Democratisation Flashcards

1
Q

Democracy define

A

Collier and Levitsky
‘procedural minimum’ definition of democracy.
1) Fully contested elections with full suffrage and absence of massive fraud;
2) Effective guarantees of civil liberties including freedom of speech and association etc;
3) effective power to govern

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2
Q

Schmitter and Karl

A

There cannot be unelected officials exercising power eg. militarised polities of Central America

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3
Q

Moore

A

‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’ - a growing middle class wants representation

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4
Q

Huntington (Third Wave)

A

Third Wave of democratisation, where more than 60 countries have undergone some form of democratic transition since the 1970s:

  1. Decreased legitimacy of authoritarian regimes from a) increased expectations of competitive elections, b) military failure, c) economic crisis in 70s which decreased their legitimacy
  2. Global economic growth - a) urbanisation, b) education, c) rising middle class
  3. Religion - changes in the Catholic Church by Vatican II emphasised individual rights and opposition to authoritarian rule. Important for Catholic countries of Southern Europe, Latin America, Philippines, Poland, Hungary
  4. Regional contingency factor (snowball effect or demonstration effects) - success of democracy in one country causing others to democratise. a) As the wave swept through Eastern Europe, African leaders began to see ’the winds of change’ and subsequently redrafted their constitutions to allow for multiparty elections, fearing that any resistance to reforms would lead to an emboldened opposition. b) once it was clear that the reformist Solidarity in Poland would come to power, reformists in other eastern European countries gained energy to push for change
  5. US and EU - a) Carter had critical approach towards communist countries and foreign policy based on human rights, b) EU required democracy to join after 1989 (pushed Portugal, Spain and Greece)
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5
Q

Huntington (democratisation)

A
  1. Transformation – A top-down (elite-controlled) change from within government
  2. Transplacement – Negotiated reform of regime and government.
  3. Replacement – Regime breakdown (rupture) and the collapse of authoritarianism.
    Huntington believed transition was based on elite choice and perceptions, with consolidation based on elite pacts and consensus
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6
Q

Lipset

A
  1. Economic development drives socioeconomic changes eg. industrialisation, urbanisation and higher levels of education, creating the conditions for democracy.
  2. Cultural factors are more important because democracy needs supportive culture and acceptance by the citizenry
  3. Protestant countries more likely to democratise when there is clear separation of religious and political beliefs (lacking in Catholic countries before third wave), also explains why Muslin countries have not seen democratisation
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7
Q

Barro

A

Education. Growth is conditional; if growth were caused by an increase in education (especially primary education) instead of a discovery of oil, it has a strong impact of democratisation

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8
Q

Przeworski and Limongi

A

Strong correlation between higher levels of development and democratic stability, so democracies are less likely to backslide. BUT economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term

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9
Q

Przeworski et al

A

141 countries - economic development does not cause democracy but does sustain it. Countries with higher levels of GDP per capita more likely to remain democratic because it reduces the likelihood of democratic breakdown and increases political stability; rich democracies are ‘impregnable’ and unlikely to collapse and return to dictatorship

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10
Q

Boix and Stokes

A

Responds to Przeworski et al - economic development increases both the chance of transition and the chance of sustaining a democracy after transition in period 1850-1950, but only has a small though statistically significant effect post-1950. Use a trichotomous measure of democracy rather than Przeworski’s dichotomous

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11
Q

Epstein et al

A

Trichotomous measure - development is a strong proxy for transitions into and out of ‘partial democracy’. Less effect on transitions from full autocracy to full democracy

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12
Q

Acemoglu and Robinson (inequality and revolt)

A
  1. Non-motonic relationship. Increased inequality when initially at low levels increases threat of revolution and chance of democratisation; But at high levels of inequality elites repress fearing redistribution.
  2. average voter’s tax preference would be less ‘confiscatory’ if income distribution is relatively equal, which usually happens when countries reach a higher level of development; and elites would rather give up some measure of power than to risk suppression causing a revolution
  3. Democracy only way to ensure credibility

People have less incentive to revolt in an egalitarian society (for example, Singapore), so the likelihood of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society (for example, South Africa under Apartheid), the redistribution of wealth and power in a democracy would be so harmful to elites that these would do everything to prevent democratization. Democratization is more likely to emerge somewhere in the middle, in the countries, whose elites offer concessions because (1) they consider the threat of a revolution credible and (2) the cost of the concessions is not too high

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13
Q

Boix

A

Income equality and capital mobility reduce elite fears of democracy:
a) reduces expected redistribution by popular governments
b) provides capital holders with an exit option if taxes become confiscatory

Evidence: income inequality has a substantial effect on the likelihood of democratisation in dataset in 1950-90, hence excludes most African democratisations.

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14
Q

Rogowski

A

Negative correlation between ‘trapped’ physical capital and democracy
Capital mobility (usually rises with development) contributes to democratisation

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15
Q

Bollen and Jackman

A
  1. Mixed evidence of more equal income distributions in democracies
  2. Dictatorships which survived longer post-WW2 had more equal income distributions
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16
Q

Hermansen et al

A

Growth may not lead to higher equality. Labour productivity growth contributes to rising market income inequality

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17
Q

Ansell and Samuels

A
  1. Two-actor model is too simplistic, need to add the bourgeoisie to the model
  2. Bourgeoisie pushes for democracy. Financially independent from the state and wish to protect their property
  3. Middle class group may be dependent on non-democratic state and oppose democratisation
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18
Q

Rosenfeld

A

Prospects of democratisation depends on the composition of the middle class and its ties to the state, not that there exists a middle class. middle class is not homogenous - there are middle-class citizens who are financially tied to the state eg. pensioners and state employees who are beholden to the incumbent autocrat and hence inhibit democratisation. It is only those who are financially autonomous who are more in favour of democratisation

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19
Q

Andersen and Ross

A

Resource curse fuels authoritarianism.
Mechanisms:
1) buy off potential opponents;
2) pay for repression;
3) resources lead to unequal and unbalanced economic growth without ‘development’

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20
Q

Collier

A

Resource curse.
Too much money means leaders 1) embezzle, 2) spend on large pet projects, 3) buy votes through contracts, so corrupt win elections.
Resources reduce the need to tax - 1) undercut public scrutiny and 2) leaves electoral competition unconstrained when parties compete for votes by patronage

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21
Q

Huntington (resources)

A

Resource increases authoritarianism. Oil revenues increase power of state bureaucracy and reduce need for taxation. Lower taxation means less reason to demand representation

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22
Q

Dunning

A

Natural resource rents eg. oil can increase democratisation because it provides another source of revenue for redistribution. Eg. Ecuador in the 1970s re-democratised because of oil rents, which 1) allowed a surge in public spending and b) placated fears of redistribution among the elites. Government could implement price and wage policies that benefited citizens at no cost to the elite and allowed for a smooth transition and growth of democratic institutions

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23
Q

Haber and Menaldo

A

Resource curse does not fuel authoritarianism
Resource reliance is not exogenous - ruleres in weak states choose to extract resources at high rates instead of saving. After controlling for this there is no evidence that oil promotes dicatorship
Haber et al - weak state capacity preceded the discovery of oil or other minerals

24
Q

Clark et al

A
  1. Not economic development but changes in the socio-economic structures from increased wealth.
  2. Europe: new kind of productive activities made it difficult for the state to tax.
  3. Predation no longer possible so state had to negotiate with the new economic elites to extract revenue.
  4. A sustainable bargain had to be reached because the state became more dependent of its citizens remaining loyal
  5. Citizens had now leverage to be taken into account in the decision-making process for the country hence democratisation
25
Q

Glaeser et al

A

Education causes democratisation
1. Schooling teaches interaction and raises the benefits of civic participation (voting and organising)
2. Democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders, vs, dictatorship provides stronger incentives to narrower base
3. Education raises benefits of civic engagement and raises participation in support for broad-based regime (democracy)
4. Raises likelihood of successful democratic revolutions

26
Q

Brady et al

A

Education provides civic skills and promotes political interests, which increase the likelihood of political participation and demand for democracy

27
Q

Lindberg

A

Elections can cause democratisation.
Dahl - the more the cost of suppression exceeds the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime. Repetitive electoral processes contribute to changing the costs that rulers must face when either using oppression or accepting more opposition and competition. Electoral contests can change the expected costs and benefits of allowing or resisting democratic transition

28
Q

Diamond

A

Civil society promotes values such as tolerance, moderation, compromise and respect - ensures democracy is stable and accommodating without violence

29
Q

Almond and Verba

A

Three types of citizens, parochial, subject, and participant. ‘Participant’ political culture is the most conducive to democracy

30
Q

Inglehart and Welzel

A

‘Post-industrialism’ and rise of the service sector are crucial for democracy, as it creates ‘postmaterial’ values supporting social liberalism and representative political institutions

31
Q

Muller and Seligson

A

Most civic cultural attitudes do not have significant impact on change in democracy; interpersonal trust is just an effect instead of a cause for democracy. Exception: public prefers gradual reform of society instead of revolutionary changes or defense of the status quo.
Eg. Honduras - 85% of the population prefers gradual reform to revolutionary change, so their public had a decisive role in the country’s transition to democracy

Low trust does not impede democratisation - Argentina, Portugal and Spain had substantial increases in democracy despite low levels of trust; Guatemala also demonstrates that above-average trust does not necessarily lead to democracy

32
Q

Putnam

A

Civic association means norms of trust, reciprocity and civic engagement which lead to democratisation and well-functioning participatory democracies.
North vs South Italy - South never built culture necessary for successful democratisation

33
Q

Huntington (religion)

A

Muslims are prone to political violence

34
Q

Lewis

A

Islam’s belief that God is sovereign and the primary lawgiver means that an Islamic country is a theocracy, which is antithetical to democracy

35
Q

Fish

A

Islamic countries have particularly poor democratic records because of their repression of women, hence it is untrue that Muslims are just antithetical to democracy

36
Q

Ross

A

The democratic deficit and female repression are a function of oil-based economies, which greatly reduce female labour force participation

37
Q

O’Donnell and Schmitter

A

Latin America. Four actors: the hard-liners and soft-liners who belonged to the incumbent authoritarian regime, and the moderate and radical oppositions against the regime
1. Democratisation is a voluntaristic act produced by the decisions made by political leaders, when there is a split between hard-liners and soft-liners
2. ‘Pacted transition’ - when the opposition takes advantage of a political opening to mobilise citizens against the regime, working together with government soft-liners to negotiate transition to democracy

38
Q

McFaul

A
  1. Balance of power between democratisers vs conservatives which explains cross-national variation in democratisation
  2. Instead of pacts and moderation, democratisers need a decisive victory
39
Q

Przeworski

A

Key puzzle: Democracy makes winners and losers. Why would the losers choose to comply with the results? The key: democratic institutions help give political actors a long time horizon, thinking about future not just now. They believe that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to advance their interests in the future

40
Q

Miller

A

Elite-driven democratization is particularly likely in the wake of major violent shocks (either domestic or international). These provide openings to opposition actors to the authoritarian regime

41
Q

Treaisman

A

Argues against autocrats deliberately choosing to surrender power hence democratisation.
Instead, democratisation happened because elites made mistakes in trying to prevent it. Eg. 1. calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; 2. ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; 3. initiating limited reforms that get out of hand; and 4. selecting a covert democrat as leader

42
Q

Olson

A
  1. How is the collective action problem solved, and how do you deal with free riders when fighting for democracy? Solution: compulsion or ‘selective incentives’, which are extra rewards contingent upon taking part, or penalties on those who do not.
  2. Civil society groups (eg. media, students, NGOs) can provide information, organise resources and act as first movers
43
Q

Kuran

A

Collective action problem is high in dictatorships because citizens’ views of the regime are hidden, leading to preference falsification. Once this is realised, revolutions can appear out of nowhere

44
Q

Weyland

A

‘Waves’ of democracy and ‘neighbourhood effects’ eg. democratisation in southern Europe, followed by Latin America; Arab Spring; or Eastern European wave and the collapse of the Soviet bloc

45
Q

Gleditsch and Choun

A

Proportion of democratic neighbours increases the likelihood of transitions to democracy (not growth). Mechanisms:
1. Demonstration effects - they see the chances of success are higher than expected
2. Diffusion of strategies - activists communicate across borders about techniques
3. Competition - autocratic leaders may relax repression if trade moves to newly democratised neighbours instead
4. Social norms - autocratic leaders feel less able to justify the legitimacy of rule as their neighbours democratise

46
Q

Direct intervention in civil society

A

National Endowment for Democracy - has created solidarity in Poland, the anti-Pinochet campaign in Chile, election monitoring in East Timor etc

47
Q

Levitsky and Way

A
  1. International effects summarised into ‘linkage’ (connections across authoritarian and democratic countries through education, trade, business ties etc) and ‘leverage’ (diplomatic avenues, sanctions)
  2. Linkages are more successful in creating pressure for democracy
  3. Authoritarian regimes with the closest linkages to the USA and Western Europe are the most likely to have democratic‐looking institutions eg. multiparty elections in which some real competition is allowed
  4. Reduction in foreign support for dictatorships since end of Cold War
48
Q

Boix (international)

A

Democratisation caused by removal of aid which supported authoritarian regimes and increased the regimes’ repressive capacity

49
Q

Bratton and van de Walle

A
  1. International financial institutions pressured a number of African dictators to agree to multiparty elections.
  2. Regimes in which power has been personalized under one individual are more likely to be replaced by a new dictatorship than by a democracy.
  3. Personalistic dictators are less willing to negotiate leaving office because they face a greater likelihood of assassination, prosecution, conscation, or exile than do the leaders of other kinds of authoritarianism.
  4. Transitions from personalist dictatorship are seldom initiated by regime insiders; instead, popular opposition, strikes, and demonstrations often force dictators to consider allowing multiparty elections.
  5. Hence the process of transition from personalized dictatorship should not be modeled as an elite-led bargain
50
Q

Schedler

A

Democratic consolidation = avoiding democratic breakdown and erosion. Includes making new democracies secure, extending their life expectancy beyond short term, making them immune against threat of authoritarian regression, and of building dams against eventual ‘reverse waves’. Further - popular legitimation, diffusion of democratic values, party building

51
Q

Przeworski et al (democratic endurance)

A

Democratic endurance is due to -
1) democracy,
2) affluence (poor democracies with per capita income less than $1000 are very fragile; the probability that one will due during a particular year is 0.12; above $6000, democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever),
3) growth with moderate inflation,
4) declining inequality,
5) a favourable international climate (the more democracies there are in the world at the time, the more likely the democracy survives, with the global effect twice as large as the regional effect), and
6) parliamentary institutions

52
Q

Linz

A

Parliamentary democracies are more durable than presidential ones:
1) Stakes are higher. a) a race for the presidency can have but a single winner; the defeated presidential candidate has no official role in politics, and most likely will not even be a member of the legislature, while in a parliamentary system the defeated candidate for the premiership will be leader of the opposition, b) fixed term of office under presidential system longer than under parliamentary system, c) under presidentialism the chief executive is at the same time the head of state, thus being able to portray the president’s partisan interest as the national interest and thereby undermine the legitimacy afforded to the opposition
2) Generate legislative paralysis. Only under presidential systems can the executive (due to fixed term office) survive along hostile legislature, leading to stalemates between executive and legislative branch. Especially bad when combining presidentialism with a legislature where no single party has majority status

53
Q

Przeworski et al

A

Support Linz
Control for previous military regime (which means presidentialism is more likely) - conclude it is presidentialism per se that makes democracy more brittle

54
Q

Cheibub

A

What kills democacries is not presidentialism but their military legacies

55
Q

Svolik

A
  1. Observed survival of democracy either because 1) democratic consolidation, which eliminates the risk of an authoritarian reversal, or 2) a separate mechanism that prevents authoritarian reversal when a democracy is not consolidated.
  2. Low levels of economic development, a presidential executive, and a military authoritarian past reduce the odds that a democracy consolidates.
  3. However, a transitional democracy experiences a reversal primarily as a consequence of an economic recession.
  4. Hence, to explain the survival of democracy, we should build separate theoretical models that account for the onset of authoritarian reversals and why only some democracies consolidate

Rebuts Cheibub’s military legacy argument