final exam Flashcards

1
Q

economically motivated interest groups

A

focused on money/economy (labor unions, National Association of Manufacturers)

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2
Q

types of interest groups (4)

A
  1. economically motivated
  2. professionally motivated
  3. ideologically motivated
  4. public interest groups
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3
Q

professionally motivated interest groups

A

focused on protecting a profession (American Bar Association, American Medical Association)

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4
Q

ideologically motivated interest groups

A

focused on right/wrong; morals (environmental groups; Greenpeace International)

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5
Q

public interest groups

A

National Governors Association, US Conference of Mayors

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6
Q

interest group activities (4)

A
  1. public relations work
  2. electioneering
  3. lobbying
  4. unconventional activities (marches, protests, civil disobedience)
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7
Q

interest group resources (4)

A
  1. money
  2. size
  3. esprit de corps (spirit of the vibe)
  4. leadership/organization
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8
Q

schools of thought on the privileged position of business thesis (3)

A
  1. business interests are privileged and environmental interests are disadvantaged
  2. business interests do not dominate, environmental interests can and do influence policymaking
  3. stalemate - neither business nor environmental interests dominate policymaking
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9
Q

bureaucratic principle of organization (4)

A

a form of organization and management based upon:
1. division of labor and specialization
2. hierarchy and a chain of command
3. management based upon files and rules
4. professionalism and expertise

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10
Q

sources of bureaucratic power (4)

A
  1. expertise: knowledge is power
  2. rule-making and/or discretion: make, execute, and adjudicate rules
  3. efficiency: the continuous and methodical pursuit and attainment of objectives
  4. the mobilization of support: public opinion (popularity); clientele politics
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11
Q

types of bureaucracy (3)

A
  1. the executive institutions of the government (the administrative state)
  2. a principle of organization and work
  3. a process of historical transformation (bureaucratization)
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12
Q

Pressman & Wildavsky definition of implementation and key findings (4)

A

to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, and complete
1. implementation is not divorced from policy
2. policymakers need to carefully consider the means for accomplishing their chosen ends
3. continuity of leadership is important
4. complexity leads to breakdown

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13
Q

Van Meter & Van Horn definition of implementation and key findings (4)

A

those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions
1. implementers may screen out a clear message when the decision seems to contradict deeply cherished beliefs
2. those holding intense negative preferences may be led to outright and open defiance of the program’s objectives
3. less intense attitudes may cause implementers to attempt surreptitious diversion and evasion
4. psychological factors include those not related to policy beliefs

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14
Q

McLaughlin definition of implementation and key findings (2)

A

implementation as a process of mutual adaptation
1. the amount of interest, commitment, and support evidenced by the principal actors had a major influence of the prospects for success
2. given different degrees of implementers’ receptivity to policy change, identifies 3 kinds of interactions: mutual adaptation, co-optation, non-implementation

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15
Q

Bardach definition of implementation and key findings (2)

A

an assembly process which involves putting the machine together and making it run
1. implementation is an ongoing attempt to exercise control through bargaining, persuasion, and maneuvering under conditions of uncertainty
2. recognizing and classifying the strategies available to implementers under varying conditions is the key to understanding implementation

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16
Q

Rein & Rabinovitz definition of implementation and key finding (4)

A

implementation is a:
1. declaration of government preferences
2. mediated by a number of actors who
3. create a circular process characterized by a reciprocal power relations and negotiations
key finding:
1. one of the consequences of passing ambiguous legislation is that the arena of decision-making shifts to a lower level interest group pressures are brought to bear largely after legislation is passed

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17
Q

Steelman definition of implementation

A

a rational administrative process with a formal institutional structure, focused information, and resource allocation central to the policy goal

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18
Q

the advocacy-coalitions framework

A

alliances among formal and informal actors are required to make public policy

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19
Q

policy beliefs of the advocacy-coalition framework (3)

A
  1. deep core beliefs
  2. policy core beliefs
  3. secondary beliefs/aspects
20
Q

deep core beliefs

A

fundamental beliefs about (and orientations to) such things as society and government or human nature; deep core beliefs are difficult to change

21
Q

policy core beliefs

A

relatively stable beliefs that convert deep core beliefs so as to more easily guide policy; they more clearly specify the nature of the policy problem as well as the possible solution

22
Q

secondary beliefs/aspects

A

beliefs are narrow in scope and are often portrayed as the instrumental decisions and informational processes focused on implementing the policy core beliefs; secondary beliefs are the easiest to change

23
Q

Vig’s types of environmental presidents (3)

A
  1. opportunistic leaders (Nixon, George HW Bush)
  2. frustrated underachievers (Carter, Clinton, Obama)
  3. rollback advocates (Reagan, Trump)
24
Q

Lowi’s typology variables (2)

A
  1. probability of government coercion: the probability of governmental restraint, restriction, or other form of control
  2. degree of disaggregation: the extent to which policy decisions are made in a non-cumulative fashion, at the level of the individual or small unit, and without consideration as to how the policies inter-relate or the overall impact
25
Q

Lowi’s typology outcomes (4)

A
  1. distributive policies
  2. regulatory policies
  3. self-regulatory policies
  4. redistributive policies
26
Q

Lowi’s typology distributive policies

A

(low governmental coercion, high disaggregation) aimed at promoting private activities said to be desirable to society as a whole and that are not likely to be undertaken without some kind of encouragement or support

27
Q

Lowi’s typology regulatory policies

A

(high governmental coercion, medium aggregation) policies that either limit the provision of specific goods and services to only a few at most, who are chosen from a large number of potential recipients (competitive) or designed to protect the public by setting the conditions under which certain private activities can be undertaken (protective)

28
Q

Lowi’s typology self-regulatory policies

A

(low governmental coercion, medium disaggregation) regulatory policies that are or have become protective of the interests of the regulated rather than the public at large

29
Q

Lowi’s typology redistributive policies

A

(high governmental coercion, low disaggregation) policies intended to manipulate the allocation of wealth among social classes or racial groups; they produce very clear winners and losers for these policies transfer some value to one group at the expense of another

30
Q

Salisbury & Heinz’s typology variables (2)

A
  1. information costs: the degree of difficulty in (a) obtaining information about the policy issue, including information about the preferences of other key actors, and (b) negotiation costs, that is, the degree of difficulty in building consensus and a coalition
  2. demand pattern: the strength (organization and otherwise) and/or scale (local, regional, national, etc.) of the petition to government
31
Q

Salisbury & Heinz’s typology allocative policies

A

policies that actually disperse benefits

32
Q

Salisbury & Heinz’s typology structural policies

A

de jure (by law) or de facto (of right) delegations of authority

33
Q

Wilson’s typology variables (2)

A
  1. perceived costs (concentrated/dispersed)
  2. perceived benefits (concentrated/dispersed)
34
Q

Wilson’s typology outcomes (4)

A
  1. interest group politics (concentrated perceived benefits, concentrated perceived costs)
  2. client politics (concentrated perceived benefits, dispersed perceived costs)
  3. entrepreneurial politics (dispersed perceived benefits, concentrated perceived costs)
  4. majoritarian politics (dispersed perceived benefits, dispersed perceived costs)
35
Q

What is partial preemption and why does Hopper think it important?

A

With respect to states creating their own implementation plans “aimed at maintaining the standards set by the federal government … the EPA simply ‘sets a floor below which standards may not fall’”
Importance:
In the enforcement of most federal environmental protection laws, state agencies get to determine what constitutes a violation of the law, whether a violation should be noted as severe or minor, which industries are subject to inspection and how often, and what enforcement actions are appropriate … States’ environmental agencies drive the direction of environmental policy

36
Q

Hopper groups the determinants of environmental enforcement into one of three categories. What are the categories?

A
  1. environmental need: driven by the state’s natural environmental order, along with the relationship between industry and pollution that has altered that natural order
  2. state capacity: State institutions, including courts, executives, legislatures, and bureaucracies, differ significantly in regard to their professionalization, time in office/at work, susceptibility to outside pressure, powers, and the ability to wield those powers …affect[ing] the ability of state governments to build environmental programs and implement those programs effectively and efficiently
  3. state willingness: In competition with each other for industry, state and local governments may set less-stringent environmental standards than does the federal government in hopes of attracting business’
37
Q

State-level environmental agencies are structured in one of three main ways. What are the three main ways?

A
  1. mini-EPAs
  2. combined public health and environmental protection agencies (PHEPs)
  3. Combined natural resource conservation and environmental protection agencies (NREPs)
38
Q

What are Hopper’s four arguments about environmental agency design?

A
  1. any combination of policy areas within a single agency allows for some tasks and mandates to be prioritized over others or for parts of the agency’s programming to be neglected
  2. public health and natural resource agencies have their own regulatory preferences that often include prioritizing the inclusion of industry stakeholders, considering cost, and focusing on education and planning
  3. the economic, social, and political pressure placed on state-level bureaucrats uniquely positions them to favor the regulatory preferences embraced by public health and natural resource agencies, particularly as these approaches are growing more common within environmental regulation and when funding and implementation structures exist that bring regulators closer to citizens
  4. the strength of agency design in shaping day-to-day enforcement decisions is dependent upon state agencies’ capacity and the capacity of those institutions with which agencies compete for influence
39
Q

Why does Hopper argue that “structures and values of American state-level environmental agencies … affect environmental agency employees’ efforts at collaboration, the way they seek common ground with industry, and the decisions they make about when and how to issue punishment for the violation of environmental rules”?

A

because of the powerful impact that organizational characteristics can have on those individuals who work within them … Structures and values are not short-term organizational forces; they perpetuate across time, continuing to affect ‘the way things are done around here

40
Q

“Natural resources conservation programming and environmental protection programming mirror each other in their attempts to control certain types of behavior, such as the exploitation of natural resources or the excessive release of toxic emissions, respectively. However, while the two policy areas are rooted in regulation, the focus and purpose of regulatory programs are fundamentally different.” Why does Hopper come to this conclusion?

A

Natural resource conservation typically includes the maintenance of state parks, lands, and animal populations, along with the control of state resources, such as oil, natural gas, minerals, and timber. Conversely, environmental regulation focuses on the control of air and water pollution … [S]tates tend to focus more on controlling wildlife for the purposes of hunting, while environmental regulators … are more focused on the maintenance of healthy ecosystems … [S]tate-level natural resource conservation involves some consideration of both how to protect resources and how to protect the industries that make those resources economically fruitful … Conversely, environmental regulators are often asked to regulate the behavior of industries, with no guarantee that regulation will not disrupt an industry’s economic contributions to the state

41
Q

Stoke’s definition of policy feedback

A

the idea that public policies can reshape the political landscape, changing both the content of policy and the likelihood of its passage

42
Q

Stoke’s path dependency

A

past decisions and actions can constrain or shape future choices and developments; policies are put onto a certain path once made

43
Q

Stoke’s retrenchment (3)

A

policy change that:
1. repeals or weakens policy targets or funding
2. restructures policies in a way that reduces their efficacy at addressing the problem, or
3. alters the policy’s context in a way that increases the potential for retrenchment

44
Q

stoke’s direct retrenchment

A

directly interacting with policymakers and implementers, ex: lobbying, contributions, relationships, implementation resistance

45
Q

stoke’s indirect retrenchment

A

using parties, the courts, and the public (used when not in power)

46
Q

Stoke’s answer to the debate

A

interest groups shape how the policy is enacted and implemented; language is too complicated for interest groups to understand