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POLI 302 > final exam > Flashcards

final exam Flashcards

1
Q

Second-strike capacity (definition)

A

If a nuclear arsenal can survive attack then nuclear deterrence exists (deter from use because of returned fire)

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2
Q

Use it or lose it dilemma (definition)

A

A dilemma that says that if a state does not have second strike capacity, and would therefore lose their arsenals upon attack they are incentivized to strike

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3
Q

Perfect nuclear stability/stability-instability paradox (definition)

A

Two nuclear arsenals cancel each other out making war safe at low level conflict

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4
Q

Perfect nuclear stability/stability-instability paradox (example)

A

In 1969 USSR and China’s small respective arsenals emboldened them to fight one another

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5
Q

Missile defense instability (definition)

A

missile defence reduces retaliatory enemy second strike capability, tempting a first strike, making the system more unstable

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6
Q

Critiques of rational deterrence theory (4)

A

Cannot tell if lack of attack is because of deterrence or something else, deterrence does not explain risk taking, cannot explain crisis mindset with its cognitive and psychological biases, assumes a given deterrence challenge can be explained without regard to past success/failure

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7
Q

Risk taking critique (example)

A

Japan-US conflict is a paradoxical war, much smaller state attacking much larger one in Pearl Harbour on a long shot gamble of distraction, big risk

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8
Q

Features of general wars

A

Involve all or most of the major powers, at sea, and in more than 1 state simultaneously

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9
Q

Most likely MID pair to escalate

A

Major on major power

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10
Q

Major on major power MID escalation (example)

A

WWI: Serbian-Austro-Hungarian dispute involved Russia and Germany

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11
Q

Relationship between war intensity and frequency

A

increase in war severity decreases subsequent probability of war

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12
Q

Enduring Rivalry (definition)

A

a hostile military confrontation between two states punctuated by disputes that may include wars

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13
Q

ER terminated by power preponderance (example)

A

US-Mexico ER terminated by relative strength of US

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14
Q

Bandwagoning (definition)

A

join with a threat and submit to them in order to not be aggressed

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15
Q

Bandwagoning (example)

A

Finland allied with the Soviet Union after WWII in order to avoid being aggressed

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16
Q

Management alliances (definition)

A

alliances to contain potential threats

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17
Q

Management alliances (example)

A

US-Japan alliance to restrain Japan and increase regional security

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18
Q

Jackal bandwagoning (definition)

A

To join with the stronger side in order to reap the benefits/spoils from war once won

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19
Q

Jackal bandwagoning (example)

A

Italy’s alliance with Germany against France in WWII

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20
Q

Buckpassing (definition)

A

maneuvering a state to attack another on your behalf

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21
Q

Buckpassing (example)

A

USSR got Germany to attack France in 1940 via a treaty

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22
Q

Bait and bleed (definition)

A

arrange for two threats to fight each other in a long war that would reduce their threat capacity

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23
Q

Bait and bleed (example)

A

US in the Iran-Iraq war

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24
Q

Minimum winning coalition (definition)

A

state seeks to minimize costs, and because of the restraints of the collective action problem, they seek the smallest possible alliance to achieve security goals

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25
Q

Preventative war

A

before a challenger state surpasses the status quo state the status quo state typically engages in a preventative war to defeat the challenger before transition occurs

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26
Q

Preventative war (example)

A

We should predict to see a preventative war in the future between the US and China

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27
Q

Hegemonic Stability Theory and War

A

hegemons provide the public good of the international system, characterized by non-rivalness (gain from one state in free trade does not cause loss to another) and non-exclusivness (states benefit from trade without having to use resources to maintain it)

28
Q

Decision: leader: selection effect

A

a theory which postulates how much of a selection for individual leaders’ preferences and actions are there.

29
Q

rational model

A

a consistent utility model which proposes goal directed behaviour; rank-ordered preferences.

30
Q

problems with the rational model (2)

A

perception horizons not specified, assumes no strategic deception

31
Q

cognitive dissonance theory

A

inconsistencies within the cognitive system cause an uncomfortable state of tension that people are then motivated to reduce or eliminate

32
Q

cognitive dissonance example

A

the Vietnam War: unwinnable but the US could not pull out because of the damage of confidence it would do.

33
Q

Ingroupism/Outgroupism

A

self worth is enhanced by identification to a group, there is a tendency to view groups outside ones own as illegitimate. the more tight an ingroup is the more hostile they are to an outgroup.

34
Q

basis for misperceptions

A

cognitive schema and dissonance, which rely on over simplified models and create resistance to new concepts

35
Q

misperceptions example

A

sino-indian war: sino-indian relations went from good to poor because of an accidental incident which found india helping chinese insurgents. Indian forward policy to prevent chinese incursion perceived as a threat by china and they responded with hositility.

36
Q

A crisis situation is characterized by: (3)

A

Surprise, high threat to important values, short decision time.

37
Q

Crisis situation (example)

A

Cuban missile crisis: Soviets installing missiles in Cuba which could reach far into US, US needs to act quickly or Soviets could deter action. US came to blockade decision.

38
Q

explanation for weapons as causes of war (3)

A

weapons as a provocative cause of war, weapons as a facilitative cause of war, weapons as a generative cause of war.

39
Q

weapons as a provocative cause of war

A

war driven by the simulative or provocative effect have on the opposing state, captured by the notion of the security dilemma

40
Q

weapons as a provocative cause of war (example)

A

Israel attacked Egypt in 1956 due to Egyptians buying weapons from Russia

41
Q

weapons as a facilitative cause of war

A

state has a pre-existing policy which remains dormant in the absence of the available means, once means are available war occurs

42
Q

weapons as a generative cause of war

A

the sudden availability of weapons in a country’s arsenal stimulates or generates a new policy for that state based on the characteristics of the weapon it obtained

43
Q

offense-defense theory

A

wars are caused according to the technical characteristics of weapons, if the weapons are offensive and suited to the geography of the conflict their possession will increase the likelihood of war

44
Q

offense-defense theory (example)

A

the technology of WWI was believed to favor the offensive so the war opened with massive attacks and continued this way until soldiers dug trenches for defense.

45
Q

diversionary theory example

A

Argentina seized the Falklands because the military government was trying to gain popular support to help weather a serious economic crisis, but there is no evidence to prove this theory.

46
Q

Walt’s Revolution and War (four ways revolutions increase the likelihood of war)

A

revolutions change the distribution of power in the international system and can be infectious. revolutions increase the likelihood of war by: creating the fear of spreading revolution, creates conflict of interest between new regime and old allies, uncertainty in calculations, disruptions create changes in power and windows of opportunity

47
Q

Example of revolution causing war

A

Hussein waited to attack Iran until he thought that revolutionary ideology was spreading to Iraq and was a threat to his regime.

48
Q

Edmund Burke’s theory on revolutionary war

A

Cycle of old regime - revolt - demise of the moderates - rise of the reign of terror - Thermidorian reaction lead to a breakdown of governance and a military state enters the vacuum.

49
Q

Burke’s theory example

A

Post-French revolution Napoleon’s military government started a general war.

50
Q

Argument for trade and peace

A

free trade brings a harmony of interests and the forming of cooperative advantages, trade reduces the likelihood of war by structurally altering the societies that engage in trade.

51
Q

Argument for free trade and peace (example)

A

When the US failed to implement free trade during the stock market crash it led to the great depression and WWII

52
Q

Argument for trade and war

A

free trade can be leveraged using mercantilism in order for war prone states to achieve an end. asymmetric trade interdependence leads to war.

53
Q

Argument for trade and war (example)

A

Nazi Germany had a very aggressive and interdependent trade policy with much of Europe that led it to leverage mercantilism and desire to invade states when they stopped trading with them.

54
Q

Tilly’s theory of war and the state

A

States were destroyed through a process of natural selection, strong states occupy weaker states, war and development are one and the same

55
Q

Capitalist imperialism and war

A

because of diminishing returns of capital investment in domestic industries states export capital abroad, global war would follow after the European occupation of China. empirically flawed theory as capitalists allied in WWI and WWII, war occurred over territories, not colonies.

56
Q

Lateral Pressure Theory

A

economic growth leads to war because increased power gives increased opportunity

57
Q

Snyder’s overexpansion

A

overexpansion is caused by a belief in the domino theory, offensive advantage and paper tigers and bandwagoning. but aggressive expansion leads to defeat

58
Q

Gerschenkron’s theory on timing

A

the later a state industrializes the more centralized its administration could be to coordinate development

59
Q

Gerschenkron’s theory on timing (example)

A

Nazi Germany is considered a late-late developer and had a highly unitary state structure and high state involvement in development leading to overexpansion

60
Q

Environment and War

A

scarcity of non-renewable and renewable resources leads to conflict

61
Q

Environment and War (example)

A

Syria built a dam on a river shared between them and Iraq and Iraq accuses them of unfairly diverting water. Both states amass troops on the border and become engaged in an interstate clash.

62
Q

Ethology

A

the study of human and animal behavior; humans have intrinsic instincts, but it is hard to actually equate them to war. war is not aggression, we have an aversion to the violence of war

63
Q

Ethology (example)

A

Elite German forces in WWII became neuropsychiatric casualties after enough time in combat

64
Q

Constructivism and Human Nature

A

anthropologists believe that human nature is learned, we can therefore learn a natural propensity for war, and it can become institutionalized

65
Q

Systemic nature of war

A

Waltz understands war as a characteristic of international system and its process of natural selection

POLI 302 (2 decks)

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