Final Flashcards
(181 cards)
1
Q
Aftermath of the 1967 War
A
1 September 1967: the Arab League meets in Khartoum and adopts a resolution enshrining the “three No’s”: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.
2
Q
No Resolution 242 (22 Nov. 1967)
A
UN Security Council unanimously passes Res. 242: the template of “land for peace”; its provisions include:
1) “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”
2) Full Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied in recent conflict
3) Right to live in peace within a secure and recognized boundaries
4) A just settlement of the refugee problem
5) Guarantee of territorial inviolability and full independence of every state in the area through measures including demilitarized zones
2
Q
Rise of Palestinian national movements (1964, 1967)
A
1964: Arab League creates an organization to represent Palestinians: Palestine National Council (PNC) and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded.
1967: After war, Palestinian groups decided they could not rely on Arab States to defeat Israel
3
Q
What did the PNC charter call for
A
Eliminating Israel and establishing independent Palestinian state; made no mention of religion
4
Q
Emergence of Palestinian militancy
A
Palestinians again came to the force of the conflict, non-state actors grew in importance. By sponsoring/founding various Palestinian armed groups, Arab states could attack Israel indirectly (proxy war) and build their own prestige among Arab states and domestically. Gradual erosion replaces direct confrontation as Arab strategy vs. Israel.
5
Q
Charter of the PFLP, December 1967:
A
“The only weapon left to the masses in order to restore history and progress and truly defeat enemies and potential enemies in the long run is revolutionary violence… The only language that the enemy understands is the language of revolutionary violence.”
6
Q
Emergence of Palestinian Militancy: 1965-1968
A
1965-7: PLO attacks launched from Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, mainly target Israel infrastructure.
1968: PLO hijacks Israeli airliner, secures release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel in exchange for hostages - starts a trend
1968-70: PLO, PFLP, DFLP launch mini-war vs. Israel from Jordan, including rocket fire, ambushes, guerrilla incursions vs. civilians and army
1968-70: Egypt launches limited war aimed at eroding Israeli positions in Sinai peninsula
21/3/1968: In response to Palestinian attacks, Israel attacks PLO positions near Jordanian town in Karameh; 150 militants, 20 Jordanian soldiers, 28 Israelis killed
7
Q
Palestinian Militancy - The fighting intensifies: 1969-1970
A
1969: Fatah alone carries out 2,432 guerrilla attacks on Israel, mainly from Jordan
The PLO becomes a “state within a state” in Jordan, controlling territory, setting up roadblocks, levying taxes, abusing Jordanians. Palestinian groups hijack, bomb planes throughout Europe and Middle East. 15/9/1970L PFLP hijacks 5 planes, diverts 3 to Dawson’s Field, Jordan; removes all passengers and blows up aircraft. This draws condemnation from Western states.
8
Q
Black September, 1970
A
16/9/1970: Jordan’s King Hussein orders army to crush Palestinian groups, reassert control over territory. Over 9 days, Jordanian forces kill 3,500 Palestinians combatants and civilians. Arafat calls for Hussein to be overthrown. King Hussein expels all Palestinian groups from Jordan. PLO and other groups relocate to Lebanon, attack Israel from there.
9
Q
The PLO into the 1970s
A
1970-80: From Lebanon, Palestinian militants kill hundreds of Israelis, mainly civilians, in attacks on school buses, apartment buildings, airports, etc.
Israeli retaliatory strikes hit militant bases, refugee camps, killing militants and civilians alike.
5/9/1972: PLO’s Black September faction takes Israeli athletes hostage at Munich Olympics, killing 11. Israel kills most Munich planners and perpetrators. Israeli strategic focus shifts from Arab States to Palestinian militants.
10
Q
The strategic logic of terrorism
A
Using spectacular violence to convey a political message. Striking fear among a country’s population. Often targets civilians (non-combatants). Perpetrated by non-state actors.
11
Q
Abu Daoud, mastermind of the Munich attack, to the Associated Press (2006)
A
Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine.
12
Q
Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman (1929-2004)
A
1959: Co-founded Fatah
1967: joined PLO
1969: Chair of Palestine National Council
1974: addresses UN General Assembly: “I come bearing the olive branch in one hadn’t and the freedom fighter’s gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my head”
1974: At Arab League summit in Rabat, PLO declared sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people”
13
Q
International Relations: The Domestic Level - Realists, Neo-Realists, Liberalists
A
Realists and Neo-Realists argue that the domestic level plays no role in shaping IR outcomes.
Liberalists argue that the domestic level does shape international outcomes.
14
Q
The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David (Stein)
A
Leaders are constrained in their negotiating behaviour by strategic and domestic (economic and political) variables. Leaders “learned over the course of negotiations to focus less on relative gains and more on avoiding absolute loss. Fear of negotiation’s failure because of unsuccessful bargaining was the driving factor in pushing leaders to get the deal done. These leaders end up shaping the international structure, rather than being constrained by them, as structural realists argue.
15
Q
Object of Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations of 1977-79
A
The Sinai Peninsula
16
Q
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations Timeline of events
A
1973: Arab-Israeli War ends in stalemate; Egypt fails to retake Sinai Peninsula by force
1972-5: Convinced that the US would never let Israel lose in battle, Egyptian Pres. Sadat begins exploring the possibility of switching superpower patrons form USSR to USA. 1977: Sadat becomes the first Arab leader to visit Israel; proposes land-for-peace deal in address to Israeli Knesset (parliament)
1978: US Pres. Carter hosts Sadat and Israeli PM Begin for negotiations at Camp David, MD
1978: Sadat and Begin sign a peace deal: Israel returns Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, Egypt gives diplomatic recognition and peace deal.
1979: Deal is finalized on the White House lawn; Carter hosts
Negotiations made provisions for Palestinian autonomy in Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza; these were never implemented.
17
Q
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Two-level bargaining
A
During the negotiations, each of the leaders involved “played two games at a time - at the international table together, and at the domestic table at home”. Shifting from achieving relative gains to avoiding absolute loss can be understood in the context of domestic crises, in particular economic crises that Egypt and Israel were both facing at this time. Strategies had to be effective simultaneously at both the domestic and international tables, and benefitted from synergistic linkages. Domestic crisis in Egypt and Israel imposed costs on participants, changed their calculus from seeking relative gains to avoiding absolute loss.
18
Q
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations: Two-level games (Stein)
A
Stein argues that Egyptian, Israeli, and US decision makers were constrained as much by domestic as by international factors
19
Q
Win-Sets as inter-state negotiations
A
Shows how each government in a peace negotiation/trade negotiations are subject to pressures by international actors but also by at least two major domestic constituencies that may ant opposite things. Some pay want peace, and some may want to keep fighting until they have everything they want - this shapes the realm of possible argument. If there is overlapping area of both countries’ win-sets: represents common-ground for peace negotiations. If no overlap, becomes difficult or impossible to achieve peace. This idea is supported by ideas of Risk aversion combined with cost-benefit analysis.
20
Q
Win-Sets example within context of conflict and negotiations between Egypt and Israeli
A
If a segment of the population is very extreme, interests are represented in the far right circle (E.g. Israel population is not willing to give up an inch of Sinaid peninsula). If that’s all the government has to work with, there would be no peace deal. However, the cross-section closer to the middle represents another domestic group that is more willing to negotiate (E.g. Israel population willing to give up segment of Sinaid peninsula).
21
Q
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Egypt’s strategic outlook
A
Egypt faced a growing economic crisis that its oped to resolve by attracting cash and investment from the oil-rich Gulf States, and support from the US. Ending war with Israel would free up resources to the negotiating table. The US would thus have to broker any peace deal. As Egypt’s economic crisis worsened, Sadat abandoned other Arab countries and the USSR in the framework of a dialogue with US and Israel and unilaterally moved to advance a peace deal.
22
Q
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Israel’s strategic outlook
A
Israel embarked on a massive military spending program after shock of 1973 war. This contributed to an economic crisis. Economic hardship borne by Israel’s Jewish urban poor, who supported the opposition Likud party, placing more pressure on the Labour government. Egypt was Israel’s most militarily powerful regional adversary; a peace deal with Egypt would reduce threats to Israel and free up resources to reduce soaring deficits and inflation. Israel relied on US military and economic assistance, and would need to US to broker any peace deal.
23
Q
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: The US outlook
A
US President Carter wanted to prevent a future regional war in the Middle East. He also wanted to protect US economic and diplomatic iterates in the region, especially energy stability. Carter also faced strong domestic pressure to reach a negotiated settlement hat would avoid another war, and to protect Israel’s interests.
24
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Suasive Reverberation and win-sets
In deciding to visit Jerusalem, Sadat aimed to increase domestic support in Israel and the US for a peace deal with Egypt. His strategy was to make a gesture that would reverberate among his partners' domestic constituencies and persuade them of his sincerity. Visiting Jerusalem was irreversible and broke with Arab States' longstanding refusal to deal directly with Israel. The power of Sadat's gesture convinced many in Israel that peace with Egypt was achievable and worthwhile. Thus, Sadat expanded Israeli PM begin's "win-set" of foreign policy outcomes that Begin's domestic constituency would find acceptable.
25
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Synergistic Linkages
For each leader, success in the 1978 Camp David negotiations was linked to domestic considerations, driving their fear of absolute loss higher. Sadat needed to deal with Israel in order to alleviate the growing economic crisis in Egypt, which would only be done with US help, and the US would only help Egypt if it stayed in the negotiations. Carter had invested tremendous time and political capital in hosting these negotiations, and his image would suffer if he failed. Begin faced economic pressures, a growing Israeli pro-peace movement that demanded a deal with Egypt, and the prospect that the US government and public would blame him if he didn't reach a deal.
26
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Peace Deal Impacts
1979: Egypt suspended from Arab League; readmitted 1989. Egypt becomes second-biggest recipient of US military aid, after Israel. 6 Oct. 1982: Sadat assassinated by Islamist extremists at parade commemorating Canal Crossing. "Cold Peace" endures to this day.
27
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations: Israel-Egypt Security Cooperation
2011: IsIs in Sinai Peninsula has launched numerous attacks vs. Egyptian targets and some vs. Israel. 2012-present: Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation very strong, discreet. More than 100 Israeli airstrikes on Isis in Sinai (2016-18). Egypt closes Hamas' smuggling tunnels into Gaza.
28
Death of Yahya Sinwar
16 Oct.: Hamas leader Sinwar killed by Israeli forces in Tel as-Sultan, Gaza.
Sinwar was architect of Oct. 7 attacks; replaced Ismail Haniyeh in April. Who will lead Hamas now? What will Iran's role be in choosing his replacement? Does this bring peace closer? Probably not
29
Nuclear deterrence
Threat of nuclear strike deters enemies from attacking
30
Mutually-Assured Destruction
If two opposing sides possess nuclear weapons, the guarantee that both sides will be annihilated in case of war actually lessons likelihood of war.
31
Security Dilemma
Not knowing their opponents' true intentions and fearing the worst, states prepare for war.
32
Conflict spiral
Each side interprets the other side's defensive actions as offensive, leading to escalation.
33
Arms racing
As each side improves its weapons technology and capabilities, the other side is motivated to do the same.
34
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Nuclear, chemical (deadly agents), and biological (deadly pathogens) weapons
35
WMD in the conflict
Israel: launched its nuclear weapons program in 1952; possessed a bomb by c.1968-70; also launched chemical and biological warfare programs in 1950s-60s.
Egypt: used chemical weapons against Yemen in 1963-7 during its intervention in Yemeni civil war.
Iraq: used chemical weapons against Iran in 1980-88 war, and also bombed Iraqi Kurds with nerve gas, 1988
Iran: used chemical weapons vs. Iraq in 1980-88 war
Syria: has used chemical weapons vs. rebel-held areas in its civil war.
36
Nuclear deterrence in the conflict
Classic nuclear deterrence argument: Israel's nuclear weapons represent an impediment to their actual use and to the commencement of regional nuclear war (Beres).
37
Should the region disarm? (Beres)
If deprived of its nuclear forces because of misconceived hopes for regional cooperation, the Jewish state could become vulnerable to overwhelming attacks" --> Security Dilemma
Even if the Middle East became a nuclear-free zone, many states possess advanced conventional, chemical, and biological weaponry.
38
Ambiguous Deterrence
Israel has declared that it "will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East". Nuclear ambiguity: Israel has never admitted to possessing nuclear weapons - it is an undeclared nuclear state. This is to avoid triggering a WMD arms race in the Middle East. By 1980s, Israel had developed smaller, tactical nuclear weapons - these could deter specific enemy actions, constituting (nuanced and graduated forms of nuclear reprisal" (Beres).
39
Has Israeli nuclear deterrence worked?
1973: Egypt launches war vs. Israel but limits its strategic objectives to retaking Sinai. 1991: Facing massive US-led coalition attack after 1990 Kuwait invasion, Iraq launches 40 SCUD surface-to-surface missiles at Israel to draw it into conflict; Israel holds its fire. These can be understood as cases were deterrence worked because attacks were limited. Or they can be understood as deterrence failures, because attacks at all.
40
Cold War Rivalry: Israel vs. the USSR
By 1970s, Israeli jets had sufficient range to hit USSR; by 1980s, Israeli missiles could hit targets in southern USSR. Israeli deterrence was thus aimed directly at Soviets during Cold War to ensure the USSR would restrain its clients. soviets also had missiles pointed at Israeli cities.
41
Israel's nuclear futility? (Maoz)
1) no evidence Arab states are preparing for "catastrophic war"
2) no evidence that Israeli nuclear capability has deterred Arab states from initiating more limited wars
3) no evidence that Israeli nuclear weapons affected Arab inclinations to make peace
--> Israeli nuclear policy has contributed to WMD arms race in the region, such as Egyptian and Syrian chemical and biological weapons and missiles, and Iraqi WMD programs.
42
Israel as sole regional nuclear power
On 7 July, 1981, Israeli jets destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor, ending Saddam Hussein's nuclear ambitions. In September 2007, Israeli jets destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria. 2010-2013: Israel assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists, set off an explosion at an Iranian missile base, and released a computer virus to disrupt Iranian uranium enrichment.
43
Israel-Palestine and nuclear weapons
Israeli nuclear weapons had absolutely no impact on Palestinian intifadas or suicide bombings by Palestinian militant groups. Fallout from nuclear-weapons attacks by or against Israel would inevitably poison the entire region and kill or maim friend and foe alike.
44
Iran's nuclear program timeline
1950s-70s: Iran explored possibility of a nuclear program.
1990s-2000s: Iranian nuclear program, ballistic missile programs advanced.
2015: Obama admin brokers multilateral nuclear deal; Iran agrees to halt nukes development
2018: Trump withdraws from agreement
2024: Iran could be weeks or months away from a nuclear wepon.
45
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Israel's Unprecedented Strategic Advantage
By 1982, Israel faced a Non-existential threat because:
1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt
Nuclear deterrence
Increased qualitative military edge
Yet the 1982 Invasion of Lebanon would become a key strategic setback for Israel
46
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Background
1970: Over 200,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon by 1970 (approx 12% of Lebanese pop)
Sep. 1970: Palestinian armed groups based in Lebanon after Black September, 1970
1975-1990: Lebanese Civil War - PLO joined left-wing, Sunni groups fighting Maronite Christian militias
1978: Israeli forces invade southern Lebanon in "Operation Litani" after Fatah unit hijacks Israeli bus, killing 38
47
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Road to War, June 1982
1978: Under Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel secretly aligns with Christian Phalangist militias under command of Gemayel clan.
Sharon planned to eradicate PLO from Lebanon, install Bashir Gemayel as PM. Jan.-Feb. 1982 Sharon and Begin both meet with Bashir Gemayel. 3 June '82: Abu Nidal group shoots Israeli ambassador Shalom Argov in London, on Iraqi orders.
Israeli uses this as a pretext to launch massive invasion of Lebanon.
48
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Clash with Syria in Lebanon, June 1982
To deter Israel's invasion, Hafez al-Assad stationed Syrian troops and surface-to-air missiles in south Lebanon. 8-9 June: Israeli airstrikes destroyed Syrian missiles and wiped out much of Syrian Air Force for minimal loss.
49
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Consolidating Strategic Advantage
Non-unitary decision-making: key Israeli leaders (Defence Minister Sharon, IDF Chief of Staff Eitan) plan the war over objection of other key officers. Can be understood as spending "Strategic capital". Aim was to:
a) eradicate PLo and Syrian forces from Lebanon
b) align with friendly militias (Phalange)
c) Install proxy head of state (Bashir Gemayel)
50
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: PLO Decisions (R. Khalidi)
Never before had PLO faced "such a formidable and ruthless" enemy. PLO forces were outnumbered by a factor of 10:1. Palestinian and Lebanese popular opinion were key factors shaping PLO decision-making. PLO had centralized command of its operations during war.
51
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: PLO Decision-making
No Arab states intervened: "the Palestinians and their allies in Lebanon are alone in facing the Israeli Goliath". As Israelis encircled Beirut, PLO ambushes took an increasing heavy toll. Small gains for the PLO boosted Palestinian morale. PLO aims: slow Israeli advance; inflict maximum casualties; preserve existence of PLO forces - these were largely fulfilled.
52
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: "Israel's Vietnam"
An undeclared war (June-August 1982). Estimated 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinian dead, many civilians. 650 Israeli dead, thousands wounded. Brutal siege of Beirut, July-August 1982. PLO withdrawal from Beirut, August 1982. Bashir Gemayel assassinated, 12/9/82. Phalangist militants massacre approx 1,500 Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatilla camps as Israeli forces stand by.
53
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Outcome - Asymmetric Warfare
PLO relocates to Tunisia, far from Palestine. Palestinian armed groups fragmented, replaced by Iranian-backed Shi'a militia Hezbollah ("Party of God") as key militia fighting Israel from Lebanon. Israeli troops remained in Lebanon until 1985; maintained a 10-km wide "Security zone" until 2000. Israel created a proxy South Lebanon Army (SLA). Existential threat is gone, but Israel cannot make lasting strategic gains via military force.
54
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Domestic Impacts - Israel
Social fragmentation around question of how to resolve non-existential security threats. 400,000-strong Israeli anti-war protest 25/9/82 (10% of Israel's population). Sharon forced to resign. Extreme-right wing grenade attack kills protester, wounds others -foreshadows further right-wing Jewish violence. Government launches Kahan Commission to investigate decision-making.
55
Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: New Strategic Reality
Rise of proxy warfare and non-stage armed groups in the Conflict. Rise of Islamist ideology: Hezbollah, later Hamas and Islamic jihad. Rise of Iranian regional influence. At a tactical level: the use of suicide bombing.
56
Interpreting Soviet goals in the Middle East: Model 1 (Herrmann)
Model 1: Ongoing conflict ensures an opening for Soviet influence, destabilizes US and Israel. Soviets support their clients enough to maintain violent status quo but avoid dangerous escalation.
57
Interpreting Soviet goals in the Middle East: Model 2
USSR as superpower in eclipse with diminishing ability to shape the Middle East. Arab states have other options for weapons, technology, investments. War in Afghanistan sapping Soviet strength.
58
Interpreting Soviet goals in the Middle East: Model 3
The USSR gets involved in the Middle East less to promote its own great-power interests and more "to compete with the unbending anti-Soviet policies" of the US.
59
Soviet deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Soviet willingness to "run risks and pay costs has been fairly moderate" (Herrmann). To signal its willingness to counter US and Israeli power, the Soviets threatened to intervene in 1967 and 1973 on their clients' behalf. 1970: War of attrition escalates; Soviet forces in Suez Canal Zone clash with Israel. USSR replenished and upgraded Syrian air defences after 1982 war.
60
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
The common understanding of Cold War dynamics is that superpower controlled client states. Client states often had more autonomy. Despite Soviet power and arms sales, Syria often charted an independent path that did not align with Soviet wishes. 1970: Against Soviet advice - and despite the threat of US intervention - Syria intervened militarily in Jordan during Black September.
61
Soviet-Syrian Relations
Syrian President Assad refused to sign a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Moscow, although Egypt (1971) and Iraq (1972) did so. The USSr sought to promote the Syrian Communist party, creating tensions with governing Arab Nationalist Ba'ath party. Soviets sought to discourage Syria and Egypt from launching Oct. 1973 war vs. Israel, but supplied them with much weaponry. Soviets also tried to pressure Syria into diplomatic negotiations with Israel.
62
Soviet-Palestinian relations
The USSr, E.Germany, Romania, other Warsaw Pact countries armed, trained, and funded militants from Fatah, PFLP, DFLP. KGB helped to plan Palestinian movements' hijackings, bombings. Eastern Bloc also expressed support for Palestinian cause diplomatically and at UN. But Soviet support directed mainly at Arab states: Egypt (until mid-1970s), Syria, Libya, Iraq. Arafat and the PLO took advantage of Soviet support but were not constrained by Soviet interests.
63
Waning Soviet Power
1976: Egypt's break with USSR signalled diminished Soviet regional power and increased US influence. Soviet clients in Mideast repeatedly humiliated in combat with Israel: bombing of Iraqi reactor (1981) and defeat of Syria in Lebanon (1982). The main Soviet priorities were to counter US influence and to create an "anti-imperialist" (i.e., anti-Western) regional bloc. By 1985, as demonstrated in its limited support for Libya vs. The US, The Soviet Union was "ready to assist and encourage but not fight"
64
Soviet decline
Were the Soviets constrained by external actors and domestic weakness, or simply less concerned about outcomes in the Middle East? Soviets seemed less concerned about the Middle East than the US was in Central America during the same period (Herrmann). By mid-1980s, the USSr had prioritized strengthening its domestic economy and addressing growing US power, over backing Third World clients.
65
Soviet Union: A fading superpower
In 1986, Soviet Premier Gorbachev barely mentioned the Middle East (or other strategically key regions) in his address to the Communist Party Congress. This signalled the decline of superpower proxy rivalries, and foretold the Cold War's end.
66
The Russian role now
2015: Russia intervenes in Syrian Civil War, deploys jets, missiles.
Russia allies with Iran, Hezbollah to preserve Assad regime. 2015-present: Coordinates with Israel to avoid confrontation as Israel launches thousands of airstrikes on Syria targeting Hezbollah, Iran. Russia as major weapons suppliers (jets, surface-to-air missiles) to Syria, Iran. Russia expressed concern over Hamas attack on Oct. 7 and over Israeli invasion of Gaza. Iran a major weapons supplier (drones, ballistic missiles) to Russia.
67
France: role of a mid-level power
French influence in the region dated back to Napoleonic times, and then Sykes-Picot agreement. France saw its role the Middle East and Africa as key to its ongoing status as a global power.
68
French Role after 1962
Close security ties with Israel waned after 1962 Algerian independence. French Pres. DeGaulle was outraged that Israel attacked first in 1967; suspended arms sales to Israel.
69
French Aims
Major French interests: access to oil; arms sales in the region; regional space and security; maintaining French influence. Post-1968: French foreign policy focused increasingly on Israel-Palestine issue. France regarded resolution of Israel-Palestine conflict as key. France also aimed to balance US influence in the region.
70
French-Palestinian Relations
Pres. Georges Pompidou ('69-'74) supported the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". Pres. Valery Giscard D'Estaing ('74-'81) called for a Palestinian homeland, played a key role in launching the EC's 1980 Venice Declaration.
71
Context of negotiations post-Camp David
Arab League rejected 1979 Egypt-Israel peace and US-led efforts. European Economic Community promoted a framework emphasizing Palestinian claims as alternative to US efforts. Israel opposed European role as being too pro-Palestinian. US opposed European role, but worried about alienating Saudis, a key oil supplier and weapons customer.
72
1980 Venice Declaration
Venice 1980: 9-member European Economic Community (EEC) meets with PLO. they address lack of provision for Palestine in the 1979 Egypt-Israel negotiations. Based on UN res. 242. Called for acknowledging "the two principles universally accepted by the international community:
1. the right to existence and to security of all States in the region, including Israel, and,
2. justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of legitimate rights of the Palestinian people".
Greater recognition than US give to PLO.
73
French policy under Mitterrand
1981: Mitterrand elected, distances France from Venice Declaration; supports US-led Camp David initiative. Sought to improve relations with Israel while maintaining strong ties to the PLO leadership. PLO maintained an official bureau in Paris. 1981: French FM Cheysson visits Arafat in Beirut. 1982: Mitterrand addresses the Knesset, called for Palestinian state at "appropriate time" 1987-90: Global support for Palestinians rises during First Intifada; Mitterrand becomes more pro-Palestinian.
74
The European Role now
April 2024: French aircraft participate in US-led alliance to intercept Iranian missile, drone barrage fired at Israel.
Sept.-Oct. 2024: France lobbies for cease-fire in Lebanon. Sept. 2024: UK restricts arms sales to Israel; Netherlands embargoes F-35 components destined for Israel; Germany said to "quietly" scale back arms deliveries to Israel. Oct. 2024: Pres. Macron halts arms transfers to Israel, bans Israeli arms companies from French arms fair.
75
Trump and Israel
Since 1967, official US policy towards Israel-Palestine has been to support a two-state solution, keep embassy in Tel Aviv. 2018: Trump moves US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; drops call for two-state solution. Trump appointed son-in-law Jared Kushner to head Mideast peace negotiations. David Friedman, Trump's bankruptcy lawyer and highly controversial pick for ambassador to Israel, was in favour of indefinite Israeli occupation.
76
Origins of US-Israel relations: 1948
Pres. Harry Truman decided to support creation of Israel in 1948. US voted in favour at UN; so did USSR. Key US policymakers opposed recognizing Israel.
77
The US and Israel: Divergence in views
At that time, a significant number of US Jews were indifferent to Zionism; therefore, govt. support for Israel was not a key to securing Jewish votes. Middle Eastern oil was already a crucial and growing strategic priority - backing Israel could endanger US access.
78
The US and Israel: 1952-1968
1952-60: Eisenhower administration refrains from choosing sides in conflict.
1961-3: JFK authorizes limited weapons sales to Israel, still maintains outreach to Egypt.
1963-8: LBJ continues JFK's approach; post-1967 war, US fills vacuum left by French. 1968: First large-scale US weapons sale to Israel; much. more to come.
79
Israel and Nixon's US: the rightward swing
December 1968: Nixon's special emissary to the Middle East, William Scranton, recommends a more 'even-handed' American policy. Eager to extricate the US from the Vietnam War, Nixon was willing to make concessions to the USSR in the Middle East. Nixon only won 17% of the Jewish vote in 1968 US elections - he was not beholden to domestic "Jewish interests".
80
Nixon and Israel
Nixon increased support for Israel after Israel expressed support for the US war effort in Vietnam, and endorsed Nixon in 1972 elections. Nixon stopped pressuring Israel to negotiate land-for-peace; US aid to Israel quadrupled; the US looked the other way as Israel became a nuclear power.
81
US economic and diplomatic support for Israel.
Since 1985, the US provided Israel with approx. $3B annual aid (mostly military); 74% must be spent buying US goods and services. Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid from 1976 to 2004. Largest cumulative recipient of aid in the world since WWII ($121B). US has used its veto at UN to sink anti-Israel resolutions 42 times, out of 83 times in total that it has led its veto.
82
Late Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) on Israel
Helms chaired Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1995-2001. Called Israel "America's aircraft carrier in the Middle East." When explaining why the US viewed Israel as such a strategic ally, he argued that the military foothold in the region offered by Israel alone justified US military aid to Israel.
83
Walt and Mearsheimer, "The Israel Lobby"
Thesis: the US supports Israel in ways that are inimical to America's own strategic interests. This is because of a powerful pro-Israel cabal within US politics and society.
84
The Israel Lobby (Walt and Mearsheimer)
This includes America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and political action committee (PAC); influential Jews among G.W. Bush's neoconservative policy advisers and Israeli government pressure. This has led to resentment of US in Middle East and among Muslims worldwide; contributed to 9/11 attacks; triggered 2003 Iraq invasion.
85
The Rebuttal: C. Hitchens, "Overstating Jewish Power" (2006)
Walt and Mearsheimer claim "the Jewish tail wags the American dog". But US behaviour towards Israel has been consistent with American interests. Iran is a greater threat to Israel than Iraq, which the US invaded. Neocons first pressured US to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo, not Middle East. Chomsky also claims US support for Israel can be explained by US interests.
86
Hitchens on Walt and Mearsheimer
AIPAC's power over Israel policy isn't as powerful Cuban exiles on Cuba. Al-Qaeda's origins are separate from the Israel-Palestine conflict. The US has also overlooked other allies' nuclear programs, invasion, and human rights violations: ex. Pakistan and Turkey. Walt and Mearsheimer's piece is "slightly but unmistakably smelly".
87
America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
The most influential pro-ISrael lobby group in US politics. Over 100,000 members. Founded in 1951- became influential in mid-1970s. Lobbies Congress on behalf of Israeli interests. Doe not donate directly to political campaigns, but its members often direct Political Action Committees that do donate.
88
AIPAC and its influence
Historically bipartisan, but increasingly aligned with Republicans in US and Likud Party in Israel.
89
Is the AIPAC more pro-Israel than the Israeli government?
1995: AIPAC pressed Congress to pass a law to move the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, against wishes of Israeli PM Rabin.
2000: Israel asked the US to honour a pledge to give Israel $225M in assistance, conditional on Egypt receiving an equal amount; to prevent further US aid to Egypt, AIPAC blocked the transfer.
90
US Christian Evangelicals: Key domestic support base for Israel
View creation of Israel as a prerequisite for Armageddon described in Book of Revelations. View Israelis as similar to US founding pioneers. More united and vociferous in support of Israel than American Jews.
91
Role of Evangelical (Miller)
Israel is a disproportionately large US foreign policy concern. 78% of Republicans and 55% of Democrats sympathized more with Israel than Palestinians. Is this because of AIPAC's influence. Miller finds this unconvincing.
92
Evangelicals' role
A 2014 poll found that only 38% of US Jews believed the Israeli government was sincerely pursuing peace; 44% thought occupying West Bank damaged Israeli national security. US Evangelical Christians are far more staunch in their support of Israel, far more numerous, and as a group, far more right-wing than US Jews.
93
Are US Jews driving America's Israel policy?
"American Jews do not appear to be Israel's strongest supporters, nor do they count US policy towards Israel among their top concerns." 2012: Jews made up 2% of the electorate and 69% of them voted for Obama. in a 2012 poll, only 4% of American Jews said support for Israel was the issue they were most concerned about.
94
Why do Evangelicals Support Israel?
White Evangelicals view the return of Jews as a key event in their view of Armageddon ("death, judgment and the end of the world"). A 2013 poll that 82% of white evangelicals believed that Israel was given to the Jewish people by God - more than double the percentage of American Jews who held this belief - and almost half of them thought that the US was not sufficiently supportive of Israel.
95
Evangelicals - A driving force
White evangelicals were 23% of the US electorate in 2012; 69% voted Republican (82% voted for Trump in 2016). "The religious beliefs of evangelicals and fundamentalists are a driving force in the Republican Party's stance on US foreign policy towards Israel"
96
Obama and Israel
Obama had a strained relationship with Israeli PM Netanyahu. In Dec. 2016, Obama admin. abstained on a UN resolution condemning Israel's occupation of the West Bank and its blockade on Gaza - a first for the US. Trump condemned the move, though he wasn't yet in office.
97
The intifadas
The first intifada lasted from 1988-1993. The Second intifada: late 2000-2005/6
98
The First Intifada
By 1987, there was an entire generation of Palestinian youth who had grown up in West Bank and Gaza knowing nothing other than Israeli military occupation.
99
Economic dynamics of occupation
Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza worked as day labourers in Israel. in 1987, over 40% of Palestinian workforce worked in Israel daily. Unemployment was rife for Palestinians; lack of prospects even for the university-educated. Israeli settler population in West Bank grew from 35,000 in 1984 to 64,000 in 1988, reached 130,000 by earlier 1990s.
100
Growth of settlements in occupied territory
As of 1977, Israel had been building settlements in the West Bank and Gaza at an increasingly rapid place. This policy was known in Israel as creating "facts on the ground," a means of continually displacing Palestinians and changing the demographics of the Occupied Territories.
101
First Intifada: Key Context
End of Cold War. Arab League seemed to accept Status Quo. Disconnect between Palestinian leadership in exile and in Territories.
102
The First Intifada Begins
9 Dec. 1987: Intifada begins after Israeli truck collides with car carrying Palestinian workers, killing three. Protests break out at Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza. They quickly spread to Palestinian populations across the West Bank and Gaza. Protestors throw stones, Molotov cocktails. Israel responds with military force. 1987-88: 332 Palestinians killed; 1,082 Palestinians, 160 Israelis killed in total (1987-93).
103
The First Intifada: Israel Reacts; The Activists Get Bolder
At first, Israel reacted to the first Intifada by attempting to crush it with a purely military response. The Israeli military was pitted against groups of Palestinian stone-throwing youth. Hundreds of Palestinians, many of them children, were killed in the protests, thousands were injured, and thousands more imprisoned by Israeli military.
104
Impacts of the first Intifada
The Intifada attracted world attention and gained international sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Children and teenagers armed with stones had achieved more for the Palestinian cause than the combined might of the Arab armies.
105
Understanding the impacts
Israel could not quell protesters or saw international public opinion. "Both within the IDF and Israeli society, the notion that additional territory necessarily provided added security was mortally undermined by the Intifada". This paved the way for negotiations.
106
The first Intifada and the PLO
Israel thought Intifada was orchestrated by PLO; assassinated Arafat's deputy Abu Jihad in Tunis, April 1988. But PLO, based in exile and disconnected from day-to-day Palestinian life, was as surprised by Intifada as Israel. To maintain its relevance, the PLO issued Algiers declaration of 1988, accepting a two-state solution and UN resolution 242 (land for peace).
107
The first intifada: Negotiations - the global context
The end of the Cold War triggered democratic transitions across the globe. Arab-Israeli conflict had been a superpower-proxy conflict; the Cold War's end created opening.
108
Madrid Peace Conference, 1991
Jan. 1991 Gulf War showed US power, boosted Pres. Bush's domestic popularity. 6 March: George H.W. Bush tells Congress "the time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict"; US State Sec. James Baker engages in 8 months of shuttle diplomacy."
109
Exploring peace negotiations
30 Oct.-1 Nov.: US, USSR co-sponsor conference: Israeli, Syrian, Egyptian, joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations attend. Israeli PM Yitzhak Shamir (Likud Party) refuses to deal with PLO. This strains US-Israel relationship.
110
Aftermath of Madrid Conference
Dec. 1991: Israel holds bilateral discussions with Syrian and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations.
June 1992: Yitzhak Rabin elected Israeli PM; with FM Peres, opts to deal with PLO directly.
January 1993: Bill Clinton becomes US President, helps broker secret Israel-PLO talks in Oslo, Norway.
Israeli-Jordanian talks begin, leading Oct.1994 peace treaty.
111
Reasons to negotiate: the PLO
The PLO had lost its superpower patron with the Soviet collapse. European powers and the US supported a negotiated settlement. The Intifada was an intractable problem for Israel, affording Palestinians new leverage.
112
Impacts of the Intifada
"Palestinian national identity and Palestinian nation-building have become institutionalized." The Intifada "has served as a catalyst in bringing Palestinian political thinking to maturity. There is a strong desire among Palestinians in the occupied territories for a settlement and a compromise."
113
The Intifada's political leverage
"The boys in the streets have proved to be more effective in using forms of civil disobedience than those with guns. But this has to be translated into political terms, which are the following: that we are willing to negotiate, and we have the power to negotiate. We can veto any political option that does not meet our minimum."
114
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: Reasons to negotiate - Israel
The Intifada represented a challenge to the occupation of Palestinian Territories for which there was no military solution. Israeli PM Rabin also saw no military solution to broader Israel-Palestine conflict.
115
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: Further reasons to negotiate - Israel
Demographics: Greater Arab birthrates meant that without Palestinian independence, Arabs would eventually outnumber Jews in Israel/Palestine. Ending PLO armed struggle could give Israel strategic advantage. Peace initiatives enjoyed substantial domestic support in Israel: the "mandate for peace".
116
Key Terms of the Oslo Accords
PLO turns into Palestinian Authority (PA); Gaza and West Bank city of Jericho immediately come under PA authority, with more of the West Bank to come gradually under PA control. A lightly-armed 40,00 strong Palestinian "police force" composed of former militants is established. Progress made on economic cooperation. Final status of Jerusalem and right of return for Palestinian refugees to be decided later.
117
Oslo Accords: The West Bank
Area A (full Palestinian civil and security control): 18%
Area B (Palestinian civil and Israeli security control): 22%
Area C (Full Israeli control): 60%
Under Accords, Israel would gradually withdraw from all of Are B and most of Area C.
118
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: Spoilers and the peace process
Spoilers: extremists seeking through violence to derail negotiated transitions. 1994-95: Israel-PA negotiations and Israeli troop withdrawals from West Bank zones punctuated by extremist violence. Feb. 1994: Jewish extremist murders 29 Muslin worshipers in Hebron.
119
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: Role of spoilers
Apr. '94-Aug. '95: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launch nine suicide bombings in Israel, killing 77 and wounding hundreds. Israel uses border closures and economic pressure against Palestinian populations. Israeli government continues to authorize West Bank settlement growth, especially in response to suicide bombings.
120
Rabin's Assassination
1993-95: Tensions in Israel worsen between pro-peace and anti-peace factions. Likud Party leader Netanyahu leads protesters chanting "the Prime Minister is a traitor!"
4 Nov. 1995: Jewish extremist assassinates Rabin after pro-peace rally in Tel Aviv.
121
Bill Clinton on Rabin, 20 years later
Had he lived, Yitzhak Rabin would have been able to reach a peace deal within three years, because "the Palestinians trusted him. They were absolutely convinced that he... would do what he promised to do. During the negotiations, Arafat had said "Rabin's word was better than any contract"
122
Rabin's Assassination aftermath
Israeli FM Peres becomes PM; Arafat trusts him less, peace process becomes more precarious. 24 Apr. 1996: in Gaza, PNC votes 504-54 to void passages in Palestine National Charter denying Israel's right to exist. April. '96: Palestinian support for negotiated settlement reaches all-time high: 80% in favour of negotiations, only 20% in favour of violence vs. Israel.
123
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: Role of Spoilers - suicide bombing to shape Israeli public opinion
In lead-up to May 1996 elections, Israelis were sharply divided between Labor party (favoured continuing negotiations with PA) and Likud party (opposed land-for-peace deal). Hamas opposed PA's negotiations with Israel. 5 January 1996: Israel assassinates Hamas master bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash.
124
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: Spoilers' Impact
25 February to 4 March 1996: Hamas carries out 4 suicide bombings in 3 Israeli cities, killing 59 civilians. This helps turn Israeli public opinion against negotiations. Netanyahu's Likud narrowly wins the May 1996 elections. Negotiations stall for years afterward. 1996-98: Periodic outbreaks of violence between Israeli and Palestinian forces erode trust.
125
Camp David Negotiations: So close yet so far
Oct. 1998: Wye River Memorandum signed by Arafat and Netanyahu aimed to restart implementation of Oslo Accords, stalled since 1995. 1999: Labour government elected to power in Israel; PM Ehud Barak, with Clinton's support, seeks to conclude peace deal with Arafat's PA. Barak in 1999: "Every attempt to keep hold of this area as one political entity leads, necessarily, to either a nondemocratic or a non-Jewish state. Because if the Palestinians vote, then it is a binational state, and if they don't vote it is an apartheid state." 11-25 July 2000: Clinton hosts Barak and Arafat at Camp David to conclude a peace deal; they come very close.
126
Negotiating the Camp David agreements
Barak offered Arafat 100% of Gaza and 73% of the West Bank, with a gradual increase to 91% of the West Bank. Israel willing to accept up to 100,000 Palestinian refugees as Israeli citizens. Israel wanted to keep some settlement blocks and would switch them for land from its pre-1967 borders. Rather than adopt Oslo I's incremental approach, Barak sought to reach a comprehensive deal in a single round of talks. This approach made Arafat nervous, worried about Palestinian popular reaction to terms of the deal.
127
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations in the 1990s: The talks break down
Key areas of disagreement included control of Jerusalem holy sites and Right of Return. Unwilling to forswear further claims, Arafat refused Barak's best offer; talks end without deal. Clinton and Barak blamed Arafat for walking way without making a counteroffer and doing little to quell violence that emerged afterward. Arafat felt Barak and US cornered him; Barak had not fulfilled Israeli commitments to withdraw troops from some zones before talks began; Israeli demands to retain sovereignty over Jerusalem went too far.
128
Competing views on Camp David's failure
Saudi Prince to Arafat on Barak's peace offer: "If we lose this opportunity, it is not going to be a tragedy, this is going to be a crime." Based on their respective rights and obligations under international law, the Camp David talks forced only one side to compromise their basic rights: the Palestinians (Norman Finkelstein, 2007).
129
The Second Intifada: Shifts in the international system
2000: George W. Bush elected US President.
2001: Likud's Ariel Sharon elected PM.
Western political landscape shifts further rightward after 9/11 attacks
130
Triggers for Second Intifada
Ariel Sharon visits Jerusalem's Temple Mount complex. Palestinians protesting Sharon's visit clash with Israeli police.
131
The Second Intifada emerge
After Sharon's visit, fresh round of violence erupts. Pitched gun-battles between Palestinian and Israeli forces.
132
The Second Intifada emerges
After Sharon's visit, fresh round of violence erupts. Pitched gun-battles between Palestinian and Israeli forces. Palestinian militants use suicide bombs (mainly vs. Israeli civilians): 138 suicide bombings from Oct. 2000-July 2005. Israel bombards targets in densely populated Palestinian areas. Over 5000 Palestinians and 1000 Israelis killed, 2000-2006.
133
Conclusions of Mitchell report (US govt., 2000)
"We have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the Palestine authority to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity, or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the Government of Israel to respond with lethal force. However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began, or that the Government of Israel made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and accordingly."
134
The Second Intifada: The fighting intensifies
Waves of suicide bombings kill mounting number of Israeli civilians. Gunbattles between Palestinian and Israeli forces. Israeli military deploys troops, tanks, helicopter gunships through West Bank and Gaza. Israeli forces reoccupy Palestinian cities and towns in Areas A, B, and C designated by Oslo Accords. Israel destroys Palestinian infrastructure; restricts population movement.
135
Key aspects of Second Intifada
PA begins losing full decision-making control; Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, carry out attacks vs Israel. 2002L Israel launches ground invasion of West Bank, occupying towns, encircling Jewish settlements. March 2002: Israel begins construction of wall through West Bank, supposedly as a security barrier.
136
Israel's separation wall
The Israeli government claimed to be building the separation wall for security purposes. However, the wall has several gaps through which infiltrators could easily penetrate. A more convincing explanation for the wall is to assert control over more West Bank territory. In many places, the wall separates Palestinians from fields, orchards, land they won; obstructs Palestinian freedom of movement; access to roads, territory.
137
Second Intifada: Ising Violence to Win Public Support
Does violence against Israelis win Palestinian militant groups greater domestic public support? Bloom (2004) argues that Palestinian militant groups use violence against Israelis to outbid each other as they compete for Palestinian public support. Why?: attacking Israelis can be seen as a public good; it also signals a group's capacity to provide public services like schools and hospitals.
138
The Second Intifada: Utility of Violence
Some also argue that attacks are intended to provoke a violent Israeli response to further radicalize the Palestinian population. Militant Islamist organization Hamas, "responsible for more than 40% of Israeli fatalities" in 2000-05, won an important victory in 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections.
139
The Second Intifada: Does "outbidding" work?
Jaeger et al. find that Hamas (Islamist) and Fatah (secular) attacks on Israelis do bring slightly more public support. But "gains in support from successful attacks against Israelis do not come at the expense of each other's support". Rather, successful Hamas attacks draw support away from the other main Islamist militant group, Palestinian islamic Jihad. Successful Fatah attacks draw support away from the other secular militant groups the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
140
The Second Intifada: Challenging the "outbidding" explanation
Palestinian militants' attacks against Israel serve goals such as: 1. Retaliation against Israel's targeted killings of militant leaders. 2. Creating political pressure for Israel to give up territory in negotiations. 3. Shaping Israeli public opinion.
But outbidding on its own "cannot explain the observed variation in violent attacks against Israel, even if such attacks usually generate greater Palestinian public support.
141
Israel's strategy of targeted assassination
As suicide bombings and widespread violence mounted, Israel sought to neutralize Hamas, other militant groups by killing their leadership. Attacks usually killed civilians, too. 22/7/2002: aerial bombing of Hamas leader Salah Shehadeh in Gaza kills him, 18 family members.
142
Targeted Assassination
After Israel kills Hamas leaders Yassin and Rantisi in 2004, pace of Hamas suicide bombings, suggesting that strategy may be effective. But Israeli assassinations have also sparked reprisal attacks, perpetuating further violence.
143
Arafat's death
Aging, besieged by Israeli forces in Jenin headquarters, Arafat's health deteriorates. He dies in France in 11/11/2004.
144
Rise in settler vigilantism
Since 1968, Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza have used violence against Palestinians, and sometimes even against Israeli forces. Israeli government has proved unwilling to deal with vigilantism - 90% of incidents have gone unpunished. Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 made some West Bank settlers feel insecure.
145
Settler vigilantism
Settlers have widespread access to weaponry, rarely face serious consequences from the Israeli government, even when they attack Israeli forces. 2006-2014: 2100 settler attacks vs. Palestinians, a 400% increase over rate in previous years.
146
The Gaza Wars, 2009-2003: Israel's unilateral Gaza withdrawal
Aug. 2005,; Israeli PM Sharon decides to unilaterally withdraw all Israeli forces from Gaza; over objections from his political allies. Israeli forces dismantle and forcibly evacuate Israeli settlement bloc Gush Katif, citing security costs. The withdrawal takes place outside of any negotiation context; intended to freeze peace process.
147
The Gaza Wars, 2009-2023: Hamas' Rise to Power in Gaza
2006: US wars of occupation rage in Iraq, Afghanistan; Second Intifada drawing down.
Jan. 2006: Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) holds first elections since 1996, scheduled by PA President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah. USAID pours money into Palestinian grassroots initiatives, hoping to bolster Fatah; EU sends election observers. Hamas wins 74 of the 132 seats, forms a government in Gaza under Ismail Haniyeh.
148
Did Palestinains elect Hamas as an anti-Israel statement?
Jan.-Feb. 2006: survey data indicates mot Palestinians agree that Hamas should recognize Israel's right to exist. Palestinian voters' main motive in electing Hamas was a rebuke of PA's reputation for corruption.
149
The Gaza Wars: Covert operations in Gaza
June 2007: responding to a US-backed faction of Fatah's attempt to take power in Gaza, Hamas seizes total power; killing several key Fatah operatives. US had covertly suppled Fatah with $1.27Bn in aid, including weapons and training. 13 June 2007: US ambassador to Israel Richard Jones cabled Washington that Israel was satisfied with Hamas takeover in Gaza.
150
The Gaza Wars: Israel's economic blockade of Gaza
After Hamas' rise to power, Israel imposed harsh restrictions in Gaza's 1.8 million people. This included restricting flow of commercial goods; cement, fishing; and many other products and economic activities. Israeli military controls Gaza's airspace, sea access and most road traffic (one border crossing with Egypt); there is no functional airport. Egypt strictly controls Gaza-Sinai border; it is wary of Islamist movements.
151
Gaza War, 2009 ("Operation Cast Lead" / "Gaza Massacre")
2001-2023: Hamas builds and receives increasingly sophisticated ground-to-ground rockets with increasing range. By mid-2000s, there replace suicide bombings; rockets are less deadly but much harder to stop. 27 Dec. 2008-18 Jan. 2009: Israel and Hamas fight mini-war in Gaza. Israel uses overwhelming force to hit Palestinian targets, killing hundreds of Hamas fighters and approx. 1000 civilians. Hams retaliates with rocket fire, tunnel infiltrations, killing 13 Israelis. UN-appointed Goldstone Commission finds Israel committed war crimes, targeted civilians.
152
Gaza Wars of 2012 and 2014
Nov. 2012: For one week, Israel strikes Hamas targets retaliates with hundreds of rockets; dozens of Hamas fighters and over 100 Palestinian civilians killed.
July-Aug. 2014: Over 7 weeks, Israeli forces launch aerial bombardment and ground invasion of Gaza; Hamas strikes back with rockets and militants infiltrated into Israel via tunnels; over 2000 Palestinians and 67 Israelis killed. Israeli strategy of "mowing the lawn": periodically assaulting Gaza, "weakening Hamas and enhancing Israel's powers of deterrence". Attacking Hamas also scuttles peace talks the Israeli government has no intention of taking seriously.
153
The Gaza Wars: Israel- Unclear strategy, diminishing gains
Israel's military assault on Gaza give "the impression of an instinctive response, provoked by frustration at Israel's failure to find any other answer to Palestinian rocket fire. In all its operations vs Gaza, Israel has failed to stop Palestinian rocket fire; in 2012 and 2014, Hamas claimed victory. Deterrence is successful when an enemy is deterred from attacking' launching a massive assault against a defiant enemy erodes, rather than restores deterrence. These attacks have been disastrous for Israel's image abroad. Hamas' credentials as resistance movement bolstered.
154
The Gaza Wars: Asymmetric Warfare and Perpetual Conflict
No, no peace: repeated iterations of asymmetric warfare have not diminished Hamas, Gaza population's willingness to fight. Hamas has expressed willingness to maintain a cease-fire but not recognized Israel or make lasting peace. Israel's overwhelming military edge has not made it more secure; strategic gap diminished as Hamas rockets increased in range; some guided missiles also supplied by Iran. Israel's Likud government unwilling to follow through with land-for-peace. Strategic alliances between Israel, Republican US admins has emboldened right-wing Israeli leaders since Second Intifada.
155
Leading up to 7. Oct 2023
Israeli govt perceives a tacit understanding with Hamas. Netanyahu govt and Hamas' joint objection to a two-state solution seen as basis for cooperation. Israel allows billions of dollars annually, mainly in Qatari funds, to reach Hamas. Led by Yahya Sinwar, Hamas uses these funds to build tunnel network and prepare for attack on Israel.
156
Most Powerful non-State Actor on Earth: Hezbollah
Iranian proxy in Lebanon, founded 1982. Main objective is to fight Israel. Power base among Shi'a in southern Lebanon. Increasing military success vs. Israel (mini-wars). Major role in Syrian civil war today. Possessed 140,000 rockets.
157
Emergence of Hezbollah
Under pressure from the Reagan administration and growing domestic outcry, Israel withdraws its troops in stages from Lebanon, 1982-85. Hezbollah filled the vacuum created by the PLO's withdrawal from Lebanon. Hezbollah ("Party of God"): Shi'a militant organization funded by the Shi'a Islamic revolution in Iran.
158
Roots of Hezbollah
Born among the Shi'a communities of Southern Beirut and rural areas of southern Lebanon. 1500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel deployed to Lebanon by early 1980s to organize Shi'a armed groups. Hezbollah more committed to armed actions compared to moderate Amal.
159
Hezbollah: Perils of Targeted Assassination
Feb. 1992: Israel assassinates Hezbollah's Supreme Leader Abbas Musawi. 18 March 1992: Hezbollah bombs Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 12. Musawi replaced by fair shrewder and more charismatic Hassan Nasrallah, who still commands Hezbollah today. Hezbollah has grown greatly in strength under Nasrallah's command.
160
2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah
12 July-14 August 2006: Hezbollah forces kidnap 4 Israeli soldiers patrolling ear Lebanon border; ambush Israeli reinforcements.
Israel responds with massive aerial and artillery bombardment of Hezbollah positions.
After several days, Israeli govt orders land invasion. Hezbollah surprised Israel with sophisticated tactics. Nearly 200 Israeli troops, hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, dozens of Israeli civilians and over 1000 Lebanese civilians killed. Outcome regarded as major success for Hezbollah.
161
Hezbollah's intervention in Syria
The Assad regime is Hezbollah's lifeline to Iranian support, weapons. Thus, Hezbollah fought alongside Assad in Syria since outbreak of Syrian civil war in 2011. Pros: Assad has remained in power, Hezbollah fighters gain combat experience. Cons: Hezbollah criticized for supporting a tyrant; over 2000 troops killed in Syrian fighting.
162
Hezbollah and miscalculation
July 2023: Nasrallah warns Israel: "You will be returned to theStone Age if you go to war"
Nasrallah often repeated claim that Israel appeared strong but was more fragile than a spider's web. He claimed Hezbollah's Iranian-built air defence systems had "eroded the Israeli Air Force's superiority in the skies". 17-18 Sept. Israel detonates rigged pagers, incapacitating thousands of Hezbollah fighters. 24-27 Sept.: Israel kills Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leadership in airstrikes.
163
Some key features of Israel-Iran rivalry
Weak states: Syria is torn by civl war, giving Iran and Russia an opening to deploy their military forces here.
Proxy forces: Iran has sent thousands of its own troops to Syria; also backs militant groups in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen.
Air Warfare: Since 2013, Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria; Iran has stationed missiles in Syria and Iraq.
Great Power Involvement: Iran is aligned with Russia in Syria; Israel is aligned with US.
Israel regards Iranian nuclear program as existential threat; killed Iranian nuclear scientist and detonated a bomb at an Iranian missile base (2011); launched computer viruses to disrupt Iranian uranium enrichment.
164
Iranian Role in Syria
Iran and Syria have been allied since 1980s. Iran seeks to broaden its regional influence; Syria is a friend in need. Iranian delivers weapons to Hezbollah via Syria. Since 2012, at least 7000 Iranian troops have been deployed in Syria to fight vs rebels. Thousands more belong to Iran-trained Syrian Shi'a militias. As of 2022, about 2000 Iranian troops had been killed.
165
8 May 2018: Trump withdraws US from Iran nuclear deal
Trump calls deal "horrible, one-sided". European partners, Russia, and China all remained in deal, expressed hope it can endure. Iran reaffirmed its adherence to deal's terms, did not withdraw. US re-imposes economic sanctions on Iran. Iran has resumed uranium enrichment.
166
Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah: Deterrence and risk of escalation
Since 2011, Iran has been building a large military presence in Syria (troops, drones, missiles, proxy militias) to challenge Israel. Israel has repeatedly warned that it would not permit a large Iranian military presence in Syria. April 2018: Israeli airstrikes on Syrian airbases kill Iranian personnel. 9//5 2018: Iran fires 32 missiles at Israel from Syria; all shots are shot down or miss. 10/5 2018, Israeli airstrikes hit over 50 Iranian targets in Syria, killing dozens.
167
Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah: Deterrence
After the May 10 strikes Israeli defence minister Avigdor Lieberman told media: "I hope its perfectly clear for everyone: if it rains on our side, there will be a flood their side." June/July 2018: Israeli airstrikes on Iranian bases I Syria continue. Iran determined to stay put.
168
Great Power role: dimensions of Russian intervention in Syria
Since 2015, Russia has stationed forces in Syria to prevent Assad regime's overthrow.
Russia, Israel reached tacit agreement condoning Israeli airstrikes on Iranian, Hezbollah targets in Syria.
Sept. 2018: Syrian air defences hit Russian plane while firing at Israeli jets; 15 Russian servicemen killed.
Oct. 2018: Russia upgrades Syrian air defence with S-300 missiles.
169
Iranian support for Hamas
Iranian support for Hamas reaches back decades. Iran has supplied funds and weaponry to Hamas and PIJ. It has also trained their engineers to manufacture weapons locally. 2012: Iran halved $150m annual funding to Hamas over its lack of support for Assad regime. Iran later increased this support.
170
Escalation of Rivalry since Oct. 7
Hamas likely did not coordinate Oct. 7 attacks with Iran, Hezbollah; failed to spark wider war. Iran has been "reluctant escalator" vs. Israel, US. Hezbollah has maintained rocket, missile, and drone attacks at Israel since Oct. 8. Houthi militants in Yemen have attacked Israeli, Western shipping in Red Sea. 1 April: Iranian proxies in Iraq launch drone attack on Israel.
171
Post-Oct. 7: Israeli escalation vs. Iran
Israel has killed multiple Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon and Syria. 23 Dec. 2023: Israeli airstrike kills Seyed Radhi Mousavi, coordinator of IRGC weapons transfers to Hezbollah, Syria. Jan. 2024: Israeli airstrike in Damascus kills give IRGC officers, including deputy head of Quds Force intelligence in Syria.
1 April 2024: Israeli airstrike on Iranian consulate in Damascus kills IRGC regional commander Mohammed Reza Zahedi. his deputy, five other IRGC officers, and two Hezbollah operatives.
172
Iran's diminished deterrence
Hezbollah more dangerous to Israel than Iran's own forces. Iran still has about 3000 missiles but very little to defend its territory from Israeli (or US) airstrikes. About half of Hezbollah's missiles and rockets destroyed by Israel since July. Iranian security forces deeply infiltrated by Israel, according to former Pres. Ahmadinejad. Iranian nuclear facilities a possible target.
173
Domestic dimensions of Israel-Iran rivalry
Netanyahu govt. is unpopular in Israel, faces mounting protests and criticism for Oct. 7 failure to return hostages. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary regime has only 20-25% domestic support.
174
The Conflict Today: ICC charges
Nov. 2024: ICC issues warrants for arrest of Israeli PM Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant along with Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif (killed by Israel in July). The warrants said there were "reasonable grounds" to believe the three men bore criminal responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza and Israel. Many ICC signatory countries have said they would comply with warrants. Israel and USA are not signatory to ICC. Netanyahu also under domestic corruption investigation.
175
Alliance patterns in the Trump era, 2016-2020
Trump administration aligns with Israel to marginalize Palestinians by forging closer ties with "other" Arab states: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar. This plan aims to put greater pressure on Palestinians to accept status quo while resisting Iranian influence. Aug-Sep 2018: Trump cancels $225M in aid funds designated for Palestinian: leverage tactic. "Moderate" Arab states have been willing to sacrifice Palestinian claims for sake of regional and domestic stability, investments, prosperity.
176
Geopolitical strategy in the Trump era
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE saw Trump's rise as an opportunity to promote their interests, check Iranian power by promoting closer US-Russia ties, including lifting US sanctions on Russia. Israeli, Gulf officials promoted idea of "trading Ukraine for Syria": Trump's US would ignore Russian aggression in Ukraine in exchange for Russia expelling Iran from Syria. Trump has ignored Russia aggression in Ukraine (and Russian meddling in US elections); Russia and Iran remind close.
177
The One-State Solution (Ghana Karmi)
Few policymakers are willing to face the truth: "The Israeli colonization of the West Bank and East Jerusalem has so advanced as to make questionable the logistical possibility of creating a viable Palestinian state on the territory that remains". "The idea of sharing the land between Rams and Jews is older than that of the two-state solution". The two-state solution is "a recent notion in Palestinian history that emerged in response to a series of defeats for the Palestinian national movement". Before 1970s, Palestinian political leadership had long rejected partition proposals reaching back to 1920s.
178
Two-State Solution: Resolution and justice
The two-state solution proposes to "divide the Palestinian's' historic homeland into grossly unequal parts," and reflects Israel's "coercion and force of arms" throughout the conflict. It restricts most Palestinian refugee's ability to return. Nevertheless, the PLO began accepting 2-state solution after 1973 war, and in successive plans proposed by USSr (1981), Saudi Arabia (1982), Arab League (2002), Bush Road Map (2003). Now, with Israel's proliferation of West Bank settlements; de-facto annexation of East-Jerusalem; Border Wall; the two-state solution seems unattainable.
179
The one-state solution as equitable
"The one-state solution means the creation of a single entity of Israel/Palestine in which the two peoples would live together without borders or partitions, thereby avoiding a division of resources that could neither be workable nor fair." "Only a one-state solution can address all the basic issues that perpetuate the conflict - land, resources, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees - in an equitable framework." The One-State Solution seems unattainable too, underscoring lack of justice for Palestinians; but it exposes fallacy of 2-state solution.
180
