Federalism Flashcards
Bednar definition
Federalism must satisfy a) geopolitical division, b) independence and c) direct governance
Riker definition
Activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions
Bermeo quote
‘federalism is not a panacea’
Beramendi (types)
- Federalism constitutes a complex reality in constant flux; there may not be one side which makes final decisions
- Eg. Germany’s ‘fiscal federalism’, the US’s dual/ cooperative/ coercive federalism
- Coercive federalism in the US - NCLB 2002 - major Bush administration domestic policy legislation, made education funding to states conditional on them adopting extensive student testing regimes and manage schools to their test results
de Figueiredo and Weingast (structure)
Two dilemmas by federal states: 1. what prevents the national government from destroying federalism by overawing its constituent units? 2. What prevents the constituent units from undermining federalism by free-riding and failing to cooperate?
- To overcome shirking - center must have sufficient monitoring resources and penalizing capacity to punish shirkers
- To police centre overwhelming the states - states must coordinate on punishment strategies which limit the centre’s ability to extract resources from the states, increase the provision of public goods and result in higher public welfare
- Exit costs shift rents to centre and low exit cost increase bargaining power
- Benefits of federalism must be large enough so centre will not expropriate all contributions and states are better off
- Bottom-up and top-down federalism bias institutions which capture rents for themselves
Hooghe and Marks
Much more fluid forms of multi-level governance than traditional federalism is increasingly common: Type I and Type II decentralised states.
Type I is mutually exclusive at each territorial level, and the units at each level are perfectly nested within those at the next higher level. Each jurisdiction caters to an encompassing group or territorial community.
Type II splices public good provision into a large number of functionally discrete jurisdictions, but such jurisdictions do not conform to an overarching blueprint, with each designed to address a limited set of related problems. This is task-driven, and has low barriers to entry and exit to create more competition
Riker
- ‘Federal bargain’ - political elites in the centre offer it to expand their territorial control, to meet an external threat or prepare for aggression. Politicians in the sub-units give up some independence for the sake of union because of some military-diplomatic threat or opportunity.
- Federalism is ultimately derived from technological advances that enable rule over a wide area
- The “establishment of a federal government must be a rational bargain among politicians”
- Federal states unstable - too weak a national government will exhibit free riding and insulated ‘dukedom’ economies, or even disintegrate. If too strong - federation typically fails because the national government compromises state independence
Stepan - Ricker’s predictions for the centrality of a ‘military or diplomatic threat’ are not empirically true
Stepan (formation of federalism)
1) coming-together hypothesis - previously sovereign polities agree to give up part of their sovereignty in order to pool their resources to increase their collective security and to achieve other goals eg. the US
2) holding-together hypothesis - “political systems with strong unitary features” - eg India, 1990 Belgium (to appease minority ethnic groups), Spain - decide the best way to hold their countries together in a democracy would be to devolve power constitutionally and turn their threatened polities into federations eg. Riker - common currency and free trade;
(not his but a third: putting-together - a non-democratic centralising power creates a multinational state)
Ziblatt (why adopt federalism?)
- Ideational theories - due to greater ideological commitment to decentralist ideas in society
- Cultural-historical theories - adopted more in societies with culturally or ethnically fragmented populations.
- “Social contract” theories - federalism emerges as a bargain between a centre and a periphery where the centre is not powerful enough to dominate the periphery and the periphery is not powerful enough to secede from the centre.
- “Infrastructural power” theories - federalism emerges when subunits of a potential federation already have highly developed infrastructures (e.g. they are already constitutional, parliamentary, and administratively modernized states)
Ziblatt (main idea)
Distinguishes between federal and unitary state. What matters is whether the subunits have 1) parliamentary institutions embedded in society and 2) well-developed administrative structures. In high infrastructural subunits, they become credible negotiating partners and have infrastructural capacity to deliver public goods & capacity to hold onto existing structures. Whereas if subunits lack institutions, negotiations break down and the centre can sweep away subunits lacking governing capacity
Boone
Decentralisation as a political strategy in West Africa
1. Has strengthened local power brokers and state agents instead in many cases
2. Freer markets can lead to cutbacks instead of new opportunities in export crop production
3. Decentralisation is something regimes use to reinforce their own advantage, and they are unlikely to devolve real power and resources to rural leaders they do not trust or control
4. Best prospects in central Senegal, where a relatively stable rural elite (with legitimate authority on the local level) is already encompassed in the governing structures of the state
Tiebout
Spatial mobility provides the local public goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip. Citizens can select a local government by moving and voting with their feet. If there is an optimal community size for a package of public goods, those in oversized cities will leave for undersized cities
Beramendi (effects)
Changing effects of federalism: in the 1980s, federalism created better democracy, bureaucracies and markets. Now, the effects are complex, multidimensional
Wibbels
Federal collective action problem:
1. across 46 developing countries, federalism has a consistent and negative impact on long-term macroeconomic performance, volatility, and the frequency of economic crisis.
2. For a subnational politician, economic reform has broad benefits and spillover to other subnational units, and narrowly focused costs (within the subnational unit). Avoiding cost of fiscal adjustment
3. Because national governments cannot take overall responsibility for macroeconomic decisions, and subnational governments face tempting incentives to default at the expense of national governments which are the lender of last resort.
Rodden and Wibbels
Among 14 federal systems, fiscal surplus increased when decentralisation increased - what matters is the structure of the federal system. This includes:
1) levels of revenue transfer and dependence on the central state (less dependence better)
2) especially when fiscal dependence on central state is combined with lots of decentralisation
3) party structure and partisan continuity is better