Cases Flashcards
Lyon’s Case & United States v. Callender - Paterson, J.
- The constitutionality of the Sedition Act is outside the scope of the jury.
- The constitutionality of the Sedition Act is outside the scope of the jury. Congress has made clear that those who write libelous content about the United States government are guilty of sedition.
- A jury’s province is to determine facts, not the constitutionality of a law.
- In this case, Lyon admitted to criticizing the United States government and to publicizing the French diplomat’s letter doing the same. As Lyon admitted to the underlying facts of the crime of sedition, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The court orders Lyon to prison for four months.
Marbury v. Madison - Marshall
- The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution.
- The Constitution clearly limits the powers that may be exercised by each branch of government. The legislative branch must operate within these Constitutionally defined limits in passing laws.
- The role of the judicial branch is to identify, interpret, and apply the law to decide cases. If there is a conflict between a law passed by Congress and the Constitution, then the Constitution must control, and the offending law will be void.
- The Act is unconstitutional because it seeks to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, and therefore, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Marbury’s claim.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
War Powers, Federalist 51, Separation of powers (+Con Jackson/Vision dissent)
- The President of the United States may not engage in lawmaking activity absent an express authorization from Congress or the text of the Constitution.
- The President’s power to issue executive orders must come from either an act of Congress or the Constitution.
- Congress expressly rejected the use of seizure to solve labor disputes as unconstitutional when it considered the drafting of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
Concurrence (Jackson, J.)
1. The President and Congress have distinct powers, but the Constitution allows for some overlap of authority in different scenarios.
2. 3 ebbs
Dissent (Vinson, C.J.)
1. The President acted in a necessary way to prevent a crisis of national defense that could result from a lack of steel production.
2. The Constitution delegates to the President the duty to execute legislative programs.
3. The President’s actions are fully within the actions given to the executive branch by the Constitution, as the Framers necessarily made the executive branch a robust one so it could serve as an actual check and balance to the other branches of government
Nondelegation Doctrine, Intelligible Principle Doctrine
Gundy v. United States
- Authorizing the attorney general to enforce the national Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act against pre-act offenders does not violate the nondelegation doctrine under the current intelligible-principle standard.
- Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress and prohibits delegating it to other governmental branches.
- The Court has repeatedly upheld statutory delegations as constitutional if Congress provided intelligible guidance directing how the delegee must perform. Nondelegation inquiries begin with interpreting the statute to see if Congress provided an intelligible guiding principle. If so, the inquiry ends there.
Myers v. United States
- The U.S. Constitution grants the president the sole power to remove executive officers.
- Congress passed an act providing that postmasters of the first class must be appointed and removed “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
- The majority of the First Congress found the removal power to be held solely by the president.
- The First Congress noted that the president is charged with faithfully executing the laws of the United States.
Removal: Executive Officers Quasi-Legislative & Judicial
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
- Is the president’s power to remove an executive branch official applicable to officials with legislative or judicial functions?
- The president’s power to remove an executive branch official is not applicable to officials with legislative or judicial functions.
- The postmaster is a position restricted to the performance of executive functions. By contrast, an FTC commissioner’s functions are not exclusively executive in nature.
Removal: Inferior Officers
Morrison v. Olson
- A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles.
- The Constitution divides federal officers into “principal” and “inferior” officers.
- The Appointments Clause requires principal officers to be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, but allows inferior officers to be appointed by the President, department heads, or the judiciary.
- There is not a precise line separating principal and inferior officers, but some factors affecting an officer’s characterization include whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher department official and whether the scope of the officer’s duties and jurisdiction is limited
Executive Discretion in Prosecution
United States v. Cox
- As an attorney for the government, a prosecutor has the discretionary power to decide whether to commence prosecution in a particular case.
- The president of the United States has the constitutional power to faithfully execute the laws.
- U.S. attorneys are executive officials who carry out this power by prosecuting offenses and participating in legal proceedings on the federal government’s behalf.
- The grand jury’s role in such proceedings is limited to a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.
- A U.S. attorney’s discretionary power to decide whether prosecution is appropriate in any given case is often distinct from the issue of probable cause.
- A court may not review, coerce, or interfere with the executive branch’s discretionary power over criminal proceedings under the separation of powers
Justiciable Doctrine (Standing, Mootness, Ripeness)
Massachusetts v. Mellon; Frothingham v. Mellon
- The enactment of a federal law that applies tax funds to programs in which state participation is optional does not give rise to a justiciable controversy between the United States government and a state or an individual taxpayer.
- The law does not require the state to do anything. State participation is optional and Massachusetts has not been forced to comply with any demand of the federal government.
- In matters in which federal law affects the rights of individual citizens, it is the United States government that represents the interests of the citizens and it is to the United States government that citizens must turn for relief.
Guarantee Clause, Political Question
Luther v. Borden
- Under the Guarantee Clause, the particular government established in a state is a question for Congress, not the courts.
- Pursuant to the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress guarantees each state a republican form of government.
- In order to determine whether a form of government is republican, Congress must first determine the government that is established in a state.
Sep. Powers, Political Question, Impeachment Proceeding = Non-justiciabl
(Walter) Nixon v. United States
- Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution gives sole power to the Senate to try all impeachments.
- The framers’ use of the word “sole” is significant in that it is a textually-demonstrable commitment of complete discretion to the Senate to conduct impeachment proceedings and to determine the rules by which those proceedings are conducted.
- It is important that there be no judiciary role in deciding impeachment proceedings issues to ensure the judiciary remains unbiased in future criminal proceedings
- Finally the framers intended impeachment proceedings to be the only check on the judicial branch by the legislature.
Hamilton Test (means-end scrutiny) Implied v. Express Powers, N&P expand
McCulloch v. Maryland
- The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to carry out this enumerated power.
- Additionally, federal laws are supreme and states may not make laws that interfere with the federal government’s exercise of its constitutional powers.
- Congress has the constitutional power to charter the Bank of the United States. This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the general power to “tax and spend” for the general welfare.
- The Bank was created by federal statute. Maryland may not tax the Bank as a federal institution because federal laws are supreme to state laws.
Commerce = traffic, intercourse, and navigation
Gibbons v. Ogden
- Congress is granted the power to regulate interstate commerce in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
- The word “commerce” includes traffic, intercourse, and navigation, as well as commodities associated with interstate commerce.
- Congress may regulate all commercial activities occurring between states but not activities occurring solely within one state’s borders.
- If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce.
Congress Can’t Regulate Purely Intrastate Commerce
Hammer v. Dagenhart (+Dissent Holmes, J.)
- May Congress regulate the interstate commerce of goods produced in factories with child labor?
- Firstly, Congress inappropriately attempted to regulate interstate commerce for the underlying purpose of seeking to standardize child labor regulations among the states.
- The regulations bear no relationship to the goal of promoting interstate commerce as required by the Constitution.
- Secondly, child labor is a purely local issue that should be regulated by individual states. Hence, even if Congress did have an appropriate purpose for passing child labor regulations, doing so would violate its Commerce Clause powers under the Constitution. Child labor relates to the production and manufacture of goods, and bears no relationship to the entry of those goods into the streams of interstate commerce.
Dissent (Holmes, J.)
1. The majority should not have disavowed the regulations passed by Congress as being an inappropriate attempt to influence states’ internal policies.
2. The immediate effect of the Keating-Owen Act is strictly to regulate the shipment of certain goods in interstate commerce.
Overrule Hammer, Regulate Intra that affects Inter
United States v. Darby
- While manufacturing is not itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods between states falls within the definition of commerce and is thus capable of regulation by Congress under its plenary Commerce Clause powers.
- The power of Congress over interstate commerce is absolute and is subject only to limitations prescribed by the Constitution.
- The present holding has no effect on the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that all powers not given to the federal government are reserved to the states.