Industrial organization perspective 2 Flashcards

1
Q

Explain the Cournot-Nash Model

A
  • A static (one period simultaneous move) model where actors compete for quantity
  • Each firm believe that output of rivals will remain constant if they change own output

(- Barriers to entry are present

  • Few firms and many customers
  • Firms can produce either homogeneous or heterogenous products)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Explain the Stackelberg Model

A

Firms competing for quantity just like in the Cournot model. However, here there is a leader who selects a quantity that maximizes profits and a follower that follows a reaction curve.
(This is a dynamic game where firms only interact once)
1. Calculate follower’s reaction function
2. Put reaction function in leaders price function

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Explain the Bertrand Model

A

Firms compete over price where price equilibrium becomes equal to marginal cost.
1. Firm 1 and firm 2 has equal output
2. Firm 1 lowers price by 1 which gives them the total demand
3. Firm 2 conquers this by lowering price to 1 – firm one price
4. This goes back and forth until P=MC (perfectly competitive)
(It thus assumes that if P does not equal MC then there are incentives to lower price and get the whole market)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

What’s Perfect Collusion?

A

When the firms are producing the joint profit-maximizing output. However, both parties have incentives to cheat

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Describe a Tit-for-tat strategy

A
  1. Start by cooperating the first round
  2. In every following round, play the strategy played by the opponent in the previous round
    (this could be a solution to the prisoners dilemma)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Explain Limit Pricing

A

Assumes that rational firms will maximize profits in the long run rather than the short run
This means that they would rather charge a low price today to deter entry than charge a high price that attract entry
(However, this has been heavily critizised by Game Theory)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Explain Predatory Pricing

A

Assumes a monopolist maximizes profit until an entry occurs, and after an entry, the monopolist expands output aggressively and cuts price, so the entrant suffers economic loss
(of course the monopolist does that as well)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Explain Product Proliferation

A

A strategic decision to prevent entrants by creating brands to fill every available product niche

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

What six strategic methods are proposed for maintaining long-run market dominance?

A
  1. Limit Pricing
  2. Predatory Pricing
  3. Creating excess capacity
  4. Advertising
  5. Learning by doing
  6. Product proliferation
    (Lobbying)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Explain how creating excess capacity is a method for maintaining long-run market dominance

A

When the monopolist moves first and selects a level of capacity, then the potential entrant decides whether to enter

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

How can increased advertising be used as a method for maintaining long-run market dominance?

A

It can either have a positive or negative effects on profits. However, advertising creates brand loyalty which forces entrants to do the same

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

What’s Game theory?

A

The study of how independent decision makers make choices

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

What’s the different information structures in game theory

A

Perfect / Imperfect
Complete / Incomplete
Symmetric / Asymmetric
Certain / Uncertain

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

What is nature referred to in game theory?

A

Nature, a player of random actions are sometimes required for a game. For example, nature can decide whether one of the players will always take the same action or vary its actions.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

What’s a Dominant strategy?

A

A strategy that outperforms any other strategy no matter what strategy opponent selects

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

What’s a Nash equilibrium?

A

A place in the game where both players are doing the best they can when given the choice of the opponent (games without a dominant strategy can have several)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

What’s a Zero-sum game?

A

Games where one player’s gain always is matched by the others loss. The dominant solution to zero-sum games is a minimax strategy

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

What’s the difference between static and dynamic games?

A

Static – players move simultaneously

Dynamic – players take turns

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

What’s a Dominated strategy?

A

A strategy that is always worse than some other strategy. It can thus be eliminated as a possible solution

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

What’s a Mixed strategy?

A

Each player randomly selects its actions with given probabilities that maximize its expected payoff

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

Explain Price discrimination

A

When a firm charges either different customers different prices for the same product supplied with identical costs or different consumers the same price even though cost of supplying varies. This can be divided into first degree (perfect discrimination), second degree, and third degree

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
22
Q

Explain Adverse selection

A

Refers to any situation where products of different qualities are sold at the same price because buyers or sellers do not have sufficient information to determine the true quality of the products

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
23
Q

What’s Double marginalization?

A

Is referred to when there are monopolies in both vertical stages. Which hurts both the retailer and the consumer since there is going to be a double monopoly markup.
(With a deadweight loss that increases for each stage there is a monopoly)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
24
Q

What are the three common vertical restraints?

A

Franchise fees
Resale price maintenance agreements
Exclusive dealing

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
25
Q

What’s foreclosure?

A

When downstream firms have difficulty finding suppliers or upstream firms have difficulty finding buyers

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
26
Q

What are the advantages of vertical integration?

A
  • Reduces transaction costs
  • Solves potential economic problems (double marginalization, insufficient presale service, inefficient input substitution)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
27
Q

How can vertical integration and relationships increase barriers to entry?

A

Exclusive dealing arrangements
Price squeezes
Increased capital barrier

28
Q

Explain the Bertrand-Edgeworth model

A

The Bertrand model but with capacity restraints
No firm has capacity to supply all demand at a competitive price
Thus it may not exist a sustainable Nash equilibrium

29
Q

What’s a Cartel?

A

A formal agreement between competing firms

30
Q

When can effective cartels form?

A
  • When group action can raise price and profits
  • Enforcing an agreement is relatively safe
  • Punishment is low relative to gains
  • Fluctuation of demand is low (elasticity)
31
Q

What’s Bertrand’s Paradox?

A

The fact that the Bertrand model assumes perfect competition as long as N > 1. Whereas Cournut need many competitors to achieve an efficiently allocated market.

32
Q

Creative destruction

A

When capitalism evolves by constantly destroying old industries and methods of production and replacing them with new, more efficient industries and methods of production. This suggests that static efficiency (P = MC) is irrelevant as concerns should be whether or not markets are evolving in an optimal manner.

33
Q

The Process of Technical Change

A
  1. Basic research – aimed at gaining knowledge for own sake
  2. Applied research – aimed at obtaining knowledge for commercial purposes
  3. Invention – a result of the research where an idea that should work is discovered
  4. Innovation – first commercial application of innovation
  5. Diffusion – innovation comes into common use
34
Q

Why does patents exist?

A

To increase the rate of technological advance, however, theory suggests that it decreases technological advantage as it creates monopoly power.

Patents always results in social benefits for patent-dependent innovations. However, it always results in social losses for nonpatent-dependent innovations because these would be developed without the cost of granting monopoly power

35
Q

Ramsey Price

A

The price that maximizes total social benefits with the requirement that price cannot be P < 0

36
Q

What is regulation?

A

Regulation places constraints on the operating firm(s) to make decisions in the interest of the public:

  • Economic regulation to obtain/maintain efficiency
  • Socio-economic regulation to achieve social goals
37
Q

Regulatory lag

A

Whenever there is a shock (increase or decrease) in cost

38
Q

The Averch-Johnson effect

A

The regulated firm will invest too much capital which leads to a non-optimal allocation of resources

39
Q

Explain how market structure and investments in R&D can relate to each other and

A

Investments in R&D requires both ability and incentives
Perfect competition – Low ability, moderate incentives
Oligopoly – Moderate ability, high incentives
Monopoly – High ability, low to moderate incentives
(Present value R&D < Present value benefits)

40
Q

When is the optimal time for technological development?

A

Marginal benefits (R&D) = Marginal costs

41
Q

What is the impact of a patent system?

A
  • Increase incentives to invest in R&D by granting monopoly power
  • Firms will spend more on R&D than socially optimal
  • The rate of technological development will be too rapid from a social perspective
  • Potential profits from R&D will be competed away
42
Q

Perfect/Imperfect information

A

Perfect information means that every player knows every move done by the others before taking action. Thus, simultaneously played games have imperfect information

43
Q

Complete/Incomplete information

A

When there’s incomplete information some players have more information than others at the beginning (natures move). Thus, complete information means that nature move is observed by all players

44
Q

Certain/Uncertain information

A

If nature never moves after any other player, the game has certain information

45
Q

Symmetric/Asymmetric information

A

If all players have exactly the same information, it’s symmetric

46
Q

What must a game include?

A
Players 
Action
Information
Strategies
Payoff 
Outcomes 
Equilibria
47
Q

What’s capture theory?

A

When regulated firms “capture” control of the regulatory commissions

48
Q

Cournot limit theorem

A

The Cournot equilibrium approaching competitive equilibrium as N increases

49
Q

Sweezy model

A
  • Unlike Bertrand, the Sweezy model assumes differentiated products
  • Rivals will not follow a price increase
  • A price cut will be responded
  • Criticised as it gives no explanation of initial price
50
Q

Secure (minimax criterion) strategy

A

The strategy that guarantees the highest payoff given worst possible scenario

51
Q

Risk-lover (maxi-max criterion) strategy

A

The strategy with the highest potential payoff

52
Q

Risk-averse (mini-max regret criterion) strategy

A

The strategy which minimises the regret of choosing the wrong strategy

53
Q

What’s a trigger strategy?

A

If one player defects, the other player retaliates by defecting ALL following rounds of an finite played game with an unknown end point.
This works as the payoff from defecting once is lower than colluding indefinitely.
-> no incentives to cheat

54
Q

What factors affect collusion and cartels?

A

Cost of capital and degree of uncertainty
Number of firms
Firm sizes
History of the game
Punishment mechanisms and legal framework

55
Q

The incentive for cartel formation

A

When uncoordinated firm behaviour leads to lower total profits than can be achieved through coordinated behaviour

56
Q

When are cartel profits high?

A

Inelastic market demand

Inelastic supply response by non-cartel members

57
Q

When is the enforcement of a collusive agreement easier?

A

Few firms in the cartel
High industry concentration
Homogenous product
Preexisting ties among firms

58
Q

Patent races

A

Firms compete to be the first to receive a patent

Does not result in optimal investment in R&D

59
Q

Natural Monopoly

A

When one firm can supply the market more efficiently than more than one firm

60
Q

Regulation instruments

A
Standard setting and licensing 
Controlling pricing, investment and profit 
Marginal cost pricing 
Profit/price regulation 
Incentive schemes 
Rate capping
61
Q

Marginal cost pricing in natural monopolies

A
Ramsey pricing 
Two part tariff 
Average cost pricing (LRAC)
Peak-load pricing 
Tax subsidy
62
Q

Profit regulation

A

Revenue constraint
Price constraint
Rate of return constraint

63
Q

Rate capping (regulation)

A

Revenue cap based on assets, investments, and costs

Capital cost cap

64
Q

Regulation to deregulation

A

Due to technical development that has eliminated natural monopolies
May increase efficiency and lower prices
(Regulation becomes contra-productive)

65
Q

Dynamic efficiency

A

Whether markets are evolving in an optimal manner in terms of technical advancement

66
Q

Static efficiency

A

P = MC

67
Q

Intellectual property rights and law

A

Research show a positive relationship between strong IPRs and investments in R&D