II. Structural Protections and Democratic Design Flashcards
Constitutional Interpretation – Judicial Review
What are the Modalities of Interpretation and how do they operate
Textual
* examining the meaning of the text, words, clauses, amendments
Structural
* examining the structure of the constitution and how they opperate; sep of power & check and balance
Historical/Original Intent
* examining the principles and meaning as it would have been understood by the founders
Purpose
* examing the purpose of the provisions
Precedent/Practice
* binding decisions; supreme court cases
* original; constitution stands as it was created
* persuasive; what is the similarity between cases
Policy
* what leads towards the betterment of society
Other sovereigns
* what do other countries do
Constitutional Interpretation – Judicial Review
What is Brutus XI
Faults of the Judiciary
* Only fired under extremes
* Will make up laws to expand its power
* Subversion of state judiciary
* Bias towards federal government
* Binds other branches by their own interpretation
Powers are vague and judges will make them up as they go; judicial power will become independent from any check and contain an ultimate finality of law
Nemo iudex in causa sua
Constitutional Interpretation – Judicial Review
Fed No. 78 + Fed No. 81
- Need a federal judiciary to protect against exec and tyranny of majority
- Needs to be independent to do job correctly
- Limited in scope
- Least dangerous branch b/c no power of purse or sword
- Needs to be powerful enough to protect private rights and protect against congressional abuses
- Lasting tenure prevents corruptions
Constitutional Interpretation – Judicial Review
Holding of Marbury v. Madison
Does the applicant have a right to the commission he demands?
* Yes the signing of the commission is what confers the right, not the placement of the seal
Do the laws of the country give Marbury a legal remedy? (ubi ius ibi remedium)
* Yes, where there is a right there is a remedy and the right was established by the judiciary act
* Not political question doctrine b/c it was an administrative task to deliver and affix the seal, not a political act
Is Marbury “entitled to the remedy for which he applies”?
Is asking the Court for a writ of mandamus the correct legal remedy?
* Yes, this is only to compel an administrative task from a gov official, which is all that’s being sought
Does the Supreme Court have the power to issue the writ?
* No, Judiciary Act that gave original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus is unconstitutional since according to Constitution, Congress can only alter appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction - Courts have to uphold and enforce laws but cannot do so if a law is contrary to the supreme law of the land (Constitution) so courts have to possess the power of judicial review (to declare a law unconstitutional and void)
* Congress cannot extend Original jurisdiction through an act only through an amendment
Constitutional Interpretation – Judicial Review
What is Judicial Review
- It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is
- The written nature of the constitution binds the courts and the judiciary hotels the power to review constitutionality on these terms
- Marshall secedes the battle, however establishes Judicial review and Political Doctrine explaining the court’s power*
Constitutional Interpretation – Judicial Review
Significance of the Supremacy Clause
- Departmentalism + Supremacy clause (with the oath clause) - every branch has to determine constitutionality
- Since for a bill to become law, has to be checked off by 2/3 branches, Court should be more conservative in striking it down
Separation of Powers
Importance of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
Did the pres have power to seize steel plants without congressional authorization
* No, 6/3 → president can’t determine the own reasons for expanding their power
* Douglas → only congress can pay in exchange for property
Better to have a government that operates slowly
* Vinson → Congress is funding the war, but is getting upset for President acting on it, President must act to ensure the continuance of the legislative programs when congress is too slow to act
* Frankfurter → Take-care gives duty not to exceed the Constitution; no law here!
* Don’t want an unhindered exec – deliberately put friction – Fed 51 - A vs. A
Separation of Powers
Justice Jackson 3 Ebbs of Power – Youngstown
First, when the President acts with the express or implied authorization of Congress then the President’s authority is at its greatest.
* President acts in parallel authorization by congress
Second, in the absence of either a congressional grant or prohibition then the President acts in a zone of twilight.
* President uses Art 2 powers
* In this circumstance, Congress and the President may have concurrent authority.
* In this zone of twilight, an actual test on authority will be dependent on the events and the contemporary theory of law existing at the time.
The third circumstance is when the President takes measures that go against the expressed will of Congress, his power is at its lowest.
* Pres acts against expressed or implied powers of Congress
* Jackson placed the action of President Truman in the third category making the order to seize the mills invalid.
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Unitary Exec importance to Removal
- Power to → (1) direct, supervise, and control subordinates, (2) remove subordinates at will.
- Four arguments: (a) executive power theory; (b) advice-and-consent theory; (c) congressional-delegation theory; (d) impeachment theory
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 67 on exec (pres ain’t monarch)
Anti-federalists have overblown President’s power → fear is unwarranted b/c not a monarch
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 68 on exec (electors)
Have to ensure electors are elected by people who are serving the national interest. Justification for electoral college
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 69 on exec (Pres not Monarch)
very different from the crown: 4 year terms, can be impeached, veto can be overridden, must have Senate agree to treaties, and can receive ambassadors
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 70 on exec (how should the exec be?)
Need an energetic Executive → see AoC’s failure w/ Shay’s Rebellion + Unity
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 71 on exec (Imp of term length)
Independent to allow to act in best interest of the nation even against public interest; Duration ensures stability and if it was too short, would tempt self-enrichment
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 72 on exec (go again)
Adequate provision for support: re-electability
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 73 on exec (Exec Check on Leg)
Competent powers - veto on legislation. This is limited by override veto and madisonian check
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Fed 77 on exec (relationship with leg)
discusses the power of the Senate to approve a President’s appointments, the Executive’s ability to call Congress together to give the State of the Union
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Importance of Gundy v. US on Nondelegation
- Locke: the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.
- The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another branch of Government.
- SORNA gives AG discretion to decide applicability – does not give total legislative power, only discretion on how to implement it and its feasibility (applicable intelligible principle) – AG doesn’t have discretion if it applies or not, only how registration should be done
- Legislative branch can give the power to decide just not to pass laws
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Importance of Myers v. US on Removal
Does Pres have the power of removing executive officers that he’s appointed with advice and consent of senate
*Article II.1 (VC) Gives President executive power, that includes ability to fire officers
* Article II.3 (TCC) President has to rely on subordinates to carry out the law so must be able to control them
* Article II.2 (Advice and Consent) separate from executive powers so more narrowly construed than general executive powers
* Article II.2 (Appointments clause) was intended to prevent small states from being run over by big states, not to give Senate ability to remove officers
After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with the interpretation of the President’s appointment power, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone.
* Brandeis Dissent: Executive power vested through vesting clause is only what Congress allows it to be
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Importance of Humphrey’s Executor v. US on removal limits
Can pres remove officers for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office?
* Myers did not → included officer who occupies no place in the executive power or doesn’t exercise executive power
* Narrows Myers → President doesn’t need Congressional approval to remove when officer is entirely executive
Here, officer is quasi-legislative/quasi-judicial b/c Federal Trade Commissioner so removal limits are appropriate
* Quasi-legislative b/c makes reports for Congress and administers provisions of statute
* Quasi-judicial b/c master in chancery
Nondelegation, Appointment and Removal
Importance of Morrison v. Olson on Removal Limits
for court appointed special prosecutors + scalia dissent
Test: Does the ability of the President to fire officers at will impede upon their executive power or impede ability to make sure laws are faithfully executed?
* Inferior officer b/c can be removed by higher exec branch officials, has limited duties, jurisdiction, and tenure → not limiting President so constitutional
* Inferior → subject to removal by higher official, empowered to limited duties, office is limited in jurisdiction and tenure
Scalia dissent
* Function is purely executive (prosecutor) so therefore according to Humphreys, President should be able to remove
* Article II VC gives ALL executive power and removing an executive officer is one of them
Direction and Control
Textual, Structual, Historical, and Policy justifications for Presidential Direction and Control
- [T] VC - if subordinates are exercising executive power so President has to be able to control them; TCC - has to make sure laws are being followed so needs to control subordinates
- [S] lack of authority in the other branches vesting clause
- [H] Weak AoC and need for a strong executive; 1607 Jamestown and King’s ability to control the governors; Washington, Jefferson, and Adams controlling executive
- [Policy] Allow executive to avoid being split by other branches; allows exec to function efficiently, want depoliticized civil service
Direction and Control
What was William Writ’s Opinion on the Accounting Officers
- President has to execute laws, but can’t do execute every law everywhere, nor cannot intervene every single time → need subordinate officers he can control
- The president cannot interfere with officers; it would be impractical to assume that the TCC expected the President to be involved in every aspect of the execution
Direction and Control
What was Roger Taney, Opinion on the Jewels of the Princess of Orange
Existence is necessarily implied by the duties imposed upon him that clause of the constitution before referred → TCC gives president power to interfere
* [T] the president can only pardon after prosecution though
* [S] judicial power have the power to prosecute and this would interference in prosection; TCC the president needs to determine when the execution of law is unlawful
* [Policy] this would impede foregin affairs