Forgets Flashcards
IRR rule if - CFS front/back loaded
front
IRR> r
back
IRR< r
IRR assumes
all FCFs reinvested at IRR
MIRR 3 different approaches
Discounting
- disc all -CFS back to 0
Reinvestment
- put all CFS but CF0 forward to end
Combination
- both disc - CFS to 0 and put all other Cfs forwards to end
NPV and IRR give same decision BUT
mutually exclusive (CFo and timing very different)
non-conventional CFs
Payback Period problem
NPV could be -
PI helpful when
funds are limited
Dep Tax Shield
Tc x Dep
3 techniques for comparing mutually exclusive projects with different lives and which method to use
LCLife
NPV Perpetuity
Equivalent Annul Cost
- identical r give all same
- diff r use NPV perp first, LCF and NPV give different and then never use EAC
scenario vs sensitivity analysis
sensitivity is effect of change of one avr and scenario is whole bunch of assumptions
What about NPV at accounting BE?
-
Acct vs Finc BE
when net profit=0
sales when NPV=0 or IRR=r
real and financial options represent ____ to __( end part diff for each)
the right but not obligation to
real: take some action in future
finc: purchase something in future for price set today
3 real options
expand, delay, abandon
what 4 things need to be true for options analysis to exist in real investment analysis
flexbility
uncertainty
learning
irreversibility
2 limitations to real options
increase capital investment values which increase agency risk
assumes perfect foresight
goal for capital structure
minimize WACC, maximise firm value
business risk
equity risk arising from nature of firms operating activities and is directly related to systematic risk of firms assets
financial risk
equity risk arising from capital structure of firm
when earnings perform good and and with debt and what is BE
good: EBIT> BE pt
bad: EBIT< BE pt
BE pt: EPSu=EPSl
why lev increases ROE if ROA>Rb
as ROA measures how efficiently a company’s assets can generate profits.
if RA>Rb it means the company is earning more from its investments than it is paying in interest
Homemade leverage
Unlev + Lev
Not paying int but want to, Shint gonna be -
Borrow D/E of shares owned money from bank at same rate as firm and use to buy shares
CF going to be EPSU x new number shares (more than before) - SH int
De-lever
Lev + de-lever
Paying int but don’t want to so going to receive int
Sell D/V shares and put those into bank at same rate as firm
CF going to be EPSL x new shares owned(less) + SHint
MM1,2,3
value, Rs, WACC
MM1,2,3 with and without taxes
without
1
Vu=Vl, cap structure/debt is irrelevant
2
Rs is increased with D as shareholders need compensating
3
WACC u=WACC l=Ro
with taxes
1
Vl= Vu+ TcB (dtax shield), debt increases value of firm
2
cost of eq to lev firm is cost of unless firm plus risk premium
3
lev firm WACC is lower as increased value
Int tax shield
Rb x D x Tc
D/E to D/V
D/E/ 1+ D/E
D/V to D/E
D/V/ 1-D/V
2 critiques of MM props
personal tax disadvantage of debt makes corp tax advantage ineffective
borrowers incur side costs of debt (bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt) which can offset value of int tax shield
who bares future costs of bankruptcy?
shareholders
3 selfish strategies shareholders take and why?
underinvestment
- shareholders would be wanted to put more money in so that increased debt holder value
take large risk
higher risk
- -NPV projects destroy value to bondholders
milking it out
- pay out extra divs to decrease value to bondholders
2 ways to decrease agency costs of debt
repurchase debt prior to bankruptcy
increase return to bondholders
trade-off theory of debt
trade-off between PV debt tax shield and costs of financial distress
optimal cap structure is ___ but firms are
static
dynamic
debt 2 adv and disadvand their implications
adv
- tax benefit (lowers taxable income), higher Tc higher advantage
-reduced agency costs equity, increases cost of equity: FCF possible wasteful managers, makes them work harder , as sep between stock and managers increase, benefits ti using debt increase
disadvantage
- agency costs of debt(shareholders being sneaky), firms where lenders have control over how monry used should be able to borrow more
- bankruptcy costs, firms with more stable earnings and lower bankruptcy costs should borrow more
MM and personal taxes
with
Gain lev= TcB if TPs=TPb
without
Gain lev=0 if (1-Tc)(1-Tps)=(1-Tcb)
classical tax system
double taxation
favours corp debt
many outcomes depending on individuals tax rate and D/E ratio
imputation tax system
Tc=0
corporate profits are taxed at the corporate level, but the tax paid by the corporation is credited to shareholders when they receive dividends
no tax adv of debt
eq income oney taxed at personal tax rate
debt is not attractive
if management know Veq<Market value
they will issue shares and @announcement investors learn so SP decreases
pecking order theory
ret earnings (cheapest), debt, equity
according to pecking order theory what should happen on announcement of debt
negative impact on SP
according to pecking order theory if internal CF> cap investment
surplus used to pay debt
3 conflicts of pecking order theory with trade-off theory
no target D/E
profitable firms use less debt
firms like financial slack and like to have cash readily avaliable
factors in D/E ratio
taxes
type of assets
uncertainty of operating income
When to use APV, FTE, WACC
APV when level of debt is known
FTW when large levered firms
WACC most common
working out D+S=V in APV
APV becomes V and D is amount of loan
APV and floatation costs
minus from loan amount and then add PV of Fcost tax shield so each years amont x Tc present values
NPVF of loan
+ in year 0 of loan, - AT int payments each year - principal loan at t
NPV all eq if depreciation is risk less
- price + EBTD x (1-Tc) x PVIFA + PV Deep tax shield(Dep x Tc x PVIFA), remember to disc dip tax shield at diskless rate
4 financing side effects
tax subsidy to debt
costs of issuing new securities
costs of financial distress
subsidies to debt financing