.R. 169

omission - duty of care - actus novus

Answer 18

The Court held that :

• S and D had assumed a duty of care and were obliged either to summon help or to care for the sister themselves when she became infirm. (Household obligations)
• Recklessness / Gross negligence which is a cause of death: “Indifference to an obvious risk and appreciation of such risk, coupled with a determination nevertheless to run it”

convicted of Gross negligence manslaughter

Stone and Dobinson (Ds) were taking care of Stone’s sister, Fanny, who was mentally unstable
Ds neglected to care for her and she died

Question 19

R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35

causation - actus novus

Answer 19

Held:

The stab wound was an operating cause of death and therefore the conviction was upheld.

The defendant, a soldier, got in a fight at an army barracks and stabbed another soldier. The injured soldier was taken to the medics but was dropped twice on route. Once there the treatment given was described as palpably wrong. They failed to diagnose that his lung had been punctured. The soldier died. The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed contending that if the victim had received the correct medical treatment he would not have died.

Question 20

R v Malcherek

death - actus novus - medical intervention

Answer 20

The test of death is where the brain stem has died. Thus at the time of switching off the machine, the victims were already dead. The doctors could not therefore be the cause of death.

Question 21

R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844

actus novus - medical intervention

Answer 21

His conviction was upheld despite the fact that the wounds were not the operative cause of death. Intervening medical treatment could only be regarded as excluding the responsibility of the defendant if it was so independent of the defendant’s act and so potent in causing the death, that the jury regard the defendant’s acts as insignificant. Since the defendant had shot the victim this could not be regarded as insignificant.

The defendant shot a man in the stomach and thigh. The man was taken to hospital where he was operated on and developed breathing difficulties. Several weeks later his wounds were healing and no longer life threatening, however, he continued to have breathing difficulty and died from complications arising from the tracheostomy. The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed.