Free Movement of Goods Flashcards
Art 3 TFEU
- The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples…
- The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced….
My thoughts: from this we can say that the internal market is not an end in itself, but it is clear that it lies at the heart of the EU’s activities.
Art 26(2) TFEU
• The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.
Art 26(2) TFEU
Economic rationale
Economic rationale: the internal market is designed to ensure competition, leading to technical innovation from firms seeking a comparative advantage and lower prices. The idea is that ultimately there will be better goods at lower prices —a large benefit to consumers.
Art 26(2) TFEU
Implementation of measures designed to regulate the internal market
Gebhard (1995) -
a case on the freedom of establishment: “It follows… from the Court’ s case-law that national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions:
- they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner;
- they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;
- they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue;
- and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”
Imports: Art. 34 TFEU:
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.
Art. 35 TFEU
Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between Member States
Derogations: Art. 36 TFEU
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
The fundamental idea here is balance: the articles are concerned with balancing: (i) impetus towards free trade; with (ii) accepting that MS retain a strictly defined competence to lawfully restrict free trade to protect certain important domestic interests. To make this more vivid: consider a country banning the import of porn in the interest of public morality.
Quantitative restrictions
“measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of, according to the circumstances, imports, exports, or goods in transit.” C/273 Geddo v Ente [1973] ECR 865. This includes bans on imports and imposed quotas on imports.
Measures having equivalent effect (MEQR’s)
“not only take the form of restraint described: whatever the description or technique employed, they can also consist of encumbrances having the same effect.” (Geddo). We need to consider what this means in more detail:
• Directive 70/50: this is no longer applicable, but continues to give some idea of the scope of MEQR’s. The directive identified two groups of such measures:
o Distinctly applicable measures (Art. 2 of directive): these do not apply equally to domestic and imported goods (e.g. they make importation more difficult / costly relative to domestic products) —e.g. higher standards for imported goods.
o Indistinctly applicable measures (Art. 3 of directive) these measures appear on their face to be equally applicable to domestic and imported goods, but the effect of the measure disadvantages imported goods by requiring them to satisfy a domestic set of rules for similar products —e.g. conditions on the packaging / composition of goods.
ECJ in Dassonville
• here the ECJ give an effect based definition — i.e. if a national measure has a prejudicial effect to the internal market, unconcerned with intention: “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade.”
CAT 1: PHYSICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
This is the category of measures that fall under Art. 2 of Directive 70/50. This type of barrier was characteristic of the earlier cases, where relatively easy-to-identify interferences with trade integration were attacked. This category does not apply to goods with distinctive characteristics that may be national or regional in origin —e.g. Stilton Cheese, Parma Ham etc.
CAT 1: PHYSICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
Imposing additional requirements on imported goods
Case 251/78 Firma Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v Minister fur Ernahgrung (1979
the requirement that imported goods should be inspected was held to breach Art. 34 because of the delays in inspection process and increased transport costs.
CAT 1: PHYSICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
National rules giving preferences to domestic goods
Commission v Ireland (1980)
Facts: The “Irish Souvenirs” case. Ireland passed a law requiring imported jewellery bearing certain motifs or characteristics to be sold as souvenirs to bear the word ‘foreign’ if not produced in Ireland.
ECJ: “
• The orders concerned in the present case are not measures which are applicable to domestic products and to imported products without distinction but rather a set of rules which apply only to imported products and are therefore discriminatory in nature” [9]
• The measure was discriminatory because “the essential characteristic of the souvenirs in question is that they constitute a pictorial reminder of the place visited which does not by itself mean that a souvenir, as defined in the orders, must necessarily be manufactured in the country of origin.” [15]
• Would be nothing wrong with leaving “domestic manufacturers to take appropriate steps such as affixing, if they so wished, their mark of origin to their own products of packaging.” [16]
CAT 1: PHYSICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
Restricting channels for the distribution of imported goods
Case 8/74 Procureur de Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837
ECJ held that a Belgian requirement that importers of Scotch whisky possess a British certificate of authentication was incompatible with Art. 34 TFEU. Belgians had imported Scotch whisky from free circulation in France. The rule favoured direct importers over traders importing Scotch whisky into Belgium from other MS in which the goods were already in free circulation. This ‘channelled’ trade and distorted the market.
• [5] A distorting measure is: “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade.”
• [6] “In the absence of a Community system guaranteeing for consumers the authenticity of a product’s designation of origin, if a MS takes measures to prevent unfair practices in this connexion, it is however subject to the condition that these measures should be reasonable and that the means of proof required should not act as a hindrance to trade between MS and should, in consequence, be accessible to all Community nationals.”
• [7] Art 36 does not apply to arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade
• [8] “That may be the case with formalities, required by a MS for the purpose of proving the origin of a product, which only direct importers are really in a position to satisfy without facing serious difficulties.”
CAT 1: PHYSICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
Licences
International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Froenten en Fruit (No 2) (1971):
Facts: Court asked to consider whether Art. 34 applies to “national legislative provisions prohibiting imports and exports without a licence but which in fact are not applied because exemptions are granted from the prohibition and, there this is not so, because the licence is always granted on request”
ECJ:
• Noted that: “Apart from the exceptions for which provision is made by Community law itself those provisions preclude the application to intra-Community trade of a national provisions which requires, even purely as a formality, import or export licences or any other similar procedure”
• More permissive approach to lawfulness of controls over trade with third countries outside the EU
CAT 2: PROTECTIONIST EFFECTS FROM NATIONAL LAW DISPARITIES
This is the category of measures that fall into Art. 3 of Directive 50/70 (indistinctly applicable rules). Even though there might be no explicit reference to the origin of goods, disparities between national laws may themselves generate measures having equivalent effect within the meaning of Art. 34 TFEU.
CAT 2: PROTECTIONIST EFFECTS FROM NATIONAL LAW DISPARITIES
Cassis de Dijon
This was a crucial development, since it concerns controlling national regulatory autonomy in establishing technical standards in so far as it may impede European market building.
Facts: A German law specified a minimum alcohol level of 25% for certain spirits including cassis (made in France). The law was indistinctly applicable because it applied to both domestic and imported liqueurs, but had the effect of impeding the importation of French cassis which had alcohol content between 15% and 20%.
ECJ: accepted that the German requirement amounted to an MEQR.
• 14: “In practice, the principal effect of requirements of this nature is to promote alcoholic beverages having a high alcohol content by excluding from the national market products of other MS which do not answer that description.
• It therefore appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the rules of a MS of a minimum alcohol content for the purposes of the sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an obstacle to trade which is incompatible with [Art 34]
• There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one o the MS, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other MS; the sale of such products may not be subject to a legal prohibition on the marketing of beverages with an alcohol content lower than the limit set by national rules.”
CAT 2: PROTECTIONIST EFFECTS FROM NATIONAL LAW DISPARITIES
Minimum fat requirement in cheese
Case 286/86 Deserbais (1988)
Facts: French legislation restricted use of the name ‘Edam’ to choose with a minimum fat content of 40%. D imported cheese from Germany where it was lawfully produced with a lower fat content. D marketed the cheese as ‘Edam’ and was prosecuted for unlawful use of a trade name. D argued Art 34 provided him with a complete defence to the charge.
ECJ:
• [12] “It would be incompatible with [Art 34]… and the objectives of a common market to apply such rules to imported cheeses of the same type where those cheeses have been lawfully produced and marketed in another MS under the same generic name but with a different minimum fat content. The MS into which they are imported cannot prevent the importation and marketing of such cheeses where adequate information for the consumer is ensured.”
• 13: Question may arise if same rule must be applied where a product under a name is so different (in terms of composition or production) from products generally known by the name that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category. But this case is not such a case. NB: there could be a case where a such a rule was legitimate.
CAT 3: SELLING ARRANGEMENTS
This is where obstacles to commerce diminish the overall volume of trade, but do not affect imports more than domestic products. Such measures are not caught by Art. 34.
CAT 3: SELLING ARRANGEMENTS
Background: Sunday Trading cases
Case 145/88 Torfaen BC v B&Q plc (1989)
Facts: B & Q was prosecuted for violating the Shops Act 1950 by allowing its retail premises to be open on Sunday other than for limited range of permitted transactions under that Act. B&Q argued that ‘Sunday trading’ depressed sales, including sales of imported products.
ECJ:
• 11: “National rules prohibiting retailers from opening their premises on Sunday apply to imported and domestic products alike. In principle, the marketing of products imported from other Member States is not therefore made more difficult than the marketing of domestic products.”
• But failed to differentiate with Cassis de Dijon… 13: Art 34 “must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition which it lays down does not apply to national rules prohibiting retailers from opening their premises on Sunday where the restrictive effects on Community trade which may result therefrom do not exceed the effects intrinsic to rules of that kind”
This led to confusion because the ECJ treated the Sunday trading rules as MEQRs falling within the Art 34 structure, but left it to national courts to decide whether or not the restriction on trade was necessary and proportionate.Confusion at national level followed, where different English and Welsh courts adopted different views of the compatibility of Sunday trading with the Treaty.
CAT 3: SELLING ARRANGEMENTS
Background: Sunday Trading cases
Case C-169/91 Stoke on Trent and Norwich City Councils v B&Q (1992):
17: Art 34 “is to be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition which it lays down does not apply to national legislation prohibiting shops from opening on Sundays.”
The importance of these cases was that in the decade preceding them, the court allowed invocation of Art. 34 where the application of rules and their consequential burdens were felt equally by both domestic and international goods. Weatherill: the ECJ got these cases ‘spectacularly wrong’ by finding that they could be within the scope of Art. 34.
CAT 3: SELLING ARRANGEMENTS
The rule in Keck
Facts: K and M resold goods at a loss. This violated French law forbidding such practices. K and M submitted the law restricted the volume of sales of imported goods by depriving them of a method of sales promotion [Art 34].
ECJ: any restrictive effect plainly effected all goods, not just imports. [Outside scope of Art 34]
• [13] “Such legislation may … restrict the volume of sales, and hence the volume of sales of products from other Member States, in so far as it deprives traders of a method of sales promotion. But the question remains whether such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legislation in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports.”
• [14] “In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke [Art 34] of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-examine and clarify its case-law on this matter.”
• [16] “… contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.”
Thus, two conditions were laid down to prove a measure is a selling arrangement outside the scope of Art. 34: (i) the measure applies to all affected traders operating within the national territory; and (ii) the measure affects in the same manner in law and in fact the marketing of domestic and imported products.
Thus, as in Keck, matters satisfying the two requirements are not the concern of EU law and lie in the hands of the local regulator.
CAT 3: SELLING ARRANGEMENTS
Examples of selling arrangements
Cases C-401 & 402/92 Criminal Proceedings against Tankstation ‘t Heukstevof and JBE Boermans (1994):
Dutch rules required the closure of all petrol stations at night, and applied to all traders operating in the national territory—these were not caught by Art 34. The rules affected domestic and foreign producers in the same way in law and fact.
CAT 3: SELLING ARRANGEMENTS
Examples of selling arrangements
Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner v Troostwijk (2004)
An Austrian restriction on the advertising of auctions of goods bought from insolvent firms, which had the aim of preventing consumers being given a misleading impression about potential prices, was seen as a selling arrangement and not caught by Art 34.