Fundamental rights Flashcards
29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419:
fundamental rights -
“fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court.”
the interpretation making the EU law compatible with the national fundamental rights is preferred.
The Decision No 69/71 ECC of the European Commission provided cheap butter for welfare benefits, but required to show a coupon with a person’s name and address.[1] Mr Stauder was entitled to buy butter at reduced prices because he was beneficiary of the welfare scheme for those disabled in the war. However, he considered it illegal to make the appearance of the name of the beneficiary on the coupon mentioned above a condition for buying the butter. He claimed this violated his dignity and challenged it.
*11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125:
see other decks
*4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491
= in these 2 cases (w/ hauer)ECJ backtrack compared to internationalle .
The criteria imposed by the Commission, established by an administrative act of general application, cannot be considered discriminatory and were sufficiently well-reasoned (justified on
the technical conditions and on the economic difficulties created by the recession in coal production), and the applicant was not treated differently from other undertakings which also failed to meet the requirements laid down under the new rules. The applicant asserts that the decision violates a right akin to a proprietary right and its right to the free pursuit of business
activity, as it jeopardizes its profitability and the free development of its business activity.
The Commission authorised the merger of most of the mining companies of the Ruhr into a single company, laying down new minimum quantities for dealers to directly purchase from the producer which Nold, a German limited partnership, did not meet. Nold applied for annulment of the Commission’s decision, claiming it was discriminatory as it forced them to deal through an intermediary while other dealers would continue to purchase directly from the producer.
*44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727
fundamental rights
This case concerned the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order, and such analysis could only be conducted, following Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. The introduction of special criteria stemming from the legislation or constitutional law of a particular Member State would damage the substantive unity of Community law and lead to the destruction of the unity of the Common Market and the jeopardising of the cohesion of the Community. Following Nold, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the law, drawing from the constitutional traditions of MS. Therefore, measures which are incompatible with rights recognised in constitutions of the MS would also be unacceptable to the Community. In terms of the specific right to property, it was deemed to be guaranteed in the Community
legal order, in accordance with ideas common to the constitutions of the Member States and also
reflected in the First Protocol of the ECHR. All the wine-producing countries had restrictive
legislation concerning the planting of vines and so the restriction imposed by the regulation was
not per se unlawful. As such, the restriction was justified by Community objectives of general
interest and did not infringe the substance of the right to property.
The plaintiff sought to challenge the decision of an administrative authority in Germany which had not granted her authorisation in respect of planting new grapes on her land, as the land did not meet the authority’s specifications. The national court she initially started the claim in had stated that EU law by way of a Council Regulation (adopted after the German law) would have had the same effect as the German law, and so her claim could not succeed. The plaintiff
then contended that the provisions of the Regulation infringed her right to property as well as her right to freely pursue a trade or profession, both safeguarded by the German constitution.
*5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609
*C‑260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925
= in this 2 case it is also the MS that must comply with EU fundamental rights when acting in the scope of EU law. It is not enough to observe national fundamental rights.
- implemeting a milk quota system.
- ERT, a Greek radio and TV company, had exclusive rights for broadcasting, and claimed an injunction against Pliroforissis and Kouvelas for setting up a rival TV station without a licence. They claimed they should be allowed to operate under the right to free movement of goods and competition law, and the ECHR article 10 on freedom of expression.
*C‑222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651
fundamental rights - new approach
“derogation from an individual right laid down in the directive must be interpreted strictly.’
ECJ: the standard of protection of EU law was higher in regard of equal treatment regardless of gender.
Facts: the govt. Of Northern Ireland takes a measure not to allow woman in the police force to carry guns. There is a provision in their national law: courts can’t question the decisions taken for purposes of national security.
Case C-368/95 Familiapress v Bauer [1997]
Fundamental rights and EU freedoms as converging forces
Article 30 of the EC Treaty does not preclude the application of legislation of a Member State that prohibits the distribution on its territory by an undertaking established in another MS of a newspaper produced in that latter State containing prize puzzles which are lawfully organized in that State, provided that that prohibition is proportionate to maintenance of press diversity and that that objective cannot be achieved by less restrictive means.
Familiapress, an Austrian newspaper publisher, brought proceedings against Bauer, a German newspaper publisher, for an order that the latter should cease to sell in Austria publications offering readers the chance to take part in games for prizes, practice in breach of the Austrian Law of Unfair Competition.In connection with these proceedings, the Commercial Court of Vienna referred for a preliminary ruling whether application of this legislation to an undertaking
established in a different Member State, in which this practice is lawful, would be considered a quantitative restriction on imports or a measure having equivalent effect.
C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279
freedoms and fundamental rights as converging forces
Held by the ECJ= his business had an interstate element. The deprtation would restrict his free movement therefore this deportation would have to be proportionate (must comply with the right to private and family life).
=> it is not proportionate bc she has only overstayed for a short period of time.
= this is a very broad judgment
she as an illegal Filipino immigrant is liable to be deported marries a British citizen. She argues that deportation would be a restriction on her husband’s freedom to provide services because she takes care of the children.
Remember Omega and Schmidberger, Ireland v Grogan
free movement vs fundamental rights
in the first two cases, the court applies a proportionality test which offers a higher standard of protection.
*Joined Cases T-315/01 and T-306/01 Kadi v Council and Commission (Kadi I), [2005] ECR II-3649, reversed on appeal: the accused does not have the panoply of rights that normally accompany the process of criminal prosecution.
= it is not for the EU court to decide on the legality of the UN’s security council decision.
*Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi I [2008] ECR I-6351 : adamant that he is not involved with Al Qaida.
The ECJ reverses the decision, the MS cannot do something within the scope of EU law that does not comply with EU law
*T-85/09 Kadi II, [2010] ECR II-05177, rvrsd on appeal:
*Joined Cases C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P Kadi II, judgment of 18 July 2013
the CJEU pursued a different path. It reviewed the lawfulness of the EU regulation transposing the resolution.4 Its central argument was that the protection of fundamental rights forms part of the very foundations of the Union legal order.5 Accordingly, all Union measures must be compatible with fundamental rights.6 The Court reasoned that this does not amount to a review of the lawfulness of the Security Council measures. The review of lawfulness would apply only to the Union act that gives effect to the international agreement at issue and not to the latter as such.7
Having established that, the review for compliance with fundamental rights was a relatively simple task. The claimant had not been informed of the grounds for his inclusion in the list of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions. Therefore he had not been able to seek judicial review of these grounds, and consequently his right to be heard as well as his right to effective judicial review8 and the right to property9 had been infringed.
=In contrast to the judgment of the GC,10 the judgment of the CJEU in Kadi has been associated with a dualist conception of the interplay between the international and the Union legal order
In the UN Security Council Kadi was identified as a possible supporter of Al-Qaida. Therefore, he was singled out for sanctions, in particular for an assets freeze. The EU transposed this UN sanction by a regulation which Kadi then attacked before the EU Courts. At first instance, the GC refused to review the EU regulation because this would amount to a review of the measure of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the GC examined whether the Security Council had respected ius cogens, in particular certain fundamental rights. But the General Court did not find an infringement of this standard.
C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats, judgment of 1 March 2011
CFR - gender discrimination
.
The partial cancellation of the directive => different political outcome.
*Held: Article 5(2) invalid (so the exemption no longer applies) on the ground that it allowed the derogation to persist indefinitely. Such a provision, which enables Member States to maintain without temporal limitation an exemption from the rule of unisex premiums and benefits, works against the achievement of the objective of equal treatment. So it was a discrimination on grounds of sex
*Directive 2004/113 laid down a framework for combating discrimination based on sex in access to and supply of goods and services. The Directive prohibited the practice of using gender as an actuarial factor in calculating insurance premiums. => It applies mostly to life insurances.
*Article 5(2) derogation: It allowed Member States to decide “to permit proportionate differences in individuals’ premiums and benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data.” => a pressure group challenges the validity of article 5(2).
*C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143
CFR - discrimination againt transsexuals
Held: this is discrimination between the sex of the same person. The sex before and the gender after.
Facts: The applicant undergoes a gender reassignment surgery and is dismissed from their job. Is it discrimination on grounds of sex.
Reasoning: dentify the relevant comparators/ is there an unequal treatment? / Is there discrimination?
The British govt.: argues that if you are a woman and become a man (and vice versa) you get dismissed anyways.
*Joined cases C-122 and C-125/99 D and Sweden v Council [2001] ECR I-4319:
see comparative law on same sex partnership
Held: there is no discrimination on grounds of sex: if you are an unmarried woman or man doesn’t change anything.
No discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, was there a marriage ceremony? No => then no allowance. A registered partnership is not the same as a marriage.
Facts: D words for the Council and has a registered same-sex partner. The EU gives an allowance to married couples. D is refused. He argues that he is in a registered partnership
NB: very different from P v S.
Cf. Coman, Case C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385
C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981
CFR - discrimination on gounds of age
The German law was invalid for infringing the general principle of equal treatment in respect of age in EU law
Under German law, the Employment Promotion Act 1996, fixed term contracts were unlawful unless they could be objectively justified, but this protection did not apply to workers over 52 The Employment Equality Framework Directive required member states to provide protection of workers on fixed term contracts by requiring employers to state objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts, the maximum total duration of successive fixed term contracts The implementation period for the directive had not yet expired
Mangold, who was 56 and on a fixed term contract, claimed that the lack of protection under German law was age discrimination
*Case C‑555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [2010] ECR I-365
CFR - discrimination on grounds of age
= the german civil code
Affirmation of the principle in Mangold that a general principle of EU law, if concretised by a directive, can have horizontal direct effect
In contrast to Mangold, this case suggests that for the general principle to take effect the implementation period for the directive must first expire
German Civil Code provided for a reduced notice period for dismissal of younger workers so that work undertaken before 25 would not be accounted for when calculating the period of notice
As a result, Ms K received a notice of about 40 days rather than 4 months
K brought claim against employer, a private company, arguing that she had been discriminated based on age
Preliminary reference was sought on whether the prohibition of non-discrimination on grounds of age in EU law applied