Final Flashcards
Aftermath of the 1967 War
1 September 1967: the Arab League meets in Khartoum and adopts a resolution enshrining the “three No’s”: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.
No Resolution 242 (22 Nov. 1967)
UN Security Council unanimously passes Res. 242: the template of “land for peace”; its provisions include:
1) “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”
2) Full Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied in recent conflict
3) Right to live in peace within a secure and recognized boundaries
4) A just settlement of the refugee problem
5) Guarantee of territorial inviolability and full independence of every state in the area through measures including demilitarized zones
Rise of Palestinian national movements (1964, 1967)
1964: Arab League creates an organization to represent Palestinians: Palestine National Council (PNC) and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded.
1967: After war, Palestinian groups decided they could not rely on Arab States to defeat Israel
What did the PNC charter call for
Eliminating Israel and establishing independent Palestinian state; made no mention of religion
Emergence of Palestinian militancy
Palestinians again came to the force of the conflict, non-state actors grew in importance. By sponsoring/founding various Palestinian armed groups, Arab states could attack Israel indirectly (proxy war) and build their own prestige among Arab states and domestically. Gradual erosion replaces direct confrontation as Arab strategy vs. Israel.
Charter of the PFLP, December 1967:
“The only weapon left to the masses in order to restore history and progress and truly defeat enemies and potential enemies in the long run is revolutionary violence… The only language that the enemy understands is the language of revolutionary violence.”
Emergence of Palestinian Militancy: 1965-1968
1965-7: PLO attacks launched from Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, mainly target Israel infrastructure.
1968: PLO hijacks Israeli airliner, secures release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel in exchange for hostages - starts a trend
1968-70: PLO, PFLP, DFLP launch mini-war vs. Israel from Jordan, including rocket fire, ambushes, guerrilla incursions vs. civilians and army
1968-70: Egypt launches limited war aimed at eroding Israeli positions in Sinai peninsula
21/3/1968: In response to Palestinian attacks, Israel attacks PLO positions near Jordanian town in Karameh; 150 militants, 20 Jordanian soldiers, 28 Israelis killed
Palestinian Militancy - The fighting intensifies: 1969-1970
1969: Fatah alone carries out 2,432 guerrilla attacks on Israel, mainly from Jordan
The PLO becomes a “state within a state” in Jordan, controlling territory, setting up roadblocks, levying taxes, abusing Jordanians. Palestinian groups hijack, bomb planes throughout Europe and Middle East. 15/9/1970L PFLP hijacks 5 planes, diverts 3 to Dawson’s Field, Jordan; removes all passengers and blows up aircraft. This draws condemnation from Western states.
Black September, 1970
16/9/1970: Jordan’s King Hussein orders army to crush Palestinian groups, reassert control over territory. Over 9 days, Jordanian forces kill 3,500 Palestinians combatants and civilians. Arafat calls for Hussein to be overthrown. King Hussein expels all Palestinian groups from Jordan. PLO and other groups relocate to Lebanon, attack Israel from there.
The PLO into the 1970s
1970-80: From Lebanon, Palestinian militants kill hundreds of Israelis, mainly civilians, in attacks on school buses, apartment buildings, airports, etc.
Israeli retaliatory strikes hit militant bases, refugee camps, killing militants and civilians alike.
5/9/1972: PLO’s Black September faction takes Israeli athletes hostage at Munich Olympics, killing 11. Israel kills most Munich planners and perpetrators. Israeli strategic focus shifts from Arab States to Palestinian militants.
The strategic logic of terrorism
Using spectacular violence to convey a political message. Striking fear among a country’s population. Often targets civilians (non-combatants). Perpetrated by non-state actors.
Abu Daoud, mastermind of the Munich attack, to the Associated Press (2006)
Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine.
Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman (1929-2004)
1959: Co-founded Fatah
1967: joined PLO
1969: Chair of Palestine National Council
1974: addresses UN General Assembly: “I come bearing the olive branch in one hadn’t and the freedom fighter’s gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my head”
1974: At Arab League summit in Rabat, PLO declared sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people”
International Relations: The Domestic Level - Realists, Neo-Realists, Liberalists
Realists and Neo-Realists argue that the domestic level plays no role in shaping IR outcomes.
Liberalists argue that the domestic level does shape international outcomes.
The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David (Stein)
Leaders are constrained in their negotiating behaviour by strategic and domestic (economic and political) variables. Leaders “learned over the course of negotiations to focus less on relative gains and more on avoiding absolute loss. Fear of negotiation’s failure because of unsuccessful bargaining was the driving factor in pushing leaders to get the deal done. These leaders end up shaping the international structure, rather than being constrained by them, as structural realists argue.
Object of Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations of 1977-79
The Sinai Peninsula
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations Timeline of events
1973: Arab-Israeli War ends in stalemate; Egypt fails to retake Sinai Peninsula by force
1972-5: Convinced that the US would never let Israel lose in battle, Egyptian Pres. Sadat begins exploring the possibility of switching superpower patrons form USSR to USA. 1977: Sadat becomes the first Arab leader to visit Israel; proposes land-for-peace deal in address to Israeli Knesset (parliament)
1978: US Pres. Carter hosts Sadat and Israeli PM Begin for negotiations at Camp David, MD
1978: Sadat and Begin sign a peace deal: Israel returns Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, Egypt gives diplomatic recognition and peace deal.
1979: Deal is finalized on the White House lawn; Carter hosts
Negotiations made provisions for Palestinian autonomy in Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza; these were never implemented.
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Two-level bargaining
During the negotiations, each of the leaders involved “played two games at a time - at the international table together, and at the domestic table at home”. Shifting from achieving relative gains to avoiding absolute loss can be understood in the context of domestic crises, in particular economic crises that Egypt and Israel were both facing at this time. Strategies had to be effective simultaneously at both the domestic and international tables, and benefitted from synergistic linkages. Domestic crisis in Egypt and Israel imposed costs on participants, changed their calculus from seeking relative gains to avoiding absolute loss.
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations: Two-level games (Stein)
Stein argues that Egyptian, Israeli, and US decision makers were constrained as much by domestic as by international factors
Win-Sets as inter-state negotiations
Shows how each government in a peace negotiation/trade negotiations are subject to pressures by international actors but also by at least two major domestic constituencies that may ant opposite things. Some pay want peace, and some may want to keep fighting until they have everything they want - this shapes the realm of possible argument. If there is overlapping area of both countries’ win-sets: represents common-ground for peace negotiations. If no overlap, becomes difficult or impossible to achieve peace. This idea is supported by ideas of Risk aversion combined with cost-benefit analysis.
Win-Sets example within context of conflict and negotiations between Egypt and Israeli
If a segment of the population is very extreme, interests are represented in the far right circle (E.g. Israel population is not willing to give up an inch of Sinaid peninsula). If that’s all the government has to work with, there would be no peace deal. However, the cross-section closer to the middle represents another domestic group that is more willing to negotiate (E.g. Israel population willing to give up segment of Sinaid peninsula).
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Egypt’s strategic outlook
Egypt faced a growing economic crisis that its oped to resolve by attracting cash and investment from the oil-rich Gulf States, and support from the US. Ending war with Israel would free up resources to the negotiating table. The US would thus have to broker any peace deal. As Egypt’s economic crisis worsened, Sadat abandoned other Arab countries and the USSR in the framework of a dialogue with US and Israel and unilaterally moved to advance a peace deal.
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Israel’s strategic outlook
Israel embarked on a massive military spending program after shock of 1973 war. This contributed to an economic crisis. Economic hardship borne by Israel’s Jewish urban poor, who supported the opposition Likud party, placing more pressure on the Labour government. Egypt was Israel’s most militarily powerful regional adversary; a peace deal with Egypt would reduce threats to Israel and free up resources to reduce soaring deficits and inflation. Israel relied on US military and economic assistance, and would need to US to broker any peace deal.
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: The US outlook
US President Carter wanted to prevent a future regional war in the Middle East. He also wanted to protect US economic and diplomatic iterates in the region, especially energy stability. Carter also faced strong domestic pressure to reach a negotiated settlement hat would avoid another war, and to protect Israel’s interests.
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Suasive Reverberation and win-sets
In deciding to visit Jerusalem, Sadat aimed to increase domestic support in Israel and the US for a peace deal with Egypt. His strategy was to make a gesture that would reverberate among his partners’ domestic constituencies and persuade them of his sincerity. Visiting Jerusalem was irreversible and broke with Arab States’ longstanding refusal to deal directly with Israel. The power of Sadat’s gesture convinced many in Israel that peace with Egypt was achievable and worthwhile. Thus, Sadat expanded Israeli PM begin’s “win-set” of foreign policy outcomes that Begin’s domestic constituency would find acceptable.
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Synergistic Linkages
For each leader, success in the 1978 Camp David negotiations was linked to domestic considerations, driving their fear of absolute loss higher. Sadat needed to deal with Israel in order to alleviate the growing economic crisis in Egypt, which would only be done with US help, and the US would only help Egypt if it stayed in the negotiations. Carter had invested tremendous time and political capital in hosting these negotiations, and his image would suffer if he failed. Begin faced economic pressures, a growing Israeli pro-peace movement that demanded a deal with Egypt, and the prospect that the US government and public would blame him if he didn’t reach a deal.
Israeli-Egyptiaon Peace Negotiations: Peace Deal Impacts
1979: Egypt suspended from Arab League; readmitted 1989. Egypt becomes second-biggest recipient of US military aid, after Israel. 6 Oct. 1982: Sadat assassinated by Islamist extremists at parade commemorating Canal Crossing. “Cold Peace” endures to this day.
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations: Israel-Egypt Security Cooperation
2011: IsIs in Sinai Peninsula has launched numerous attacks vs. Egyptian targets and some vs. Israel. 2012-present: Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation very strong, discreet. More than 100 Israeli airstrikes on Isis in Sinai (2016-18). Egypt closes Hamas’ smuggling tunnels into Gaza.
Death of Yahya Sinwar
16 Oct.: Hamas leader Sinwar killed by Israeli forces in Tel as-Sultan, Gaza.
Sinwar was architect of Oct. 7 attacks; replaced Ismail Haniyeh in April. Who will lead Hamas now? What will Iran’s role be in choosing his replacement? Does this bring peace closer? Probably not
Nuclear deterrence
Threat of nuclear strike deters enemies from attacking
Mutually-Assured Destruction
If two opposing sides possess nuclear weapons, the guarantee that both sides will be annihilated in case of war actually lessons likelihood of war.
Security Dilemma
Not knowing their opponents’ true intentions and fearing the worst, states prepare for war.
Conflict spiral
Each side interprets the other side’s defensive actions as offensive, leading to escalation.
Arms racing
As each side improves its weapons technology and capabilities, the other side is motivated to do the same.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Nuclear, chemical (deadly agents), and biological (deadly pathogens) weapons
WMD in the conflict
Israel: launched its nuclear weapons program in 1952; possessed a bomb by c.1968-70; also launched chemical and biological warfare programs in 1950s-60s.
Egypt: used chemical weapons against Yemen in 1963-7 during its intervention in Yemeni civil war.
Iraq: used chemical weapons against Iran in 1980-88 war, and also bombed Iraqi Kurds with nerve gas, 1988
Iran: used chemical weapons vs. Iraq in 1980-88 war
Syria: has used chemical weapons vs. rebel-held areas in its civil war.
Nuclear deterrence in the conflict
Classic nuclear deterrence argument: Israel’s nuclear weapons represent an impediment to their actual use and to the commencement of regional nuclear war (Beres).
Should the region disarm? (Beres)
If deprived of its nuclear forces because of misconceived hopes for regional cooperation, the Jewish state could become vulnerable to overwhelming attacks” –> Security Dilemma
Even if the Middle East became a nuclear-free zone, many states possess advanced conventional, chemical, and biological weaponry.
Ambiguous Deterrence
Israel has declared that it “will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East”. Nuclear ambiguity: Israel has never admitted to possessing nuclear weapons - it is an undeclared nuclear state. This is to avoid triggering a WMD arms race in the Middle East. By 1980s, Israel had developed smaller, tactical nuclear weapons - these could deter specific enemy actions, constituting (nuanced and graduated forms of nuclear reprisal” (Beres).
Has Israeli nuclear deterrence worked?
1973: Egypt launches war vs. Israel but limits its strategic objectives to retaking Sinai. 1991: Facing massive US-led coalition attack after 1990 Kuwait invasion, Iraq launches 40 SCUD surface-to-surface missiles at Israel to draw it into conflict; Israel holds its fire. These can be understood as cases were deterrence worked because attacks were limited. Or they can be understood as deterrence failures, because attacks at all.
Cold War Rivalry: Israel vs. the USSR
By 1970s, Israeli jets had sufficient range to hit USSR; by 1980s, Israeli missiles could hit targets in southern USSR. Israeli deterrence was thus aimed directly at Soviets during Cold War to ensure the USSR would restrain its clients. soviets also had missiles pointed at Israeli cities.
Israel’s nuclear futility? (Maoz)
1) no evidence Arab states are preparing for “catastrophic war”
2) no evidence that Israeli nuclear capability has deterred Arab states from initiating more limited wars
3) no evidence that Israeli nuclear weapons affected Arab inclinations to make peace
–> Israeli nuclear policy has contributed to WMD arms race in the region, such as Egyptian and Syrian chemical and biological weapons and missiles, and Iraqi WMD programs.
Israel as sole regional nuclear power
On 7 July, 1981, Israeli jets destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor, ending Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions. In September 2007, Israeli jets destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria. 2010-2013: Israel assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists, set off an explosion at an Iranian missile base, and released a computer virus to disrupt Iranian uranium enrichment.
Israel-Palestine and nuclear weapons
Israeli nuclear weapons had absolutely no impact on Palestinian intifadas or suicide bombings by Palestinian militant groups. Fallout from nuclear-weapons attacks by or against Israel would inevitably poison the entire region and kill or maim friend and foe alike.
Iran’s nuclear program timeline
1950s-70s: Iran explored possibility of a nuclear program.
1990s-2000s: Iranian nuclear program, ballistic missile programs advanced.
2015: Obama admin brokers multilateral nuclear deal; Iran agrees to halt nukes development
2018: Trump withdraws from agreement
2024: Iran could be weeks or months away from a nuclear wepon.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Israel’s Unprecedented Strategic Advantage
By 1982, Israel faced a Non-existential threat because:
1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt
Nuclear deterrence
Increased qualitative military edge
Yet the 1982 Invasion of Lebanon would become a key strategic setback for Israel
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Background
1970: Over 200,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon by 1970 (approx 12% of Lebanese pop)
Sep. 1970: Palestinian armed groups based in Lebanon after Black September, 1970
1975-1990: Lebanese Civil War - PLO joined left-wing, Sunni groups fighting Maronite Christian militias
1978: Israeli forces invade southern Lebanon in “Operation Litani” after Fatah unit hijacks Israeli bus, killing 38
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Road to War, June 1982
1978: Under Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel secretly aligns with Christian Phalangist militias under command of Gemayel clan.
Sharon planned to eradicate PLO from Lebanon, install Bashir Gemayel as PM. Jan.-Feb. 1982 Sharon and Begin both meet with Bashir Gemayel. 3 June ‘82: Abu Nidal group shoots Israeli ambassador Shalom Argov in London, on Iraqi orders.
Israeli uses this as a pretext to launch massive invasion of Lebanon.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Clash with Syria in Lebanon, June 1982
To deter Israel’s invasion, Hafez al-Assad stationed Syrian troops and surface-to-air missiles in south Lebanon. 8-9 June: Israeli airstrikes destroyed Syrian missiles and wiped out much of Syrian Air Force for minimal loss.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Consolidating Strategic Advantage
Non-unitary decision-making: key Israeli leaders (Defence Minister Sharon, IDF Chief of Staff Eitan) plan the war over objection of other key officers. Can be understood as spending “Strategic capital”. Aim was to:
a) eradicate PLo and Syrian forces from Lebanon
b) align with friendly militias (Phalange)
c) Install proxy head of state (Bashir Gemayel)
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: PLO Decisions (R. Khalidi)
Never before had PLO faced “such a formidable and ruthless” enemy. PLO forces were outnumbered by a factor of 10:1. Palestinian and Lebanese popular opinion were key factors shaping PLO decision-making. PLO had centralized command of its operations during war.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: PLO Decision-making
No Arab states intervened: “the Palestinians and their allies in Lebanon are alone in facing the Israeli Goliath”. As Israelis encircled Beirut, PLO ambushes took an increasing heavy toll. Small gains for the PLO boosted Palestinian morale. PLO aims: slow Israeli advance; inflict maximum casualties; preserve existence of PLO forces - these were largely fulfilled.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: “Israel’s Vietnam”
An undeclared war (June-August 1982). Estimated 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinian dead, many civilians. 650 Israeli dead, thousands wounded. Brutal siege of Beirut, July-August 1982. PLO withdrawal from Beirut, August 1982. Bashir Gemayel assassinated, 12/9/82. Phalangist militants massacre approx 1,500 Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatilla camps as Israeli forces stand by.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Outcome - Asymmetric Warfare
PLO relocates to Tunisia, far from Palestine. Palestinian armed groups fragmented, replaced by Iranian-backed Shi’a militia Hezbollah (“Party of God”) as key militia fighting Israel from Lebanon. Israeli troops remained in Lebanon until 1985; maintained a 10-km wide “Security zone” until 2000. Israel created a proxy South Lebanon Army (SLA). Existential threat is gone, but Israel cannot make lasting strategic gains via military force.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Domestic Impacts - Israel
Social fragmentation around question of how to resolve non-existential security threats. 400,000-strong Israeli anti-war protest 25/9/82 (10% of Israel’s population). Sharon forced to resign. Extreme-right wing grenade attack kills protester, wounds others -foreshadows further right-wing Jewish violence. Government launches Kahan Commission to investigate decision-making.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: New Strategic Reality
Rise of proxy warfare and non-stage armed groups in the Conflict. Rise of Islamist ideology: Hezbollah, later Hamas and Islamic jihad. Rise of Iranian regional influence. At a tactical level: the use of suicide bombing.
Interpreting Soviet goals in the Middle East: Model 1 (Herrmann)
Model 1: Ongoing conflict ensures an opening for Soviet influence, destabilizes US and Israel. Soviets support their clients enough to maintain violent status quo but avoid dangerous escalation.
Interpreting Soviet goals in the Middle East: Model 2
USSR as superpower in eclipse with diminishing ability to shape the Middle East. Arab states have other options for weapons, technology, investments. War in Afghanistan sapping Soviet strength.
Interpreting Soviet goals in the Middle East: Model 3
The USSR gets involved in the Middle East less to promote its own great-power interests and more “to compete with the unbending anti-Soviet policies” of the US.
Soviet deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Soviet willingness to “run risks and pay costs has been fairly moderate” (Herrmann). To signal its willingness to counter US and Israeli power, the Soviets threatened to intervene in 1967 and 1973 on their clients’ behalf. 1970: War of attrition escalates; Soviet forces in Suez Canal Zone clash with Israel. USSR replenished and upgraded Syrian air defences after 1982 war.
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
The common understanding of Cold War dynamics is that superpower controlled client states. Client states often had more autonomy. Despite Soviet power and arms sales, Syria often charted an independent path that did not align with Soviet wishes. 1970: Against Soviet advice - and despite the threat of US intervention - Syria intervened militarily in Jordan during Black September.
Soviet-Syrian Relations
Syrian President Assad refused to sign a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Moscow, although Egypt (1971) and Iraq (1972) did so. The USSr sought to promote the Syrian Communist party, creating tensions with governing Arab Nationalist Ba’ath party. Soviets sought to discourage Syria and Egypt from launching Oct. 1973 war vs. Israel, but supplied them with much weaponry. Soviets also tried to pressure Syria into diplomatic negotiations with Israel.
Soviet-Palestinian relations
The USSr, E.Germany, Romania, other Warsaw Pact countries armed, trained, and funded militants from Fatah, PFLP, DFLP. KGB helped to plan Palestinian movements’ hijackings, bombings. Eastern Bloc also expressed support for Palestinian cause diplomatically and at UN. But Soviet support directed mainly at Arab states: Egypt (until mid-1970s), Syria, Libya, Iraq. Arafat and the PLO took advantage of Soviet support but were not constrained by Soviet interests.
Waning Soviet Power
1976: Egypt’s break with USSR signalled diminished Soviet regional power and increased US influence. Soviet clients in Mideast repeatedly humiliated in combat with Israel: bombing of Iraqi reactor (1981) and defeat of Syria in Lebanon (1982). The main Soviet priorities were to counter US influence and to create an “anti-imperialist” (i.e., anti-Western) regional bloc. By 1985, as demonstrated in its limited support for Libya vs. The US, The Soviet Union was “ready to assist and encourage but not fight”
Soviet decline
Were the Soviets constrained by external actors and domestic weakness, or simply less concerned about outcomes in the Middle East? Soviets seemed less concerned about the Middle East than the US was in Central America during the same period (Herrmann). By mid-1980s, the USSr had prioritized strengthening its domestic economy and addressing growing US power, over backing Third World clients.
Soviet Union: A fading superpower
In 1986, Soviet Premier Gorbachev barely mentioned the Middle East (or other strategically key regions) in his address to the Communist Party Congress. This signalled the decline of superpower proxy rivalries, and foretold the Cold War’s end.
The Russian role now
2015: Russia intervenes in Syrian Civil War, deploys jets, missiles.
Russia allies with Iran, Hezbollah to preserve Assad regime. 2015-present: Coordinates with Israel to avoid confrontation as Israel launches thousands of airstrikes on Syria targeting Hezbollah, Iran. Russia as major weapons suppliers (jets, surface-to-air missiles) to Syria, Iran. Russia expressed concern over Hamas attack on Oct. 7 and over Israeli invasion of Gaza. Iran a major weapons supplier (drones, ballistic missiles) to Russia.
France: role of a mid-level power
French influence in the region dated back to Napoleonic times, and then Sykes-Picot agreement. France saw its role the Middle East and Africa as key to its ongoing status as a global power.
French Role after 1962
Close security ties with Israel waned after 1962 Algerian independence. French Pres. DeGaulle was outraged that Israel attacked first in 1967; suspended arms sales to Israel.
French Aims
Major French interests: access to oil; arms sales in the region; regional space and security; maintaining French influence. Post-1968: French foreign policy focused increasingly on Israel-Palestine issue. France regarded resolution of Israel-Palestine conflict as key. France also aimed to balance US influence in the region.
French-Palestinian Relations
Pres. Georges Pompidou (‘69-‘74) supported the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”. Pres. Valery Giscard D’Estaing (‘74-‘81) called for a Palestinian homeland, played a key role in launching the EC’s 1980 Venice Declaration.
Context of negotiations post-Camp David
Arab League rejected 1979 Egypt-Israel peace and US-led efforts. European Economic Community promoted a framework emphasizing Palestinian claims as alternative to US efforts. Israel opposed European role as being too pro-Palestinian. US opposed European role, but worried about alienating Saudis, a key oil supplier and weapons customer.
